236 Conn. 710 | Conn. | 1996
In this tax appeal, the sole issue is whether the trial court properly concluded that it lacked the authority to award costs to the prevailing party for fees that that party had incurred in preparing an appraisal report. The plaintiff, M. DeMatteo Construction Company,
The relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed. The plaintiff is the owner of the parcel of land and buildings comprising a shopping center located on Frontage Road in New London known as the New London Mall. The tax assessor of the city of New London determined that the fair market value of the property as of October 1,1993, was $11,136,500. The plaintiff appealed from the assessment by the assessor to the city’s board of tax review (board), which upheld the assessor’s valuation of the property. The plaintiff then appealed from the decision of the board to the Superior Court pursuant to § 12-117a.
In its appeal to the Superior Court, the plaintiff sought a reduction of the assessment that had been levied against it on the ground that the assessor had overvalued its property. In support of its claim, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of a real estate appraiser, Arthur Estrada, who testified that the fair market value of the mall was $9,500,000. The plaintiff also introduced into evidence a report prepared by Estrada detailing his conclusions.
The trial court agreed with the plaintiff that the assessor had overvalued the property and concluded that the fair market value of the mall as of October 1, 1993, was $10,668,858.
The plaintiff contends, as it did in the trial court, that it is entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable appraisal fees incurred in connection with its successful tax appeal, including the cost of Estrada’s report. The plaintiff, in support of its claim, relies on both § 12-117a and § 52-260 (f). With respect to § 12-117a, the plaintiff maintains that the legislature, by broadly authorizing the taxing of “costs” in favor of the prevailing party, intended that a municipality held responsible for an overassessment of property should bear the reasonable expenses incurred by the taxpayer for an appraisal report. The plaintiff also relies on § 52-260 (f), which provides that the reasonable fee charged by a real estate appraiser for his or her trial testimony shall be taxed as part of the costs in lieu of all other witness fees otherwise payable to the appraiser. Although the plaintiff acknowledges that § 52-260 (f) makes reference only to fees arising out of an expert’s trial testimony, the plaintiff nevertheless claims that, because the work necessary to the preparation of an appraisal report is also essential to the appraiser’s sworn testimony, the fee for the report must also be a taxable cost under the statute. We are not persuaded by either of the plaintiffs claims.
Our analysis of the plaintiffs claims is guided by well established tenets of statutory construction. “[0]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. ... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circum
It is a settled principle of our common law that parties are required to bear their own litigation expenses, except as otherwise provided by statute. Verrastro v. Sivertsen, 188 Conn. 213, 217, 448 A.2d 1344 (1982). Furthermore, because “[cjosts are the creature of statute . . . unless the statute clearly provides for them courts cannot tax them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Audubon Parking Associates Limited Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804, 814, 626 A.2d 729 (1993); Verrastro v. Sivertsen, supra, 217; Waterbury v. Macken, 100 Conn. 407, 413, 124 A. 5 (1924), appeal dismissed, 273 U.S. 646, 47 S. Ct. 244, 71 L. Ed. 820 (1926). Accordingly, the plaintiff can prevail only if the statutory provisions upon which it relies
Section 12-117a, to which we turn first, contains no reference to appraisal fees. Moreover, the pertinent legislative history is devoid of any indication that the legislature’s use of the term “costs” in § 12-117a was intended to authorize the trial court to award to the prevailing party the cost of a real estate appraisal report prepared by its expert.
Furthermore, in circumstances in which the legislature has intended that the prevailing party shall recover appraisal fees, it has expressly so provided. See, e.g., General Statutes § 8-133 (if redevelopment agency undervalues property it takes by eminent domain, court shall award property owner reasonable appraisal fees); General Statutes § 12-161a (in proceedings by municipality to collect delinquent taxes on personal property, the owner of the property shall pay reasonable appraiser’s fees incurred by municipality); General Statutes § 12-193 (reasonable appraiser’s fees incurred by municipality as result of foreclosure action under General Statutes § 12-181 or § 12-182 shall be taxed against party having title to property so foreclosed); General Statutes § 13a-76 (when transportation commissioner undervalues property taken by state for construction or maintenance of highway, court shall award property owner reasonable appraisal fee); General Statutes § 16-
The plaintiff fares no better under § 52-260 (f). By its express terms, § 52-260 (f) treats as taxable only those costs that arise from an expert’s testimony at trial. Furthermore, the plaintiff points to nothing in the legislative history of § 52-260 (f) to suggest that the legislature intended to convey a broader meaning than is imparted by the plain statutory language. See Home Ins. Co. v.
The plaintiff also claims that public policy considerations militate in favor of permitting a property owner to recover the cost of an appraisal report following a successful tax appeal under § 12-117a. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that a property owner’s knowledge that he or she must shoulder the burden of the cost of the appraisal report might serve to discourage the filing of meritorious tax appeals. The plaintiff, however, has presented nothing to substantiate this claim. Even if we assume, arguendo, that some taxpayers will be deterred from filing tax appeals, we “may not, by construction, supply omissions in a statute . . . merely because [we opine] that good reason exists for so doing. . . . This is especially so where it appears that the omission was intentional. ... In such a situation, the remedy lies not with the court but with the General Assembly.” (Citations omitted.) Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 598, 87 A.2d 388 (1952); State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 416, 11 A.2d 856 (1940); see also United Aircraft Corp. v. Fusari, 163 Conn. 401, 414, 311 A.2d 65 (1972).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
On June 30, 1993, M. DeMatteo Construction Company transferred title to its property to DeMatteo Management, Inc., which was made a plaintiff. References to the plaintiff are to both M. DeMatteo Construction Company and DeMatteo Management, Inc.
General Statutes § 12-117a provides in relevant part: “Appeals from decisions of boards of tax review concerning assessment lists for assessment years commencing October 1, 1989, to October 1, 1992. Notwithstanding Hie provisions of sections 12-118,12-121aa and 12-121bb, any person, including any lessee of real property whose lease has been recorded as provided in section 47-19 and who is bound under the terms of his lease to pay real
General Statutes § 52-260 (f) provides: “When any practitioner of the healing arts as defined in section 20-1, dentist, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, as defined in section 20-87a, or real estate appraiser is summoned to give expert testimony in any action or proceeding, the court shall determine a reasonable fee to be paid to the practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, as defined in section 20-87a, or real estate appraiser and taxed as part of the costs in lieu of all other witness fees payable to the practitioner of the healing arts, dentist, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, as defined in section 20-87a, or real estate appraiser.”
On appeal, neither party challenges the trial court’s valuation of the property.
The plaintiff also sought reimbursement for the $2100 fee that it had incurred in connection with Estrada’s trial testimony, and the trial court allowed that item of the bill of costs. The defendant does not challenge that portion of the trial court’s judgment.
We note that § 12-117a uses the same language as did General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-118 regarding the authority of the trial court to award costs to a property owner who successfully challenges an assessment of the value of his or her property by the state appeals board for property valuation. The legislative history of § 12-118 also contains no discussion regarding the right of a successful litigant to recover appraisal fees as part of the costs of the tax appeal.