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M.L., a Minor C.D., His Parent S.L., His Parent v. Federal Way School District Washington Superintendent of Public Instruction
394 F.3d 634
9th Cir.
2005
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 minor; C.D., parent; S.L., M.L., a his parent, Petitioners-

Appellants,

v. DISTRICT;

FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL

Washington Superintendent of Public

Instruction, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 02-35547. Appeals,

United States Court

Ninth Circuit.

Argued Aug. and Submitted 5, 2004.

Filed Nov.

Amended Jan. *2 Lobsenz, Carney Badley E. Spell- James IEP team precludes us from considering P.S., Seattle, WA, man, petitioners- for the whether the IEP developed without the appellants. inclusion of at least one reasonably teacher was calculated to en- Hirst,

Christopher L. Preston Gates & *3 able M.L. to receive free and appropriate LLP, Seattle, WA; Dionne, Ellis James J. (“FAPE”). public education I believe we Rorick, Seattle, WA, Dionne & for the must vacate judgment and remand respondents-appellees.

with instructions that the district court enter directing an order the FWSD to select an IEP complies team that with the procedural requirements of the IDEA. Judge Gould separate has filed a concur- ALARCÓN, GOULD, Before ring opinion in joins which he inme con- CLIFTON, Judges. Circuit cluding that the omission of classroom teacher from M.L.’s IEP team ALARCÓN, Judge: Senior Circuit was a error and that we must M.L., minor, C.D., mother, his and reverse the district court’s granting order S.L., father, appeal his from the order summary judgment. Judge Gould has granting summary the motions for judg- applied the harmless error standard of ment Appellees, filed the Federal Way review, instead of the structural defect (“FWSD”) School District and the Wash- analysis I have employed, in concluding ington Superintendent of Public Instruc- judgment must be reversed. contend, alia, They tion.1 inter dissent, failure of the FWSD to include a Judge his agrees Clifton with education teacher pre- on the team that Judge Gould the harmless error test pared M.L.’s individualized applied matter, must be in this but con- (“IEP”) gram rendered the invalid. cludes that the school district’s error in failing to include a regular classroom I persuaded am that we must reverse team, teacher on the IEP required the order granting summary judgment be- IDEA, error, was harmless and did not cause the failure of the FWSD to include a result in the loss of an educational oppor- regular education teacher on the IEP team tunity M.L., deny him a appro- free significantly deviated from the priate public education. requirements of the Individuals with Dis- (“IDEA”) abilities Education Act that at least one education teacher in-

cluded the development of an IEP for a disability student with a pursuant indicated, Unless otherwise the facts are 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii). undisputed. This critical M.L. was born on November structural defect in the constitution of the autism, He suffers from mental complaint 1. The in this matter named the "respondent,” ment Appellants have Washington Superintendent of Public Instruc- challenging not raised issue the merits of ("SPI”) party tion aas to this action. The summary judgment order in favor of the granted summary judgment district court Thus, appear SPI. it Appellants would favor of the SPI on the basis that the claim appeal regarding abandoned their "premature.” was appeal While the notice of SPI. granting refers to the summary judg- order . year Each the class also retardation, and activities macroeephaly.2 As included several of same students delayed globally he was February the' same instructional assistants. domains consis- developmental all across level, cognitive displayed tent his course of improved M.L.’s skills over the problems. was significant behavioral preschool three in Ms. years Wicks’s nonverbal, virtually completely almost more fre- began class. M.L. interact skills, toilet no communication participat- children and quently with other ability trained, cognitive and had extent, ed, activi- to limited percentile on the placed him first teased a times while ties. M.L. was few Inventory.3 Developmental Battelle During years three he enrolled there. *4 class, in Ms. he was Schwarz, was enrolled Wicks’s regarding expert Dr. an llene assigned a one-on-one instructional assis- practices for children au- throughout tant who remained with him tism, might be able to indicated M.L. day. with a familiar service perform tasks

vider, to demonstrate would be unable but displayed increasingly aggressive M.L. do so another when asked to those skills This conduct during behavior time. gains made M.L. had environment. by many was of his service documented and physical therapy between 1997 escalat- providers. aggression His level Puget reports The Sound progress given more ed when he was frustrated or however, indicate, Therapy Services whine, cry, He challenging tasks. would frequently had August as of M.L. bite his instructional assis- or and scratch displayed aggressive and temper tantrums many objects and on at tant. He mouthed hitting pinching, and behavior such as Lai bit child. least one occasion another performance which interfered with his Doo, therapist, in-home testified M.L.’s occupational therapist . M.L.’s therapy. in- level of communication that as M.L.’s that M.L. would benefit recommended creased, aggression decreased. level of his from a more structured environment. However, that M.L.’s Doo also stated Ms. to be a lot aggression “level of seem[ed] enrolled in the Tukwila Pre M.L. was [she had] more than the others that severe at the Riverton Park United Meth seen.” in the Tukwila School Dis odist Church trict He attended disabled, in November 1997. Tukwila Because M.L. approxi preschool days four per required by week was School District years. 1414(d)(1)(A) day year hours for three mately two to create an each per third year, “present for a few months levels of edu- Except that stated M.L.’s “spe- continuously assigned Jodie cational outlined performance,” was ... integrated class until and related services preschool Wicks’s cial education [M.L.],” and set forth provided followed the same be June 2000.4 class January goals.” day, same “measurable annual On using songs each routine adaptive, receptive and ex- Macroeephaly personal-social, is a condition causes part cognitive pressive language, distance around widest skull skills. age expected greater than for the background of the child. "integrated” "regular” 4.An developing typically children consists both Inventory Developmental 3. The Battelle children. and a number disabled small Screening Test is to children six administered They taught by "regular education” eight years old and includes sub- months teacher. motor, gross tests measure which fine 81, 2000, Tukwila School ported District’s this conduct to Ramsey Ms. an IEP for prepared M.L.’s initial testified, Ms. Warden. C.D. later howev- placement for the 2000-2001 er, academic that M.L. “happy as a little lark” (“Tukwila IEP”). Wicks, year Ms. M.L.’s during recess. teacher, preschool was a member of the 7, 2000, September On again C.D. ob- IEP provided IEP team. The that M.L. served teasing children M.L. at recess and in September was to be enrolled during class time. She discussed this con- integrated kindergarten class for 180 min- Ramsey. duct with Ms. Ramsey Ms. told utes, week, per four times and was to C.D. that she “had not witnessed teas- therapy receive additional and instruction- class, ing during of M.L. but would contin- al services. ue to watch for it and intervene if neces- Prior to M.L.’s enrollment an inte- sary.” Ramsey informed C.D. that grated kindergarten class in the Tukwila “policies in place were regarding teasing District, family School M.L. and his moved and that she did not allow such behavior in July the FWSD on or about 2000. her class.” M.L. was enrolled at the Mark Twain Ele- C.D. witnessed additional teasing inci- *5 mentary School the FWSD. The FWSD September 11, dents on September 8 and implemented the Tukwila IEP for M.L. reported 2000. She these events to Ms. until it expire September 30, was due to on Ramsey. Ramsey Ms. replied that “she 2000. Accordingly, placed M.L. was keep eye would an on [M.L.] and would Sandy Ramsey’s integrated kindergarten take care of it.” Ramsey Ms. did not take class in the Mark Twain Elementary any regarding action teasing incidents. School. Ramsey Ms. is certified as a regu- C.D. testified that there was no evidence lar special education teacher. that M.L. actually was by affected At suggestion, Ramsey C.D.’s Ms. con- teasing and that “because he had his head-

trolled M.L.’s behavior in class letting phones on most of the time he being him listen to his favorite music on his teased ... didn’t [she] know if he even headphones. The hired a FWSD series of heard it.” one-on-one instructional assistants to work 12, September 2000, On C.D. called Di- with M.L. Each quit of them after working Niksich-Conn, ane the Vice-Principal of with him day. for one the Mark Elementary School, Twain to C.D. during attended class with M.L. report teasing incident that had occurred days the five that was enrolled at M.L. previous day. Vice-Principal Niksich- Mark Elementary Twain Sep- School. On suggested Conn that C.D. contact Ms. 5, 2000, tember boys C.D. witnessed two Ramsey. Ms. Niksich-Conn then contact- teasing M.L. She discussed this incident Ramsey ed Ms. and advised her to talk to Warden, with Ms. Ramsey and Pat Ms. C.D. Ramsey’s classroom assistant. Ms. Ram- sey responded that she 13, “would make a September 2000, On Ramsey Ms. note and make it a priority keep observ- telephoned C.D. discuss her complaint ing keep eye an on these children and a that M.L. had been teased on September — eye better 11, if anything [M.L.] see 2000. Ms. Ramsey informed C.D. that continued to happen so she could teasing address place took on September might 11, incidents that happen.” On only 2000 was the incident that she had September 6, 2000, C.D. observed more observed. Ms. Ramsey testified that dur- children teasing M.L. at conversation, recess. She re- ing that requested she IEP. and the Tukwila stop identified C.D. an give her C.D. psychologist also interviewed children before The by other teasing of M.L. did M.L. Ms. Wicks. took matter further. C.D. Elementary to the Mark Twain

not return (“Evalua- group produced report 11, did 2000. C.D. September after School Report”) that recommended that M.L. tion administrator speak FWSD with special placed be her from the school. removing child before size, provided offered a small class 17, 2000, predictable con- supports, visual September orOn about or schedules routines. On at the Wild- sistent place M.L. FWSD offered 2000, Drink- in a October Dr. Sarah Elementary School self-con- about wood water, support Thom- FWSD’s director of student taught by Teresa tained classroom5 services, place at the as, teacher offered Wild- special a certified School, Mark Elementary Twain autistic children. wood experience teaching with School, Elementary other several to enroll M.L. the Wild- refused C.D. rejected within the Elementary she be- schools FWSD. C.D. School because wood suggestions. On October classroom each these lieved that self-contained objection filed a Appellants written partic- for sufficient provide would They Report. also re- to the Evaluation education students. ipation potentially provide the FWSD for thought quested “it could She M.L. at independent public evaluation of to interact with dangerous [M.L.]” expense. response, class- the FWSD filed in the self-contained other students process hearing. request a due C.D. did not visit Thomas’s room. any time. classroom at 1, 2000, Saffrey, Dr. Lee On November *6 specialist, Appel- mailed expired Sep- IEP on a FWSD After the Tukwila meeting IEP 30, 2000, proposing a an multidisciplinary a team lants letter tember 13, a.m. 6, 2000, 2000 at 8:00 to determine for November met on October Elementary faxed School. C.D. provided special Wildwood whether M.L. should be 1, Saffrey to Dr. on November A school a letter education services the FWSD.6 2000, that she would pa- in which she stated speech language and psychologist, IEP “the therapist, any meetings and attend unless occupational thologist, an neighborhood child’s from[her] initial evaluation. staff participated C.D. (Starlake Elementary)” present and participated were teacher No education held at only meetings if the were in this assessment. In addition to observ- hours, offices or the Star- interviewing administration two and FWSD ing indi- Elementary C.D. also C.D., of ex- lake School. the initial evaluation consisted attend providers that she would available cated tensive review records a child with and related services to consists 5. A "self-contained” classroom subchapter. only disability this disabled students. under (B) Procedures 1414(a)(l)(A)-(B): 6. See U.S.C. shall consist Such initial evaluation (1) Initial evaluations procedures— (A) general (i) child is to determine whether agency, State A State educational other (as disability defined in sec- child with a agency agency, shall or local educational 1401(3) title); this tion evalu- conduct a full ation, individual initial (ii) educational needs to determine the paragraph with this in accordance of such child. section, (b) before and subsection of this provision special education initial 13, meeting IEP on November 2000 Northwest Behavioral She Associates. 2, 2000, p.m. 6:00 On November Dr. after stated she left home at 3:45 did p.m. and Saffrey notified C.D. location of not p.m. return until 7:30 found The ALJ changed had been to the meeting testimony ad- this was not credible. ministrative offices FWSD and that C.D.’s fax log machine C.D. reflected that at 4:00 meeting p.m. would occur on 13, sent a fax from her home on November Dr. 13, Saffrey also in- November 2000 at The p.m. 5:05 cover sheet was Sapronari, a regu- formed C.D. that Sarah handwriting. C.D.’s special lar education teach- IEP meeting on FWSD was held er, the IEP would be member team. 2000, 13, p.m. Appel- November at 4:00 2000, On November C.D. faxed a let- Thomas, lants did not attend. Ms. a certi- to the in which she ter FWSD stated special fied education teacher assigned would not be able attend the she School, Elementary Wildwood awas p.m. IEP at 4:00 on posed meeting Novem- However, member team. no 13, 2000. stated that she ber She would regular education teacher participated 4:15 a.m. be available between and 5:15 the IEP or meeting evaluated the facts a.m., any p.m. Tuesday, or at 6:00 on Wed- determine whether the was reason- Friday, nesday, Thursday or and at 7:00 ably to provide calculated M.L. with a Mondays. or later on p.m. sug- She also FAPE. meeting Saturdays gested Sundays. on Wicks, A letter written M.L.’s Saffrey Dr. C.D. notified that an IEP teacher, 10, 2000, preschool May dated meeting only during could be conducted by. considered the IEP team. She stated day from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on in this good letter that has “[M.L.] made day Monday through Friday. Dr. Saffrey progress in setting this and exceptional partici- informed C.D. that she could also gains in socialization.” She recommended via pate replied a conference call. C.D. that M.L. in general “remain[ ] November that she would not be kindergarten classroom during his kinder- an IEP team meeting able attend dur- garten year he continue to be ing the days suggested by hours and Dr. supported by a one-on-one assistant.” Saffrey, nor could she or her husband *7 reviewing IEP, After the Tukwila M.L.’s call participate a conference on Novem- records, and Ms. Wicks’s recom- 13, 2000. ber mendation, IEP the FWSD team conclud- (“ALJ”) Law Judge The Administrative ed that M.L. do better in “would a smaller found that the assertion that par- M.L.’s setting with opportunity on to work ents could not attend IEP meeting at specific skill areas” and recommended p.m. 4:00 was not credible. S.L.’s time placement in Ms. Thomas’s self-contained his employer sheet records from indicate classroom at Elementary the Wildwood 2000, 13, that on November his workday provided School. IEP The main- for ended at At the p.m. hearing 2:58 before lunch, streaming opportunities7 during re- ALJ, C.D. testified she was not cess, music, assemblies, library, and school to able attend the November 2000 IEP activities. meeting p.m. participate 4:00 a conference call because M.L. Ms. had an Thomas’s curriculum incorporated afternoon appointment on that day specialized strategies with for teaching autistic "Mainstreaming” a term used to describe activities with non-disabled students. opportunities for engage disabled students to partial motion for Appellants filed a Thomas’s self-contained children. they alleged in which summary judgment integrated than an smaller classroom was the FWSD violated designed specially kindergarten by failing IDEA requirements kindergarten ranging for students teacher on the include a grade. through sixth IEP The filed a cross mo- team. FWSD copy The mailed FWSD summary judgment. The district tion for 17, 2000. Dr. parents on November M.L.’s motion Appellants’ partial court denied offering also enclosed letter Drinkwater summary judgment granted the parents to discuss M.L.’s court found FWSD’s motion. The district did parents M.L.’s and refine the IEP. M.L. was new to the school that because so, process requested due but instead do district, participating and not Depart- an ALJ with the hearing before the time the IEP education classes at ment of Education. place, permissible “it meeting [was] took only teachers [on team] include eight-day due February an likely to him in who be entrusted with regarding appropriate- hearing cess The district court placement.” the new IEP was held before ALJ ness of the if the Court were to also stated: “Even the IDEA. ALJ found pursuant find the district’s failure to include team was District’s evaluation “the teacher M.L.’s The ALJ de- appropriately constituted.”. to a viola- IEP team amounted motion reconsidera- Appellants’ nied IDEA, violation would not tion such tion. of a necessarily constitute denial the ALJ’s Appellants sought review of timely filed a notice of Appellants FAPE.” States District decision before the United May 2002. The district court appeal on District of Wash- for the Western Court jurisdiction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 20 U.S.C. ington pursuant 1415(i)(2)(A). jurisdiction pur- We (i)(2)(A). judi- petition for § 1451 In their § 1291.8 suant to 28 U.S.C. al- complaint, Appellants cial review alia, failed leged, inter FWSD II safeguards comply A. 1400-15, §§ under 20 U.S.C. provided for 3001-.556, appeal, Appellants In this con Washington §§ 34 C.F.R. to include a tend that the FWSD's failure state law. administrative [state] ceive the records of with this court on 8. The FWSD filed a motion *8 addition, 10(e) of 24, 2002, proceedings"). the In Rule requesting sup- we December Appellate Procedure allows Federal Rules to include plement administrative record "anything be if mate- the record to corrected testimony of Niksich-Conn. Diane party is omitted from or misstat- brief, rial to either Appellants ar- supplemental their letter by ed record error or accident.” reviewing will gue normally court a supplement not con- the record with material Niksich-Conn’s testimo- It clear that Ms. is previ- court. We have sidered the district ny erroneously omitted from the adminis- held, however, reviewing ously "[i]n district court. considered trative record record, court must examine the adminis- this required are to consider- entire Since we determining as whole v. trative record a whether ...Gonzalez record administrative 1197, Cir.1990) Sullivan, (9th determining 1200 914 F.2d court erred in the district added); place- (emphasis special 20 education appropriateness see also U.S.C. of a ment, 1415(i)(2)(B)(l) reaching grant supple- to (stating FWSD's motion § that in its ' decision, record. reviewing required is ment the a court "re- 642

regular education teacher on the IEP each disability child with a that is devel- "significant team was a violation" of the reviewed, oped, and revised in accordance requirements of the IDEA 1414(d) with section of this title.” 20 IEP and renders the invalid ensure 1401(11). § U.S.C. disabled child receives a FAPE. 1412(6)(A)provides Section that “[Chil- argues response The FWSD that it did dren with disabilities and parents their are requirements violate the the procedural afforded safeguards re- IDEA that at least one quired by section 1415 of this title.” 20 participate education teacher evaluat 1412(6)(A). § A required U.S.C. state is

ing the factors to considered “conduct full and individual initial IEP preparation of an because three ... provisions evaluation before the initial "significant members of special education and related services to teaching experience." Appellees' Brief at 1414(1)(A). § child.” U.S.C. authority propo No was cited for this argument sition. construe this as a re 1414(d)(1)(B), §In Congress set forth luctant concession that at regu least one persons who must be included an IEP lar education teacher was not member team to evaluate a spe- disabled student’s team, required by cial educational needs. The statute IDEA. We review de novo whether a vides as follows: proposed provides district's The term “individualized education pro- FAPE under the IDEA. v.W.G. Bd. of gram team” or “IEP Team” means a Cir.1992) Trustees, (9th 960 F.2d group of composed individuals of— ("TargetRang e"). We review a (i) parents of a child with a dis- findings district of fact court's ability; Gregory IDEA case for clear error. K. Dist., Longview

v. Sch. (ii) at least one education (9th Cir.1987). (if is, teacher of such child the child IDEA by Congress was enacted be, may participating in agencies financially assist state and local environment); education educating with Ojai students disabilities. (iii) at least special one Jackson, 4 Sch. v. Dist. F.3d Unified teacher, or where appropriate, at least (9th Cir.1993). Its “to goal is ensure special one provider of such that all children disabilities have child; available to appropriate public them a free (iv) representative local edu- emphasizes education that special edu- agency cational who— cation and designed related services meet their unique prepare needs and them (I) qualified provide, or super- employment independent liv- of, provision vise the specially de- ing....” 1400. The term signed instruction to meet appropriate “free education” public is de- unique needs children with dis- “special fined as education and related ser- abilities; vices that ... provided in conformity *9 (II) knowledgeable is about the with the individualized education program curriculum; general 1414(d) required under section of this ti- 1401(8). (III) tle.” 20 § U.S.C. The term “in- is knowledgeable about the dividualized education program” is availability defined of resources of the local in the IDEA as “a written statement for agency;

643 Further, emphasis the (v) ment. with interpret can individual who general in the progress involvement implications evalu- the instructional the results, may added IDEA-Amend- be a member 'curriculum ation who (ii) 1997, regular ments of education teach- in clauses team described of the increasingly critical role (vi); ers have an through (together special with education and re- (vi) or parent of the at the discretion personnel) implement- lated in services who agency, the other individuals FAPE most chil- ing special expertise knowledge or disabilities, as described dren child, including related regarding their IEPs. personnel appropriate; services as the IDEA Amendments of Accordingly, (vii) the child that each appropriate, requirement 1997 added whenever must include at least child’s IEP team disability. with a of the regular one education teacher 1414(d)(1)(B). § 20 U.S.C. child, is, be, may partici- if child or reg- also provides “[t]he The IDEA regular environ- pating in the education child, of the ular education teacher- (see 300.344(a)(2)). (See § ment also shall, Team, of the IEP member 300.346(d) regular §§ on the role of re- participate appropriate, extent development, in the education teacher IEP of the child.” and revision of the view IEPs.). review and revision 1414(d)(4)(B). The regula- § 20 U.S.C. app. A. C.F.R. 300 the IDEA con- implement tions drafted to following provisions: tain provided IDEA Prior that the public agency The shall ensure obligated to include the school district was disability for each child with team a member the student’s current teacher as includes— 1997, Congress re the IEP team. In

(1) child; require the inclusion of parents The vised IDEA regular least education teacher “at (2) one regular education At least one (if is, be, may child child or such (if is, child or teacher of the child regular in the education envi participating may be, regular in the participating ronment)” “at edu special least one environment).... education e teacher, appropriate, cation wher 300.344(a). § C.F.R. provider special one least A Part of Title Appendix 1414(d)(1)(B) child.” such commentary explains the following added). (2003) (emphasis education teacher regular critical role of an IEP: developing meaning of terms plain Partic- Regular Education Teacher 1414(d)(1)(B) compels section used Review, and ipation Development, that least requirement conclusion Revision of IEPs be included regular one education teacher IEP-team, may if the student often, on an Very education teachers classroom, participating play a central role the education Thus, (H. mandatory discretionary. Rep. No. children with disabilities —not (1997); finding that the 105-95, S.Rep. No. 105- district court’s p. 103 the IDEA (1997)) constituted under important properly p. and have was least curricu- without at one expertise regarding general According- clearly erroneous. general lum education environ- teacher and the *10 ly, decide whether the FWSD’s we must vidualized educational program developed comply requirement with the through procedures failure of the Act's reasonably at one regular the IDEA that least edu- calculated to enable the child to receive (footnotes the unique teacher evaluate needs of educational cation benefits?" Id. omit ted). fatally compromised the judgment a disabled student The Court reversed the of of IEP and integrity compels Appeals the us to the of Court which had affirmed judgment court’s reverse the district with- the district court's decision that a deaf considering the out whether error was child was denied a FAPE because school findings harmless or the of parents' whether the request administrators denied her district ALJ the court that the IEP be provided she with the services of a requirements qualified meets the substantive of sign language interpreter the in all of clearly 209-10, IDEA are erroneous. her classes. at Id. 102 S.Ct. 3034. held, findings

The Court "[T]he of neither B. court support would a conclusion that Amy's to com failed Citing v. Bishop, Poolaw ply requirements with the substantive of (9th 830, Cir.1995), FWSD contends (em the Act." Id. at 102 S.Ct. 3034 “[a] district court’s determination that added). phasis While the Court concluded incapable deriving student edu findings district court that placed in cational benefits unless self the IEP complied with the substantive contained program is reviewed for clear provisions of the clearly IDEA were not Appellees’ error.” Brief at 21-22. This erroneous, it held that a remand was com only applicable standard of review is to a pelled because district court failed to district findings court’s factual regarding determine whether complied the state with complied whether a school district has with procedural requirements of the IDEA. the IDEA. “The of a appropriateness spe 209-10, Id. Here, at 102 S.Ct. 3034. placement cial education under the IDEA district court determined that the FWSD Poolaw, is reviewed de novo.” 67 F.3d at did not violate the procedural require 1483). (citing Target Range, 960 at Thus, ments the IDEA. even if we as Because FWSD violated the re arguendo sume findings quirement of the IDEA at least one ALJ and the district court in this matter participate education teacher complied that the IEP with the substantive IEP, of an precluded evaluation requirements pursuant of the Act to Row by the law of this circuit from considering ley, we must determine effect on the findings regard district court’s factual district judgment court's of the FWSD's ing the provi merits the substantive comply failure to its duty under sions of the IEP. appoint IDEA to least one edu Rowley, Bd. Educ. v. U.S. cation teacher to the IEP team. (1982), 102 S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 690 Supreme date, Court instructed that a state To Supreme Court has not comply procedurally must expressly both and sub determined whether a violation stantively 206-07, with the IDEA. Id. at requirements 102 S.Ct. 3034. The subject Court held that "a IDEA is to harmless error review. court's inquiry suits brought under That issue not properly before it in 1415(e)(2) First, is twofold. has Rowley because the district court had State complied procedures with the set respondents’ failed rule on the conten- forth in second, Act? And petitioners is the indi tion that comply had failed to *11 reasonably was calculated to enable IEP procedural requirements. the IDEA’S with In n. 102 S.Ct. 3034. child to educational benefits. at 210 the receive 458 U.S. Rowley published, was after case's decided Id. will not review concluded that we

we have County v. Clark Sch. In Amanda J. of IEP if a provisions an the substantive (9th Dist., Cir.2001), ap 267 F.3d 877 the IEP fails include on district to school Rowley in plied principles the set forth as by Congress identified persons Target Range. We concluded qualifications to necessary possessing the procedural violations in de school district’s In we com- Target Range, an IEP. develop IEP veloping prevented an the child from do not flaws “[procedural mented , receiving Id. In a FAPE. at 890-91. of a denial automatically require finding J., to the failed Amanda school district However, procedural inade- FAPE. all parents in loss of education- allow the child’s “to examine that result the quacies seriously infringe on or opportunity, respect al the to the identi relevant records with in the opportunity participate parents’ fication, evaluation, and place educational in process, clearly result IEP formulation required of the child” as 20 U.S.C. ment F.2d at 1484 the of a FAPE.” 960 denial 1415(b)(1)(A). (quoting § at Id. omitted). (internal citations 1415(b)(1)(A)). We held Target Range, we violations that interfere “[p]rocedural held procedures school district violated the IEP formula parental participation by Congress IDEA mandated very undermine process tion essence of the to secure failing participation IDEA.” Id. at education teach- student’s disabled characterized the viola- We er, private any representative of the or Id. at 891. de- “egregious.” tion We district school he attended after question to address the whether the clined identify or de- him as disabled refused reasonably calculated to enable IEP was Target Range IEP. held in velop an We educational Amanda J. receive benefits. in the devel- that “the defects (citing Target Range, at 960 F.2d Id. denying of the resulted opment 1485). at a FAPE.” Id. at 1485. We [the student] the school district reasoned that because recently, Shapiro Shapi- ex More rel. recommendations failed to consider the Dist., Valley Sch. v. Paradise ro Unified knowledgeable most persons who were the (9th Cir.2003), we held that F.3d 1072 child, “duty its to con- it failed about representative failure to include meeting appro- with the meaningful duct a child cur- private school that the was it priate parties” accordingly, did attending the IEP team violated rently sufficiently indi- “develop complete and IDEA. procedural requirements according

vidualized educational the failure to include reasoned We specified by Id. procedures the Act.” knowledgeable about teachers most “the at We also concluded that where special levels and child’s] [the an inadequacies Id. of the IDEA. at a violation heeds” was an may edu- have resulted loss Shapiro that it We concluded 1076-77. opportunity, deprived child’s cational second necessary to address the participate parents analysis. Rowley of the FAPE Id. prong IEP, an forming appel- meaningfully J., at (citing 267 F.3d at 1079 Amanda two proceed step late should not court 1485). i.e., Range, Target analysis, whether the Rowley *12 646 app. maintains the failure to 34 C.F.R. A. IEP

The 300 The team did FWSD regular least one Congress include at not include individuals concluded that developed knowledgeable the team most teacher on were a disabled about type flaw that student’s special is not educational needs. As a result, compel Appellants us to hold that no way determining would have They their to a FAPE. right were denied whether the IEP team would devel Long oped cite our in Ford v. Beach considering decision different after (9th Dist., F.3d regular Sch. 291 1086 the views of a education teacher. Unified Cir.2002) for reli proposition. this Their The failure to include at least one readily ance on Ford is It misplaced. is education teacher on the IEP team awas distinguishable. structural defect the constitution of the IEP team. Ford, hearing the state’s officer and upheld involving prosecutions, the district court the school dis- In cases criminal not Supreme trict’s assessment that student was has Court ruled a struc court, disabled. Id. at Before tural this defect in the trial mechanism is subject parents analysis. student’s contended that “the to harmless error Ari Fulminante, 279, dis- 309, [of assessment Amanda’s abilities and zona v. 499 U.S. 1246, (1991). it inadequate was because did S.Ct. abilities] 113 L.Ed.2d 302 We include of Amanda classroom observation have defined a defect structural as “an by other than her edu- permeate[s] someone error ‘that the entire conduct required by cation C.F.R. teacher as of the trial beginning to end or af- § Id. at 300.542.” 1089. Because the stu- feet[s] framework within which the disabled, Recio, dent being proceeds.’” was assessed as not trial United v. States (9th Cir.2004) 1093, 1102 no IEP We developed. was held Ford 371 F.3d (quoting (9th Wood, 1138, C.F.R. comply the failure Rice v. F.3d Cir.1996) (internal § validity “did not 300.542 affect quotation citations and omitted)). Id. at No contention assessment.” marks Ford that the school dis- asserted requirement The appellate that an court procedural requirements trict violated must reverse because of the effect aof by an the IDEA its failure to include structural error has applied been in civil Congress individual identified as neces- disputes where members of evaluation sary to evaluate a student’s abilities or board expressly mandated Congress Thus, opinion disabilities. our in Ford were not In Doyle included. v. United does question not resolve the whether States, (Cl.Ct. 220 Ct.Cl. 599 F.2d 984 failure of the FWSD to include at least one 1979), on grounds by amended other prej- on education teacher the IEP (Cl.Ct.1979), Ct.Cl. 609 F.2d 990 udiced to a Appellant’s rights FAPE. Court Claims reversed the decision of Army The record demonstrates Board for the Correction of Mili comply FWSD failed to with the “rigorous tary Records because none of the selection procedural requirements of IDEA.” Union boards for convened the evaluation of re (9th Smith, 1519, 1524 Sch. Dist. v. promotion serve to permanent officers for Cir.1994). The officers, failure to include at least rank included reserve as re 3362(b) one regular education quired by § teacher (repealed 10 U.S.C. team deprived “important 14102(b)). the team of ex and recodified at 100 U.S.C. pertise regarding general curriculum Court The of Claims held that the failure and the general educational environment.” to include reserve officers on selection " California, v. su Chapman error.... officers evaluating reserve boards er at 827 subject pra, to harmless 87 S.Ct. 386 U.S. was not promotion (coerced confession, counsel, right im analysis. It reasoned ror follows:. cases in however, partial judge). These include case, not a this error compositional are found to substantive which defects plaintiffs’ *13 of the violation See, plain- juries. of the respect e.g., a violation in Whi rights but rather exist procedure process. 545, or rights to fair Georgia, tiffs’ tus v. 385 U.S. 87 S.Ct. the fact that (1967). not of are 643, justifi We unmindful 599 17 L.Ed.2d Two fifth process protections the due for rule of automatic reversal cations extend- sparingly been amendment have First, advanced. some er generally are but that government employees, ed to judicial or fair are so inimical to rors this The is immaterial to case. problem cannot process their violation be insti- procedures is the violation of error any Ap circumstances. tolerated under and, regulation, by statute and tuted error plication of the test of harmless may not be employees federal though of in the dilution the afford result would not established any procedure entitled Second, court, ed protection. always agency, we have by Congress or errors, improp as the case of some such proce- to such they are entitled held that or of a composition jury er of the bias so provided. dure that has been way evaluating of judge, "has no of the issue presents this case Since judgment on the effect of the error decision-making errors but might of what have been the dark board, ...." we find of a selection process was, Traynor, The R.J. Rid never dealing with the violation cases those (1970). dle Harmless Error 66 rights to be constitutional involved herein Though proceeding analogous. Supreme Court more evaluational, and the accusatory, is not the case of recognized has even constitutional, we statutory, not do error occurring crimi in a error constitutional that these for these reasons believe not trial, requires every such error nal not protec- plaintiffs less are entitled convic reversal of the "the automatic tion. Decisions selection boards upheld if tion"; will be a conviction for those con- consequences important ... error "federal constitutional promoted are They either sidered. doubt." beyond harmless reasonable are pay rank and or terminated higher 18, 22, California, v. 386 U.S. Chapman pay. employment and lose their 828, 24, 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 87 that se- explicitly commands The statute (1967). See, Harrington v. Cal e.g., 705 of an composed shall be 1726, lection boards 250, 89 S.Ct. 23 ifornia, 395 U.S. officers number of Reserve (1969) (violation appropriate sixth 284 L.Ed.2d prej- will be confrontation); so officers that Reserve right amendment Parker, Congress’ purpose and so that udiced States v. United Cir.1977), denied, (9th protected by military the nation is cert. qualified 52 L.Ed.2d 365 of those officers best composed U.S. S.Ct. (1977) Regular on defen as (prosecutor's comment of their status regardless officers, testify, violation out. We be- dant's failure carried Reserve amendment). be Congress’ purpose fifth would lieve that Secretary is aware however, unless thwarted rights, Some constitutional requirement that statutory is a that this that their infrac "so to a fair trial basic be cannot waived. treated harmless tion can never be Moreover, we believe that persuaded by analysis second am Doyle justification the automatic reversal Dilley failure include the rule, is not possible that it review- individuals by Congress identified as nec- ing to determine what effect body essary participants evaluating whether judgment error on the of the origi- entitlement to benefits has been demon- proceeding, nal forces us to conclude is applicable strated to an administrative of harmless error the doctrine can- proceeding Accordingly, under the IDEA. type to this applied I conclude that the failure to include at error. teacher, least one stand- 995-96, Id. F.2d alone, ing is a structural defect that preju- *14 Alexander, v. Dilley In F.2d 914 right dices of a disabled student (D.C.Cir.1979), the United States Court of receive a FAPE. Under these circum- Appeals of District Columbia held stances, a of findings review of the Army that the failure of the include ALJ and the regarding district court officers on a promotion reserve board vio merits the substantive recommendations (1976). lated 10 Id. at 920. of an illegally constituted team for rejected The Army's court contention produce clear error would a futile advisory appellants prejudiced by were not opinion which beyond judicial power our in the composition pro defect of the or competence. motion a subsequently board because properly Relook Board constituted found C. composition the defect of the promotion any board not result in did The argues FWSD partic prejudice appellants. to the The court ipation of a regular education teacher on prejudice stated: which the "[T]he statute the IEP team was not required because it guaranteed against, insofar as reserve offi likely was not that M.L. would be placed in concerned, cers were consideration by was integrated an since Evalua promotion a board devoid reserve offi Report tion against recommended it. This (emphasis cers." Id. in original). argument completely ignores the fact that addition, In the court reasoned the record shows that the Tukwila IEP findings, Relook Board's "while laudable directed that M.L. be placed regular a perhaps, are either irrelevant or incorrect kindergarten classroom. M.L. had attend a Although as matter of law. a desire to regular ed a preschool classroom for three prejudice obviously eliminate occasioned years. After his family moved to the statute, enactment section 266 FWSD, M.L. placed Ramsey’s was in Ms. itself does not anti-Reserve outlaw bias. regular education classroom. This conten It prescribes a entitlement that tion is also inconsistent with the FWSD’s no subsequent findings can dimin factual representation that “the District did not added). ish." (emphasis Id. at 923-24 predetermine placement.” the Student’s The court further commented Dilley Appellees’ Brief at 35. light that, these "Congress made decision over a facts, supports record an inference quarter of century ago promotion it was possible that M.L. would be selection considering board Reserve candi placed in regular dates was inherently if it classroom. defective lacked Reserve So representation; Army long this was a possibility, partic was not at liberty ipation to review and reverse that con education teacher in gressional decision on its own." Id. at 924. the IEP team required by the IDEA. ... of the IEP demonstrates two teachers ment was aware that The FWSD legislative adequate compli- conviction that integrated class- M.L. had observed prescribed procedures with the would him for ance Ramsey had observed room. Ms. much if not all of him in most cases assure mother withdrew one week before way Congress what wished was teased non-disabled because he in an IEP.” Id. at content had substantive Ms. Wicks observed children. integrated preschool 102 S.Ct. 3034. in an years three Of the two classroom. Clearly, of this under the circumstances teachers, was the most knowl- Ms. Wicks case, party was a concerned Wicks educational needs edgeable about M.L.’s placement M.L. in an regarding the for three his teacher she been because because he was her integrated classroom that M.L. be recommended years. She years. three Because she was student for classroom. integrated in an placed team, in the IEP no not included Ramsey not include either Ms. FWSD did her way ascertaining whether observa- other edu- or Ms. Wicks persuaded the other tions would have teacher its team. cation members to formulate different tai- appropriately for M.L. that would be *15 appears suggest to The FWSD to and special lored his abilities needs. object to to right waived their Appellants limited of Ramsey’s more observation a regular to include the failure integrated might in her they the IEP team because teacher on IEP in also have assisted the team ensur- meetings. The to the IEP failed attend a FAPE ing that M.L. received based on attempt- District argues “[t]he FWSD Indeed, physical and condition. mental the Parents’ participation to facilitate ed any regular teacher would have meeting IEP but Parents refused knowledge his or of the contributed her to participate attend. Their refusal to ability of to benefit a disabled student Appellees’ risk.” Brief at 36- at their own in a being placed from classroom. argument rejected a similar 37. We responsible Appellants for the The Target Range: re- of FWSD’s violation im/poses tipon The Act the school district of the IDEA. quirements meaningful meet- duty to conduct Tar- appropriate parties. ing with argues that it was not com- The FWSD Target to get Range failed do so. reg- of participation to pelled ensure the of Range goal paren- failed fulfill the “because evalu- ular education teacher in the IEP participation process tal a self-contained ators had recommended and suffi- develop complete failed to This Appellees’ Brief at 28. placement.” ciently individualized educational although fact ignores the argument according procedures speci- to the gram regular education named a the FWSD by team, Act. fied of IEP a member teacher to be 13, 2000 attend the November she did not added). (emphasis F.2d 1485 at 960 meeting. Having determined assumption-of-the-risk de- The FWSD’s be a member education teacher should misunderstanding betrays its fense team, should have the FWSD requirements of the importance proceed- meeting instead of cancelled that Supreme IDEA. The Court stated IEP team. ing illegally with an constituted congres- think that the Rowley, “[w]e circuit, the of this full Under the law FWSD upon emphasis participation sional requirements develop- violated the throughout parties concerned 650 (7th Cir.1996) IDEA, failing partic- (holding that, ensure the 993 “at least of a education teacher in

ipation in principle relief is available under the the evaluation M.L.’s educational needs. IDEA” when a pupils teacher invited her compels defect This structural reversal of to express complaints their about a dis judgment the district court’s without con- humiliation, abled student which led to fist sidering developed the merits of mistrust, fights, loss of confidence and self- at regu- without the one esteem, evaluation least disruption of his educational lar education teacher.9 progress). IDEA, Under the a disabled child FAPE, guaranteed is 20 U.S.C. Appellants further assert that (cid:127)“ 1412(1), ‘provide[s] which

M.L. was denied FAPE because the ” handicapped the- child.’ Gregory prevent failed take action to FWSD benefit ., 811 at F.2d teasing (quoting Rowley, Ap other students M.L. The K 3034) (emphasis U.S. pellants argue that is S.Ct. there uncontradicted added). If a deliberately teacher is indif evidence the record the FWSD was ferent deliberately teasing of a reports indifferent C.D.’s disabled child and being that her child was the abuse is so severe They teased. that the child can teasing maintain no resulted a derive benefit from the services that he district, denial of a FAPE. Neither the statute nor she offered the school any court directly ques has addressed the has child been denied a FAPE. Davis Cf. tion can teasing County Educ., whether unremedied con v. Monroe Bd. 526 U.S. 629, 633, stitute a of a FAPE. denial F. Charlie S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 839 Cf. *16 (1999) of Educ., ex rel. Neil F. v. Bd. (holding that to violate Title IX Although procedures would apply prescribed I structural error would most above, analysis recognize I outlined that a cases assure much not all what Con- if majority panel adopted of the has gress harmless way wished in the substantive con- error test instead. How harmless error re- tent an IEP. squarely view is to 205-06, be conducted therefore Rowley, 458 U.S. at 102 S.Ct. 3034 Therefore, presented. I believe I should ad- added). (emphasis panels dress the so that issue future confront- Judge recognizes Rowley Clifton that man- expression ed-with have it will an of each of two-step analysis. dates See at 661 infra question. our views on this (Clifton, J., Nevertheless, dissenting). ap- he pears jumped to have to the substantive sec- Judge agree analysis I cannot with Clifton's step ond procedural step, to resolve the first because he relies on the ALJ's and the district effectively circumventing two-step pro- findings placement by court’s made cess. was, procedurally defective IEP team nev- ertheless, Even under the harmless error standard of harmless because it was the best adopted by (Clifton, majority, my review it is view placement M.L. at See J. infra that opportunity loss of an educational cannot dissenting). approach proce- This rewards by considering be determined non-compliance the merits of dural is at and odds with the Instead, placement Supreme identified holding that in the IEP. it Court's the IDEA seeks by must be whether largely through to achieve substantive ends the failure to its determined procedural include at least one means: education teach- er, expressly Congress, importance Congress as mandated [T]he attached to had a [the procedural inherently and safeguards gain- impact Act's] material harmful cannot he ability congressional said. ... We think that the the defective IEP team to devel- emphasis upon op participation reasonably full of con- that was calculated parties throughout development cerned to enable M.L. receive to educational benefits. Thus, legislative of the ... demonstrates the I believé the school district’s adequate that compliance conviction with error was not harmless.'' severe, requirements the IDEA’S per structural be] ... so “harassment [must vacation of the procedures requiring order vasive, objectively that it ef offensive summary in favor judgment granting fectively victim’s access to bars remand, benefit”). Upon the district the FWSD. or opportunity educational to enter an order di- court is instructed removing that The record shows an IEP recting the FWSD to select Elementary from Mark Twain School M.L. fully complies that re- to Appellants failed only days, five after IDEA. of the quirements the FWSD a reasonable give remand, is re- Upon the district court prevent other students way find determine, discretion, its quested have also teasing Appellants attorneys award reasonable teasing whether to demonstrate resulted failed part Appellants of the costs to the Ap- fees of an benefit. in the loss prevailing pursuant to 20 parties as the no evidence that have offered pellants 1415(i)(3)(B). § The district court with U.S.C. teasing affected M.L. interfered Appel- whether the during should also determine C.D. testified that his education. incidents, equitable lants are entitled to reimburse- M.L. was teasing one they educational costs also ment a little lark.” C.D. stated “happy as FWSD’s he incurred due episode “because during another IDEA. he violation of the headphones on most of time if teased ... didn’t know being [she] in- and REMANDED with VACATED it.” he even heard structions. contend, evidentiary Appellants without GOULD, concurring Judge, Circuit “can unpunished teasing easi- support, that concurring judgment: part abuse, from mere ly escalate verbal “potential- abuse” and is physical or sexual judgment I concur in the at dangerous.” II-A, Brief ly Appellants’ I, II-C, Judge III of in Sections teasing poses a Appellants argue also agree U.S.C opinion. Alarcon’s since, danger 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii) to M.L. because particular requires least *17 skills, or he would he has little no verbal be included regular one education teacher any report physical abuse. Program be unable an Individualized Education on However, this Appellants (“IEP”) team, have not directed the of a and that omission violence, or threat any court’s attention from M.L.’s IEP teacher However, stu- physical contact between another I of error. procedural team was ad- Appellants have not dent and “structural per with the se agree do evidence to show by Judge duced sufficient Alarcon analysis adopted defect” by FAPE the M.L. was denied a FWSD’s separately I make in Section II-B. write alleged stop failure to M.L.’s classmates procedural analysis clear that our court’s him in a teasing during days his five start and end with under IDEA does not theory education classroom. of on a automatic reversal based Instead, must assess error. we structural

CONCLUSION district’s error for harmless the school in precedent Tar with our par- the ness—in accord failure ensure FWSD’s J., Shapiro by Range, Amanda get a education teacher ticipation of — procedural the error possibility considering a whether IEP team when there was opportuni in a loss of educational placed integrated in an resulted that M.L. would be parental par- ty significantly restricted violation of significant classroom was IDEA ticipation (1982), formation. L.Ed.2d 690 the Supreme Court may in procedural error be held harmless established for IDEA framework review: cases, appropriate may and this include “First, has the complied State with the mistake in the IEP involving cases how procedures set forth in the Act? And sec- Judge Although was constituted. ond, is the individualized educational pro- I Clifton in dissent concurrence gram developed through the proce- Act’s agree rejection of on the structural error reasonably dures calculated to enable the assessing harm- and on the standard child to In receive educational benefits?” error, less reach different conclusions standard, (and applying this our cases of application governing stan- circuits) of our those sister agree dard.1 We both the harmless adopted approach. structural error In- error turns whether assessment here on stead, each procedural case treats there of opportuni- was a “loss of prong Rowley having subparts: two ty” for M.L. this test for Applying correct First, was there a of violation error, harmless I further conclude IDEA, second, error, if there team, error in composition case, under the circumstances did it affect rights of this the substantive caused a violation of the IDEA and re- (“On plaintiff. See 28 quires reversal of district court’s order hearing any appeal or writ of certiorari granting summary judgment. case, give the court shall judgment I,

In explain Section I what I believe to after examination of the record without controlling be the test for harmless error regard to errors or defects which do not under why our case law and I believe rights affect the substantial par- analysis structural inapplicable defect ties.”). II, an IDEA In I apply context. Section determining The test for whether IDEA test harmless error to the facts record, conclude error affects the substantial error in this case was not harmless. rights parties has been established Henee, I judgment concur reached prior precedent. our In W.G. v. Board Alarcon, Judge but not the structural Trustees Target Range Sch. Dist. No. error analysis that he advances. (9th Cir.1992) "), ("Target Range we stated: "Procedural automatically flaws do not require a find

A ing However, of denial of a FAPE. pro inadequacies cedural Rowley, Board Education v. that result in the loss *18 176, 206-207, 3034, U.S. 102 S.Ct. 73 of educational opportunity, or seriously in Judge 1. Clifton's dissent states: at Dissent 658. Gould, Judge Finally, Clifton in his dissent agree Judge concludes that I as ex- pressed composition the error in I the IEP opinion, in Section of his team was analysis harmless under by apply. structural the same standard supported error is not I part our Our differences place disagree- caselaw has no turn on our and in the IDEA in Judge correctly context. ment on As Gould whether the assessment ob- of loss serves, procedural opportunity question violation is a constitutes of fact error, appropriate public denial of a free and to be reviewed edu- for clear or a mixed law, only cation question when it lost of fact results in a edu- and to be de reviewed novo, opportunity signifi- cational for the as can comparative child or be seen from a cantly parental participation opinions, apply restricts in review our which the same formation of the IEP. contrary but standard reach results.

653 it in edu only FAPE when results lost partici to opportunity fringe parents' child, for the or when clear cational process, IEP formulation pate in the partic significantly parental it restricts FAPE." Id. of a in the denial ly result Target omitted).2 in the IEP formation. See ipation (internal more re Our citations 1484; at 317 Range, Shapiro, 960 F.2d proce Target Range cent cases follow 1079; J., 892; F.3d Amanda 267 F.3d at at Shapiro v. Para analysis. See dural error rel. v. Island Sch. ex G. Vashon Dist., S. Sch. 317 F.3d Valley dise Unified (9th Cir.2003) Dist., 1115, F.3d 1129 Cir.2003) 337 (9th 1072, (quoting 1079-1080 grounds 20 U.S.C. superseded other in Target Range standard and applying 1414(d)(1)(B). § par aof child's holding that the omission prior from her school ents and a teacher B in the creation violations were Judge Alarcon characterizes absence IEP team which of her composition a regular education teacher from M.L.'s FAPE denial of a because amounted as a "structural error" or a they in the loss of educational "resulted subject that is not "structural defect" child]") superseded on opportunity for [the analysis. Judge error Alarcon's harmless 20 grounds other so, extrapo In Opinion doing at 612. he 1414(d)(1)(B); J. Clark Amanda v. context, lates from the criminal where the Dist., 877, 891-892 County Sch. er Supreme Court has immunized certain Cir.2001) (9th Range (applying Target rights rors that affect the constitutional IDEA analysis procedur an "egregious" error from harmless review. defendants granting automatic re al error instead of Fulminante, generally Arizona 499 See v. versal). sum, Target precedents In in our 309-310, 1246, 111 S.Ct. 113 U.S. J., Shapiro establish Range, Amanda 302, (1991); Chapman v. L.Ed.2d Califor by a all violations that not nia, 18, 22-24, S.Ct. 386 U.S. implementing the IDEA school district (1967).3 L.Ed.2d 705 result in the denial necessarily will ap including might one other contexts FAPE. While Procedural error — case, solution to a difficult plaud of members of a creative M.L.'s case the omission analysis error strik the denial of a find this structural IEP team —constitutes infringe” ability parental "seriously Target Range, addressed rors whether In process. Id. at 1484. participate in the IEP of an consti- formulation omissions appropriate public a free tuted the denial of ("FAPE”). concept The district court support his extension of this case, plaintiff family, finding Judge cites held in favor of civil Alarcon two our Range addressing Target school district had cases external our circuit parties United important promotional boards failed to include evaluation —the teacher, States, Army, Doyle v. 220 Ct.Cl. parents, States United child's (Cl.Ct.1979), Dilley v. private F.2d 984 representative Alexander, (D.C.Cir.1979). develop- F.2d 914 the IEP child had also attended —in affirmed, analogized Doyle Dilley to the structural We ment. 960 F.2d 1483-1484. Chapman, holding cases holding “Target Range clearly did not defect discussed statutorily-mandated re- required by omission of comply procedures *19 military evaluating boards analysis pro- that serve officers from Id. elaborated IDEA.” Our a er- per promotion structural a se reservists errors do amount to cedural but, rather, FAPE, preclud- per prejudicial se ror which was of a will denial subsequent review. any ed harmless error denied where find that a FAPE has been 995; Dilley, Doyle, at 603 F.2d at 599 F.2d inadequacies result in the "loss of cedural such er- 921-924. opportunity,” or when educational 654 Fulminante, context, our civil can be

ingly inapplicable case harmless.” 499 U.S. 306, to at 111 S.Ct. 1246. we are asked assess whether a where infringed rights a school district has child’s Judge precedent Alarcon apply- cites no with the IDEA. to education consistent ing structural error in civil cases our of constitutional error in Even the realm circuit, none, I nor and have found has he where life and liber prosecutions, criminal any IDEA-specifie cited cases in our cir- stake, ty at the Court has made clear are applying cuit a structural error test where we will find situations Moreover, Judge error.5 Alar- structural automatic rever requiring error any examples con does not cite of IDEA “very sal a limited class of cases.” are analysis structural error from other cir- States, v. 461, Johnson United 520 U.S. fact, cuits. In our sister circuits have 468, 1544, 117 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 137 718 rejected consistently per se IDEA struc- (1997).4 “excep errors are the Structural arguments, tural error and instead have Clark, rule,” Rose v. tion and not 478 adopted case-by-case, in- harmless error 578, 3101, 570, standard, 106 92 L.Ed.2d quiries U.S. S.Ct. similar our which (1986), 460 and “most constitutional errors have reviewed above.6 Nor does strue- emphasizing any procedural the narrowness of this limit has not established that defi warranting ciency of oppor ed universe structural defects resulted in loss a of educational Court, relief, per Supreme tunity infringed parents' Neder opportunity se v. or his States, 1, 8, 1827, United 527 U.S. 119 S.Ct. participate process"); in the IEP v. Bd. DiBuo (1999), key Educ., 184, (4th Cir.2002) 35 144 L.Ed.2d cited cases identi 309 F.3d 191 of fying such defects: (rejecting argument that a States, 461, 468, per IDEA violation should se Johnson v. United 520 U.S. constitute deni FAPE); 1544, (1997) al of a v. 117 137 L.Ed.2d 718 MM Sch. Dist. Greenville S.Ct. of 335, 523, (4th Cir.2002) (citing Wainwright, County, v. 372 303 F.3d Gideon U.S. 533 792, (1963) (com (holding 799 83 S.Ct. 9 L.Ed.2d such a "[w]hen de Ohio, counsel)); exists, plete Tumey obliged v. denial of fect we are to assess whether it 510, 437, 273 U.S. 47 S.Ct. 71 L.Ed. 749 resulted in the of educational loss Hillery, (biased (1927) child, whether, judge); Vasquez trial v. disabled or on the 254, 617, hand, 74 U.S. 106 S.Ct. 88 other it awas mere technical contra 4 (1986) (racial IDEA"); L.Ed.2d 598 discrimination Indep. vention of T.S. v. Sch. Dist. grand jury); 54, 1090, of McKaskle (10th Cir.2001) selection v. No. 265 F.3d 1095 168, 944, Wiggins, 465 104 S.Ct. ("Procedural U.S. 79 defects alone do not constitute a (denial (1984) self-represen of L.Ed.2d 122 right they of the to a FAPE violation unless trial); Georgia, v. 467 tation Waller U.S. opportuni result of in the loss 2210, 39, (1984) 104 81 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 31 Dist., ty."); Bexley City Knable v. Sch. 238 (denial trial); public Sullivan v. Louisi 755, (6th Cir.2001) ("[A] procedural F.3d 765 ana, 275, 2078, 508 U.S. 113 S.Ct. 124 per violation of the IDEA is se denial (1993) (defective L.Ed.2d 182 reasonable FAPE; rather, a school district's failure to instruction). doubt comply procedural requirements with the only Act will constitute a of a denial FAPE by Judge 5. The two Ninth Circuit cases cited if such violation causes substantive harm Alarcon to define structural both con error parents.... the child or [P]rocedural viola rights cern constitutional de criminal deprive eligible tions that student of an Recio, fendants. United States v. 371 F.3d op [IEP] result in the loss of educational 1093, (9th Cir.2004); Wood, Rice v. portunity also will constitute denial of 1138, Cir.1996). (9th They F.3d IDEA."); FAPE under the Weiss v. Sch. Bd. of inapposite in this IDEA context. (11th Hillsborough County, 141 F.3d Dist., ("For Indep. Cir.1998) [plaintiff Adam J. v. family] prove Keller Sch. (5th Cir.2003) (citing FAPE, Target Range, they [their child] was denied a holding 960 F.2d at [the "even if must show child] harm as a result alleged procedural [the child's] determination of IEP was violations. Violation procedurally respects, procedures deficient some he IDEA is not

655 iting applying find future courts a struc- litigation in IDEA position tural error histo- legislative virtually any text or support approach tural error guid- In ry view, the IDEA. the absence my the procedural IDEA error. Congress, we or from the Court ance means which to differentiate be- best IDEA cases are sub- that should conclude is to each one tween such errors evaluate principle of harmless ject general to the individually by each colored case’s —as in civil and generally applies error a particular apply facts —and to uniform See 28 U.S.C. criminal law contexts. op- standard that assesses lost educational 52(a); 2111; § P. Fed. Fed R.Crim. portunity parental participation, or lost R.Civ.P. a by adopting per a se rule that insulates analy- error Judge Alarcon’s structural of errors from future review. It subset and general applicability a disclaims sis that, forgotten interpret- should be limited, advocating per a se purports IDEA, we, district, like the ing par- only for the violation rule of reversal ents, participating and the advocates of the IDEA: requirement procedural one courts, hearing administrative and the 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii), require- § the 20 U.S.C. trying to determine what is best for a are that an IEP team include ment disabled child. However, Alar- Judge teacher. qualitative persuasive no con sets forth II 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii) § and distinction between Accordingly, my analysis takes me back procedural requirements of the other commenced, applying Tar- to where IDEA, are important.7 which too Conse- get Range standard determine whether posits no opinion Alarcon’s quently, Judge composi- error IEP team necessary logical stopping point prohib- procedural or Act."); general possibility, both S. v. education is real per se violation of Heather Wisconsin, 1045, (7th special Cir. and F.3d 1059 classroom teacher 125 643; standard); 1997) Range Op. (quoting Target compare 20 teacher. 556, S.D., 1414(d)(1)(B) (2003), § 283 88 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. v. F.3d with 20 U.S.C. Cir.1996) ("An (8th 1401(a)(20) (1996). § IEP should be set IDEA 562 But 1997 substantive, inadequacies compro only procedural and aside if amendments were numerous scheme, pupil's right appropriate affecting statutory edu re- to an entire and mised cation, hampered op seriously parents' working procedural requirements, in- several cluding process. portunity participate aspects in the formulation of the IEP See other Huefner, deprivation process, generally or of educational caused Dixie Snow Individu- (internal enefits.") quotation omit b marks With Disabilities Education Act Amend- als Dist., (1998). ted); Reg. Rep. Murphy v. Timberlane Sch. Ed. L. ments (1st Cir.1994) ("[N]ot every "[m]ajor requirements added F.3d Other new were liability irregularity gives We rise to Id. at 1112-15. IEP section." Nevertheless, focus, Congress’s purpose in under the IDEA. accounted for pu provision, by compromised the hold- adequacies have] when it our [that amended violated, right appropriate rejecting ... or pil's ing to an it been deprivation argu- array of educational benefits caused the school district’s defensive actions.") Yet, nothing IDEA stuff successful statute ments. there is omitted); (internal quotation Hampton regulations marks from which to conclude its Dobrowolski, F.2d 52-53 Dist. v. changes Sch. those necessitate (1st Cir.1992). 1414(d)(l)(B)(ii) de- own structural its separate analysis, procedural error fect analysis apart applied to the other from the emphasizes Judge the 1997 Alarcon require- equally important IDEA language of revised the IDEA amendments ments, general and at odds with the course provision, changing re- this teacher, criminal law. when civil even quirement from current *21 of to denial a FAPE or regular tion amounted Ms. Wicks other education excluding parental par- appropriate either teacher on the IEP participating team de- causing op- or a lost ticipation prived educational M.L. of an opportunity. educational poses for the child. This case no portunity This is unmistakable for sev conclusion parent of whether a of M.L. genuine issue First, eral reasons. there is the IDEA’S process,8 was excluded statutory preference mainstreaming. controlling so issue becomes whether The IDEA mainstreaming favors the edu regular to include education the failure cation of a child disabled to “the maximum the IEP team teacher on resulted extent appropriate” given the of nature opportunity” within “loss of educational disability. child’s 20 U.S.C. meaning of the in Tar- test established 1412(a)(5)(A).10 § When is mainstreaming that, persuaded I am under get Range. pursued child, with a disabled and the circumstances, M.L. lost an edu- total child’s proceeds education in the “Least opportunity cational because the FWSD Environment,” Restrictive as set forth in requirements violated the 1412(a)(5)(A), § 20 U.S.C. the crucial pur by failing partici- the IDEA to include a poses and requirements of IDEA are real education pating regular teacher ized: The disabled child receives the bene IEP team.9 of observing working fit with those statutory requirement disabled, that an are not who which can provide may team disabled child who for a is or be the disabled child with both educational must regular regu- education include a and non-academic benefits. Children who merely lar teacher techni- given is are not disabled may cal. A acquainted teacher to' become better with their or insights perspectives that aid the peers, may help disabled which avoid ster process IEP formation. eotyping, prejudice, We need not lessen prepare all say in composition that error of an IEP together students work in society. to. always prejudicial invariably importantly, Most mainstreaming is the Rather, in the denial of a results FAPE.' fulfilling mechanism for statutory goal we should assess circumstances of each that the disabled child be educated in the case, and here the record demonstrates least setting, experience restrictive which Ramsey that the failure include us is best development. tells child’s Appellants opportunity” do not contend that the FWSD’s ques- under IDEA is a mixed significantly error their restricted tion of law and which fact we review de novo. process. participation in the IEP K., 1310; Gregory F.2d Target at Range, (holding 960 F.2d at 1483 that the issue of de We review novo the district con- court's proposed whether a IEP constitutes a FAPE is Gregory Longview clusions of law. K. v. Sch. question a mixed of law and fact that we Dist., (9th Cir.1987). F.2d novo). review de Judge question Clifton concludes that the harmless error is one of fact and that accomplish 10.To goal better this and accom- findings review the district court’s for clear modate those disabled might children who analysis error. at Dissent 662-63. His must require specialized however, supplements, tools and concede, that the district court did Congress mandated that a only child could "fram[e][its] discussion terms 'loss of ” removed from the class environment opportunity' educational and that "the phrase supplementary when the meaning op- 'lost "use aids and ” portunity' legál question. satisfactorily” is a services could not be achieved Dissent reasons, '4. question n. For these educational environment. 20 1412(a)(5)(A). whether M.L. "los[t] has an educational

657 classmates, him, for in- challenges for Dorothy Lip K. & Alan Gartner e.g., See structors, a That Toward and for administration. Special Education: Beyond sky, Students, 57 Harv. But un- System All record before us. Quality clear the (1987) that (concluding circumstances, Educ. Rev. we can- totality the of der body growing” and a “substantial there is statutory vio- conclude that the readily not the academic supports that of evidence having regular a education lation not of developmental value and emotional on the IEP team was participate teacher parents disabled mainstreaming). The is a contrary, the there harmless. To prove regular a ed do not have to children op- strong mainstreaming that likelihood their chil is best for environment ucation M.L. would have been bet- portunities for rather, dren; it is school district’s bur the regular a education ter considered had the in the IEP extent explain den prepa- part program’s taken teacher participate regular a child cannot which ration, mainstreaming that more and activities. education under for M.L. might permitted have been 1414(d)(l)(A)(iv). § Hence, IEP. I do not that we the believe Second, Wicks, prior regular M.L.’s IEP that error in properly can hold teacher, written to the had here was harmless. composition team FWSD, informing district that the school on record that I conclude this Because progress” in her “good had made M.L. pro IEP we must hold that FWSD’s non- class, comprised of twelve which was opportu a “loss of educational cess caused or five and four students disabled district court’s conclusion nity,” and the needs,” that recommending “special error,11 not reach the second was I need during regular remain M.L. i.e., analysis, whether step Rowley Third, year. FWSD kindergarten “reasonably to en IEP calculated was education teacher appointed regular team, bene receive educational inexplicably IEP went able child to to the but meeting planning with the IEP U.S. at 102 S.Ct. Rowley, forward fits.” partic- presence 3034; that teacher’s (providing without see also 28 U.S.C. Fourth, past IEP and M.L.’s ipation. ... hearing any appeal that”[o]n it was demonstrated placement case, judgment give court shall could possible conclude least without record after examination regular in a education classroom. placed not or defects which do regard to errors rights part affect the substantial certainly that M.L.’s edu- recognize I ies”).12 poses regular in a classroom serious cation nonacademic benefits initially my the academic and ized reach this conclusion on I But, page 659. Dissent at question available to him.” premise that the issue is mixed regarding findings law, made its the district court predominantly factual in fact reasonably was calculated whether the IEP statutory preference for light IDEA’S bene- educational enable the child receive mainstreaming; I were but even if to view exper- benefit of the views standard, fits without the error” I under the "clear this issue having regular teacher tise of classroom the district court’s would still conclude that team meet- expressed at the critical IEP been summary theory grant judgment on ing M.L. The IDEA mandates discuss opportunity was no educational that there lost a member of teacher be was reversible error. per se Although I do think team. our under reversal from violation that we must affirm follows dissent concludes 12. The precedent, doubt the inclusion is no found "that there the district court because on the of a education teacher developed by team the IEP We M.L., purposes promotes the of the IDEA. because it maxim- placement for best

CLIFTON, Judge, dissenting: Specifícally, I Circuit conclude the failure to include a classroom teacher on the my colleagues many agree with IEP team result in did not the loss of an par- this case. important issues deny for M.L. or *23 I, II-A, ticular, II-C,1 join I in Sections him' public a free appropriate education. opinion, Judge and III of Alarcon’s and in Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Gould’s Judge opinion. Section I of In English, agree that I with' that means both my colleagues Both of focus on Plain- Judge Judge Alarcon and Gould procedures challenge employed tiffs’ to. the regu- school district should included a district, by the which was the issue on lar classroom teacher team and that emphasized appeal. Plaintiffs on do so the failure to constituted a district court apparently concluded that procedural violation of the IDEA. I also the IDEA require did not the IEP team to agree my colleagues with that the school teacher, include a classroom a view procedural prevent district’s error did not panel all three of on this agree us was parents participating M.L.’s from incorrect. The district court did not rely To formation of the IEP. the extent that only on that legal erroneous conclusion to enjoyed parents partic- M.L.’s limited decision, support its however. Perhaps ipation parents it was because volun- recognizing question, it was close tarily removed themselves from the the district court observed that if’ “even I, Finally, Gould, cess. with agree Judge the failure to a regular include classroom I expressed opinion, as of his Section a procedural teacher amounted to viola- analysis that a sup- structural error is not tion, “such a violation would not necessari- ported by our and has no place caselaw in ly constitute of a the denial FAPE.” The Judge the IDEA As context. Gould cor- district court on relied W.G. v. Board of observes, rectly violation con- District, Range Trustees Target School appropriate stitutes a denial of a free and (9th Cir.1992), 960 F.2d public only when it results in a County Amanda v. J. Clark School Dis- lost educational for the child trict, (9th Cir.2001) —the or significantly parental partic- restricts my colleagues’ same cases cited in opin- ipation in formation the IEP. ions—and determined that question “the

I part my colleagues with in the applica- whether the alleged violation case, tion of these to this principles how- amounted to the denial of a FAPE de- ever, pends different and reach a conclusion. on or not M.L. whether suffered a ought speculate noncompli- assignment here that ed in a different for M.L.’’Dissent page ance at with the standards mandated in the IDEA matter. did not Because the regu- failure of the school district to include a precise, agree 1. To be I while with the main team, lar classroom on the IEP teacher con- II-C, point of Section which is that the school

joined with the other circumstances reviewed procedural requirements district violated the above that made IDEA, for M.L. a join of the I do not the last sentence possibility, say distinct we cannot the error Judge of that section. In sentence Alar- reasons, was harmless. these For and be- applies con analysis the "structural defect" my disagreement cause of on the standard opinion contained II-B in Section of his review, supra see notes 9 and I cannot reach the conclusion district court’s agree dissenting my colleague’s with judgment disagree conclu- must be reversed. sion that if a classroom approach teacher had both defect the structural and the participated join on the IEP team “there [not] conclusion. do I in the Nor footnote possibility realistic that it accompanying would have result- that sentence. out, completely is almost points opportuni- loss of substantive virtually no com- essentially legal non-verbal. He has same ty.” That skills, majority of our munication the time of his adopted by a standard me), yet trained. (consisting Judge Gould and evaluation he was not toilet panel at the Judge cognitive ability places I of Gould’s His him Section expressed appears, it level on the Battelle opinion. large part, percentile because first Inventory.... kin- way Developmental [A] the case was framed parties, geared the dis- toward dergarten made arguments ques- reading teaching went to address that children skills is trict court terminology. very pre- using tion somewhat different different environment *24 Nonetheless, the court made factu- district school. that point

al conclusion findings process due experts The District’s not suffer a substantive loss M.L. did hearing uniformly special identified opportunity. agree with educational placement at Ele- education Wildwood findings and reach court’s district option, mentary superior as the and Pe- conclusion. same testimony in expert titioners offered no dis- vigorously argued to the Plaintiffs rebuttal. vio- that the school district had

trict court law found that judge The administrative requirements of lated the substantive regular in a IDEA, procedural require- its as well as in- classroom environment M.L. would by alleged A violation ments. substantive primarily with his one-on-one aide teract Plaintiffs was that the district peers. ... M.L. lacks opposed as to his maxi- “mainstream” M.L. to the failed to independent necessary even to skills plan possible. The mum extent in an inte- socialize with other children prepared for M.L. did not IEP team setting-The grated classroom Wild- “inte- “regular” in a placement vide for placement ... special wood classroom, kindergarten as his grated” worlds; it teaches offers best of both wanted, parents in a “self-contained” but func- challenges children with M.L.’s special disabled and with other classroom presence of an constant tion without the re- education students. The district court adult, mainstreaming offers it also plan team’s and discussed viewed throughout the week opportunities objections it. substantive Plaintiffs’ opportunities for socialization provide in terms framing While not that discussion The ex- non-handicapped children. opportunity,” of a “loss in this case unanimous pert testimony fact findings detailed district court made is the least restrictive Wildwood program developed to the effect that the for M.L. option the best by placement the IEP significant no non-aca- The Court finds M.L., placement maxim- because that benefit to M.L. from demic bene- the academic non-academic ized placement. to him. available fits ... that M.L.’s Court must find [T]he factual are findings district court’s in the classroom disruptive presence enlightening: likely the education impair would hope gain could little academic normally developing children. in a placement from a benefit balance, find that the Court cannot on de- On kindergarten classroom focused to mainstream M.L. As the District the District failed veloping reading skills. Here, possible develop- the maximum extent the evidence establishes ing IEP. his has extremely disruptive [M.L.] behav- iors and must be constantly monitored court’s factual findings The district by a 1:1 aide.... Until is' able to [M.L.] consistent with those the administrative generalize increase and receptive his law judge process hearing.2 the due expressive skills, communication Fact, Her 73-page Findings of Conclusions directions, and is able to attend to adult Law, thoroughly supports Order he will continue displaying behaviors the district court’s Specifical- conclusion. such whining, crying, biting, pulling ly, the law judge administrative found: others, scratching, laying down on evidence establishes that [T]he [M.L.] the floor and throwing Although fits. expected opportunity has no for making this behavior would be addressed meaningful progress academic in the ... aide, 1:1 it would nonetheless be dis- kindergarten class- tracting to the teacher and the other room .... While autistic some children students. do in an integrated well classroom if they high skill levels and can at- The findings by district court and *25 directions, tend to the overwhelming-evi- administrative law judge a constitute fac- dence establishes that has diffi- [M.L.] tual determination that the program devel- directions, culty attending to very has oped by the IEP team was place- the best domains, low skill levels across all ment for M.L. because the academic and difficulty making transitions and non-academic benefits to M.L. were max- Therefore, learning routines. [M.L.’s] placement imized in a self-contained opportunities a self-con- classroom, rather than a regular kinder- tained classroom are better than those garten classroom. The support- evidence in [regular] a classroom. ing that conclusion was overwhelming. support[ The level of ] [M.L.] needs This factual necessarily determination will interfere with ability to make that, means even though plan the IEP progress non-academic in regular edu- prepared M.L. was through procedurally environment, cation even with a trained process, flawed plan prepared by that staff assistant. will dependent [M.L.] be team did not result a loss of educational assistant, on his which means he will opportunity for M.L. have less to interact with peers. day spent His will be It interacting important recognize with the adult assistant and not his district court simply did determine no.t Therefore, peers. placement in gener- that Plaintiffs failed to state a substantive al education may in fact be violation of the IDEA. The statute re- more restrictive than a self-contained quires only that a disabled student giv- classroom. en an “appropriate” education. There is The evidence no establishes that the self- substantive mandate that a school dis- contained classroom at trict provide program Wildwood' will the best possible. provide with opportunities As Supreme [M.L.] for so- Court observed Board and modeling peers 176, cialization Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. normal behaviors and communications (1982), S.Ct. 73 L.Ed.2d 690 the stat- skills. ute contains “elaborate and highly specific (and us) Plaintiffs did not introduce new evidence in court before was the same record district court. The record before the district that was before the judge. administrative law 207, 102 Id. at “general ceive educational benefits.” only but safeguards” ad- substantive S.Ct. 3034. imprecise somewhat at 102 S.Ct. 458 U.S. monitions.” process We concluded Thus, brought reviewing actions IEP for prepare M.L. was used statute, are courts instructed under the correct, tougher procedurally so a substan- inquiry: a twofold make applied. should be Our case- tive standard First, complied with has the State tougher in terms law defines standard Act? And forth procedures set there of edu- of whether has been “loss second, is individualized educational The district court opportunity.” cational through Act’s developed program tougher also applied in this case substan- reasonably to en- calculated procedures only court not tive standard. The district ben- the child to receive educational able program prepared concluded met, requirements If efits? these “reasonably was calculated” to obli- complied with the the State has (the ap- M.L. with a FAPE standard vide Congress imposed by gations error, plicable absence no more. require courts can Rowley), plan under but also 206-07, 3034. The Court at 102 S.Ct. Id. so, being That best for M.L. “adequate procedure because focused held if court that even properly the district procedures prescribed with the compliance composition had been error in the there if not all in most assure much would cases team, M.L. had not been denied way Congress wished of what education.3 appropriate public free in an IEP.” Id. substantive content *26 not proce- caselaw tells us that all Accordingly, process if the Our S.Ct. 3034. the errors to violations of IEP was dural amount prepare procedurally used Rather, only procedural error correct, require that the statute. the law does not in a opportu- that results lost educational to maximize each “be sufficient services view, my In the violates law. nity Id. at 102 S.Ct. the potential.” child’s findings the district court dem- only “reason factual program The need did not suffer a lost the to re onstrate M.L. ably to enable child calculated opportunity is for the child. There Judge my reliance cational takes issue with Alarcon finding, he precludes district not because nothing Rowley on the court's which consider- itself, challenges finding he the but because impact the on the child ation of substantive finding upon disagrees my with reliance determining a lost there has been whether procedural here to conclude that the error due to a educational my approach as criticizes was harmless. He my approach error. Nor does involve inquiry being two-step set "at odds with” the Instead, Rowley question. the district second Rowley Supreme Court's decision in forth applied I described above as court what above), (and I quoted arguing text "tougher second standard.” The substantive step in jumped substantive second have to the only Rowley question under asks whether step. first order circumvent "reasonably to en- program was calculated” respectfully disagree. I at 650 I Ante n. 9. child to receive educational benefits. able the Rowley ques- give the same answer to the first beyond that here to The district court went no, my colleagues do: tion as both of more, plan something proposed that the find complied district not has finding program best That was the Rowley does the Act. But cedures set forth in step Rowley that it relates to second say to the happens what when answer impact the child the substantive considers previ- question Our has first is "no.” court process employed the procedural than rather held, ously majority panel of this holds and a plan, it is not the same here, create the but again violates error inquiry. only edu- Act it results in a lost when opportunity. program applying op- The the “loss of educational educational by the IEP would maxim- portunity” outlined standard the facts of this and non-academic ized both academic case, Judge opinion not chal- Gould’s does him, main- would have benefits lenge any of district court’s factual him maximum pos- streamed to the extent findings, explain let alone how those factu- sible, uniformly and was identified findings “clearly al erroneous.” In- experts superior who as to the testified stead, Judge legal Gould offers one reason placement M.L.’s reversing and three factual reasons for sought. parents The statute does re- district court. not persuaded. am quire anything more than that. Even if statutory The first is the prefer- reason process leading program to the for mainstreaming ence to “the maximum deficient, not, itself was appropriate.” Opinion Judge extent injured thus the student was not —M.L. Gould, (quoting lose an opportunity. did not 1412(a)(5)(A)). Judge interpreted The IDEA should not be Gould builds on impose liability statutory preference on a school that seeks to the for mainstream- provide the possible program. feasible,” best ing, “when highlighting, at 632-33, placing the benefits of disabled clearly applies erroneous standard in regular settings. students As to a findings district court’s of fact stated, the district expressly court’s order where, here, IDEA cases the decision however, the “expert testimony in this case below relied on a written administrative unanimous [special that Wildwood edu- Gregory Longview record.4 K. v. Sch. placement] (9th Cir.1987). cation is the least Dist., restrictive option for entirely M.L.” Given the one- finding For factual to be considered erroneous,” expert testimony regarding sided “clearly ap- must be left with placement M.L., propriate the “definite and firm that a the district conviction wrong concluding mistake has been court was not committed.” Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 887. district did “mainstream M.L. to the maxi- *27 maintains, Judge regarding Gould at appropriate place- 656 n. er evidence question only "the of whether M.L. has legal los[t] ment for M.L. component The is the opportunity’ educational meaning under the IDEA is a phrase of the "a lost educational question mixed of law and fact which we opportunity." predominance marked The K., (citing de Gregory review novo." 811 F.2d legal inquiry factual over issues in our is 1310; 1482) Target Range, at 960 F.2d at by portion Judge confirmed the relevant (alteration caselaw, original). Our howev- II, which, opinion, Gould’s Section in five er, only provides that the broad substantive pages analysis, argu- makes three factual issue—"whether the school district's ments, just argument, legal one and does not posed appropriate public IEP was a free edu- case, single to a cite other than for the stan- question cation”—is mixed of fact and law question dard of review. aWhere mixed K., Gregoiy that is reviewed de novo. nature, primarily law fact is factual in 1310; Target Range, F.2d at accord apply clearly erroneous standard of re- (internal omitted). quotation at 1482 marks J., view. Amanda 267 F.3d at 887. finding question The relevant of the The district court is before us is more limited: even narrower than that. The whether the error at district court issue caused placement loss of found for M.L. recommended question primarily placement That the IEP team best is one. It was the for M.L. factual determination, requires physical purely is a consideration M.L.’s That factual not a limitations, cognitive placements pro- legal question. one or a law mixed and fact Thus, posed IEP, challenged subject it alternative should be to clear error re- placements, expert testimony and the and oth- view. observed, judge his the administrative law developing possible mum extent “admitted that she did not why even Ms. Wicks explain does not Judge Gould IEP.” to achieve much academic expect [M.L.] discussion court’s the district detailed placement.” in a mainstream And clearly success mainstreaming is erroneous that a recognized Nor she also class of review. any standard error under would work for M.L. identify placement for room his reasons Judge Gould does since, by the longer, much as noted admin prepared by the the IEP believing judge, opinion, “in her istrative law failed to mainstream district school only option would have after one [M.L.] The extent feasible.” “to the maximum kindergarten in an would mainstreaming year integrated is naked observation placement in a self-contained classroom to disabled be and can be beneficial preferred day and main- part at least of the right mean that it is children does not during non-academic activi streamfing] findings child. The every single ” ties. recommendation is M.L. and cite unan- Ms. Wicks’ court deal with district a conclu nearly strong enough support testimony that mainstream- expert imous clearly court was un- sion that the district appropriate child was not ing for that as the finding, erroneous administrative der the circumstances. found, that a judge had self-contained law given by Judge reason The second kindergar the better presented classroom preschool that M.L.’s teacher Gould is surely for M.L.5 It is not the placement ten District, Wicks, the Tukwila School teacher’s rec prior preschool case that a that M.L. had informed the school district and binding is determinative ommendation in her class and “good progress” made district.6 regu in a that M.L. remain recommended by Judge third reason identified kinder during lar education Gould, Gould, simply at the fact of the year. Opinion Judge garten to include violation: the failure and the ad Both the district court in the IEP classroom teacher judge were aware of and ministrative law fact that there recommendation, meeting. But the planning Ms. Wicks’ considered says nothing violation the school district. was the IEP team and did had a sub- whether that violation recommenda about Notwithstanding Ms. Wicks’ reason for simply it is tion, impact; stantive court and the administra the district Judge proper- Gould found, asking question. as a factual judge tive law both applied by Judge ly rejects per se rule matter, served that M.L. would be better that our caselaw recognizes Alarcón and by the district. As prepared the IEP *28 factors, pos- procedural important It is to note Among note that Ms. Wicks’ other sitting in review ture this case. are not We regular kindergarten a recommendation ruling, ordinary summary judgment of an placement was first made before classroom disputed issues we scour the record for where family to the Federal with his M.L. moved posture, were the Ms. material fact. If that surprising Way School District. It is might to cre- suffice Wicks’ recommendation what team would take into account the IEP genuine fact. But a issue of material ate during happened the week M.L. that subse- here, we are asked to determine whether Ramsey’s regular spent kinder- quently in Ms. finding IEP that M.L.'s district court erred Judge garten As described classroom. opportunities. his maximized 596-97, exten- opinion, at and more Alarcon’s out- recommendation Unless Ms. Wicks' record, a sively developed evidence, that week in contrary weighed the mountain setting positive testimony, regular including expert was not classroom the unanimous affirm the district court. anyone should experience for M.L. or else involved. that not all viola- establishes want a different placement. Even if there in the denial of a FAPE. tions result The was error in preparing this IEP, fact of the violation is not a fact the student here was not harmed. indicating actually that M.L. an lost edu- If we need to consider what would have cational as result. happened regular if a classroom teacher Gould, given by Judge

The final participated team, reason on the IEP I do not past that “M.L.’s place- is think that there was a possibility realistic ment it demonstrated was at least that it would have resulted in a different possible to conclude that M.L. could assignment be for M.L. If a regular classroom placed regular in a education classroom.” present, teacher had been teacher Anything possible, highly is but it is un- along with the rest of the IEP team would likely including regular necessarily have considered hap- what teacher on the IEP team would pened during have re- days the five that M.L. was sulted in a recommendation that M.L. Ramsey’s regular kindergarten placed in a kindergarten class- Way class the Federal district. An room, explain as I will below. More im- instructional assistant assigned portantly, found, as the district court such M.L. on a one-on-one basis because his a placement would not have been the best great needs were so that he could not be placement In being for M.L. denied such dealt with part of the class as a whole. placement, an he did not lose educational There was a different instructional assis- terms, opportunity. by propos- broader tant every day, because each quit one after ing placement which would have single day. better M.L. was allowed to listen to needs, served his the school district did not through favorite music headphones provide fail to him class, with a free appropriate while in keep control, him under education, public primary requirement which meant that his involvement with the of the IDEA. rest of the class was limited at best. Though thought M.L.’s mother that M.L. aim principal of the statute is to students, was teased other she acknowl- improve provided the education to the af- edged herself that M.L. did not appear to fected children. See 20 U.S.C. it, be aware of because he had his head- 1400(c)(1) (“Improving educational re- phones on most of the time. After five sults for children with disabilities is an days, the mother removed M.L. from essential element our poli- national classroom and refused to return. With ”). cy.... goal That is not served satis- history, proposition that Ms. Ram- fying parents’ placement desire for a sey other classroom teacher which would not have maximized the bene- attempted would have persuade the oth- fits for the child. The law could have been er place members to M.L. in give parents written to of a disabled child another kindergarten classroom is power absolute placement over the deci- dubious. sion, but it was not. Certainly parents should play important role and must be It is unlikely even more that any such included process, within the and that a person would have succeeded in persuad- *29 key part obligation im- ing the other members of the IEP team. posed by IDEA. But IDEA does not and classroom teacher would not should not impose liability on a school have been the final decisionmaker. That when the IEP provides for the best Rowley, Wicks, teacher —be it Ms. gram student, for the though parents his someone only else—would have been one the team had team. And member CO., LIFE INSURANCE PRINCIPAL just reports than go

much more corporation; Petula Associ an Iowa Prior to the teachers. previous M.L.’s Ltd., corporation; Equi ates Iowa formed a meeting, the district IEP team ty Ltd., corporation, an Iowa team, FC including multidisciplinary separate Plaintiffs-Appellants, lan- speech and psychologist, a a school occupational a certified pathologist, guage v. mother, to evaluate and M.L.’s therapist, ROBINSON; L. A. Chester Constance team also recom- That the student. Robinson, individually and as trustee special placement mended Trust; Lynn of the Chester Robinson needs, rather tailored to M.L.’s Robinson; Kay Bell; Thea Wood; Dee classroom. regular kindergarten in a than Hanson, Defendants-Appellees. unani- matches the That recommendation experts present- all the mous judgment of No. 03-35376. judge and the law ed to the administrative Appeals, Court of United States circumstances, those district court. Under Ninth Circuit. reasonably that includ- possible it was in the IEP classroom teacher ing regular 3, 2004. Argued and Submitted Nov. in an would have resulted meeting Filed Jan. M.L. in a edu- placed IEP that during kindergarten cation

year. shrug off are hesitant to

My colleagues error made here

lightly

understandably so. The safe- important the IDEA are

guards of in all But in followed cases.

should be overwhelming evidence

light of maximized placement

the self-contained and non-academic benefits

the academic M.L., agree I cannot that the district findings were erroneous.

court’s factual disagree I with the conclusion of

Nor can court that the school district

the district appropriate pub- a free deny

did not respectfully Accordingly,

lic education.

dissent.

Case Details

Case Name: M.L., a Minor C.D., His Parent S.L., His Parent v. Federal Way School District Washington Superintendent of Public Instruction
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Jan 14, 2005
Citation: 394 F.3d 634
Docket Number: 02-35547
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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