101 Mo. App. 494 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1903
On June 29, 1901, Martha Lyons (colored) filed, in the probate court of Jefferson county, her petition or motion representing that she was the
Notice of the filing of the petition was served on the administrator.
On July 27, 1901, the probate court found that it had not ordered the administrator to rent the premises and that it had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and dismissed the proceedings. Martha Lyons appealed from this judgment.
On the same day the probate court dismissed the proceedings, it made an order removing William Lyons as administrator and ordered the public administrator to take charge of the estate.
On a trial de novo, in the circuit court, to the court sitting as a jury, the court found for Martha Lyons and rendered judgment that she recover of William Lyons $275, on account of the rents collected on the homestead of Edward Lyons by the said William Lyons, with six per cent interest thereon from the date of the commencement of the suit, ordered that William Lyons, administrator, account to the probate court for said rents, and that Martha Lyons have the free use and occupancy, rents and profits of the premises until dower therein
Plaintiff’s own evidence shows that at least twenty years prior to the death of Edward Lyons she had abandoned him and had lived in a state of adultery with another negro named Brown, by whom she had five or six illegitimate children. On her own evidence she was not entitled to quarantine (sec. 2954, R. S. 1899) nor is she entitled to dower (sec. 2953, R. S. 1899).
In Duffy v. Harris, 40 L. R. A. (Ark.) 750, following the New Hampshire and Missouri cases, it was held that the abandonment by the wife of her husband and living apart from him in another State, though in
It has been held in Texas, Tennessee and Michigan that abandonment of the husband by the wife forfeits her rights to his homestead.-
It appears that in most of our States, including our own, the law is the other way, and that so long as the husband has a domicile his domicile is the legal domicile of his wife wherever and however she may in fact dwell and that on his death her inchoate right to his homestead ripens into a life estate, and we conclude that if the premises constituted Edward Lyons’ homestead at the time of his death, plaintiff is entitled to the rents collected by the defendant a.s administrator. But it is not made clear by the evidence that the premises constituted Edward Lyons’ homestead.
The case seems to have been decided on a wrong theory of the law. In the absence of any direct testimony that plaintiff is entitled to homestead in the premises, we will reverse the^ judgment and remand the cause with the suggestion that as it appears Edward Lyons left a minor child, the interest of this minor be protected in the event it is found that plaintiff is entitled to the rents and to homestead in the premises.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.