Mindy Jaye Zied-Campbell and Dennis John Campbell, Petitioners v. Department of Human Services, Respondent
No. 615 M.D. 2017
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
January 21, 2026
Submitted: July 7, 2025
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge, HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER
FILED: January 21, 2026
Before this Court in its original jurisdiction is the February 23, 2024 pro se Application for Summary Relief1 (Application), in which Mindy Jaye Zied-Campbell and Dennis John Campbell (Petitioners) argue they are entitled to judgment and summary relief in their favor against the Department of Human Services (DHS) based on the allegations contained within their Petition for Review/Ancillary Petition for Review (together, Petitions). Upon careful review, the Court denies the Application.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts, averred in the Petitions and/or found in their attachments, are, in general, undisputed unless otherwise indicated. Petitioners are married,
On or about November 20, 2017, Petitioners filed the Petition for Review, naming only DHS as Respondent. Petitioners attached to the Petition the Secretary‘s Order granting reconsideration and remanding for a hearing, the BHA‘s order dismissing the appeal, and other documents they contend are relevant to this matter. These additional documents include Ms. Zied-Campbell‘s motion seeking a continuance of the underlying hearing, certain notices from the CAO, and United States Postal Service (USPS) and United Parcel Service (UPS) tracking information for some of their filings.
As relief, Petitioners seek: reversal of the Secretary‘s order; reinstatement of monthly SNAP benefits in a certain amount and be declared exempt from certain reporting requirements; reassignment to a different CAO that has an ADA coordinator or person trained in how to work with persons with disabilities; access to that CAO‘s supervisor and director to seek assistance if needed; reimbursement for their postage relating to mailing their paperwork/documentation and mileage charges for their travel from their home to the Boulevard CAO to drop off paperwork relating to their claims; an order estopping DHS from scheduling any further hearings relating to their SNAP and/or MA benefits until all of their pending litigation is resolved; and reversal of an overpayment of SNAP benefits bill sent by Boulevard CAO, which they argue was mistakenly imposed per a letter from DHS‘s Operations Manager (Operations Manager). (Id. at 36-38.)
To the Ancillary Petition, Petitioners attach 163 pages of exhibits (some of which have their own exhibits), which include: the Petition for Review and attachments; Petitioners’ request for reconsideration from the October 4, 2017 order with exhibits; filings and notices related to other litigation between Petitioners, DHS,
By Order dated January 29, 2018, this Court quashed the appellate portion of the Petitions because the Secretary‘s October 24, 2017 Order remanded for additional proceedings before the BHA, rendering that order an unappealable interlocutory order. Zied-Campbell v. Dep‘t of Hum. Servs. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 615 M.D. 2017, filed Jan. 29, 2018). After Petitioners filed numerous applications for relief between February 6, 2018, and October 31, 2018, which were denied, no further activity occurred on this docket until February 2024.
On or about February 23, 2024, Petitioners filed the instant Application, asserting they were entitled to summary relief because DHS did not file a timely responsive pleading and based on the pleadings contained in the Petitions. DHS filed an Answer, asserting no response was required to the Petitions because they were not accompanied by a notice to plead or notice to defend. This Court, by Order dated April 19, 2024, denied summary relief based on DHS‘s alleged failure to respond to the Petitions and ordered briefing on “the portion of the Application which seeks summary relief based on the allegations set forth in the original jurisdiction petition for review.” Zied-Campbell v. Dep‘t of Hum. Servs. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 615 M.D. 2017, filed Apr. 19, 2024), at 1 (per curiam).
Petitioners subsequently filed, on October 16, 2024, a “Request for Relief Pursuant to
For the purposes of reviewing the Application, however, the Court discusses only that which is relevant to resolving the original jurisdiction claims presently before the Court as raised in the Petitions. Accordingly, the Court does not consider arguments or facts or relief requested in Petitioners’ brief, reply brief, and the attachments thereto, that are not asserted or presented in the Petitions, including issues relating to actions and decisions that occurred after the Ancillary Petition was filed. See Ducjai v. Dennis, 656 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 1995) (stating summary relief is properly granted where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission[s] on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law“) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court also observes that while Petitioners appear to maintain that all of their litigation is connected and must be considered, all but one of the cases cited by Petitioners have been finally resolved and the last matter in our original jurisdiction was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County by this Court on September 3, 2024. Zied-Campbell v. Dep‘t of Hum. Servs. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 451 M.D. 2022, filed Sept. 3, 2024). “At some point litigation must end.” Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. 1998); see also In re Devine‘s Est., 145 A. 300, 301 (Pa. 1929) (“Litigation must end somewhere[.]“). Indeed, “[i]t is fundamental to our legal system that all litigation must end in due course and reach a resolution that cannot be disturbed.” In re Butko, 624 B.R. 338, 366 (Bankr., W.D. Pa. 2021). The litigation in these past matters has ended, and their resolution cannot be disturbed.
A. Legal Standards for Summary Relief
Petitioners seek summary relief on their original jurisdiction claims pursuant to
Summary relief is properly granted where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admission[s] on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ducjai v. Dennis, 656 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary relief “will be denied where material facts are in dispute or the applicant is not clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Allen v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 207 A.3d 981, 984 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). “The record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.” Marks v. Tasman, 589 A.2d 205, 206 (Pa. 1991). The record in summary relief matters is the same as for an application for summary judgment and consists of “the pleadings and other documents of record, such as exhibits.” Allen, 207 A.3d at 984 n.4. Summary relief may be entered only in those cases “where the right is clear and free from doubt.” Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co., Inc., 562 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1989).
Zied-Campbell v. Commonwealth (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 451 M.D. 2022, filed Sept. 3, 2024), slip op. at 44.8
“The moving party bears the burden of proving that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Allen v. Colautti, 417 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). “A
B. Due Process Violation Claims
The Court begins with Petitioners’ claims that their due process rights were violated by DHS and whether their allegations on these points, and the materials attached to their Petitions, establish that no material facts are in dispute and that it is clear and free from doubt that they are entitled to summary relief on those claims. Petitioners’ allegations regarding how their due process rights are violated by DHS are not clearly set forth, but the Court has carefully examined the Petitions to ascertain which could relate to such claims. It appears their main contention is that they were deprived due process because the Secretary‘s Order did not “list ALL offices of reference as to Legal Assistance in the area of where the pro se
The October 24, 2017 ORDER failed to list “ALL” Legal Assistance Offices that are contained in [DHS‘s] Standing Practice Order on their website under “Hearings and Appeals Procedure[.]”
30. It is prejudicial to choose only the legal assistance offices that you direct pro se [a]ppellants to contact. There are only two offices listed, and no referral to the Standing Procedural Order, or direction to the DHS website where many other offices are listed that an [a]ppellant proceeding without counsel can contact for assistance with their case(s).
31. For instance, the following offices are alternative offices located in the Standing Order on DHS‘s website which should have been listed in the October 24, 2017 ORDER but were not:
[list of six legal assistance offices in the Philadelphia area with contact details.]
(Id. at 17-18 (bold omitted).)
They further claim that DHS should have prevented the Boulevard CAO from making any further determinations regarding Petitioners’ benefits while their appeals of other determinations were pending before this Court and the Supreme Court. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 21; Petitioners’ Brief (Br.) at 6.) In this regard, Petitioners aver that
48. Due process requires that [Petitioners] be heard on the initial issues first, which are already up here on appeal, rather than the lone ranger [Boulevard] CAO office making and creating additional appeals so that they can find just one [Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)] to rule in [its] favor, even as was in this case, that [Petitioners] were out of State the day [a] November 30, 2017 hearing was subsequently heard.
DHS responds that Petitioners are not entitled to summary relief because they have not met the high standard of obtaining that relief.
It is unclear from Petitioners’ allegations whether they are attempting to raise a procedural due process and/or substantive due process claim. “The constitutional guarantees of due process are applicable to administrative as well as judicial proceedings.” Walker v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 381 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). The essential elements of procedural due process “are notice and [a] meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Dep‘t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 1996). “The key factor in determining whether procedural due process is denied is whether the party asserting the denial of due process suffered demonstrable prejudice.” Riccio v. Newtown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 308 A.3d 928, 936-37 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024); see also D.Z. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 2 A.3d 742, 749 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (stating “that demonstrable prejudice is a key factor in assessing whether procedural due process was denied“).
“The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.‘” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). “Only after finding the deprivation of a protected interest do we look to see if the State‘s procedures comport with due process.” Id.
Our review of the Petitions reveals that Petitioners do not identify what “protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty‘” they are being denied when DHS did not include the names and contact information of all the legal assistance offices in the Secretary‘s Order. Id. To the extent Petitioners appear to argue they have a right to have all of the legal assistance offices that are available listed on the Secretary‘s Order, Petitioners do not cite legal support that such a right exists. Moreover, the Court notes that “[t]he law is well settled that there is no right to counsel in civil cases,” V.S. v. Department of Public Welfare, 131 A.3d 523, 529 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (alteration in original; citation omitted), and, therefore, Petitioners cannot rely on their having a right, let alone a fundamental right, to counsel in their civil appeal to allege a substantive due process claim. Finally, the Petitions do not allege what prejudice Petitioners suffered due to the lack of a complete listing, particularly where
As for Petitioners’ claim that DHS violated their due process rights by not directing the Boulevard CAO to stop issuing determinations and scheduling hearings while they have appeals of other determinations pending in the appellate courts, they similarly do not identify what “protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty‘” they are being denied. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 59. The Petitions do not point to legal support for the contention that DHS must itself refrain, or direct a CAO to refrain, from acting on matters involving recipients of benefits based on those recipients having pending appeals relating to other, prior DHS or CAO determinations. In addition, the Petitions do not aver, beyond a conclusory statement, that DHS‘s actions adversely affected Petitioners’ due process rights. (Ancillary Petition ¶ 51.) This Court may not rely on conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments to grant summary relief. Hughes, 629 A.2d at 195.
Summary relief may be granted only if the applicant is “clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” Allen, 207 A.3d at 984 n.4 (emphasis added), and there is no doubt that the right to summary relief exists, Musser, 562 A.2d at 280. For the reasons set forth above, the Petitions and record do not contain the level of clarity and lack of doubt as to Petitioners’ due process claims needed to grant Petitioners summary relief. Therefore, the Application is denied as to any alleged due process claims Petitioners assert in the Petitions.
C. Discrimination Claims
Turning to Petitioners’ discrimination claims, the Court must determine whether their allegations on these points, and the materials attached to their Petitions, establish that no material facts are in dispute and that it is clear and free from doubt
Petitioners assert that the Boulevard CAO employees testifying at hearings on prior appeals from CAO determinations were unprepared and gave incorrect testimony, which they attempt to establish by reproducing portions of hearing transcripts to which they added footnotes asserting why certain statements therein were inaccurate or false. (Ancillary Petition ¶¶ 40-45; Petitioners’ Br. at 22-34.) They further maintain that the ALJs at those hearings should have left the hearings, which were held in absentia,10 open so that Petitioners could respond. (Ancillary Petition ¶ 46.) Petitioners aver that the Boulevard CAO disregarded a letter from Operations Manager indicating they were entitled to a certain amount of SNAP benefits when the Boulevard CAO found them ineligible for those benefits six days after the Operations Manager‘s letter. (Ancillary Petition ¶¶ 14, 39, 43; Petitioners’ Br. at 55-56, 70.) They contend that DHS submits incomplete certified records to this Court in some of Petitioners’ appeals. (Ancillary Petition ¶ 13; Petitioners’ Br. at 73, 97-98.) Petitioners aver that the Boulevard CAO has a history of issuing unnecessary notices and scheduling unnecessary hearings, including when they learned of a stay of one of Petitioners’ appeal hearings. (Ancillary Petition ¶¶ 19-20, 35, 47, 50; Petitioners’ Br. at 53, 70.) Petitioners also allege that DHS has failed
DHS responds that summary relief should be denied because Petitioners have not clearly established, by their allegations, that they have been discriminated against where the allegations provided do not meet the elements for such a claim. DHS points out that some of Petitioners’ allegations relate to claims that were filed previously against the same or related defendants and have already been resolved by various courts against Petitioners. DHS maintains that, as a matter of federal law,11 it cannot waive program requirements and award benefits based solely on the presence of disability without altering the purpose of the program, which is not permitted. DHS further contends that any allegations regarding it having anything to do with issues with the delivery of the mail are based on conjecture and speculation. DHS maintains that Petitioners have not been excluded from any programs based on their disabilities, and there are no facts presented or case law that support Petitioners’ speculation and conjecture. DHS notes that Petitioners have had
Petitioners filed a reply brief in which they assert DHS has not adequately responded to their claims and arguments.13 (Petitioners’ Reply Br. at 28-29.) Petitioners object to any factual assertions DHS made in its brief, contend that DHS has failed to rebut any of Petitioners’ factual allegations, and deny that their allegations are speculative or based on conjecture. Petitioners contend that they have clearly established, through their pleadings in this matter and in all their other cases, the averments of which they attempt to incorporate here, that Petitioners are being excluded from benefits due to their disability.14 (Id. at 11-15, 30-31, 125.)
must show that: (1) [the petitioner] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [the petitioner] was either excluded from or otherwise denied the benefits of some public entity‘s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits[,] or discrimination was by reason of the [petitioner‘s] disability.
Kramer v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 876 A.2d 487, 493 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); see also Watson v. Dep‘t of Corr., 990 A.2d 164, 168 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (holding that in order to establish a successful claim, an inmate needed to allege that the Department of Corrections discriminated against him because of his disability).
Where an individual asserts discrimination based on the failure to provide accommodations for the individual‘s disability, courts
have recognized that [Section] 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] requires some affirmative steps to accommodate handicapped persons. Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991). The burden is on the recipient of federal funds “to show that the required modification entails a substantial alteration in order to avoid a violation of the [Rehabilitation] Act.” Id. “[I]f there is no factual basis in the record demonstrating that accommodating the individual would require a fundamental modification or an undue burden, then the handicapped person is otherwise qualified and refusal to waive the requirement is discriminatory.” Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 1994).
Juvelis by Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 653 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
D. Discretionary Relief
Finally, the Court addresses Petitioners’ request that it use its “discretion to make any decision it deems just under the circumstance(s), which falls outside of the
III. CONCLUSION
It is well-settled that summary relief may be granted only where there are no material facts in dispute and that it is without doubt that the moving party has a clear right to relief as a matter of law. Allen, 207 A.3d at 984 n.4; Musser, 562 A.2d at 280. Examining the allegations here “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” as the Court must, Marks, 589 A.2d at 206, Petitioners have not met their burden of proving a clear right to summary relief on their claims. Accordingly, the Application is denied.
Respondent is directed to file and serve within 30 days an Answer to Petitioners’ October 16, 2024 “Request for Relief Pursuant to
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
NOW, January 21, 2026, based upon the foregoing opinion, the February 23, 2024 Application for Summary Relief filed by Mindy Jaye Zied-Campbell and Dennis John Campbell (Petitioners) is DENIED. Respondent Department of Human Services is DIRECTED to file and serve an Answer to Petitioners’ October 16, 2024 “Request for Relief Pursuant to
RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge