224 P. 793 | Idaho | 1924
— The district court of the seventh judicial district, for Payette county, heretofore made and entered a judgment detaching a tract of ten acres of land from the corporate limits of the city of Payette. Being dissatisfied with the judgment, the city has appealed, and urges, as grounds for reversing the judgment, first, that the law under which the proceeding was instituted is unconstitutional, and, second, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment.
The proceeding was instituted under the provisions of article 4, chapter 169, title 32, of the Compiled Statutes, as amended by chapter 111 of the Session Laws of 1921. Appellant contends that this article is in contravention of article 12, section 1; article 5, section 20; and article 2, section 1, of the constitution of the state of Idaho. Article 12, section 1, authorizes the legislature to provide, by general laws, for the incorporation, organization and classification of cities. Article 5, section 20, vests district courts with original jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity, and
Appellant contends that the peculiar vice of the law lies in the fact that it attempts to delegate legislative powers to the district courts; and that in making and entering a judgment detaching land from a city, the court exercises a legislative rather than a judicial power. The constitution-^ ality of the law and the consequent determination of this cause must turn upon the question of whether the power, conferred upon the district courts, of determining, in the manner prescribed, whether territory should be detached from the corporate limits of a municipality is a judicial or a legislative power. It is fundamental that if the court, in hearing and determining the matter, exercise legislative power, the law is in contravention of article 2, section 1, of the constitution, and is void, for it is well settled that the power to establish municipal corporations and to enlarge and contract their boundaries is purely and wholly legislative. (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., vol. l,t<^ p. 61, see. 33; 19 R. C. L. 700; 12 C. J. 856.) That the question is not easy of solution is evidenced by the fact that there appears to be a conflict in the authorities, statutes of the nature of the one in question here having been held valid and invalid under constitutional provisions almost identical with the sections above quoted and referred to.
It is a judicial function to hear a cause pending between adverse parties, to apply the law to the facts, and to make and render a judgment determining the rights of the parties. Does the law under consideration either authorize or permit the court to do more than this? It is generally conceded that while the legislature cannot delegate the power con
But where, in addition to a determination of the existence of the facts which bring the provisions of the law to bear upon the particular object, the law-making body has gone further, and has provided for an appeal to the courts from the decision of a body to which a legislative power has been delegated, or has authorized the court “in its discretion,” or “if the court is of the opinion that the prayer of the petition should be granted” (and similar expressions), to grant or deny the relief, some courts hold that such legislative acts constitute an attempted delegation of a legislative power to the courts. (Winkler v. City of Hastings, supra; Borough of Belle Plaine v. Brenke, supra; Glaspell v. City of
Bearing in mind what appears to be the reason for the conflict in the authorities on this question, it is proper to examine the law under consideration to determine if it constitute a delegation of legislative power. C. S., sec. 4101, as amended, authorizes the owner of any tract of land of five acres or more, used exclusively for agricultural purposes, included within the corporate limits of any municipality, to petition the district court to detach such lands from the municipality. (C. S., sec. 4105, as amended, requires the court to grant the prayer of the petition where the following conditions or facts exist: (1) that the tract is at least five acres in extent; (2) that the lands sought to be detached are used exclusively for agricultural purposes; (3) that such tract does not receive sufficient special benefits to justify its retention within the municipality; and (4) that “by the detachment of said lands the symmetry of the municipality would not be materially marred. ” It is thus seen that there are four facts or conditions which the court must find to exist in order for the statute to apply. The statute provides that if, upon a hearing, these facts be found to exist, “ . . . . the judge of said court shall grant the prayer of said petition and shall enter judgment and decree accordingly.” (Italics ours.) This provision would appear to be mandatory. Town of Edgewater v. Liebhardt, 32 Colo. 307, 76 Pac. 366.) The statute does not vest the court with any discretion in the matter other than to decide whether the four facts or conditions exist. If the court find that such facts exist, the law makes it the court’s duty to render judgment detaching the lands irrespective of what may be the' court’s views as to the public policy or the justice of the action required by the law. The discretion of the court is restricted to a finding as to the existence of the facts.
Counsel for appellant admits that had the law required •the rendition of the judgment upon the ascertainment of the existence of the fact that the land sought to be detached contained at least five acres, and that it was used exclusively/ forjigriculturai purposes, it would have been a valid enact-l*' ment; in other" words,- that'’ the ascertainment of the size of the tract and its use is a proper matter for judicial ascertainment. But counsel contends that neither the ascertainment of whether the land receives~süBicieñt special benefits to justify its retention within the municipality, nor whether the symmetry of the municipality would be materially marred , by Jdie detachment of_ the _land. is a. subject for judicial determination, but that their ascertainment involves the dis- \ cretion of the court “as to what the policy as to ‘special, benefits’ and as to municipal ‘symmetry] shall be.” The law does not require the court to determine any policy concerning special benefits or municipal symmetry. The court is required to find whether the particular tract does receive sufficient special benefits. This involves the determination of a fact. It is possibly difficult of determination, but many facts that the courts are daily called upon to determine are difficult of determination. Such an ascertainment, however, does not involve or determine any policy of special benefits, or what special benefits ought to consist of or amount to. The court merely finds, as an existing fact, whether the tract receives sufficient special benefits to justify its retention. What has been said about special benefits applies to “symmetry.” In order for the statute to become effective, and for the relief prayed for in the petition to be granted, the court must find that by the detachment of the tract, “the symmetry of the municipality would not be materially marred.” We are unable to comprehend how such a determination constitutes anything more than a finding of fact.
Appellant also insists that the provision of O. S., sec. 4104, which permits the court to view the lands sought to be de
, A consideration of the decisions cited by appellant in support of its contention that the act under consideration is. invalid will reveal the fact that they all, in one way or another, recognize the right of the legislature to invest the judiciary with power to determine whether certain prescribed conditions or facts exist, on the determination of which the law becomes effective. But the statutes construed in the decisions cited by appellant attempted to vest the court with a discretion to determine whether the property should be attached to or detached from the city, instead of. merely authorizing the court to determine whether or not the facts existed, as required hy the law, to bring into effect the provisions of the statute. The law under consideration in the ease at bar, however, goes no further than to vest the court with power to héaFTEe_caüsé- and determine the ex
The second reason urged by appellant for a reversal of the judgment is that the evidence is insufficient to establish rthe"existcnce of the facts ’or 'coiiditlons ih be'found before the court ^couM^ render judgment defac!ung"”jhN7la5f^ It~TNclear_from the record,that respondent ijT a professional^ man residing on the property and practicing his profession
A careful consideration of the entire record.,, however. leadsjto the conclusion that it does not appear “that by the detachment of said lands the symmetry of the municipality would not be materially marred.” Upon this point we have before us, as exhibits, two maps of the city of Payette, one introduced by appellant and the other by respondent. The land in question has a frontage of 330 feet and a depth of 1,320 feet. There is also the testimony of the city engineer, called as a witness by respondent, who testified that, in his judgment, the detachment of the land “would mar the symmetry of the city very much,” and that “it would only leave two very small, narrow necks connecting that part of the city north of this tract with the part south of it.” There is no evidence from which the court could determine that the symmetrs-of the city, would not be marred by the detachment of this tract other than that.which might be gained from the tw&jnap.sv and, while, it.ap pears from the maps that the boundaries of the city are ^somewhat irregular, at the same time we are of the opinion that the_evidence shows that the symmetry Qf_thu...clt.Y_w.ould be materially marred., by the detachment. The evidence not being sufficient, there