Lynnette Andujar Strauss v. Rent-A-Center, Inc.

192 F. App'x 821

11th Cir.

2006

Check Treatment

Docket

Lynnette Andujar STRAUSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RENT-A-CENTER, INC., d.b.a. Rent-A-Center, Rent-A-Center East, Inc., f.k.a. Rent-A-Center, Inc., d.b.a. Rent-A-Center, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 05-16401, 06-10478

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 11, 2006.

192 Fed. Appx. 821

Non-Argument Calendar.

violations of his First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights that stemmed from his employment with the federal government because of the comprehensive statutory scheme related to federal employment, the CSRA. See Stephens, 901 F.2d at 1577. Further, the district court correctly determined that Pinson‘s Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed, because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states and state actors, not the federal government. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that “No State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.“).

Pinson‘s remaining First Amendment claim against the defendants in their individual capacities concerns the defendants’ refusal to conduct a pre-publication review of his book and it arose after Pinson‘s federal employment was terminated. With regard to that claim, the district court properly determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Pinson failed to meet his burden to establish that the district court had jurisdiction over the individual defendants. See Cable/Home Commc. Corp., 902 F.2d at 855. Pinson misstates the test for personal jurisdiction when he alleges that he need only show that the defendants had minimum contacts with the United States. Although Pinson argued below that the DOD and DA both maintain a presence in Georgia, he did not allege, and the record does not reveal, that the district court could obtain jurisdiction over the individual defendants via the Georgia long-arm statute. The district court did not err in dismissing this claim for lack of personal jurisdiction.

III. CONCLUSION

Pinson appeals the dismissal of his complaint alleging violations, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and various constitutional amendments, primarily related to his federal employment. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Pinson had filed his Title VII in the improper venue or that the interests of justice did not warrant a transfer to another judicial district. The district court did not err in dismissing his § 1985 claims or his constitutional claims arising from his employment because the CSRA precluded these claims. The district court also did not err in dismissing Pinson‘s First Amendment claim, which did not involve his federal employment, because he did not establish that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the individually named defendants. The district court properly dismissed all of Pinson‘s claims, and we AFFIRM.

AFFIRMED.

Kathryn S. Piscitelli, Egan, Lev & Siwica, PA, Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert Francois Friedman, Littler Mendelson, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before CARNES, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Lynnette Andujar Strauss appeals the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Defendants Rent-A-Center, Inc., d.b.a Rent-A-Center and Rent-A-Center East, Inc., f.k.a Rent-A-Center, Inc., d.b.a Rent-A-Center (collectively, “Rent-A-Center“) on all of Strauss‘s claims of retaliation in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq. Strauss also appeals the district court‘s denial of her Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment to Rent-A-Center, holding that Strauss‘s claims were barred by res judicata, accord and satisfaction, and judicial estoppel. We reverse.

Strauss‘s retaliation claims are not barred by res judicata nor by accord and satisfaction because her claims are distinct from those claims that were settled by the consent decree entered by the district court in the Southern District of Illinois, on October 11, 2002, in Wilfong, et al. v. Rent-A-Center, Civil Action No. 00-680-DRH. As to unnamed class members, that consent decree resolves only sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims; it does not address any retaliation actions by unnamed class members.

We also hold that, under the circumstances of this case, application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel is reversible error. We do not think this is a case where Strauss‘s nondisclosure of her employment action on her Chapter 13 petition was “‘shown to have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.‘” Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, M.D., 260 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir.2001)). Strauss was not successful in “persuading a tribunal to accept the earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of the inconsistent position in a later proceeding creates the perception that either court was misled.” Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285 (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750-51, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1815, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001)). This is not a case like Barger v. City of Cartersville, Ga., 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2003), in which there was evidence that: (1) the debtor intentionally misled the bankruptcy court as to the existence and then character of her employment lawsuit, and (2) the debtor‘s success at concealing the true character of her lawsuit from the bankruptcy court resulted in a bankruptcy court ordered discharge of all her debts. The bankruptcy court never entered any order discharging any of Strauss‘s debts.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Rent-A-Center is reversed and the action is remanded to the district court. We need not address Strauss‘s appeal of the denial of her Rule 60(b) motion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.