M.G., As Legal Guardian of A.B., a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. LUCIE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, A political entity or subdivision of the State of Florida, Michael Lannon, Superintendent, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 13-13130.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Feb. 4, 2014.
741 F.3d 1260
Offshore also voices displeasure—for the first time on appeal—about the sufficiency of Lynch‘s stipulations, complaining both that they did not fully protect Offshore‘s rights and that they were never filed with the district court. In section II of her motion seeking relief from the injunction, Lynch stipulated in detail, as we have noted, that Offshore had the right to litigate the limitation of liability and the value of the vessel in the district court, and that Lynch would not seek to enforce a state court judgment before the district court had the opportunity to adjudicate Offshore‘s effort to limit its liability. Again, this issue has been waived on appeal because Offshore never disputed in any way the sufficiency of the stipulations or the method by which they were entered before the district court. See id.
AFFIRMED.
Joseph R. Fields, Jr., Labovick Law Group, Palm Beach Gardens, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Rhea Pincus Grossman, Rhea P. Grossman, PA, Fort Lauderdale, FL, Allen Coleman Sang, Law Office of Allen Coleman Sang, Winter Park, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
PER CURIAM:
M.G., as guardian for her minor daughter, A.B., appeals the district court‘s denial of her motions (1) for reconsideration of the district court‘s dismissal with prejudice of her complaint and (2) for leave to amend her complaint. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
M.G. filed a civil suit against the St. Lucie County School Board and various School Board employees (“Defendants“), asserting claims for violations of the Equal Protection Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
On 27 February 2013, the district court dismissed M.G.‘s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim but granted M.G. leave to file an amended complaint. M.G. then filed an amended complaint, which the district court described as being “essentially identical” to her initial complaint. Concluding that M.G.‘s amended complaint again failed to state a plausible claim for relief, the district court dismissed it with prejudice.
Thereafter, M.G. filed motions for partial reconsideration, pursuant to
On appeal, M.G. challenges the district court‘s denial of her motions for partial reconsideration and for leave to amend.2 We review a district court‘s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Willard v. Fairfield S. Co., 472 F.3d 817, 821 (11th Cir. 2006). Under
M.G. based her motion for partial reconsideration on purported “newly discovered evidence” that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered before her amended complaint was dismissed. This “new” evidence consisted of a letter written by M.G. to which she attached three police reports and an arrest affidavit. In her undated letter, M.G. explains that, since the initial complained-of sexual assault, A.B. was transferred to a different and more “hostile” school, was sexually assaulted again while in Defendants’ custody, and suffered a “mental breakdown.” The first police report and accompanying arrest affidavit indicate that, in December 2012, a fellow student made sexual advances toward A.B. and exposed himself to her. On the same day—as documented by a second police report—A.B. reported being depressed and having thoughts about hurting herself and was placed under psychiatric care. The third police report documents a police investigation—initiated on 8 February 2013—into M.G.‘s allegation that A.B. was forced to perform oral sex on another student while on school grounds. The police concluded ultimately that no probable cause existed for an arrest.
“[W]here a party attempts to introduce previously unsubmitted evidence on a motion to reconsider, the court should not grant the motion absent some showing that the evidence was not available during the pendency of the [case].” Mays v. U.S. Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997). M.G. has failed to demonstrate that the substantive information contained in the documents upon which she relies was unavailable earlier. M.G.‘s letter, the three police reports, and the arrest affidavit all concern incidents that happened—and of which M.G. was aware—before M.G.‘s initial complaint was dismissed. Nothing evidences that these police reports—or at least the information contained in the police reports—could not have been discovered earlier with reasonable diligence. Thus, M.G. has failed to demonstrate the existence of “newly discovered evidence” warranting the district court‘s reconsideration.
Contrary to M.G.‘s assertion, she did not file her first amended complaint “as a matter of course” under
M.G.‘s first amended complaint failed entirely to correct the deficiencies identified by the district court when it dismissed M.G.‘s initial complaint. Although M.G. contends that she should be permitted to amend her complaint a second time to correct the deficiencies and incorporate her “newly discovered evidence,” nothing evidences that M.G. can state a plausible claim for relief against Defendants. Because M.G. failed to demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” warranting the reopening of the final judgment, the district court abused no discretion in denying her motion for partial reconsideration.
Having denied properly M.G.‘s motion for partial reconsideration, the district court abused no discretion in denying M.G.‘s motion for leave to amend her complaint. See Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004).
AFFIRMED.