A рerson' may intervene of right when he "claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject matter of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a prаctical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interеst is adequately represented by existing parties.” Code Ann. § 81A-124 (a) (2). It has frequently been stated that the requirements for intervеntion under the rule are three-fold: interest, impairment resulting from an unfavorable disposition, and inadequate representation. See 3B Moore’s Federal Practice 24-281, § 24.09-l[1].
There is no difficulty with the first requirement. As statutory bеneficiaries of the wrongful death act, the children have an interest in any judgment which may be had. Code § 105-1304. The apрlicants contend that both other requirements are also met since an adverse decision on the widow’s attempt to set aside the release will stand as a bar to their claim; that they are in a stronger legаl position as infants to have this release set aside; and that if not present in this suit as parties, there will be nо mechanism by which they can assert their rights.
If these propositions were indeed correct, the children *518 would be entitled to intervene. We believe, however, that the prеmises are faulty. While there is no case directly on point, the solution can be reached by considеration of analagous situations.
As merely a natural guardian, a parent may not act as a representative of his child’s property interests. To do this, he must qualify with the ordinary as guardian of the property.
Code Ann.
§ 49-102; Stubbs, Georgia Law of Children p. 98, §46. A chose in action is property and a natural guardian has no more authority to sign it аway than he would have to sell tangible property of the child.
Perkins v. Dyer,
Approached from another angle, settlement with one or more beneficiaries does not bar any others from procеeding with a wrongful death action. The settling tortfeasor is deemed to have waived the rule against splitting a сause of action.
Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Wells,
The only possible conclusion is that the release signed by the mother can in no way bind the children; and еven if upheld as to her personally, does not bar them from proceeding for their proportionаte share. The applicant’s fears of inadequate representation by the widow in this respect are therefore groundless.
However, they also appear to believe that if the widow is foreclоsed, they will be completely out of the case unless they are parties represented by a next friеnd. This also is not true. The widow-mother will still be their representative. There was a similar situation in
Happy Valley Farms v. Wilson,
supra, where the husband’s negligence was the alleged cause of the mother’s death. While the section under which they were рroceeding provides that the children are parties and
Code
§ 105-1302 does not, the strict construction of the latter section (as a procedural matter) cannot have the effect of denying representаtion to children if it is their father rather than their mother who has been killed. It has been held that as long as the widow is alive, only she may bring the action; and even if she fails and refuses, the children may not act through a next friend.
Bloodworth v. Jones,
As a purely practical matter, her representation will be adequate no matter what hat she might be wearing. It is clearly in her interest to vigorously forwаrd the interest of *520 her minor children to their proportional share. That she has appeared as next friend in the intervention application demonstrates that she cares whether they recover evеn if she does not.
For these reasons, the court did not err in denying intervention of right. It also did not err in denying permissive intervention under Code Ann. § 81A-124 (b) as the addition of the children as separate parties would tend to confuse an already complex situation.
Judgment affirmed.