14 Ala. 753 | Ala. | 1848
This cause was here at a previous term, and the decision then made settles the equity of the bill, at least to the extent of the judgments which McVoy recovered against T. R. Bolling, (9 Ala. Rep. 463 ;) and we are now to consider whether the complainant has sustained his case by proof.
The testimony adduced to establish the existence of the judgments described in the bill was clearly incompetent.
The copy offered in evidence must be a copy of the original, and from the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment. 3 Phil. Ev. C. & H’s Notes, 1065, 1076, 1240. An examined or sworn copy is in general to be proved such, by one who has compared it with the original. Where however, a witness testified that a certain record of a power of attorney, was a copy of the original made by him, and that the copy produced was a true copy of the record, having been compared with it by himself; it was held, that this was not the case of a copy simply, but the case of a second copy, verified as a true copy of the original; and therefore admissible as secondary evidence. This was considered precisely the same as if the witness had made two copies of the original at the same time, and then compared one of them with the original, and the other with the first copy, which he found correct ; that although the mode by which the second was ascertained to be a true one of the original, may have been more circuitous than that by which the first was found to be correct, yet this consideration only went to the strength, and not to the dignity of the proof. Id.; Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. Rep. 663.
In Brewster v. Countryman, 12 Wend. R. 446, a sworn copy of an agreement was produced against the defendant,
Conceding that the records which were offered by the complainant, were the same that are referred to in his bill, and it may be questioned whether the proof of their authentication was not altogether insufficient. It merely affirms that one of the witnesses to the point was clerk of the circuit court of Mobile from 1837 to 1841, and that the papers exhibited to him by the other witness, as records of that court, “ were issued and filed by him when he was clerk,” “ that they are in the hand-writing, so far as the writing purports to be done by the clerk, of the deponent and his deputies, and he believes that they are the records of that court.” The other witness testifies that he received the record from the present clerk of the circuit court, as the record of the suits to which they relate. The records in respect to which the witnesses speak are doubtless the original papers in the case to which they refer, and are only admissible upon the hypothesis that the final records were not made up. Ansley v. Carlos, 9 Ala. Rep, 973; Brown v. Isbell, 11 Ala. Rep. 1009. Where an objection is made to the decision of an inferior court for the rejection of the original papers, will not a revising tribunal intend, that the clerk of the court from which the papers come, has done his duty, and recorded them within the time prescribed by law, unless the reverse appears ? Again: should not the genuineness of the papers be shown by the testimony of their custodian, the clerk ?
We need not stop to answer these questions, for conceding
It does not appear from the record, that the objection to the defect of proof was not made until the argument of the cause ; and it was certainly competent then, to have urged for the first time the absence of the judgments as a ground why the complainant should be denied the relief he sought. If an objection goes merely to a defect in an exemplification of a record, it should perhaps be made while the evidence is being developed. See Burton v. Pettibone, 5 Yerg. R. 443; 2 Phil. Ev. C. & H’s Notes, 558; 3 Id. 790. But this is not a point in the cause as presented to us.
The answer of T. T. Bolling explicitly denies that his father purchased the land in question of Gazzarn, or that he paid, or is bound to pay, any portion of the purchase money, affirms that the purchase was made upon his own account, and the improvements were paid for with funds provided by him : he also denies all fraud, and declares that resources derived from his own personal employment were entirely adequate to the expenditure. As it respects the purchase, his answer is fully sustained by his co-defendant, Gazzarn, whose answer it is agreed shall be considered as a deposition ; and thus supported, it is not overbalanced by the testimony of Brooks and Perrine, which merely relate declarations or acts of T. R. Bolling when his son was not present. Conceding that these depositioirs are competent evidence, so far as they are explanatory of the declarant’s possession, and still they cannot outweigh the answer of T. T. Bolling, supported as
The testimony of the witnesses for the complainant in respect to the improvements, are not sufficiently potent to override the denial in the answer of T. T. Bolling, that they were made by his father. If the declarations of the latter are placed out of view, the evidence is not inconsistent with the supervision by him of the improvements upon the son’s account. But admit the declarations of the father are competent testimony, are they irreconcileable with the idea that the land was his son’s property, and the former was improving it with means furnished by the father? The remark of T. R. Bolling, that he was erecting buildings upon his land, that he wished to borrow money for that purpose, and that he found it difficult to raise money to pay the workmen as the work progressed, may have been a loose mode of expressing himself, and in view of the positive assertions of the answer upon the subject, and the testimony that the father was restricted in his means, and that the son was engaged in a prosperous business, we strongly incline to regard them as insufficient proof. Besides, it may be asked whether these declarations, although related by several witnesses, are entitled to greater weight than the testimony of one testifying to the same facts, as they all emanate from a single individual, and rest upon his veracity ? If such be the effect of the evidence, the familiar rule, that the testimony of one witness will not overbalance a positive answer responsive to the bill, is decisive of the point.
There can be no pretence that the reason assigned by T. R. Bolling, for the purchase having been made in his son’s name, cannot defeat, or in any manner impair the title of the latter. And the want of punctuality of the father, if admissible evidence under any circumstances, does not tend to establish any point at issue in the present case.
The failure off T. T. Bolling to answer as to the indebtedness of his father to the complainant, cannot be regarded as
It may be conceded that a father is not allowed to make advancements to his children to the prejudice of his creditors. Patterson v. Campbell, 9 Ala. Rep. 933; Elliott et al. v. Horn et al. 10 Ala. Rep. 348. But he may permit his child to leave the parental homestead, and labor for his own benefit — in such case, the father is supposed to have “emancipated ” the child for the time being, and relinquished all claim to his services, or the earnings of his industry. Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. Rep. 272; Godfrey v. Hays, 6 Ala. Rep. 501; Tillotson v. McCrillis, 11 Verm. Rep. 477; Smith v. Knowlton, 11 N. Hamp. Rep. 191; Wodell v. Coggeshall, 2 Metc. Rep. 89; White v. Henry, 11 Shep. R. 531; Lord v. Poor, 10 Shep. Rep. 569; Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. Rep. 204; Benson v. Remington, 2 Mass. Rep. 113; Jenney v. Alden, 12 Mass. Rep. 375; U. S. v. Metr, 2 Watts’ Rep. 406; Eubanks v. Peak, 2 Bail. Rep. 497; Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. Rep. 201; Chase v. Smith, 5 Verm. R. 556; Galbraith v. Black, 4 Serg. & R. Rep. 207; Sumner v. Sebee, 3 Greenl. R. 223; Manchester v. Smith, 12 Pick. 113. It is abundantly apparent from the answers and proof, that the father in the present case permitted his son to leave his house and engage in business upon his own account, without attempting to control him in his contracts or in the disbursement of his money. This being the case, it follows, that the father has not yielded up to the son any thing which his creditors can subject in any forum to the payment of their demands.
In respect to the application to the chancellor to open his decree or re-hear the cause, that the complainant may perfect his record evidence, we would remark, that it has been