*1
applied it in Texas.
Etheridge,
versed,
State v.
and the case is remanded to the
Cf.
(Tex.Comm’n
whether apply case, however, it in this
because we believe the Legislature has fore-
closed that decision requiring “majority
vote quorum”. abstention, of a An even if acquiesce
deemed to in the action favored
the majority, is not a vote. The Commission tells us that custom the may chairman LYONS, Petitioner, Golda A. vote in order to create a tie and thus defeat v. action, suggesting that his failure to do so The MILLERS CASUALTY INSURANCE case indicates acquiescence grant- TEXAS, Respondents. COMPANY OF ing of Gulf However, Coast’s application. against chairman voted application No. D-0664. meeting. course, first It possible, Supreme Court of Texas. that the changed chairman his mind between meetings, although two none of the other Dec. 1993. did, commissioners but unwilling we are presume that he did Legislature when the required
has a vote. Etheridge, See hold, therefore,
S.W.2d at 831. We
vote of the commissioners at the second
meeting did not authorize the action taken
the Commission.
Since we conclude that the order from appeal invalid, has been taken is
need not consider whether there was sub-
stantial
evidence to
Accordingly,
it.
is re-
legislative
vote,
body
fourths of
meant affirmative
all of &e members of the council shall be neces
acquiescence
submission);
not mere
silent
sary”); Braddy
Zych,
Gruber,
State v.
231 Or.
373 P.2d
(statute
(Mo.Ct.App.1986)
stated that "no bill
(1962) (statute required "appointment [by] a ma
majority
shall become an ordinance unless a
jority
council”;
membership
of the entire
adoption”).
all the members vote in favor of its
councilmen,
qualified
favor,
of six
three voted in
abstained,
absent;
one
and two were
court held
Etheridge
statutory language
concluded that
re-
get
requisite
that the measure failed to
four
quiring
city
a "two-thirds vote of the
council” to
votes, calling
acquiescence
the rule of
an "un
adopt provisions of title 28 did not mean a two-
Foxcraft).
warranted extension” of Rex v.
present
thirds vote of the council members
requiring
Courts have also construed statutes
voting, (assuming quorum present). Strictly
majority
foreclosing
"affirmative vote” of a
as
construing
language, especially
See,
application of
acquiescence.
the rule of
statutory provisions,
other
the Commission rea-
Prosser,
Haven
244 Kan.
766 P.2d
(1988) (statute
McAllen,
City
required
S.W.2d at 831. Contrast State v.
"majority
of all the
(1936),
members-elect of the council of
Brian D. Christine Sumner, Roberts, CA, Newport, Steve Webb Dallas, Joiner, Jr., petitioner. for F. Dallas, respon- for Stolley, Scott Patrick dents.
CORNYN, Justice, delivered PHILLIPS, Court, Chief which HECHT, GONZALEZ, Justice, ENOCH SPECTOR, Justices, join. opportunity presents case us with Texas courts clarify the method review should conduct insurer. against factfindings of bad windstorm, Lyons submitted After a Golda her Casualty Company, claim to Millers carrier, insurance homeowner’s stair- outside back to the brick veneer and investiga- Following an of her house. Lyons tion, Lyons’ claim. denied duty of and of the for breach of contract sued dealing. The essence of fair good faith and Lyons controversy while claims is that by the was caused to her house windstorm, peril, Millers claims a covered by settling the founda- that it was caused tion, Because we hold peril. excluded the bad that there is no evidence the substan- Lyons under Insurance adopted in Aranda v. tive test we Co. North (Tex.1988), judgment of affirm the appeals. 798 S.W.2d during a storm Lyons testified at trial bang- 29,1984, something she heard April She later the house. ing on the outside of the external bricks within discovered and that the loose cracked and veneer were standing “out of kilter.” back staircase was neigh- two of According to bors, exist before the damage did not knocked over a hack- also storm. The storm berry Lyons’ yard, tree in ground, which had fallen during struck the house the first storm, perpendicular away to and from the causing resi- tree, hackberry dence. Another located February sued Millers for staircase, damaged inches from the remained contract, breach of violation of the Texas *3 standing. (DTPA) Deceptive Trade Practices Act Code, the of the Texas Insurance and breach Lyons After submitted her claim to Mil- duty good dealing. juryA faith and fair lers, Benoy, adjustor Millers, Hal one-quarter of the structural dam- found that Herman, Charlie expert a reconstruction age the house was attributable by Benoy, inspected hired the house. Her- windstorm, three-quarters was attributable damage man concluded that was not structure, $25,- to settlement of the and that storm, by caused by settling but rather repair was the reasonable cost shifting of the foundation. He based residence. The further found that Mil- this conclusion on several cracks he found in DTPA, lers violated the and breached its the foundation and the any absence of indica- duty good dealing failing faith and fair in impact tion of between a tree and the house. claim, pay Lyons’ awarding an additional Herman also noted that the wood in the $75,000 claims, damages plus for those staircase was rotted. Millers denied the $8,700. damages exemplary The trial days claim five receiving after Herman’s court rendered on the verdict for report, written less than one month after the $89,950, plus pre-judgment interest and at- storm. torneys’ fees. Lyons protested the denial of her appeal, appeals On the court of determined dispatched Clyde Hardy, Millers that there was no evidence of a breach of the registered professional engineer specializing duty good dealing faith and fair or a damage analysis, failure to reinspect DTPA; violation of the it therefore rendered property. Hardy’s conclusions were take-nothing judgment on those claims.1 identical to Herman’s. He likewise noted the Lyons complains appeals’ here of the court of existence of numerous cracks in the founda- supports conclusion that no evidence tion, indicating settling shifting, jury’s finding of bad faith. any absence of evidence of contact between a 5, 1984, tree and the house. On October recognized duty We first an insurer’s tort Hardy’s report, based on again de- good dealing faith and fair to its insured in nied claim. County Arnold v. National Mutual Fire Ins. Co., (Tex.1987), in which we August Lyons Avila, hired Marcus stated: engineer an architect and resident with Trin- duty A for breach cause action ity Materials, inspect Construction good dealing and fair stated when property. By inspection, the time of Avila’s alleged it is that there is no reasonable collapsed following the staircase had a second basis for denial of a claim or storm on March 1985. Avila concluded part payment or a failure on the original damage to the staircase and insurer to determine whether the brick veneer had been caused delay. reasonable basis for the denial or April 1984 storm. He theorized that added). surviving hackberry duty tree located (emphasis near Id. at 167 That staircase, laying relationship rather than the one found special arises from the between appeals legally poli- 1. The court did find and factu- should have been submitted in terms of the ally jury's exclusion, sufficient evidence to cy find- not which excluded losses ing damage was attributable to 25% "settling, cracking, bulg- settling from but from windstorm, but nonetheless reversed and re- ing, shrinkage, expansion of foundations.” manded the contract claim because of sub- question The court also determined that two did Question mission of an erroneous issue. proof properly place the burden of percentage two asked the to determine the prove was not caused percent- of age caused windstorm and the problems. S.W.2d at foundation "settlement of structure.” The challenged these determinations. has not appeals question concluded that St.Mary’s (1993); L.J. William resulting insured from insurer and the Ratliff, Powers, Another Look at disproportionately favorable Jr. & Jack the insurer’s Evidence," handling the claims bargaining posture in “No Evidence” and “Insufficient (1991); process. Robert W. L.Rev. Calvert, Evidence” and “No “Insufficient later, year in Aranda v. Insurance A Error, Points 38 Texas L.Rev. Evidence” estab we said that to Co. North (1960). courts of Our liability for the tort of bad lish an insurer’s struggled to reconcile the insurer’s sub have prove: faith the insured must the Aranda test and rights under stantive (1) reasonable basis for the absence of a of the no evidence statement the traditional delaying payment of the bene- denying or Lloyds, Farm review. See State standard of *4 (2) that the carrier policy fits Polasek, that there was or should have known knew (sur denied) 1992, writ App. Antonio - San denying the reasonable basis for not a about the noting “confusion veying cases and of the claim. delaying payment or claim legal assessing the suffi approach for proper in (emphasis finding”). ciency of a bad faith distinguished the insur- original).2 alsoWe contract of insurance liability er’s under the demonstrates, we believe As this of bad liability for the tort from the insurer’s legal reviewing the that when a court stated, “[C]arriers,” “will maintain we faith. supporting a bad sufficiency of the evidence deny questionable or right to invalid the rela finding, should be on faith its focus subject [bad faith] not be to claims and will arguably supporting evidence tionship of the denial of a claim.” liability for an erroneous bad the elements of finding faith to the bad words, if has denied In other the insurer Id. presented, viewed The evidence faith. claim to be a valid is later determined what prevailing party, to the light most favorable insurance, the insurer the contract of under infer logical permit must be such as to damages up to the respond in actual must had no reasonable basis ence that the insurer long the insurer has But as as policy limits. claim, and delay deny payment of the to or deny delay payment to or a reasonable basis it have known had that it knew or should claim, eventually if that basis is See Pittman basis for its actions. reasonable erroneous, by the factfinder to determined Baladez, insurer for the tort of bad is not liable (1958). to the tort must relate The evidence faith. for denial or basis issue of no reasonable Appellate review of claim, just to the delay payment of a judgment for the supporting a the evidence nothing coverage. This is issue of contract however, case, presents in a bad faith insured application of our particularized a more than among Primary these is problems. unusual This focus on review. traditional no evidence scouring reviewing a court the conundrum to the elements its relation the evidence and claim that an insurer’s the record evaluate necessary maintain the faith is bad fact, that negative “no evidence” of there is on the claim a contract distinction between basis is, had no reasonable that the insurer of bad policy, and a claim claim. delay payment of a deny or from the arises denial of that of the standard statement The traditional in Arnold imposed on insurers duty we tort requires legal sufficiency of review and Aranda. favoring only the evidence to consider court support by Lyons offered The evidence and to disre- judgment for the insured finding consisted of Avila’s See, contrary. bad gard all evidence caused the dam- Stores, Inc., windstorm E-Z Mart Havner v. and her Hall, (Tex.1992); age, Revis- Wendell W. and staircase brick veneer neighbors that the Appeals, iting Review in Civil Standards of accordingly. analysis formula- our the Aranda strict case was tried under 2. This test, therefore re- and we tion of the bad faith visibly damaged were after the storm. policy ultimately insurance was estab- supports jury’s evidence finding Focusing specific lished. on the elements Lyons’ damage part was proved support that must be wind, and therefore claim was covered bad faith and the evidence offered to words, policy. Millers In other finding, agree ap- with the court of was mistaken liability. as to its contract peals that there is no evidence that Millers jury was entitled to resolve the conflict be- deny had no reasonable payment basis to tween evidence that the windstorm Lyons’ claim.3 caused the and Millers’ evidence that By cross-application Millers con settling of the foundation caused the tends that the court of should have If the concluded that the for- rendered in its favor on the con credible, mer is more and some evidence allegedly tract claim because supports that finding, our inquiry as to con- providing a basis for the liability tractual is concluded. allocate the between the storm and But the issue of bad faith focuses not problems. structural covered and ex valid, on whether the claim was but perils injury, cluded combine to cause an reasonableness of the insurer’s conduct in present insured must some evidence afford *5 rejecting the claim. coverage Evidence of ing a reasonable basis on which to might in some support circumstances a find allocate the Paulson v. Fire Ins. ing that an any insurer lacked reasonable (Tex.1965). Exch., 316, 319 Mil basis for denying a example, Lyons lers provide asserts that failed to such the insurer unreasonably disregards the evi evidence, expert “likely” as her admitted the coverage. case, however, dence of In this presence preexisting damage of some and Lyons no reports offered evidence that the that determination of the extent of storm- experts Millers’ objectively pre were not damage “very related would be hard.” Ex pared, or that Millers’ reliance on them was pert damages allocation of between covered unreasonable, any or other evidence from not, however, and excluded risks is necessari which a factfinder could infer that Millers ly required; circumstantial evidence can suf acted without a reasonable basis and that it Fidelity fice. See United States and Guar. or knew should have known that it lacked a (Tex. Morgan, 399 540 S.W.2d contrast, reasonable basis for its actions. 1966). testimony The and her Miguel pleaded only Aranda sup facts neighbors preexisting that there was no dam porting coverage, but also alleged that age to the staircase or brick veneer constitut companies ignored insurance their own ad damage ed some evidence of the extent of justers’ Aranda, pay advice to his claim. 748 solely attributable to the windstorm. 213-14. S.W.2d at Under the rule estab Aranda, rendition, As deny grounds lished in additional Mil- Lyons’ Millers could exposing appeals’ claim without itself to lers relies on the court of determina- a bad faith judgment reasonably charge improperly if it tion that expert relied on instructed reports indicating by loss was not caused on allocation of the cause of the peril, though a covered liability damage4 support its assertion that (1) adjuster 3. Evidence that the claims refused to after the claim was denied the first time condone, speak Lyons investigator an support was sent out is not behavior we but does not after denied, (2) adjuster unreasonably and the claim was and Millers’ acted in inference that neighbors, denying report. did not interview her does not amount the claim based on Herman’s supporting to more than a scintilla of evidence Con/Chem, Inc., Question bad faith. See Kindred v. 650 4. two asked the to determine the (Tex.1983) ("when damage percentage 63 the evidence the windstorm prove percentage offered to a vital fact is so weak as to do "settlement of struc- cause suspicion appeals more than create a mere or surmise ture." The court determined both existence, question the evidence is no more than a that should have been submitted in and, effect, evidence”). precise language policy scintilla in is no terms of the more neighbors proof of her was cumulative should exclusion and the burden have placed own that was visible been on the insured to show that adjuster’s speak problems. after the storm. The refusal was not caused foundation 602 constituted waiver of “must consider the evidence infer
erroneous submission agree tending support jury’s finding, Lyons’ contract claim. We with ences appropriate disposi- favorably court of most find viewed tion remand than contrary rather rendition. ing, disregard all evidence and Stores, Havner E-Z Mart inferences.” Accordingly, affirm Inc., (Tex.1992); 458 see appeals. Alviar, 395 823 Garza v. Canode, 1965); Tex. Cartwright v. DOGGETT, Justice, joined by (1914). If more than a S.W. GAMMAGE, Justices, HIGHTOWER and exists, the claim is scintilla of such evidence dissenting. law, a matter of chal sufficient as unequivocal constitutional com weight to be lenges go merely to the accord industry mand and concern for insurance Stafford, ed the evidence. Stafford Court, longer in this the outcome is no collide (Tex.1987); King’s In re Es 1891, the Constitu in doubt.1 Since tate, required has that “the decision of the tion (1951). jurors empowered to Although are appeals] on all shall conclusive [courts credibility qualitatively evaluate brought questions of fact before them weight conclude that it of some evidence and Const, V, § art. appeal error.” Tex. evidence, the Texas Constitu constitutes terms, express provision “restrict[s] performing from precludes tion this Court court, jurisdiction supreme ... that task. it to of law.” questions confine[s] Choate Ry., San Antonio & A.P. Tex. an- Today’s opinion changes all (1898); rule, Coulson v. Lake LBJ previously see S.W. unknown nouncing a new *6 Dist., 594, Municipal Utility 781 S.W.2d 597 no review: evidence (Tex.1989) (acknowledging that Court this legal suffi- reviewing court is when a jurisdiction suffi has no to undertake factual a supporting bad ciency of the evidence review); Fe ciency Gulf, Colorado & Santa finding, its should be faith focus 466, Deen, Ry. v. 158 Tex. 312 S.W.2d Co. arguably sup- of the relationship evidence (1958) 933, (Supreme Court cannot 937-38 to the finding bad ele- porting the faith review); sufficiency v. factual Wilson conduct faith. ments of bad 226, 607, 145 201 S.W.2d 227 Tex. Wilson (1947) (“Supreme is not with Court invested seemingly 600. innocu 866 at S.W.2d facts”); also W. power determine see by which is a device this pronouncement ous Hall, Revisiting Standards Re Wendell circumvent the Constitution Court can St.Mary’s 24 L.J. Appeals, in Civil view weight credibility consider (1993) (constitutional 1045, “provision 1139 evidence, something only by now known until judicial a on the author ... acts as limitation its review. true name —a supreme ity of the court confines “nothing more a Disguising its work as than law.”). jurisdiction questions traditional particularized application of our review,” majority cites as its Constitution, no evidence compliance with the Baladez, 158 Tex. Court, authority sole v. determining point, a “no evidence” Pittman 17, 67, 1993) (Tex. challenge Sup.Ct.J. October 75 at As does not 798 S.W.2d 345. Conoco, J., dissenting); v. 868 application (Doggett, in her for writ of these conclusions Ruiz J., 752, error, (1993) (Hightower, 760 dissent neither. S.W.2d consider ing rehearing); v. Tank Co. Brother National 193, (Tex.1993, ton, orig. pro S.W.2d 195 Today's opinion example 851 one is but Air (Tex.1993); ceeding); Ass’n v. Texas Control precedent Bus. Court’s recent indifference to and its 440, Bd., n. 10 S.W.2d 446 852 commitment to wholesale revision of Texas law. 593, Kerr, See, Saenz, e.g., Corp. Boyles 855 595-96 v. WL v. S.W.2d General Motors 1993 833, Packer, J., 1993); (Tex.1993) (Doggett, dissenting); 827 S.W.2d *9 C Walker 483479 (Tex.1992, Nationwide, orig. proceeding); Thompson, Carrollton-Farmers 1993 WL & H Inc. J., (Tex.1993) EdgewoodIndep. Indep. (Doggett dissenting); Sch. Sch. Dist. v. 483450 *18 Branch Dist., (Tex.1992); Industries, Lee, 37 520 n. 1993 S.W.2d WL 826 Dresser
603
(1968),
If,
conclusively
a case
established
record.
says nothing
legal sufficiency
about
review or
upon
reviewing
evidence in the
most
only
evidence
bad faith but
concerns
verdict,
favorable to the
reasonable minds
admissibility
justifica
of evidence. The sole
could
to the
differ as
reasonableness of
given
tion
for this new
ne
[the]
focus “is
denial,
challenge
claim’s
the no-evidence
fails.
cessity] to maintain the
between
distinction
Con/Chem, Inc.,
See
Kindred v.
policy,
a
claim on the
claim of
contract
and a
(Tex.1983).
approach
This is the
delay
bad
or
denial.”
generally
courts of
have
followed
cryptic
hardly
600. This
comment
consti
determining
whether there
no evi
a
tutes
decent
for this
rationalization
dence
unreasonableness.2
of an insurer’s
unprecedented disregard of our constitution
century
of jurisprudence.
and over
relevancy analysis
Substituting
new
law,
ma
previously
well-established
I.
jority arbitrarily
any explanation
and without
prohibition
The constitutional
fact-
against
declares that evidence
offers to show
finding
applies,
this Court
no
than
less
coverage.
evidence of
bad faith is
The
situation,
any other
to an insurer’s contention
categorical
drawn here between
distinction
is no
evidence to
coverage
evidence relevant
and evidence
denial of a claim without
relevant to bad
conflicts with our hold
basis.
today,
reasonable
Until
reasonable
v. Ins.
ing in
Co. North
Aranda
recognized
been
question
ness had
as a
(Tex.1988),
in
See,
fact to
decided
the fact-finder.
presentation
sured’s
evidence
insur
Sharpe,
Corp.
Adam Dante
er that his claims were covered constituted
cases);
(citing
some evidence that there was
reasonable
Crowe,
Nationwide Mutual Ins.
basis for
See also St. Paul Ins. Co.
denial.
(Tex.App.
[1st
- Houston
Luker,
(Tex.App
pending).
appellate
writ
. Tex
Dist.]
An
writ) (evidence
contradicting
arkana
weigh
should not
conflicting
court
evidence
assertion,
the insurer’s factual
which formed
conducting
review; rather,
a no
all
coverage,
the basis for its denial
is suffi
conflicts must be resolved
in favor
challenge
cient alone to
a no evidence
defeat
verdict.
effect of this
is that
standard
*7
finding
jury
to a
that the denial was unrea
appealing
insurer must demonstrate that
sonable).
a reasonable basis for
denial is
delay or
1,
897,
Sterling,
(Tex.App. Corpus
Title Guar.
Stewart
Co. v.
822 S.W.2d
805 S.W.2d
905
Christi
-
(Tex.1 991).
1991,
denied) (in "no
of
5-6
writ
evidence” review
basis,
jury finding of no reasonable
"we consider
See, e.g.,
State Farm Fire &
v. Sim
Cas. Co.
only
and reasonable inferences that
the evidence
mons,
126,
(Tex.App
S.W.2d
857
132-36
jury findings,
disregard
. -Beau
support the
and
tend to
1993,
(court
pending)
conducting
mont
writ
no
contrary");
inferences to the
all evidence and
guess
review
evidence
should not
fact-
"second
Zubiate,
Auto. Ins. Co. v.
808
State Farm Mut.
only
unless
finders
one inference
be drawn
could
1991,
590,
(Tex.App.
Paso
writ
S.W.2d
596
- El
evidence”);
Lloyd's
from the
Commonwealth
Ins.
denied) (considering only evidence of no reason
Thomas,
135,
(Tex.App.-
825 S.W.2d
143
able
most favorable to
basis viewed
1992) (testimony
expert
Dallas
of insured’s
wit
Luker,
verdict);
Guardian Ins. Co. v.
801
St. Paul
inadequacy
investigation
to
ness as
insurer’s
(Tex.App.
620
S.W.2d
- Texarkana
some evidence of
ba
constituted
no reasonable
writ) (conducting legal sufficiency
review of
sis), judgment
pursuant
set aside
settlement
faith,
to
finding
only
"the court considers
the
of bad
(Tex. 1993);
agreement,
relevant consideration of vious and visible nature of the coverage dispute, majority necessarily by photographs, was evidenced authenticated credibility, sufficiency post-storm evaluates the showing as condition of the weight experts house, in order to find revealing Millers’ severe to the stair- serious, investigation adequate that their was wall; way the brick the rear and to ac- factually constituted a reasonable basis eyewitness, cording to one the brick veneer Lyons’ denial of To extent claim. separated pulled away “quite had a dis- majority implicitly disparages that the house. tance” from testimony Lyons’ expert inadequate as to initially denied claim Millers within credibility overcome attributed to Mil- receipt solely on the a month of its basis of a experts, engaging very type it lers’ is “report”; three sentence written claims precluded review adjustor Lyons, to talk refused to V, Article section 6 of the Constitution. point hanging up she called with
II.
investigators consciously
inquiries; and
independent eye
any
interview
chose not to
incomplete summary
An obscure and
years
Lyons,
two
after
until
almost
witnesses
today’s
presented
opinion:
the record is
claim,
Compare
filed suit.
State
making her
by Lyons
evidence offered
[t]he
Moran,
Ins. Co.
Farm Mut.
of the bad faith
of Avila’s
consisted
(Tex.App. Corpus Christi
opinion that
caused the
the windstorm
-
denied) (insurer’s
writ
failure
interview
damage,
and that of her
relating
eyewitnesses
two
occurrence
veneer
stair-
neighbors that the brick
factually sufficient
coverage
legally and
is
visibly damaged
after the storm.
were
faith).
of bad
evidence
Although
this evi-
600-601.
acknowledged
is
to be relevant to
dence
Condemning it as
Ms.
“cumulative
Lyons’
majori-
validity
coverage
majority
excuses
opinion,”
own
ty
any
declares that
this nor
other
neither
failure
interview
completely the insurer’s
to Millers’ bad faith:
relevant
aftermath of the
only eyewitnesses
reports
offered no evidence
it
at 601. What is
windstorm. 866 S.W.2d
objectively
experts
Millers’
were
neigh-
is a
whose source
about observations
them
prepared, or that Millers’ reliance on
inherently worthless?
bor that makes them
unreasonable,
other evidence
why
as to
any explanation
Nor
offered
a factfinder could infer that
from which
appearance
“damage
was visi-
[which]
acted without a reasonable basis
significance.
ble
the storm” has
after
it
and that
knew or should have known
easily
n. 3.
it could
at 601
While
*8
it lacked a reasonable basis for
holding
investiga-
that insurance
misread as
actions.
insured without even
tors can disbelieve an
thorough
A
review of the
witnesses,
today’s
bothering
interview
to
just
reveals that
this is
not true.
record
Note
actually more narrow.
three
opinion is
Corroborating Lyons’
testimony
own
re-
for
method contrived
merely represents the
damage
by
the house
garding
to
caused
life
vaporize
to
testi-
particular
windstorm,
Zivot, neighbor
a
and for-
Louie
justify
in order
a
mony
three Texans
Perot,
lawyer for
Ross
testified that
mer
H.
result.
preconceived
by
damaged
stairway
the back
was
the storm
other
majority fails mention
evi-
being
dangerous
point
too
use.
that,
in a
favor-
interpreted
dence
storm,
had
he also
observed
Until
verdict,
bad faith on
jury’s
shows
able to the
Having
damage.
been in
veneer
brick
insurer. Millers continued
of the
backyard
day
part
oc-
both the
after this
Lyons’ claim even
it,
any payment on
refuse
times before
another
and several
currence
engineering report
Hairston,
produced
after she
Mary
observed
neighbor,
means,
fully explored by
never
previously
explaining
functional
a
the rear wall and the
insurer,
(insurer’s
by
pending)
duty
good
which the windstorm had
in
faith
part
fair,
caused at least
“obligation
objec
cludes an
to conduct a
tive, thorough
systematic investigation^]
and
Additional evidence was introduced from
...,
every
considering]
turning] over
leaf
jury
which
could have
concluded
positive along
negative,
with the
and
perfunctory
claim was denied after
a
indulging]
policy
holder with the benefit
incomplete investigation,
purpose
which
doubt.”);
Moody,
at 607
fully ignored
contradicting
Millers’
(“duty
good
dealing
fair
predetermined
Simmons,
conclusions. See
(some
breached when there is no reasonable basis
TEXAS Flint, ANCE, Georgia Permanent Re D. Indemnity Financial ceiver Standard Corporation.
No. D-4305. Texas. Court of Supreme 31, Dec. to remand for parties motion of Joint INSURANCE LLOYDS SERVICE filed herein dismissal entry settlement and COMPANY appli- granted; is December granted without error is writ of cation for merits; judgments of to the reference refer- without are set aside below the courts Kay THOMAS. Rhonda merits, remand- the cause is ence No. D-4220. proceedings further court for ed to the trial agreement the settlement in accordance with Texas. Supreme Court of parties. 22, 1993. Dec. rehearing (pursuant
Joint motion
settlement) November filed herein on Court of the order of this granted; 10, 1993, denying application November PRICE, Appellant, Wiley John withdrawn, applica- of error writ to the mer- reference granted tion is without Texas, Appellee. below are judgments of the courts its. The STATE merits; reference to without set aside No. 037-93. court for fur- to the trial cause is remanded Texas, the set- in accordance with proceedings Appeals ther of Criminal Court parties. agreement of tlement En Banc. 3, 1993.
Nov.