M.G. v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7M.G. v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7
The Court of Appeals held that M.G. was indefinitely suspended in violation of his statutory procedural rights and reversed the superior court‘s summary dismissal of M.G.‘s suit. The Court of Appeals also determined that the case is not moot since M.G. did not voluntarily withdraw from high school in the District following the District‘s denial of his request to return to his regular educational setting. It concluded that M.G.‘s long-term suspension for an indefinite period of time violated
In addition, M.G. seeks to strike sections of the District‘s responses to the amici briefs. We grant the motion to strike in part.
M.G. and his mother live in Yakima County, Washington. He resides within the boundaries of the District. In 2019, M.G. began attending Eisenhower High School. While in middle school, M.G. had signed a behavior agreement, or “gang contract.” Clerk‘s Papers at 5-6.
Shortly after the 2019 school year began, the District emergency expelled M.G. from Eisenhower for violating the gang contract. The basis for expulsion included M.G. wearing a red shirt, which is affiliated with the Norteño gang, and M.G.‘s altercation with a student. Approximately two weeks later, the District converted M.G.‘s 10-day emergency expulsion into a long-term suspension, totaling 12 days. The District provided written notice to M.G. the next day. The notice stated in part, “Due to this situation and the involvement in others, aka victim of previous threat, [the student] will be long-term suspended and placed in an alternative educational setting.” Id. at 42, 77-78.
M.G. appealed the suspension. Following a hearing, the District sent M.G. and his mother a written hearing decision affirming the long-term suspension of 12 days and a return date of September 23, 2019. M.G. did not appeal. However, one day prior to the conclusion of the suspension, the District‘s executive director of student life wrote to M.G.‘s mother, informing her that the District‘s school transfer committee decided that M.G. was prohibited from returning to Eisenhower. M.G. did not receive any notice regarding the educational services he would be provided during his suspension.
Approximately one month after the conclusion of the suspension, the District enrolled M.G. in Yakima Online, a computer online learning program established by the District as an alternative learning experience. M.G. signed up for art, science, and music classes. M.G. lacked a laptop at home, so he would travel to a distant computer lab to access his classes.
M.G.‘s performance was unsatisfactory. The District assessed M.G.‘s academic levels and found that he performed at a grade level below that required at Yakima Online. Shortly after beginning Yakima Online, M.G., through counsel, spoke with Eisenhower‘s principal and vice principal. They acknowledged that M.G.‘s suspension ended, but stated that he could not return because of his gang-associated “Mongolian” hairstyle that violated school policy. Id. at 7. No new form of written discipline had been received in relation to M.G.‘s hairstyle.
In the following months, M.G.‘s counsel initiated discussions with the District, seeking a transfer for M.G. from the online classes to a building-based high school. At one meeting, the District‘s representative acknowledged that the online learning program was not meeting M.G.‘s needs. M.G. unsuccessfully sought reenrollment in another high school in the District. The requested transfer was denied based on M.G.‘s refusal to alter his alleged gang-style haircut and on incidents in which M.G. visited different schools under a different name and was seen flashing gang signs. The denial letter cited Yakima School District Policy 3131, which gives the District the right and responsibility to enroll students and determine enrollment options in classrooms.
In response, M.G. requested reconsideration of the District‘s decision denying his transfer request. A meeting was held with members of the District who participated in the denial of the transfer decision. Shortly after that meeting, the principal of Yakima Online provided an intervention plan to M.G. M.G. opposed the plan and instead sought to return to his regular educational setting.
In March 2020, counsel for M.G. received a letter from the District, affirming thе previous denial of M.G.‘s request to transfer to a high school within the District and cited M.G.‘s refusal to change his hairstyle as the basis for denial. M.G. then sent a letter to Eisenhower two days after receiving the denial letter, requesting that he be allowed to return to Eisenhower in accordance with
The District responded by e-mail and, without a hearing, denied M.G.‘s request. The District again invoked M.G.‘s refusal to
The following month, M.G. appealed the District‘s March decision denying his request to return to Eisenhower under
For relief, M.G. sought an order under
On M.G.‘s motion for summary judgment, the superior court affirmed the District‘s decision to deny M.G. reentry into Eisenhower. The court denied M.G.‘s motion and dismissed the case.
M.G. appealed. The District moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The District argued that M.G. had left the school system for an extended period of time that exceeded 20 days, and M.G. thus was no longer an enrolled student. M.G.‘s family experienced a pеriod of homelessness, leading them to temporarily reside outside the District. M.G. then returned and requested to be reenrolled in Yakima Online or an alternative program.
The Court of Appeals rejected the mootness argument, concluding that M.G. did not voluntarily withdraw from Eisenhower but was forced to leave the District during the pendency of his appeal from the March 2020 decision denying his return to Eisenhower. M.G. v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7, 24 Wn. App. 2d 703, 721, 524 P.3d 670 (2022). By the time the March decision was made, M.G. returned to Yakima and sought reenrollment in Eisenhower. The Court of Appeals further held that it could grant compensatory educational services to M.G as an equitable remedy, reversing the superior court and noting that none of the exceptions to the statutory and regulatory prohibition against indefinite suspensions applied. Id. at 722. Thus, M.G. was indefinitely suspended in violation of
The District petitioned for review here, which we granted. M.G. seeks to strike portions of the District‘s responses to the amicus curiae briefs from both the Americаn Civil Liberties Union of Washington (ACLU) and Attorneys for Education Rights.
ANALYSIS
Questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. El Centro de la Raza v. State, 192 Wn.2d 103, 111, 428 P.3d 1143 (2018) (plurality opinion). “Our fundamental objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the legislature.” Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson, 172 Wn.2d 756, 765, 261 P.3d 145 (2011). When construing the meaning of a statute, we look to its plain meaning. Dep‘t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If the meaning cannot be derived from looking at the language of the statutory text, then we look to related statutes and the overarching statutory scheme. Id.
1. M.G. Was Indefinitely Suspended in Violation of Statutory and Regulatory Disciplinary Procedures
The parties disagree about how to characterize the decision tо exclude M.G. from Eisenhower. The District contends it made a placement decision, while M.G. argues that the District made a disciplinary decision entitling him to due process protections, which the District failed to provide. We agree with M.G. and hold that the District‘s decision was disciplinary.
The statute controlling expulsions and suspensions states,
(1) The superintendent of public instruction shall adopt and distribute to all school districts lawful and reasonable rules prescribing the substantive and procedural due process guarantees of pupils in the common schools. Such rules shall authorize a school district to use informal due process procedures in connection with the short-term suspension of students to the extent constitutionally permissible: PROVIDED, That the superintendent of public instruction deems the interest of students to be adequately protected. . . . An expulsion or suspension of a student may not be for an indefinite period of time.
(2) Short-term suspension procedures may be used for suspensions of students up to and including, 10 consecutive school days.
(3) Emergency removals must end or be converted to another form of corrective action within ten school days from the date of the emergenсy removal from school. Notice and due process rights must be provided when an emergency expulsion is converted to another form of corrective action.
(4) School districts may not impose long-term suspension or expulsion as a form of discretionary discipline.
M.G. argues that after the long-term suspension was imposed, the District was required to create a culturally responsive reengagement plan2 and failed to do so. M.G. is correct. The District was required to convene a meeting with the student and the student‘s parents or guardians within 20 days of the student‘s long-term suspension. See
Instead, when M.G. attempted to return after his susрension ended, the District informed M.G. that he would not be allowed to return to Eisenhower. No hearing occurred regarding this decision.
After M.G.‘s transfer requests were denied, he demanded to return to Eisenhower. The District denied this request via e-mail, citing M.G.‘s refusal to change the alleged gang-associated hairstyle and M.G.‘s behavior that had ultimately resulted in his suspension. The reason for the denial was disciplinary in nature, and no new disciplinary
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, if the District sought to extend the suspension, it could have done so by petitioning the District superintendent to extend the expulsion under
(a) An expulsion or suspension of a student may not be for an indefinite period of time and must have an end date.
(b) If a school district enrolls a student in another program or course of study during a suspension or expulsion, the district may not preclude the student from returning to the student‘s regular educational setting following the end date of the suspension or expulsion, unless:
(i) The school district superintendent or designee grants a petition to extend a student‘s expulsion under
WAC 392-400-480 ;(ii) The student is excluded from the student‘s regular educational setting in accordance with
WAC 392-400-810 ; or(iii) The student is otherwise precluded under law from returning to the student‘s regular educational setting.
(Emphasis added.) The District conceded below that none of the exceptions listed under
establishes its right and responsibility to consider safety when it makes enrollment аnd placement decisions. We disagree.
The plain reading of
(1) The board of directors of each school district may exercise the following:
(a) The broad discretionary power to determine and adopt written policies not in conflict with other law that provide for the development and implementation of programs, activities, services, or practices that the board determines will: . . .
(ii) Promote the effective, efficient, or safe management and operation of the school district.
follow the substantive and procedural limitations prescribed by
The District characterizes M.G.‘s claim as arguing for a right to an education in the school of his choice and cites cases such as Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 149 Wn.2d 660, 72 P.3d 151 (2003). Pet‘r‘s Suppl. Br. at
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that M.G. was indefinitely suspended and was entitled to return to his regular educational setting following the conclusion of his suspension absent further disciplinary action permitted by statute. We affirm that decision.
2. M.G.‘s Statutory Remedy
M.G. appealed the District‘s decision preventing M.G. from reenrolling at Eisenhower under
When no adequate legal remedy exists, a court may exercise its equitable powers to grant equitable relief. Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wn.2d 249, 252, 692 P.2d 793 (1984) (finding that the superior court had jurisdiction to grant equitable relief where the petitioners alleged that there were system-wide violations of mandatory statutory requirements by a municipal court). Where a stаtute provides a right of recovery, it is incumbent on the court to devise a remedy. State v. Manuel, 94 Wn.2d 695, 699, 619 P.2d 977 (1980); see also Beggs v. Dep‘t of Soc. & Health Servs., 171 Wn.2d 69, 78, 247 P.3d 421 (2011).
Considering the silence on remedies within the school disciplinary statutes and regulations, as well as the statute authorizing appeals from school board decisions to the superior court, we remand this case to the trial court to determine, in its discretion, the type of equitable relief to which M.G. is entitled. See
3. Compensatory Education as an Equitable Remedy
The District claims the Court of Appeals erred when it held that M.G. was not precluded from seeking compensatory education as an equitable remedy. It argues that there is no precedent to support the award of compensatory education to students who voluntarily absent themselves and choose not to avail themselves of educational services. Moreover, it contends that compensatory education is limited to students who have not received Free and Appropriate Education (FAPE) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),
M.G. argues that when the right to education is denied, a meaningful remedy is necessary, and therefore, M.G. requested equitable relief in the form of compensatory education under the UDJA. M.G. seeks to earn his high school diploma or GED (general equivalency diploma) and suggests the District provide him with a one-to-one teacher. We hold that compensatory education is a form of equitable relief available to M.G. for the violation of rights created by the educational statutes discussed above.
Compensatory education seeks to “make up for ‘educational services the child should have received in the first place.‘” R.P. ex rel. C.P. v. Prescott Unified Sch. Dist.,
631 F.3d 1117, 1125 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reid ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 365 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 401 F.3d 516, 518 (2005)). Trial courts have “broad discretionary power to fashion equitable remedies.” Borton & Sons, Inc. v. Burbank Props., LLC, 196 Wn.2d 199, 206, 471 P.3d 871 (2020) (quoting In re Foreclosure of Liens, 123 Wn.2d 197, 204, 867 P.2d 605 (1994)). Here, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the equitable remedy of compensatory education is most often awarded in the context of special education litigation but held the remedy was not limited to cases involving special education. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282, 97 S. Ct. 2749, 53 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1977) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering compensatory educational programs for schoolchildren who had been subject to de jure segregation); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 408 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that compensatory and remedial programs were potential remedies for children who attended segregated schools). The District cites no authority to support its claim that compensatory education is available only to a student who has not received FAPE under the IDEA.
The essence of a court‘s equity power lies in its inherent ability to adjust remedies in a practical way to redress injuries resulting from a denial of a constitutional right. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 118 L. Ed. 2d 108 (1992). We hold that compensatоry education is a form of equitable relief available to those who have been denied the rights guaranteed under the state‘s educational statutes and remand this
case for the trial court to consider an appropriate remedy, which may include compensatory education.
4. M.G‘s Constitutional Right to an Education
Washington‘s constitution provides that it is the State‘s duty to “make ample provision for the education of all [resident] children.”
M.G. contends that the education he was receiving after his enrollment at Yakima Online was so deficient that it was unconstitutional. He claims that the District violated his right to an education when it moved him to an online program without appropriate academic support, without core classes for basic education, without needed technology, and without a culturally competent reengagement plan. The District denies this and claims that M.G. was unsuccessful due to his own failure to consistently attend classes. The District also urges us to adopt a “total exclusion” standard used by other jurisdictions to determine whether a student‘s right to education has been violated. Under the total
exclusion standard, students are deprived of their right to education only when they are totally excluded from the educational
Whether Yakima Online was sufficiently comparable to the regular educational services at Eisenhower was not litigated below. Without a sufficient record, it is difficult to determine whether M.G. was provided with the opportunity for an adequate education. Moreover, because we remand for the triаl court to determine an equitable remedy for statutory violations, we decline to address this issue.
5. M.G.‘s Motion To Strike
Finally, M.G. moves to strike portions of the District‘s briefing. We grant M.G.‘s motion, in part.
M.G. moves to strike sections of the District‘s response briefs to amici curiae. M.G. contends the District violated RAP 10.3(a)(5). RAP 10.3(a)(5) states that a reference to the record “must” be included for each factual statement. This appellate rule concerns briefs of the appellant or petitioner—that is, briefs on the merits. The contested briefs here are not merits briefs, they are answers to an аmici. On its face, RAP 10.3(a)(5) does not apply.
The rule addressing answers to amici curiae briefs says only that they “should” be limited to new matters raised in the amici brief. RAP 10.3(f). Generally, all briefing to
this court should provide citation to the record. See Hurlbert v. Gordon, 64 Wn. App. 386, 400, 824 P.2d 1238 (1992) (stating that the purpose underlying RAP 10.3(a)(5) and related rules is to “efficiently and expeditiously” allow the court and opposing counsel to review the accuracy of the facts and relevant legal authority). Specific record citations are not expressly required in a party‘s answer to amici, and the District largely cures that failure by providing citations in its opposition to the motion to strike. RAP 10.4(f) (“Reference to Record. A reference to the record should designate the page and part of the record.” (emphasis added) (boldface omitted)).
Those record citations, however, do not support all of the challenged portions of the District‘s briefing. See Dep‘t of Labor & Indus. v. Lanier Brugh, 135 Wn. App. 808, 822-23, 147 P.3d 588 (2006) (presenting facts outside the record is inappropriate for consideration under RAP 9.1‘s requirements for the composition of the record).5
Therefore, we strike two portions of the District‘s answer to amicus curiae of the ACLU that were not part of the record.
First, on page 15 of the District‘s answer, M.G. asks us to strike the paragraph beginning, “There was no evidence produced in any prior . . . .” Resp. to Br. of ACLU of WA Found. at 15. This paragraph references gang-style haircuts, wearing of gang colors, and potential for gang violence. The record supports all but one statement in this
paragraph—that “M.G. is a well-known member of the Norteño gang.” Id. The record does not appear to support this assertion.
Similarly, the second statement sought to be struck is on pages 17 to 18 of the District‘s answer. M.G. seeks to strike the paragraph starting, “The decision to not allow M.G. among the genеral population . . . .” Id. at 17. This paragraph discusses the ACLU‘s assertion that M.G.‘s gang affiliation was “perceived,” while the District contends it was “real gang” activity. Id. at 17-18. The District‘s support for its claim that M.G. engaged in real gang activity and is a well-known gang member appears to come from a motion in the Court of Appeals. In the court below, the District moved to dismiss the case as moot; it included declarations stating that after his suspension, M.G. was subsequently
CONCLUSION
The District‘s refusal to allow M.G. to return to Eisenhower was a disciplinary decision.
District failed to follow these procedures, violating M.G.‘s right to due process and effectively indefinitely suspending M.G. from Eisenhower where he was entitled to return. We further find that compensatory education is a potential equitable remedy for violations of student disciplinary statutes and regulations. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the superior court to determine the appropriate remedy.
Madsen, J.
Madsen, J.
WE CONCUR:
González, C.J.
Johnson, J.
Owens, J.
Stephens, J.
Gordon McCloud, J.
Yu, J.
Montoya-Lewis, J.
Whitener, J.