17 Wis. 61 | Wis. | 1863
By the Court,
The power of a railroad company to receive from a subscriber, in payment of its stock, a promissory note secured by a mortgage on real estate — instead of being paid therefor in cash — was distinctly affirmed in Clark vs. Farrington, 11 Wis., 306; Blunt vs. Walker, id., 334; and Cornell vs. Hichens, id., 353. Since those decisions were pronounced, many other cases have come before us involving the same question of power, and have been decided in the same way. These cases were all well argued, and were considered with all the care and attention we were able to bestow upon them consist-tently with a proper discharge of our other duties And as
If the contract is considered with reference to the laws of this state, then clearly it is valid, because the railroad company was expressly authorized to borrow money of any person or corporation at any rate of interest which might be agreed
But suppose we are mistaken in this, and that the contract must be construed with reference to the laws of New York, where the principal and interest were payable. By the law of that state a corporation was prohibited from interposing tho defense of usury in any action (Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y., 9; Butterworth v. O'Brien, 23 id., 275); and it has been held that the act applied to a foreign corporation litigating in the courts of that state. Southern Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Packer, 17 id., 51. If therefore the place of performance is to” govern, then indubitably the railroad bond is a legal and valid obligation. And if the courts of New York would enforce this contract, for a much stronger reason should the courts of this state do so, in view of the provisions of the charter which permit the company to agree for the payment of any rate of interest
On tbe trial, tbe respondent Ewings attempted to defeat a recovery in whole or in part by showing a failure of consideration, or that be bad been injured by some action of the board of directors in reference to tbe transfer of bis stock upon tbe books of tbe company. And tbe admissibility of this defense depends entirely upon tbe question whether tbe appellant bolds these securities free and discharged from all equities existing between Ewings and tbe railroad company. We think it very clear that be does. It is not pretended that tbe appellant, at tbe time of tbe transfer, bad notice of any of these matters set up in tbe defense. And tbe fact that be took tbe note and mortgage as collateral security for money actually loaned at tbe time of such transfer upon tbe bond of tbe company, does not, within all tbe authorities, render him less entitled to tbe protection of tbe statute. Nor was there anything in tbe manner in which the note was transferred calculated to affect him with notice or put him upon inquiry. The note and mortgage were in terms made payable to tbe order of Edward D. Holtonf' who indorsed tbe note in blank without recourse. Such an indorsement we suppose transfers tbe title to and property in the note to any subsequent bolder. Therefore it is not neceesary to rely even upon tbe rule laid down in Crosby v. Raub, and Kimball v. Porter, recently decided by this court. 16Wis.,616. For here, although the payee transferred tbe note without rendering himself liable thereon, yet bis indorsement was valid according to tbe law merchant, and authorized any bolder to fill it up with his own name.
We therefore think the judgment of tbe circuit court should be reversed, and tbe cause remanded with directions to render judgment in favor of tbe appellant according to tbe prayer of the complaint.