EDWARD J. LYONS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ERWIN WICKHORST et al., Defendants and Respondents.
L.A. No. 31991
Supreme Court of California
Dec. 1, 1986.
42 Cal. 3d 911 | 231 Cal. Rptr. 738 | 727 P.2d 1019
Edward J. Lyons, in pro. per., and Edward Tabash for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Patricia F. Clothier for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
BIRD, C. J.—Does a trial court exceed its authority when it dismisses a plaintiff‘s action with prejudice because no evidence was presented at a court-ordered arbitration?
I.
In June of 1980, appellant Edward Lyons filed a lawsuit against respondent Erwin Wickhorst seeking actual, compensatory, and punitive damages for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment.1 Since appellant did not seek dam-
The first arbitration hearing was set for November of 1982. Immediately prior to the arbitration, appellant informed the arbitrator and counsel for respondent that he did not intend to present any evidence in support of his case. In response, respondent made no attempt to refute appellant‘s claims. Thus, no evidence was introduced at the first hearing.
The superior court appointed a new arbitrator and set a new hearing for June of 1983. During this second attempt at arbitration, appellant once again declined to present evidence. Respondents did not attend the hearing after informing the arbitrator that attendance would be futile in light of appellant‘s refusal to proceed.
Although no evidence was presented during either of the two hearings, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of respondents. On the same day that the award was entered, appellant requested a trial de novo pursuant to
Appellant challenges the authority of the trial court to dismiss his action for failure to participate in the mandatory arbitration procedures.
II.
In dismissing appellant‘s action, the trial court relied in part on
A separate provision—
In the absence of express statutory authority, a trial court may, under certain circumstances, invoke its limited, inherent discretionary power to dismiss claims with prejudice. (See 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Proceedings Without Trial, § 212, pp. 517-518.) However, this power has in the past been confined to two types of situations: (1) the plaintiff has failed to prosecute diligently (Romero v. Snyder (1914) 167 Cal. 216); or (2) the complaint has been shown to be “fictitious or sham” such that the plaintiff has no valid cause of action (Cunha v. Anglo California Nat. Bank (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 383, 388).4
The discretion to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution has recently been recodified in
As this court noted in Weeks v. Roberts (1968) 68 Cal.2d 802, 805, this two-year statutory period was intended to “limit[] the court‘s independent power to dismiss an action for want of prosecution at any time.” Thus, a minimum delay of two years is required before a trial court can exercise its discretionary dismissal powers. (See Hartman v. Gordon H. Ball, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 779 [dismissal was improper under both the five-year and two-year periods and was therefore not justified as an exercise of the trial court‘s inherent power to dismiss]; see also Raggio v. Southern Pacific Co. (1919) 181 Cal.
In those situations in which a dismissal pursuant to the court‘s discretionary power has been upheld, affirmance has not been without reservation. (See, e.g., Karras v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 753, 758.) The courts have long recognized a policy favoring a trial on the merits. (Ibid.) As the courts of this state have stressed, “[a]lthough a defendant is entitled to the weight of the policy underlying the dismissal statute, which seeks to prevent unreasonable delays in litigation, the policy is less powerful than that which seeks to dispose of litigation on the merits rather than on procedural grounds.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566; Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 389-390.) In sum, although the discretionary power to dismiss with prejudice has been upheld in this state, its use has been tightly circumscribed.
Similarly, federal appellate courts have also construed this power narrowly.
If read literally,
An order dismissing an action on one of the grounds delineated in
The effect of a dismissal under
While
The constraints placed on the discretion of the trial court in this area clearly attest to the fact that
Likewise, this court must examine the circumstances under which appellant‘s motion for a trial de novo was dismissed. The dismissal of ap-
Hebert v. Harn (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 465 was the first appellate opinion to address the question of the appropriate sanction for a party‘s nonparticipation in the judicial arbitration process. In Hebert, the defendant failed to participate in a mandated arbitration proceeding, and the arbitrator issued an award in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court denied the defendant‘s timely request for a trial de novo, relying on a local rule of court which required a party who had failed to participate in an arbitration proceeding to demonstrate good cause for its nonparticipation as a prerequisite for obtaining a trial de novo. On appeal, the Hebert court concluded that the governing statutes did not authorize denial of a de novo trial under these circumstances and invalidated the local rule.
The court in Hebert noted that unlike the legislation establishing prerequisites to appealing a small claims court judgment (see
Within two years, the Legislature responded by amending
According to the report, the sponsors of the bill contended that the legislation would ““ameliorate the unfairness’ that results when a party requests a trial de novo after failing to appear and participate in a judicial arbitration hearing.” (Ibid.; see Staff Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2752 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.) to Sen. Com. on Judiciary, p. 3.)
Thus, the 1984 amendment to
The Legislature squarely considered the problem of nonparticipation in judicial arbitration proceedings and decided to put teeth into the “mandatory” nature of the process by authorizing the assessment of expenses, including attorney‘s fees, against a nonparticipating party.
An immediate and unconditional dismissal entered at the first suggestion of noncooperation is too drastic a remedy in light of the fact that arbitration was not intended to supplant traditional trial proceedings, but to expedite the resolution of small civil claims.
We, therefore, reverse the trial court‘s order dismissing appellant‘s action and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Mosk, J., Broussard, J., and Grodin, J., concurred.
BIRD, C. J., Concurring. In order to secure a majority for today‘s decision, I have omitted from my opinion any discussion of the implications
Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution gives to all its citizens the inviolate right to trial by jury. This right has been long protected and cherished in our jurisprudence.
The jury system is an essential part of our courts’ ability to safeguard the rule of law in the face of constant challenges to the authority of that fundamental principle. In fact, our reliance on, and confidence in, the institution of the jury is primarily a function of the key role that the jury system plays in protecting our citizens against the unchecked powers of government, and concomitantly in providing a critical counterbalance to the power and persuasiveness of lawyers and judges.
The framers of our federal and state Constitutions were “reluctan[t] to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.” (Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 156.) The guarantee of a jury trial, therefore, reflects a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. On the most general level then, the function of the jury is to safeguard the citizen against the arbitrary exercise of official power. (See Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 87.)
This function finds expression in, and is reinforced by, the principles governing the right to trial by jury. Jury service provides one of the few opportunities for an ordinary citizen to participate in the affairs of his or her government. Unlike the executive and legislative branches, the judicial branch‘s definition of “decision maker” includes both judges and jurors and is not limited to elected or appointed officials.
Jurors are an integral part of the judicial process. As a result, the jury system not only provides an important civic experience for the citizen, but also imbues the entire judicial process with a sense of legitimacy. The jury‘s verdict ensures that the outcome of the trial will be acceptable to a substantial portion of the community. It gives to all adult citizens the opportunity to be self-governing.
Indeed, in recent years the requirement of community participation has been amplified to include the demand for a more representative cross-section of the community in jury decision-making (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357). As the United States Supreme Court declared in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) 435 U.S. 223, 236-237
The value of the jury in representing the community‘s mores is inestimable. It furnishes a degree of flexibility to the system by tempering the sometimes rigid procedural and substantive requirements of the law with the common sense of the community at large. This characteristic makes the institution of the jury a remarkable device for insuring that any general rule of law can be shaped to ensure justice in each individual case.
Dismissal of an action for failure to comply with a court order does not always violate the right to a jury trial.1 The dismissal power is narrowly circumscribed because every litigant must be afforded the opportunity to present his claims before a jury of his peers. (Cf. Dorsey v. Barba (1952) 38 Cal.2d 350, 355-356.) The trial court denied appellant that opportunity here. Therefore, we must critically examine the purposes and policies underlying the involuntary dismissal power to determine whether the trial court‘s action violated appellant‘s right to a jury trial.
In a civil action, the plaintiff has a duty to comply with court orders and a duty to prosecute his case in a diligent manner. (See Oberkotter v. Spreckels (1923) 64 Cal.App. 470, 473.) A breach of either duty in most jurisdictions can result in the dismissal of the complaint.2 As the party seeking relief, the duty to prosecute with diligence and in accordance with court orders rests with the plaintiff. ““[N]o affirmative duty to do more than meet the plaintiff step by step is cast on the defendant.‘” (Knight v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 923, 929, quoting Gunner v. Van Ness Garage (1957) 150 Cal.App.2d 345, 347; accord, Abner Corp., Inc. v. Lushing (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 597, 606.)
The authority of a trial court to dismiss sua sponte for disobedience or lack of prosecution is founded on this conception of the judicial process. The dismissal sanction provides the courts with the power to “manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases” (Link v. Wabash Railroad Co. (1962) 370 U.S. 626, 630-631) and in this way serves “the needs of court[s] in . . . preserving respect for integrity of [their] internal procedures . . . .” (Moore v. St. Louis Music Supply Co., Inc., supra, 539 F.2d at p. 1193.)
Although the practice varies from court to court at both the state and federal levels, involuntary dismissal is most frequently employed where the conduct of the plaintiff demonstrates an unwillingness to participate in the fact-gathering and disclosure process, thereby impeding the determination of the substantive rights of the parties.
In many of these cases, dismissals have been affirmed because the plaintiff exhibits a reluctance to assist in any disclosure of facts or issues or to proceed to the next stage of the litigation process. (See, e.g., Darms v. McCulloch Oil Corp. (8th Cir. 1983) 720 F.2d 490, 495 [dismissal affirmed where plaintiffs refused to put on any evidence although two years had elapsed since the denial of class certification]; Von Poppenheim v. Portland Boxing & Wrestling Com‘n (9th Cir. 1971) 442 F.2d 1047, 1053-1054 [dismissal affirmed where plaintiff refused to comply for 11 months with the court‘s order that he set forth with specificity the acts he claimed formed the basis of his cause of action].)
The sanction of dismissal with prejudice is a quid pro quo for a plaintiff‘s intransigence. Having exercised his rights to utilize the forum, it is the plaintiff‘s own dilatory or disobedient conduct in prosecuting a lawsuit that forecloses his opportunity to have his rights determined upon the merits.
The considerations underlying the employment of this involuntary dismissal power in the trial context do not justify a dismissal entered after a refusal to cooperate in a judicially mandated arbitration proceeding. In contrast to dismissals ordered pursuant to
An involuntary dismissal under
The circumstances here differ markedly from those evident in
Under these facts, the considerations invoked when a plaintiff refuses to prosecute his claims in the trial court are not present. Dismissal here would not serve the purposes of involuntary dismissals in other contexts. The policy of maintaining the integrity of internal court procedures is not applicable where, as here, the plaintiff‘s conduct affected a wholly different forum.
Moreover, the compulsory arbitration proceeding cannot operate as a substitute for the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. The current scheme does not embody any of the features of the jury system deemed essential to the political viability of our legal system. Thus, the analogy implicitly accepted by the trial court here between a judicially mandated arbitration proceeding and a court proceeding does not support the drastic foreclosure of rights that an unconditional dismissal represents.
The judicial arbitration statute was enacted as an alternative to the traditional method of dispute resolution with the hope that it might help offset a seemingly ever increasing judicial workload. In responding to the demand for improving the efficient resolution of small civil claims, the Legislature made clear that the procedures employed should be simple, economical,
As with other court-annexed arbitration systems,3 the scheme in this state provides for a hearing that is considerably less formal than a trial in a court of law. The arbitrator‘s powers are expressly limited to nine listed functions. The most important are: (1) to permit testimony to be offered by deposition; (2) to permit evidence to be offered and introduced as provided in the rules; (3) to rule on the admissibility and relevancy of evidence offered; (4) to decide the law and facts of the case and to make an award accordingly; and (5) to award costs, not to exceed the statutory cost of the suit. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1614(a).)
All disputes regarding procedural, evidentiary, or discovery matters beyond the scope of these powers must be brought to the attention of the supervising court. (Ibid.) In addition, the rules of evidence governing civil actions apply only partially to judicial arbitration. The Evidence Code is relaxed in several areas permitting the introduction of certain forms of written testimony and documentary evidence not admissible in court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1613.)
Under the present scheme, any person may serve as an arbitrator if selected by the parties. (
These characteristics of the compulsory arbitration scheme provide more than adequate proof that the system was not intended to be a substitute for a judicial determination on the merits in small civil cases. Arbitrators have limited powers and are free to disregard legal precedent. Procedural safeguards required in court proceedings are relaxed considerably in arbitration proceedings.
More significantly, the Legislature unconditionally provided for a trial de novo on demand following arbitration. The Legislature recognized the constitutional problems that could arise if the arbitration hearing were to be construed as a substitute for a judicially supervised trial.
In searching for instant solutions to increasingly complex social and economic problems, various modifications of the legal process have been suggested. The court-annexed arbitration scheme is one of the results of efforts in recent years to streamline court procedures, relieve congestion of court calendars, and reduce expenditures. (See
Although complexity, congestion, delay, and expense are legitimate concerns, these factors have never justified the sacrifice of fundamental rights. Efforts to expedite and efficiently administer the legal process are commendable. However, our interest in economy and speed must be tempered by the recognition that certain fundamental institutions are so essential to our system of justice that we cannot change them drastically without dramatically altering the foundation of the rule of law and the basic shape of our governmental structure.
Despite its duty to “zealously” preserve the right to jury trial (Byram v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 648, 654), the trial court sacrificed this fundamental right in favor of its concerns with administrative efficiency. These concerns cannot support the drastic remedy of eliminating the long-standing practice of providing jury trials in all legal actions. (See People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe (1951) 37 Cal.2d 283, 299.) This right is “so fundamental and sacred to the citizen . . . [that it] should be jealously guarded by the courts.” (Jacob v. New York (1942) 315 U.S. 752, 753.)
Penalizing a litigant by dismissing his action for failure to present evidence at a compulsory arbitration proceeding places too high a premium on achieving the goals of expediency and efficiency. An involuntary dismissal may clear the dockets of troublesome cases, but it demonstrates a strikingly indifferent attitude toward the fundamental constitutional right to a trial by jury.
The state‘s interest in providing a forum for the quick resolution of relatively small civil claims cannot overcome appellant‘s right to a jury trial.
I would therefore hold that the use of involuntary dismissals as a sanction to ensure full participation in judicially mandated arbitration proceedings creates an unconstitutional burden on a litigant‘s right to a jury trial.
REYNOSO, J., Concurring.—I agree with the majority that dismissal here was too drastic a penalty for appellant‘s refusal to present evidence at the arbitration proceedings, which took place (1) after Hebert v. Harn (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 465, had furnished a reasonable basis for assuming that such tactics would not impair appellant‘s right to a trial de novo and (2) before a contrary possibility had been indicated by the filing of Genovia v. Cassidy (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 452. Accordingly, I concur in reversing the judgment of dismissal.
On the other hand, since it is clear that the judicial arbitration program was intended by the Legislature to be mandatory, the trial courts should actively support it by taking appropriate measures to encourage or require good-faith participation by litigants. As the majority points out, Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5, empowering trial courts to require payment of reasonable expenses incurred as a result of bad-faith actions or tactics, is made expressly applicable to judicial arbitration proceedings.1 (
Moreover, subdivision (d) was added to section 128.5 in 1985 to provide that “[t]he liability imposed by this section is in addition to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions within the purview of this section.” In light of that subdivision, I agree with Justice Grodin that “in particular situations, additional statutorily authorized sanctions may be properly invoked,” such as dismissal under section 2034. (Post, p. 928 [conc.
Lucas, J., and Panelli, J., concurred.
GRODIN, J., Concurring.—Unlike the Chief Justice (see conc. opn. of Bird, C. J., ante), I believe that the Legislature may constitutionally authorize a trial court to dismiss an action if a plaintiff intentionally refuses to participate in a legislatively established, mandatory judicial arbitration process. Indeed, as a policy matter, it may well be that dismissal is the most appropriate sanction for such conduct.
I have joined the lead opinion, however, because as I read the relevant statutes, the Legislature has to date declined to authorize the denial of a trial de novo and the dismissal of the plaintiff‘s action as a sanction for such conduct. The provisions of the Judicial Arbitration Act explicitly embrace an alternative sanction, under which a party who requests a trial de novo is required to pay specified costs if the judgment after the trial de novo is not more favorable to such party than the arbitration award. (
As the lead opinion explains (see ante, pp. 918-919), the absence of a statutory provision authorizing dismissal takes on added significance in light of the pertinent judicial and legislative history in this area. After the Court of Appeal ruled in Hebert v. Harn (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 465 that the governing judicial arbitration statutes did not authorize the denial of a requested trial de novo as a sanction for a party‘s failure to participate in a judicial arbitration proceeding, the Legislature took up the question raised by a party‘s refusal to participate in such proceedings. If the Legislature had intended to authorize dismissal for such nonparticipation, it seems evident that it would have simply amended the judicial arbitration provisions at that time to so provide. Instead, the Legislature opted to amend
I agree with Justice Reynoso (see, ante, p. 926) that if a trial court finds that a litigant has refused to participate in the judicial arbitration proceeding as a means of avoiding the award-of-costs penalty provided by section 1141.21, the court may award the costs that would have been recoverable under section 1141.21 as an element of the monetary sanctions authorized by section 128.5. I also agree that, in particular situations, additional statutorily authorized sanctions may be properly invoked, depending on the nature of the litigant‘s misconduct in the judicial arbitration proceeding. (See, e.g.,
