27 Vt. 36 | Vt. | 1854
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The case of Mussey v. Noyes et al., 26 Vt. 462, seems to dispose of the principal question involved in this case. It was there held, that a partial assignment by a debtor of his property for the payment of his debts, though made to one in trust, was not a general assignment within the act of 1843, rendering all general assignments void. To render a transfer void under the statute as a general assignment, it must be of all the debtor’s property and in trustfor the benefit of creditors. Treating those questions as having been determined, we are only to inquire in this case, whether this was a partial assignment, or whether it embraced all the debtor’s property, or such a substantial part of it, as to render the part reserved, so inconsiderable in amount with reference to the whole, that it must be treated as a general assignment, and void under the statute.
The assignment on its face does not purport to be a transfer of all the debtor’s property. It is somewhat difficult to arrive with much certainty at either the real value of the property assigned, or of that which remained unassigned. The transfer included the property which he had, and which is usually kept for sale by manufacturers of tin ware, and also three claims which were due the
In relation to the right of the trustee to retain the amount of his claims from the funds in his hands, if the assignment is to be treated as void, it is proper to observe, that the 51st section of the act, (Comp. Stat. p. 263,) giving such right, extends only to existing demands arising on contract, and not to matters on which the trustee stands simply as surety. If the trustee has absolutely assumed the payment of the debts for which lie stood as surety, his right to retain that amount would probably exist under the statute; and would seem to be sustained by the case of Strong v. Mitchell, 19 Vt. 644. The eases of Goddard v. Hapgood and Scofield v. Sanders, 25 Vt. 351, 181, fall within this principle, and beyond that the authorities do not seem to extend that right. The question in this case, however, is unimportant, as the transfer is deemed valid, and the trustee can hold the property for the purposes for which it was transferred to him.
The judgment of the county court is affirmed.