Defendant-Appellant Hugh Ray Lyons, Jr., was convicted by jury of robbery, a class C felony, in the Marion Superior Court, Division Six, and was found to be an habitual offender. He was sentenced on September 21, 1984, to 35 years imprisonment. He now directly appeals, raising the following issues:
1. the victim's identification testimony;
2. allowing testimony regarding Appellant's out of court statement;
8. admission of State's Exhibits 10, 14, and 18 and expert testimony regarding those exhibits; and
4. sufficiency of the evidence.
The facts most favorable to the State are as follows. On February 10, 1984, at approximately 4:50 a.m., William Knelanger, the victim, was attacked while walking in downtown Indianapolis. Appellant hit the victim in the side and threw him to the ground. Appellant fell on top of the victim and demanded his money. Appellant took the victim's wallet from his hip pocket and then both stood up. Appellant then left.
The vietim walked to the Greyhound bus station where he saw Appellant enter a white taxi cab. He reported the robbery to a bus station security officer and told the officer that Appellant left in a taxi. The officer notified the police.
The taxi took Appellant to a restaurant at 16th and Illinois streets. Appellant went into the restaurant, then returned and paid the taxi driver. The police arrived shortly thereafter. The taxi driver told the police that Appellant was walking toward Meridian Street.
*815 Police stopped Appellant one block away. Shortly thereafter, the victim arrived in a police car. He identified Appellant while seated in a police car approximately 30 feet from where Appellant stood on the street. A police officer then placed Appellant under arrest and read Appellant his rights. Appellant stated he was really in trouble this time.
The next day, a police investigator attempted to interview Appellant. He advised Appellant of his rights but Appellant refused to sign a waiver form. Appellant then voluntarily stated that an old drunk white man had cut Appellant's jacket with a knife. Appellant said he had taken the knife away from the man and thrown it in the bushes at Illinois and Maryland Street near the Hyatt Regeney. The investigator later searched the area but found no knife. Lab tests performed on Appellant's jacket revealed the sleeve was cut by a sharp instrument from the inside.
Prior to trial, Appellant filed motions alleging the arrest, search and show-up identification were conducted improperly. Following a hearing, the court ruled that the wallet and money obtained during the search of Appellant would be suppressed, as they were taken before Appellant was lawfully arrested. However, the show-up identification was found to have been conducted properly and was allowed.
I
Appellant asks us to review the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress Identification Evidence. He first claims the pre-trial identification was unnecessarily suggestive, resulting in the substantial likelihood of misidentification. Appellant argues secondly that the subsequent in-court identification was tainted by the unlawfully suggestive show-up identification procedure.
Unnecessary suggestiveness alone does not require exclusion of the evidence. Hamlet v. State (1986), Ind.,
The record here reveals that police detained Appellant at a location different from where the robbery occurred. Further, the victim identified Appellant from the back seat of a police squad car 30 feet away from where Appellant stood. Appel lant was the only black male at the location. However, at the time of the robbery, the victim had an opportunity to view Appellant at close range under adequate lighting for two to three minutes. The victim was able to describe Appellant and his clothes. The show-up identification occurred within 15 to 30 minutes of the robbery, at which time the victim unequivocally identified Appellant as his assailant.
We have consistently found that the merit of having a witness observe a suspect while the offender's image is still fresh in that witness' mind can properly justify a show-up identification occurring shortly after the commission of an offense. Hamlet,
Appellant further contends the victim's in~court identification was impermissible. However, an in-court identification is permissible, in spite of a suspect pretrial identification, if an independent basis for the in-court statement exists. Kusley v. State (1982), Ind.,
II
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding an out of court statement made by Appellant. Appellant maintains that because he was not advised of his Miranda rights, his post-arrest statement that "this time he was really in trouble" was inadmissible. The officer testified that he did advise Appellant of his rights after the victim identified Appellant as his assailant.
The admissibility of a statement is controlled by determining, from the totality of the circumstances, whether or not it was made voluntarily. The same test determines whether a waiver of Miranda rights has occurred. Smith v. State (1986), Ind.,
The State is not required to prove it gave an advisement of rights to a suspect unless it seeks to introduce the product of custodial interrogation. Smith v. State (1981),
IH
Appellant contends the trial court erred by allowing State's Exhibits Nos. 10, 14, and 18 into evidence pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. These Exhibits were admitted during the habitual offender portion of Appellant's trial and were part of a large number of exhibits admitted into evidence. The other exhibits accompanying 10, 14, and 18, were conviction and commitment records establishing the underlying felonies to prove Appellant was a habitual offender. These other exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection. Exhibits 10, 14, and 18 were sponsored by Officer Frank Wefler, who testified he was the keeper of the records and an identification technician for the police. Wefler testified Exhibit 10 was part of the records under his custody, consisting of an arrest report dated December 1, 1970, and bearing Appellant's name as the arrestee. Exhibit 14 contained a computer report dated December 1, 1970, stating that Appellant was arrested on a warrant for uttering a forged instrument, and a computer report dated January 7, 1971, stating that a capias was issued in relation to the aforementioned forgery. Exhibit 18 consisted of an arrest report dated April 6, 1975, stating that Appellant was arrested for robbery.
An official record, such as the arrest reports here, may be attested to by the person who has custody of those records, regardless of whether that person has first hand knowledge of the underlying transaction. McBrady v. State (1984), Ind.,
*817
Appellant further complains that the trial court erred in permitting Officer Wefler to testify as a fingerprint expert. Wefler testified as to his qualifications, including education and experience in the analysis and identification of fingerprints. He testified he took Appellant's fingerprints and compared them with fingerprints accompanying the records put in evidence to show Appellant previously had been convicted and committed for prior unrelated felonies. His opinion was that the prints in those records were those of Appellant. Wefler's testimony, indicating he had substantial background education and experience in analyzing fingerprints, supported the trial court's decision to permit him to testify as an expert witness. Appellant gives neither argument nor legal support to his claim that the trial court erred in allowing Wefler to testify as an expert witness. He simply makes the statement that it was error. We, however, find no ~ error in the admission of these exhibits, or in permitting Wefler's testimony as a fingerprint expert.
IV
Finally, Appellant claims there is insufficient evidence to support his conviection. The only argument he makes in this regard is directed to the credibility of the victim. However, on sufficiency questions we neither weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses. If there is substantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we will not disturb that verdict. Whitt v. State (1986), Ind.,
The trial court is affirmed.