MĀLAMA KAKANILUA, an unincorporated association; CLARE H. APANA; and KANILOA LANI KAMAUNU v. DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, COUNTY OF MAUI; and MAUI LANI PARTNERS, a domestic partnership
SCWC-19-0000107
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
SEPTEMBER 30, 2025
MCKENNA, EDDINS, AND DEVENS, JJ., WITH GINOZA, J., DISSENTING AND CONCURRING, WITH WHOM RECKTENWALD, C.J., JOINS
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST‘S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
(CAAP-19-0000107; CASE NO. 2CC181000122)
OPINION OF THE COURT BY DEVENS, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dispositive question raised in this appeal is whether a motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to
This case arises from a dispute over the extension of a grading and grubbing permit by the Director of the Department of Public Works (Director), County of Maui (County) (collectively, County Respondents), issued to Maui Lani Partners (MLP). The permit was for excavation work at a residential development project that has ancestral Hawaiian burial sites.
In March 2018, Mālama Kakanilua, an unincorporated association, and its members, Clare H. Apana and Kaniloa Lani Kamaunu (collectively, Petitioners) filed an action challenging the validity of the permit extension against MLP and County Respondents in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (circuit court).
In April 2018, County Respondents and MLP each filed a motion to dismiss the case pursuant to
On October 29, 2018, pursuant to
On January 25, 2019, the circuit court denied Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and awarded costs to MLP.
On February 23, 2019, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) appealing the circuit court‘s orders granting MLP‘s bill of costs and denying Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and the final judgment of dismissal without prejudice.
In a Summary Disposition Order (SDO), the ICA affirmed the circuit court‘s charge of costs and the denial of Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. However, determining that Petitioner‘s notice of appeal was untimely, the ICA did not reach the merits of Petitioners’ appeal of the circuit court‘s dismissal of Petitioners’ complaint. The ICA applied the holdings from its prior decisions which treated an
Petitioners ask this court to review for error whether Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to
On this record, we hold that the ICA erred in concluding that Petitioners’
II. BACKGROUND
A. Circuit Court Proceedings
1. Petitioner‘s Complaint
Petitioners filed their complaint asserting three causes of action: injunctive relief (Count I), a quo warranto claim (Count II), and declaratory judgment (Count III).
Petitioners alleged that in September 2014, MLP had applied to County Respondents for a grading and grubbing permit, which would allow MLP to excavate ground material at its Phase IX site which was part of MLP‘s larger residential project located in the County‘s Wailuku-Kahului Project District 1 (Maui Lani Project). Petitioners alleged that MLP had prepared an archaeological monitoring plan (AMP) for Phase IX of the Maui Lani Project recommending archaeological monitoring at the project site as highly warranted due to numerous primary burial features and secondarily deposited human skeletal remains within the Maui Lani landholdings. Petitioners further alleged that in November 2014, the State Historic Preservation Division (SHPD) accepted MLP‘s 2013 AMP; and in December 2014, County Respondents approved Grading Permit No. 20140191 (grading permit) for Maui Lani Phase IX, which was valid until December 8, 2017.
Petitioners alleged two relevant events took place in November 2017: (1) in a separate but related action, the circuit court entered a preliminary injunction on November 16, 2017, which halted ground disturbing activity unless Petitioners were notified forty eight hours in advance and their representative could be present to view the work; and (2) on November 20, 2017, County Respondents (a DPW administrator) granted MLP a one-year extension of the grading permit to December 8, 2018.
Petitioners further claimed that in January 2018, they wrote to the Director requesting recission of the grading permit extension. Petitioners alleged that in February 2018, the Director denied the rescission request after stating there was good cause for the permit extension, and that SHPD had not responded to the Director‘s July 2017 letter concerning MLP‘s alleged non-compliance with the AMP.
In Count I of their complaint, Petitioners sought injunctive relief against the Director‘s renewal of MLP‘s grading permit for violation
2. County Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
In April 2018, County Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Petitioners’ complaint with prejudice pursuant to
As to Count II, County Respondents argued that Petitioners’ quo warranto/ultra vires claim could not stand where the Director acted within the scope of the County‘s enumerated powers; in this case, the Director had the power to extend existing grading permits “in cases of hardship or for good cause” pursuant to
Finally, County Respondents argued that Count III‘s request for declaratory relief corresponded to Petitioners’ claims in Counts I and II, and therefore should also be dismissed.
3. MLP‘s Motion to Dismiss
On April 4, 2018, MLP filed a motion to dismiss Petitioners’ claims pursuant to
As to Count I and its corresponding part of Count III, MLP echoed County Respondents’ contention that there was no private right of action to bring a claim enforcing alleged violations of the County‘s grading ordinances, as enforcement was at the County‘s discretion. Further, MLP asserted Count I should be dismissed for absence of law to support Petitioners’ claim and a failure to alleged sufficient facts.
As to the dismissal of the Count II quo warranto claim, MLP argued that such a claim was improper in that Petitioners did not challenge the Director‘s authority to hold office, and “law of the case” foreclosed Petitioners’ challenge of the Director‘s discretion to enforce the County‘s grading ordinances.
3. Petitioners’ Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss
Petitioners filed an opposition to County Respondents’ and MLP‘s respective motions to dismiss. Petitioners reasserted that Count I sought injunctive relief against the Director for granting a grading permit extension in violation of
4. Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on all the counts of their complaint,
5. Hearing on the Motions, Order and Judgment
At the May 25, 2018 hearing on the motions to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment, the circuit court orally granted County Respondents and MLP‘s motions to dismiss Petitioners’ complaint but without prejudice, rather than with prejudice, as had been requested by the parties. The circuit court then orally denied Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the complaint was being dismissed. Due to the potential impact of the court‘s ruling on the related litigation, in its July 24, 2018 Order Granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Without Prejudice, the circuit court ordered the complaint dismissed without prejudice. The circuit court found no regulatory or statutory authority (including
On October 2, 2018, the circuit court entered its judgment of dismissal without prejudice.7
5. Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for Reconsideration
On October 29, 2018, Petitioners filed a motion styled “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration and Relief From Judgment.” They asked the circuit court “for reconsideration of its Order of Dismissal filed July 24, 2018 and Final Judgment filed, October 2, 2018, pursuant to
As to the alleged new law enabling their new argument against the court‘s grant of defendants’ motions to dismiss, Petitioners submitted the then-recent publication of this court‘s opinion (dated October 9, 2018, as corrected October 15, 2018) in Bank of America v. Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo II), 143 Hawaiʻi 249, 428 P.3d 761 (2018) as justifying relief from the operation of the circuit court‘s final judgment. Specifically, Petitioners claimed that the motions to dismiss relied upon the ICA‘s decision in Pavsek v. Sandvold, 127 Hawaiʻi 390, 279 P.3d 55 (App. 2012) as well as federal case law, in requesting that the circuit court apply the “plausibility” pleading standard in reviewing Petitioners’ complaint. Petitioners asserted that the circuit court‘s dismissal did not, but should now take into consideration Reyes-Toledo II, as the decision abrogated Pavsek, and expressly rejected the “plausibility” pleading standard, and reaffirmed the “well-established” notice pleading standard of our jurisdiction. Petitioners asked the circuit court “to reconsider” its prior decision based on the new law and vacate its order dismissing Count III and its final judgment.
County Respondents and MLP filed oppositions to Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The parties generally contended, first, that this court‘s decision in Reyes-Toledo II clarified and reiterated Hawaiʻi‘s use of the notice pleading standard, and did not articulate new law; and second, that the circuit court‘s reasoning in dismissing Petitioners’ complaint, including Count III, was consistent with the application of Reyes-Toledo II‘s notice pleading standard.
6. Circuit Court Denies Petitioners’ Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
On January 25, 2019, the circuit court entered an order denying Petitioner‘s
Although the original motion to dismiss was based, in part, on [Pavsek), in dismissing Counts I and II, the [circuit court] determined that these counts were not supported by any “regulatory or statutory authority.” The [circuit court] acknowledged that all well-pleaded facts were to be accepted as true, but that the (circuit court] was not required to accept conclusory allegations on the legal effect of the events alleged. Count III requested declaratory relief based on the conclusory allegations contained in Counts I and II. Thus, Count III was dismissed without prejudice. In dismissing Count III without prejudice, the [circuit court] applied the “notice pleading” standard that the [Reyes-Toledo II] court reaffirmed has been the [Hawaiʻi] standard for seventy years, i.e., the liberal “notice pleading” standard.
The same day, the circuit court entered an order awarding MLP its costs.
B. ICA Proceedings
On February 23, 2019, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal with the ICA. Petitioners appealed the circuit court‘s orders awarding costs to MLP and denying Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration, and the judgment of dismissal of Petitioners’ complaint without prejudice.
1. Petitioners’ Opening Brief
Petitioners raised three points of error in their opening brief, two of which are relevant here.
Petitioners argued the circuit court erred in dismissing Count I of their complaint, based upon the court‘s conclusion that the Director was not required to consult SHPD before “reissuing” MLP‘s grading permit. Petitioners maintained that the Director‘s action violated the constitutional protections of Petitioners’ traditional and customary practices. Petitioners also asserted that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to reconsider the court‘s dismissal of Count III. Counts II and III, Petitioners noted, “held in common the allegation that no ‘good cause’ existed to authorize the Director‘s extension of MLP‘s grading permit” pursuant to
Thus, Petitioners maintained that the circuit court should have granted their motion for reconsideration.
2. County Respondents’ Answering Brief
In their answering brief, County Respondents argued, in relevant part, that the circuit court properly dismissed Petitioners’ Count I claim, as
In response to Petitioners’ final point of error, County Respondents observed that Petitioners’ focus on the circuit court‘s denial of their
3. MLP‘s Answering Brief
MLP‘s answering brief, in relevant part, asserted that the circuit court properly applied the notice pleading standard when the court dismissed Count III; and did not err in denying Petitioners’
4. Petitioners’ Reply Briefs
In their reply briefs, Petitioners reiterated that the Maui County Code required the Director to conform to
5. ICA‘s Summary Disposition Order
The ICA issued its decision on March 15, 2024, affirming the circuit court‘s orders and final judgment, concluding in relevant part that the ICA did not have appellate jurisdiction over Petitioners’ appeal of the circuit court‘s judgment dismissing the complaint. Mālama Kakanilua v. Dir. of the Dep‘t of Pub. Works, No. СААР-19-0000107, 2024 WL 1134051, at *2-5 (Haw. App. Mar. 15, 2024) (SDO). The ICA determined that Petitioners’ appeal was untimely, since it was filed well after
We accepted Petitioners’ application for writ of certiorari and held oral argument in this matter.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Interpretation of Court Rules
We review the interpretation of a court rule de novo. State v. Choy Foo, 142 Hawaiʻi 65, 72, 414 P.3d 117, 124 (2018) (citing Sierra Club v. Dep‘t of Transp., 120 Hawaiʻi 181, 197, 202 P.3d 1226, 1242 (2009)). And “[w]hen interpreting rules promulgated by the court, principles of statutory construction
B. HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) Orders
Having a “very large measure of discretion,” a trial court‘s ruling on an
IV. DISCUSSION
A. An HRCP Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration is a “tolling motion” pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) and extends the deadline under HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) to file a notice of appeal.
Petitioners assert that the ICA gravely erred in holding that Petitioners’
MLP and County Respondents counter that
We agree with Petitioners.
This court‘s policy favors hearing cases on the merits whenever possible, including on appeal. Alexander & Baldwin, LLC v. Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi 37, 54, 508 P.3d 832, 849 (2022). The history of our case law indicates that the underlying purpose of the ICA‘s treatment of
Based upon our reading of the plain language of the applicable rules, and for the following reasons, we hold that an
1. HRCP Rule 60(b) specifies the time by which a motion under the rule shall be filed as “within a reasonable time,” triggering an HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) extension of time to file a notice of appeal.
If any party files a timely motion for judgment as a matter of law, to amend findings or make additional findings, for a new trial, to reconsider, alter or amend the judgment or order, or for attorney‘s fees or costs, and court or agency rules specify the time by which the motion shall be filed, then the time for filing the notice of appeal is extended for all parties until 30 days after entry of an order disposing of the motion. The presiding court or agency in which the motion was filed shall dispose of any such post-judgment motion by entering an order upon the record within 90 days after the date the motion was filed. If the court or agency fails to enter an order on the record, then, within 5 days after the 90th day, the clerk of the relevant court or agency shall notify the parties that, by operation of this Rule, the post-judgment motion is denied and that any orders entered thereafter shall be a nullity.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party‘s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (6) any other reason [not subsections (1)-(5)] justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
The ICA in the instant case relied primarily on its prior decisions interpreting the interplay between
At the time Simbajon and Simpson were decided,
Citing to Simpson, the ICA subsequently stated in Lambert v. Lua that a ”
The ICA has continued to interpret and treat an
MLP and County Respondents argue that this court has cited approvingly to the ICA‘s decisions treating an
In Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Amasol, Justice Nakayama, concurring in part with the majority, stated as dicta in a footnote that “[b]ecause
At the time of Sakuma and Amasol,
Whether
We do so now. Here, plainly read,
To the extent that our past affirmations of the ICA‘s construal of a motion filed pursuant to
The dissent concludes that an
The holdings of this court make clear that a motion filed under
In the instant case, Petitioners’ motion asked the circuit court to reconsider its order dismissing their complaint and the court‘s final judgment, and sought vacatur as relief. Petitioners titled their motion “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration and Relief From Judgment,” and stated that the motion was being brought not only pursuant to
As held by this court, a motion for reconsideration can be filed pursuant to
2. An HRCP Rule 60(b) motion may extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if filed within thirty days after judgment pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(1).
In James B. Nutter & Company v. Namahoe, this court discussed how the specific circumstances of a case should be weighed in determining whether an
[o]ur case law sets a high bar. In Uyehara, Uyehara filed his
Rule 60(b) motion over three-and-a-half years after the entry of the order. Uyehara claimed that his delay in filing was “not unreasonable because, throughout this period, [Uyehara] was attempting to obtain counsel.” This court concluded, however, that “even under the more relaxed time limitations ofHRCP Rule 60(b)(6) , it is unreasonable for Uyehara to claim that three and one-half years is a reasonable time expenditure for obtaining an attorney.” [S]ee Aiona v. Wing Sing Wo Co., 45 Haw. 427, 432, 368 P.2d 879, 882 (1962) (“There must be an end to litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be relieved from.“). . .
Here, Namahoe has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances that would justify waiting more than three years from the filing of the Decree of Foreclosure and more than two years from the filing of the Order Confirming Sale to file his
Rule 60(b) motion. Namahoe recounted that he had “no memory of being served or signing a paper that I was served,” and that he was receiving care for an illness. . . . This inquiry is fact-specific and determined on a case-by-case basis. Here, Namahoe has shown that the delay was warranted due to his personal circumstances which were, in significant part, generated by [plaintiff‘s] conduct.
153 Hawaiʻi at 169-170, 528 P.3d at 242-243 (quoting Uyehara, 77 Hawaiʻi 149, 883 P.2d at 70) (cleaned up).
In In re Cole, we noted that “[w]e believe that a sound rule does not permit an appellant to revive a case decided (final judgment-wise) years before. An ideal rule promotes finality and sets an easy-to-understand notice of appeal deadline.” 154 Hawaiʻi at 32, 543 P.3d at 464 (emphasis added). The important case-by-case, fact-specific determination of when an
Therefore, reading
B. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners assert that the ICA gravely erred in “incorrectly appl[ying] the abuse of discretion standard” when it affirmed the circuit court‘s denial of Petitioners’
On the record before us, we construe the circuit court‘s denial of Petitioners’
As stated,
Reyes-Toledo II reaffirmed our “well-established historical tradition of liberal notice pleading” ensuring citizens’ access to justice and our courts. 143 Hawaiʻi at 262, 428 P.3d at 774. Our opinion in that case merely added to our liberal notice pleading precedent, upheld “[f]or approximately seventy years[.]” Id. Citing to Reyes-Toledo II‘s publication as the basis of their motion, Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration did not present new arguments or new law which could not have been presented earlier in the adjudication. The circuit court stated that in dismissing Count III of Petitioners’ complaint, the court applied the notice pleading standard reaffirmed in Reyes-Toledo II. Petitioners have not met their burden of a strong showing to establish that the circuit court abused its discretion when there was no new law to be applied by the circuit court.
Therefore, we affirm the ICA‘s decision in its result only. Based on our reasoning above, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, insofar as the
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the ICA‘s April 12, 2024 Judgment on Appeal is vacated in
Lance D. Collins for petitioners
Kristin K. Tarnstrom (Kenton S. Werk on the brief) for respondent Director of the Department of Public Works, County of Maui
Gregory W. Kugle (David H. Abitol on the brief) for respondent Maui Lani Partners
/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
/s/ Vladimir P. Devens
Notes
HRS § 6E-42 provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 6E-42.2, before any agency or officer of the State or its political subdivisions approves any project involving a permit, license, certificate, land use change, subdivision, or other entitlement for use, which may affect historic property, aviation artifacts, or a burial site, the agency or office shall advise the department and prior to any approval allow the department an opportunity for review and comment on the effect of the proposed project on historic properties, aviation artifacts, or burial sites, consistent with section 6E-43, including those listed in the Hawaii register of historic places. If:
- The proposed project consists of corridors or large land areas;
- Access to properties is restricted; or
- Circumstances dictate that construction be done in stages,
the department‘s review and comment may be based on a phased review of the project; provided that there shall be a programmatic agreement between the department and the project applicant that identifies each phase and the estimated timelines for each phase.
(b) The department shall inform the public of any project proposals submitted to it under this section that are not otherwise subject to the requirement of a public hearing or other public notification.
(c) The department shall adopt rules in accordance with chapter 91 to implement this section.
HRS § 6E-42.
MCC § 20.08.080 (2017) provided:
Drainage, engineering slope hazard report, and erosion control plans shall be submitted to the applicable soil and water conservation district(s) and to the department of land and natural resources’ state historic preservation division for review and comment. Final approval or disapproval by the County shall be made within ten days after receiving their comments.
MCC § 20.08.080. This ordinance was amended in 2018, adding further language on the agency‘s review of the proposed work.
HRS § 6E-13(b)(2009 & Supp. 2015) provided:
Any person may maintain an action in the [environmental court] having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for restraining orders or injunctive relief against the State, its political subdivisions, or any person upon a showing of irreparable injury, for the protection of an historic property or a burial site and the public trust therein from unauthorized or improper demolition, alteration, or transfer of the property or burial site.
HRS § 6E-13(b).
MCC § 19.500.080 (2017) provides:
The director of public works shall determine whether applications for grading, electrical, plumbing, sign, and other construction and development permits issued by the director conform to requirements of this title, chapter 6E of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, and any other development regulation or law of the county or the State of Hawaii. No grading, electrical, plumbing, sign, or other construction or development permit shall be issued unless the director of public works or the director‘s authorized representative certifies that the construction or development being requested by the application conforms to the provisions of this title.
MCC § 19.500.080.