Lyttle v. StateLyttle v. State
Lead Opinion
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Dean Lyttle, appeals a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas denying a petition challenging his reclassification as a sex offender under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act.
{¶ 2} In December 1991, appellant pleaded guilty to four counts of gross sexual imposition. He was convicted of each count in January 1992 and sentenced to four consecutive two-year prison terms. Prior to his release, on March 14, 1997, the trial court adjudicated appellant a sexual predator pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950 (“Megan’s Law”), effective January 1, 1997. The record indicates that appellant was released from prison on March 18, 1997.
{¶ 3} On direct appeal, this court affirmed appellant’s sexual-predator classification in State v. Lyttle (Dec. 22, 1997), Butler App. No. CA97-03-060,
{¶ 4} Appellant subsequently received a letter dated November 26, 2007, from the Ohio Attorney General informing him that he would be reclassified as a tier III offender under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act.
{¶ 5} On January 27, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on appellant’s petition. At that time, appellant advised the court that there was an additional issue unrelated to the constitutionality of his reclassification. He claimed that he was
{¶ 6} The trial court agreed to entertain briefs on the issue. In its memorandum in opposition, the state claimed that in affirming appellant’s sexual-predator classification in Lyttle I, this court also addressed appellant’s registration requirements under Megan’s Law. The state argued that as a result of our previous decision, the “law of the case” doctrine prohibited the trial court from entertaining appellant’s claim. The state also asserted that even if his claim were not barred, appellant would still be required to register under the new duties imposed by the Adam Walsh Act.
{¶ 7} In its March 30, 2010 decision and entry denying appellant’s petition, the trial court rejected appellant’s argument that he had no duty to register as a sexual predator under Megan’s Law. The court determined that “on March 14, 1997, this Court had the authority under the January 1, 1997 version of R.C. 2950.09(C)(1) to classify [appellant] as a sexual predator; therefore, [appellant] had a duty to register under the former R.C. 2950.”
{¶ 8} Appellant appeals the trial court’s decision, raising two assignments of error for our review.
{¶ 9} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 10} “The trial court erred by holding that [appellant’s] offenses required him to register and verify his address with the sheriff.”
{¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 12} “The trial court erred by holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred [appellant’s] challenge to his registration and address verification obligations.”
{¶ 13} In his first assignment of error, appellant challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he was required to register as a sexual predator under Megan’s Law as a result of the court’s March 14,1997 decision classifying him as such. In his second assignment, appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining that our decision in Lyttle I barred him from challenging his registration obligations under the Adam Walsh Act. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to review appellant’s claims.
{¶ 14} After the trial court denied appellant’s motion, on June 3, 2010, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Bodyke,
{¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the effect of Bodyke’s severance remedy in Chojnacki v. Cordray,
{¶ 16} Upon review, we conclude that the issues presented in appellant’s appeal are moot in light of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Bodyke and Chojnacki. The arguments made in the context of appellant’s reclassification petition arose under the now-severed provisions of R.C. 2950.031. With the severance of this section, no petition process exists for appellant to challenge whether he was exempt from registering under the Adam Walsh Act. See State v. Jackson, Franklin App. Nos. 09AP-687 and 09AP-689,
{¶ 17} In the absence of a petition process, the trial court was without jurisdiction to render its March 30, 2010 decision. The court’s judgment is therefore null and void. “ ‘The effect of determining that a judgment is void is well established. It is as though such proceedings had never occurred; the judgment is a mere nullity and the parties are in the same position as if there had been no judgment.’ ” State v. Bezak,
{¶ 18} This appeal is dismissed.
Judgment accordingly.
Notes
. Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act, also known as Senate Bill 10, amended provisions of R.C. Chapter 2950 and replaced the classification system under Megan’s Law with a new, retroactive classification scheme that included a three-tiered system. The act went into effect on January 1, 2008.
. In January 2009, following this court's decision in State v. Williams, Warren App. No. CA2008-02-029,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
{¶ 19} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s dismissal of the instant appeal. I would sustain appellant’s first assignment of error and reverse the decision of the trial court.
{¶ 20} The majority concludes that neither this court, nor the trial court, has jurisdiction to review appellant’s challenge. However, the issue raised by appellant involves criminal subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s ability to hear and finally determine a certain criminal charge, including the sentencing of a defendant following conviction and any other penalties imposed. State v. McCoy (1953),
{¶ 21} The majority concludes that appellant cannot raise his challenge to the Megan’s Law registration requirements since the issue was raised at a hearing under the Adam Walsh Act. However, the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived. State v. Williams (1988),
{¶ 22} In January 1992, appellant was convicted of four counts of gross sexual imposition and sentenced to four consecutive two-year prison terms. Prior to his release from prison, on March 14, 1997, the trial court adjudicated appellant a
{¶ 28} Former R.C. 2950.04(A)(1) indicates which individuals must register under Megan’s Law:
{¶ 24} “(a) Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was committed, an offender who is sentenced for the sexually oriented offense to a prison term, a term of imprisonment, or any other type of confinement and, on or after July 1, 1997, is released in any manner from the prison term, term of imprisonment, or confinement;
{¶ 25} “(b) Regardless of when the sexually oriented offense was committed, an offender who is sentenced for a sexually oriented offense on or after July 1, 1997, and to whom division (A)(1)(a) of this section does not apply;
{¶ 26} “(c) If the sexually oriented offense was committed prior to July 1, 1997, and neither division (A)(1)(a) nor division (A)(1)(b) of this section applies, an offender who, immediately prior to July 1, 1997, was a habitual sex offender who was required to register under Chapter 2950. of the Revised Code.”
{¶ 27} In State v. Bellman (1999),
{¶ 28} This court applied Bellman in State v. Benson (Aug. 28, 2000), Butler App. No. CA99-11-194,
{¶ 30} Like the defendants in Bellman, Taylor, Benson, and Champion, although appellant was properly classified as a sexual predator, he was released from prison prior to July 1, 1997, and, as a result, does not fit within any of the categories of R.C. 2950.04(A)(1) requiring registration under Megan’s Law. The trial court had no authority to impose registration requirements under Megan’s Law. This court should grant appellant the remedy to which he is entitled. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would sustain appellant’s first assignment of error and reverse the decision of the trial court.