EIFRID v. MILLIKAN
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
May 3, 2012.
966 N.E.2d 254
Finally, it is apparent that the trial court relied on
(a) In all civil actions, the party recovering judgment shall recover costs, except in those cases in which a different provision is made by law.
(b) In any civil action, the court may award attorney‘s fees as part of the cost to the prevailing party, if the court finds that either party:
- brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;
- continued to litigate the action or defense after the party‘s claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or
- litigated the action in bad faith.
(c) The award of fees under subsection (b) does not prevent a prevailing party from bringing an action against another party for abuse of process arising in any part on the same facts. However, the prevailing party may not recover the same attorney‘s fees twice.
As noted above, the trial court initially determined that Eifrid should take nothing by way of her complaint. However, the trial court subsequently granted Eifrid‘s motion to correct errоr in part. Indeed, the trial court acknowledged that it “struggled” with the issue of whether the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied, and obviously found the case and issues involved to be complex. Tr. p. 102. As a result, there is no showing that Millikan‘s defense of the matter was frivolous, groundless, or unreasonable. Millikan only continued to litigate the matter after the issuance of the September 29, 2010 findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, because of Eifrids‘s actions that involved the filing of additional motions. And the trial court never stated or alluded to an idea that Millikan was litigating the matter in bad faith. Thus,
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions that the award of attorney fees in Eifrid‘s favor be vacated.
KIRSCH, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
M.O., Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, Indiana PATIENT‘S COMPENSATION FUND, Appellee-Defendant.
No. 53A05-1112-PL-682.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
May 3, 2012.
A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Charles R. Whybrew, Lewis Wagner, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
OPINION
SHARPNACK, Senior Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case presents issues of which of two statutes sets the interest rate on payments by the Indiana Department of Insurance Patient‘s Compensation Fund (“the Fund“) to successful malpractice claimants and of when interest begins to accrue on payments due.1 The trial court concluded that
ISSUE
M.O. raises two issues, which we consolidate and restate as: whether the trial court erred in determining the date upon which postjudgment interest began to accrue and the applicable rate of interest.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
M.O. sued IMA, Inc. (“IMA“), a qualified health care provider as defined by Indiana‘s Medical Malpractice Act (“the Act“), claiming mediсal malpractice. On July 1, 2010, a jury returned a verdict in favor of M.O. in the amount of $1.25 million. On September 27, 2010, the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of M.O. in the same amount. IMA paid M.O. $250,000, the maximum amount for which it was liable under the Act, and filed a
M.O. sent a certified copy of the final judgment to the Fund. The Fund received the judgment on October 12, 2010, and initially rejected M.O.‘s request to pay the unpaid portiоn of the judgment. Consequently, M.O. returned to the trial court and requested that the Fund be added as a party. The trial court granted M.O.‘s request on November 17, 2010.2 On May 9, 2011, M.O. filed a motion asking the trial court to order the Fund to pay M.O. one million dollars plus postjudgment interest. On June 21, 2011, the trial court ordered the Fund to pay M.O. one million dollars and determined that the question of postjudgment interest would be decided by separate motion. Next, the Fund filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the Fund subsequently ended its opposition to M.O.‘s claim for the unpaid portion of the judgment and dismissed its appeal, which had proceeded under Cause Number 53A05-1107-PL-352. On September 8, 2011, the Fund paid M.O. one million dollars.
Meanwhile, M.O. had filed a motion for postjudgment interest. After further proceedings, the trial court granted M.O.‘s motion and held: “[M.O.] is entitled to post-judgment interest to be paid by [the Fund] and the post-judgment interest shall accrue pursuant to statute at the annual rate of 8% and shall begin accruing as of January 15, 2011.” Appellant‘s App. p. 26. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
The parties agree that there are no factual disputes and that the appeal presents a pure issue of law. We review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court‘s legal conclusions. 600 Land, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Marion Cnty., 889 N.E.2d 305, 309 (Ind.2008).
We first address whether the trial court established the correct postjudgment interest rate. The parties agree that the applicable interest rate is set by statute, but they disagree as to which statutе applies. M.O. contends that
(a) A claim or suit settled by, or a judgment rendered against, a governmental entity shall be paid by the governmental entity not later than one hundred eighty (180) days after the date of settlement or judgment, unless there is an appeal, in which case not later than one hundred eighty (180) days after a final decision is rendered.
(b) If payment is not made within one hundred eighty (180) days after the date of settlement or judgment, the governmental entity is liable for interest from the date of settlement or judgment at an annual rate of six percent (6%). The governmental entity is liable for interest at that rate and from that date even if the case is appealed, provided the original judgment is uphеld.
Except as otherwise provided by statute, interest on judgments for money whenever rendered shall be from the date of the return of the verdict or finding of the court until satisfaction at:
(1) the rate agreed upon in the original contract sued upon, which shall not ex-
ceed an annual rate of eight percent (8%) even though a higher rate of interest may properly have been charged according to the contract prior to judgment; or (2) an annual rate of eight percent (8%) if there was no contract by the parties.
Our Supreme Court‘s opinion in Poehlman v. Feferman, 717 N.E.2d 578 (Ind.1999), provides guidance as to which statute applies. In that case, Poehlman obtained a judgment against a doctor for medical malpractice. The doctor paid Poehlman the maximum amount that he owеd under the Act. Next, the Fund paid Poehlman the unpaid balance of her judgment, excluding postjudgment interest. As a result, Poehlman filed a separate complaint for declaratory judgment against the doctor, the doctor‘s insurer, and the Fund, seeking postjudgment interest. The trial court concluded that Poehlman was not entitled to postjudgment interest from any of the three defendants. On аppeal, a panel of this Court concluded that the Fund was obligated to pay all amounts in excess of the health care provider‘s statutory limit, including postjudgment interest.
On transfer, our Supreme Court noted that the parties disagreed “over whether [the Act‘s] liability limits apply to damages only or also to the interest and costs and over how to allocate those еxpenses between the doctor and patient‘s compensation fund.” Id. at 579. The Court concluded that the Act‘s recovery limitations are intended to limit only the amount of damages, “not collateral litigation expenses,” including postjudgment interest. Id. at 581. Thus, Poehlman was entitled to collect postjudgment interest.
Next, the Court recognized that health care providers and the Fund are both potentially responsible for paying medical malpractice judgments, but they may have separate litigation strategies that may delay payment and independently generate collateral litigation expenses. For this reason, our Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ determination that the Fund must pay all amounts in excess of the health сare provider‘s statutory limit. The Court determined that if the health care provider is not held responsible for its share of collateral litigation expenses, the provider would have an incentive “to run up collateral litigation expenses to be subsidized with the monies of the [Fund.]” Id. at 583. Consequently, our Supreme Court concluded that the health care provider and the Fund are individuаlly responsible for their collateral litigation expenses. Furthermore, the Court held that
In this case, we are bound by our Supreme Court‘s holding in Poehlman, and we conclude that
M.O. also argues that
Here, we cannot conclude that
To summarize,
Next, we determine whether the trial court erred by designating January 15, 2011, as the date upon which postjudgment interest began to accrue. M.O. contends that the date of the jury verdict against IMA is the appropriate start date. The Fund contends that the trial court properly selected the beginning date.
The Act provides, in relevant part:
If a health care provider or its insurer has agreed to settle its liability on a claim by payment of its policy limits of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), and the claimant is demanding an amount in excess of that amount, the following procedure must be followed:
(1) A petition shall be filed by the claimant in the court named in the proposed complaint, or in the circuit or superior court of Marion County, at the claimant‘s election, seeking:
(A) approval of an agreed settlement, if any; or
(B) demanding payment of damages from the patient‘s compensation fund.
Similarly, another section of the Act provides, in relevant part:
[A]ll amounts that may subsequently become due and pаyable to a claimant arising out of an act of malpractice of the health care provider occurring during the year in which the annual aggregate was exhausted shall be paid from the patient‘s compensation fund under the following terms and conditions:
(1) A health care provider whose annual aggregate has been exhausted has no right to object to or refuse permission to settle such a claim.
(2) If a health care provider or the commissioner and claimant agree on a settlement, the following procedure must be followed:
(A) A petition shall be filed by the claimant with the court in which the action is pending against the health care provider or, if none is pending, in the circuit or superior court of Marion County, seeking approval of the agreed settlement.
(B) A copy of the petition shall be served on the commissioner and the health care provider at least ten (10) days before filing and must contain sufficient information to inform the other parties about the nature of the claim and the amount of the proposed settlement.
The Act also establishes a procedure for the Fund to pay patients who present claims for unpaid damages:
Claims for payment from the patient‘s compensation fund that become final during the first six (6) months of the calendar year must be computed on June 30 and must be paid not later than the following July 15. Claims for payment from the fund that become final during the last six (6) months of the calendar year must be computed on December 31 and must be paid not later than the following January 15.
The auditor of state shall issue a warrant in the amount of each claim submitted to the auditor against the fund on June 30 and Decеmber 31 of each year. The only claim against the fund shall be a voucher or other appropriate request by the commissioner after the commissioner receives:
(1) a certified copy of a final judgment against a health care provider;
or
(2) a certified copy of a court approved settlement against a health care provider.
Thus, aftеr a final judgment is issued against a health care provider in a medical malpractice action and the provider pays the maximum amount allowed under the Act, a patient that seeks payment for the remaining portion of the judgment must submit a certified copy of the final judgment to the Fund. The Fund may accept the amount of damages requested by the patient or disputе the amount and request an evidentiary hearing. In either event, once the Fund agrees (or is ordered by a court) to pay a patient‘s claim for damages, the commissioner of the Department submits a voucher to the auditor of state, who issues payments from the Fund biannually.
Based upon our review of the statutes and the holding in Poehlman,3 we conclude that postjudgment interest began to accrue against the Fund on the first biannual payment date applicable to the claim. M.O. submitted a certified copy of the jury verdict against IMA to the Fund on October 12, 2010. The next payment date under
M.O. argues that our Supreme Court‘s holding in Poehlman is the result of “poor statutory construction.” Appellant‘s Reply Br. p. 4. We find the Court‘s reasoning in Poehlman to be clear and applicable here. In any event, we may not disregard our Supreme Court‘s precedent.
M.O. also contends that the Fund has waived the “grace period” discussed in Poehlman because the Fund failed to promptly pay M.O.‘s claim for damages and instead filed a separate action for a declaratory judgment, seeking a ruling that the Fund was not required to pay any excess damages to M.O. We disagree. Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. In re Unsupervised Estate of Deiwert, 879 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (Ind.Ct.App.2008). Silence, inactivity or acquiescence is not waiver unless the party against whom waiver is claimed had a duty to act or speak. Hastetter v. Fetter Props., LLC, 873 N.E.2d 679, 684 (Ind.Ct.App.2007).
Here, the Fund had the statutory right to challenge a claimant‘s calculation of unpaid damages and to request a hearing. See
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
DARDEN, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.