Otis Lyоns appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Pittsburgh (City) and denying his motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
In Novembеr of 1987, Lyons was elected to the Pittsburgh City Council. He was elected at large to a four-year term expiring at the end of 1991. Prior to 1987, all City Council members were elected at large under the provisions of the City’s 1976 Home Rule Charter. 1 However, in the 1987 primary election (the same election which elеcted Lyons as an at-large councilman), the Pittsburgh voters approved by referendum an amendment to the Home Rule Charter providing for district elеctions of all councilmen in place of the at-large system. An apportionment commission was created to establish the councilmanic districts and the commission’s nine electoral districts scheme was confirmed by an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny *333 County on October 24, 1988. In May of 1989, a primary election nominated candidates to vie for the nine district Council seats. In the general election of November, 1989, nine рersons were elected and these nine council members all took their seats in January of 1990. 2 Lyons was not a candidate in either the 1989 primary or general election for City Council.
On December 28, 1989, Lyons filed a declaratory judgment action against the City seeking a declaration that he was entitled to complete the four-year Council term he had been elected to in 1987. The City filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrеr on the grounds that Lyons failed to state a cause of action. The City also filed preliminary objections on the grounds that the trial court lackеd jurisdiction and that Lyons failed to join as parties the nine newly elected City Council members. At argument on the preliminary objections, the parties stiрulated that the facts were not in dispute and that the question of Lyons’ right to office was purely one of law. The parties agreed that they would proceed as if the City had filed an answer to Lyons’ complaint admitting all of the averments of fact and each party then moved for summary judgment. Thе trial court denied Lyons’ motion for summary judgment and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
Lyons contends (1) that under Section 306 of the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law (Act 62), 3 he has a right to continue in office as a councilman at-large until the end of his term, and (2) that under Sectiоn 304 of the City’s Home Rule Charter he was also entitled to remain in office until the end of his term.
Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting summary judgmеnt is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed or the trial judge abused his discretion.
Burnatoski v. Butler Ambulance Service,
130
*334
Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 264,
The law is well settled that public officers possess no vestеd right to a public office and a legislature or governing body may abolish a public office and oust the office holder prior to the comрletion of his term.
Commonwealth v. McCombs,
56 Pa 436 (1867);
Suermann v. Hadley,
There is no right to public office unless it is under the express protection of the constitution, and such protection is nowhere given to municipal officers. On the contrary, the universal rule is that ... the officers go out with the charter under which they held [office], and the officers under thе new charter take their places____
Id.,
This rule was applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Reapportionment of School District,
Lyons contends that Section 306 of Act 62 gives him the right to continue to serve the remainder of his City Council term. Section 306 states that “all elective officials of the municipality in office at the time of the adoption of a home rule charter shall continue in office until their terms expire.” 53 P.S. § 1-306. This statute was plainly intended to protect elected officials in office at the time a munici *335 pality initially adopted a home rule charter. As the City adopted its Home Rule Charter in 1976, Section 306 cannot give Lyons a statutory right to remain in office.
Lyons argues, however, that Section 306 should apply because the amendment creating the district-wide electoral system constituted a change in the form of the City’s government tantamount to the adoption of a new home rule charter. He relies on
Borough of Warren v. County Bоard of Elections of the County of Warren,
59 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 137,
(b) Changes in the method of election of a municipal governing body from at-large elections to elections by district ... may be implеmented by amending a home rule charter or optional plan without the creation of a government study commission.
53 P.S. § l-221(b).
The language of Section 221(b) clearly demonstrates the intent of the General Assembly to allow the amendment of existing home rule charters in order to change the system of еlecting council members. Hence, an amendment to an existing home rule charter changing the method of electing councilmen is not the equivalent of adopting a new home rule charter.
*336 Last, Lyons asserts that Section 304 of the City’s Home Rule Charter allows him to continue as a member of City Council. Section 304 states that “Council members shall serve for a term four years from the first Monday of January following their election.” This Section merely describes the length of a City Council member’s term, including the new council members; the language of this Section cannot be construed to give Lyons a prоperty or statutory right to remain in the position of an at-large councilman after that office was abolished. Lyons argues, however, that the fаilure of the electorate to alter Section 304 suggests that the electors had no intention to shorten the terms of incumbent at-large counсil members. Since we have held, however, that Section 304 merely describes the length of a councilmanic term, and creates no substantive right to remain in an abolished position, this argument must fail.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the City and cоrrectly denied Lyons’ motion for summary judgment.
ORDER
NOW, January 24, 1991, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Alleghеny County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.