MEMORANDUM OPINION
This Memorandum Opinion and its accompanying Order address Plaintiff Kevin M.
I. BACKGROUND
Substantively, this case involves Plaintiffs allegations that Defendant violated the federal and state Telephone Consumer Protection Acts by repeatedly calling Plaintiff using an “automatic telephone dialing system,” or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiffs express consent. See generally Compl., ECF No. 2; 47 U.S.C. § 227 (federal statute); Md.Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 14-3201-14-3202 (Maryland statute). Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendant’s repeated telephone calls, he suffered actual damages, “including phone charges for both the incoming calls and the caller ID information for each call,” Compl. ¶ 24, and various noneco-nomic damages, for, inter alia, disruption of “Plaintiffs peace of mind,” id. ¶ 30.
Plaintiff served interrogatories, document production requests, and requests for admission on Defendant on October 20, 2011. PL’s Mot. ¶ 1. Defendant served its discovery responses on Plaintiff on December 5, 2011. Id. ¶ 2. At various times thereafter, counsel conferred with each other regarding what Plaintiff views as deficiencies in Defendant’s discovery responses, as this Court’s Local Rules require. See id. ¶¶ 3-6; D. Md. Loc. R. 104.7; Loe. R. 104.8.b. On April 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Local Rule 104.7 certificate, stating that counsel had conferred regarding discovery disputes for approximately one hour on December 14, 2011 at 2:30 PM. See PL’s Loe. R. 104.7 Certificate 1, ECF No. 24; see also PL’s Mot. 1 (itemizing the discovery disputes requiring resolution by the Court). Not all issues were resolved at that conference. Id. Consequently, pursuant to Local Rule 104.8, Plaintiff appended to his certificate a copy of his Motion to Compel and all memoranda exchanged by the parties. Thus, briefing of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is complete and pending determination by this Court.
II. DISCUSSION
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a) provides that, where notice has been given, “a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1). The motion to compel “must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make
Central to resolving any discovery dispute is determining whether the information sought is within the permissible scope of discovery, as stated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(a)(2) (“An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).”); Fed. R.Civ.P. 34(a) (stating that document production requests must be “within the scope of Rule 26(b)”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(1) (limiting requests to admission to “any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)”). Under Rule 26(b)(1), “[pjarties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); see also Fed.R.Evid. 401; Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3) (explaining that work product or trial preparation material ordinarily is not discoverable). If good cause is shown, the Court “may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). “Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. In addition, “[a]ll discovery is subject to the [proportionality] limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).” Id.; see also Victor Stanley,
Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) “cautions that all permissible discovery must be measured against the yardstick of proportionality.” Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,
A. Answers to Interrogatories
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 governs interrogatories to parties. Interrogatories may “relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b).” Fed. R.Civ.P. 33(a)(2). Interrogatories must be answered “by the party to whom they are directed,” or, where that party is a corporation, partnership, organization, or agency, “by any officer or agent, who must furnish the information available to the party.”
1. Interrogatories # 1 and # 6
Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 1 states: “Identify all persons who are likely to have personal knowledge of any fact alleged in the complaint, and state the subject matter of the personal knowledge possessed by each such person.” Pl.’s Mot. 2. Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 1 is this Court’s Standard Interrogatory No. I.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s answers to Interrogatories # 1 and # 6 fail to “state the subject matter of the personal knowledge that any of these employees have about this case.” Id. at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff states that Defendant’s answers fail to “provide any phone numbers, or zip codes, which are discoverable and necessary to contact and possibly depose these actual or potential discovery or trial witnesses.” Id. In its response to Plaintiffs motion, Defendant provides previously undisclosed information about the subject matter of the personal knowledge that the four present and two former employees may have; identifies three additional persons who may have relevant personal knowledge
A party responding to an interrogatory “must furnish information that is available to it and that can be given without undue labor and expense.” 8B Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2174 (3d ed. 2012); id. § 2177 (“Though there are limits on the extent to which a party can be required to hunt out information in order to answer interrogatories, it will be required to provide facts available to it without undue labor and expense.”). Put differently, a party must “provide relevant facts reasоnably available to it but should not be required to enter upon independent research in order to acquire information merely to answer interrogatories.” Id. § 2174. Appendix D of this Court’s Local Rules provides a number of useful standard forms and definitions. Included in this Appendix are the Court’s standard interrogatories. Appendix D also contains a sample definitional section, which the parties may include in their interrogatories, or to which the Court may refer for guidance. The definition of “identify (with respect to persons)” included in that section provides: “When referring to a person, to ‘identify’ means to state the person’s full name, present or last known address, and, when referring to a natural person, additionally, the present or last known place of employment. If the business and home telephone numbers are known to the answering party, and if the person is not a party or present employee of a party, said telephone numbers shall be provided." D. Md. Loc. R., App’x D, Def. 4, at 134 (emphasis added). Because there is no contention that these phone numbers are outside the scope of discovery permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1), and in light of the definition stated above, to the extent that either the business or home telephone numbers of the two former employees are known to Defendant or may be оbtained without undue burden or expense, Defendant is DIRECTED to provide them to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days of this Order. Thus, with regard to Interrogatories # 1 and # 6, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED.
2. Interrogatories # 9 and # 12
Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 9 states: “State the date, time, and originating number for every call made to 301-62-2250 by you or any person calling or acting on your behalf, and identify all persons with knowledge of these calls.” Pl.’s Mot. 3. In its answer, Defendant states that it is further investigating its response. Id. Nonetheless, Defendant attaches a listing, showing telephone numbers from which the calls to Plaintiffs phone number could have been made. See id. According to Defendant, the date, time, and content of the calls included on the listing “are set forth in the relevant account records,” which Defendant feels, “cannot be produced without an appropriate confidentiality agreement or order.” Id. Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 12 states: “Identify and describe the substance of all communications you, your employees, contractors, or agents have initiated or had with [Plaintiff], and state the date and time of each communication, includ
Plaintiff argues in his motion that Defendant “needs to identify which calls to [Plaintiff] came from which of the many numbers included in the list, and not just respond with ‘could have originated from the phone numbers’ in the list.” Id. Defendant responds that it is “unable to provide any further clarification beyond that already produced and provided in response to Interrogatory No. 12.” Def.’s Resp. 4. Additional information is necessary, Plaintiff replies, so that Plaintiff can, at the very least, issue a subpoena Defendant’s telecommunications carrier to obtain the necessary information. Pl.’s Reply 4. Without additional detail, Plaintiff is unable to define a narrow search for the telecommunications carrier, and therefore is unable to obtain the documents by subpoena. See id.; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 45(e)(1) (“A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.”). Essentially, Plaintiff requests that Defendant match each call made to Plaintiff with the originating office and telephone number. Because Defendant has not made any particularized showing that it is unable to do so “without undue labor and expense,” it is DIRECTED to provide this information within fourteen (14) days. Thus, as to Interrogatory # 9, Plаintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED.
Defendant’s objection to production of the account records that would satisfy Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 12 is not unqualified. See Pl.’s Mot. 3-4; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(d) (explaining when business records may be produced as an alternative to answering the interrogatories). Rather, Defendant states that such documents “cannot be produced without an appropriate confidentiality agreement or order.” Pl.’s Mot. 3. Subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Defendant’s response thereto, the parties’ supplied, and I approved, a stipulated confidentiality order governing production of these documents. See Stipulated Confidentiality Order, ECF No. 37. In light of this order, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED as to Interrogatory # 12. Defendant will produce the responsive documents to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days, subject to the terms of the confidentiality order.
3. Interrogatory # 15
Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 15 states: “Describe fully your involvement in and knowledge of the calls alleged in this suit, including but not limited to the creation, initiation, delivery, arrangement or coordination of the necessary phone lines, provision of numbers, provision of any script or prerecorded message, or any other product or service in any way related to the alleged calls.” Pl.’s Mot. '4. Defendant objected to this interrogatory “as vague and ambiguous,” noting that Defendant “does nоt understand this interrogatory.” Id. Plaintiff argues that responses to ¡this interrogatory should be compelled because Defendant has failed to answer, giving only “a frivolous objection that [Defendant] could not understand this perfectly straightforward question to describe [Defendant’s] involvement with the collection calls at issue.” Id. In its response, Defendant notes that subsequent conversations with Plaintiffs counsel have indicated that, through Interrogatory # 15, counsel may be “seeking the identity of the person(s) responsible for [Defendant] dialer campaigns.” Id. To that end, Defendant supplements its response by referring Plaintiff to its response to Interrogatory # 1, “identifying Anthony Mazzacano, as Chief Strategy Officer/Owner who manages [Defendant’s] dialer and telephone resources and has knowledge and information regarding the dialer and dialer technology, and Brian Holmes as the person who builds and manages [Defendant’s] dialer campaigns.” Id. In his reply, Plaintiff states that his inteiTogatory “does not seek the identity of employees,” as Defendant appears to believe. Pl.’s Reply 5. Rather, “[i]t seeks a full description of [Defendant’s] involvement in and
Generally, the “party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has the burden of showing such vagueness or ambiguity.” Deakins v. Pack, No. 1:10-1396,
While a responding party “‘should exercise reason and common sense to attribute ordinary definitions to terms and phrases utilized in interrogatories,’ ” Deakins,
4. Interrogatories # 16 and # 17
Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 16 states: “Identify any and all persons who made or assisted you in making calls for you to Plaintiff or 301-620-2250.” Pl.’s Mot. 4. Plaintiffs Interrogatory # 17 states: “Identify fully all persons who approved the making of the calls [sic] on your behalf.” Id. Defendant answered both interrogatories by stating that it objected to the questions “as overbroad and unlimited in time.” Id. Subject to that objection, Defendant directed Plaintiff to “see the individuals identified in [Defendant’s] Response to Interrogatory No. 1, above.” Id. In his motion, Plaintiff states that counsel “agreed to limit the questions] to the [three] accounts involved, and limit the scope to 2010 to 2011.” Id. In Plaintiffs view, an answer to Interrogatory # 16 “should include [a list of] persons involved in creating any prеrecorded voice message that was delivered, as well as live collectors.” Id. Plaintiff contends that referral to the persons listed in the answer to Interrogatory # 1 is insufficient because it requires Plaintiff to guess, among those persons listed, who “really approved the making of the calls.” Id. at 4-5. Defendant responds that its answer to Interrogatory # 1 identifies the collectors who called Plaintiffs number,” and identifies the individuals who build and manage Defendant’s dialer and telephone resources and campaigns. Def.’s Resp. 5-6. In his reply, Plaintiff states that the persons identified in Defendant’s answer to Interrogatory # 1 are “managers, supervisors, collectors, technology persons, etc., but not ... the person(s) who made the calls.” Pl.’s Reply 6. “Some person or persons,” Plaintiff states, “made the calls,” and “Plaintiff wants to know who.” Id. Additionally, according to Plaintiff, Defendant’s answer to Interrogatory # 1 does not make clear “who authorized the making
Merely stating that an interrogatory is “overbroad” does “not suffice to state a proper objection.” Cappetta v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, No. 3:08CV288,
B. Responses to Document Production Requests
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 governs document production requests. Pursuant to Rule 34, a party may request that the opposing party “produce and permit the requesting party ... to inspect, copy, test, or sample” relevant documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that are within the party’s “possession, custody, or control.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a)(1). The party served with a document production request may object to the request if a legitimate basis for doing so exists. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 34(b)(2)(B); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b)(2)(C). Thus, a party may object that a document production request exceeds the scope of discovery permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); that it should be denied for the grounds stated in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(2)(C); that it impermissibly requests privileged or work product material, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3); or that documents should not be produced without implementation of a protective order, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c). All objections to document production requests must be stated with particularity and specificity; objections may not be “boilerplate.” See Hall,
To the extent that the specific items at issue are relevant and properly discoverable, taking into consideration the Rule 26(b)(2)(C) proportionality factors, and to the extent that they have not been produced by Defendant, Plaintiffs motion to compel should be granted. The motion should be denied, however, if the items are not relevant or discoverable.
1. Document Production Request # 11
Plaintiffs Document Production Request # 11 requests “[a]ll documents identifying any calls to Plaintiff or 301-620-2250.” Pl.’s Mot. 5. Defendant objects to this request “as overbroad and unlimited in time, and as seeking the production of documents containing financial and personal identifying information of third parties that cannot be produced without an appropriate confidentiality agreement or order.” Id. Plaintiff argues in his Motion to Compel that Defendant’s “telephone statements or invoices will show the calls to Plaintiff or [to] his number 301-620-2250,” and that “[t]here is no reason these cannot be produced, with [Defendant] redacting calls to other persons that appear on the same statement or invoice page if it chooses.” Id. In its response, Defendant states that it subsequently has “provided the account notes [to Plaintiff] without a confidentiality agreement, but in a redacted format to preserve the confidential aspects of those documents.”. Def.’s Resp. 6. According to Defendant,
Rule 34 requires a party to produce only those documents that are within the party’s “possession, custody, or control.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(a)(1). “Rule 34 ‘control’ does not require a party to have legal ownership or actual physical possession of any [of the] documents at issue.” Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc.,
2. Document Production Request # 12
Plaintiffs Document Production Request # 12 requests “[t]he complete telephone invoices or statements for your phone bills or statements including call detail records for the periods from (1) July 1, 2010 through August 31, 2010 and (2) from March 1, 2011 through May 31, 2011.” Pl.’s Mot. 5. Defendant objects to this request as over-broad, stating that “it will unduly burden [Defendant] with the task of obtaining itemized phone records from its service provider, ... which [Defendant] does not maintain in the ordinary course of business.” Id. In his motion, Plaintiff argues that he “need[s] the
Plaintiff has failed to show that the additional documents that it seeks pursuant to this request are within Defendant’s possession, custody, or control. Accordingly, as to Document Production Request # 12, Plaintiffs motion is DENIED. Plaintiff may obtain the documents it seeks directly from Defendant’s telephone service provider through a Rule 45 subpoena.
3. Document Production Request # 15
Plaintiffs Document Production Request # 15 seeks production of “[t]he ownersf] manual, instructions[,] and any other manuals related to any equipment used to dial or call Plaintiff or 301-620-2250.” Pl.’s Mot. 6. This request is aimed at obtaining information necessary for Plaintiff to prove that Defendant used an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as that term is defined by federal statute. See id. On June 8, 2012, the parties submitted a discovery stipulation, stating that they agree and stipulate, “for purposes of this suit only,” that any calls made to Plaintiff “were made using Aspect dialer equipment that constitutes an ‘automatic telephone dialing system’ as that term is defined by the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act.” See Stipulation as to ATDS 1, EOF No. 33. In light of the parties’ stipulation, Plaintiffs Motion to Comрel is DENIED AS MOOT as to Document Production Request # 15.
4. Document Production Requests # 18 and # 19
Plaintiffs Document Production Request # 18 seeks “[a]ll account documents including electronic ones related to any debt or account for which the alleged calls to the Plaintiff or 301-620-2250 were made by you or any person or entity acting on your behalf or for which you were trying to reach [the debtor] or obtain any information about at the number 301-620-2250.” Pl.’s Mot. 6. Plaintiffs Document Production Request # 19 seeks “[c]all detail records, reports, reeords[,] or logs for each and every alleged call to Plaintiff or 301-620-2250.” Id. at 7. Defendant objects to production of the documents requested on the grounds that Plaintiffs request is overbroad and seeks “the production of documents containing financial and personal identifying information of third parties that cannot be produced without an appropriate confidentiality agreement or order.” See id. at 6-7. In his motion, Plaintiff argues that the documents requested in Document Production Request # 18 must be produced because, under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, one of the causes of action asserted by Plaintiff, he must establish that Defendant was attempting to collect on a debt, as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). See id. at 7. As to Document Production Request # 19, Plaintiff argues that, while Defendant has produced redacted logs, Plaintiff “need[]s the full unredaeted account numbers for the three accounts involved.” Id. According to Plaintiff, his efforts to serve subpoenas on two financial institutions using the redacted account numbers has been unsuccessful; the financial institutions have reported to Plaintiff that the full account numbers are necessary. See id.
Defendant jointly responds to Plaintiffs request to compel his Document Production Requests # 18 and # 19, stating that the requests seek “the records of accounts [Defendant] collected or attempted to collect from third parties.” Def.’s Resp. 8. Defendant reports that it “has already provided the account notes in a redacted format to preserve the confidential aspects of those documents, which contain personal or financial information regarding non-parties.” Id.
C. Responses to Requests for Admission
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 governs requests for admission. Under that rule, a party “may serve on any other party a written request to admit, for purposes of the pending action only, the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1)” that relate to “facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either” and “the genuineness of any described documents.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(1). A matter is deemed admitted if the responding party fails to timely provide a written answer or objection to the request for admission. Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(3); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(b) (“A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.”).
If a matter raised in a request for admission is not admitted, the responding party’s answer “must specifically deny [the matter] or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4). The denial “must fairly respond to the substance of the matter.” Id.; see also Wright et al., supra, § 2260 (“It is expected that denials will be forthright, specific, and unconditional. If a response is thought insufficient as a denial, the court may treat it as an admission.”). When “good faith requires that a party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the answer [to the request for admission] must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the rest.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4). The party responding to a request for admission also may “assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny.” Id. But, the party may do so “only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.” Id.; Wright et al., supra, § 2261 (“A general statement that [a party] can neither admit nor deny, unaccompanied by reasons, will be held to be an insufficient response, and the court may either take the matter as admitted or order a further answer.”).
Additionally, the party responding to a request for admission may object to the request if a legitimate basis for doing so exists. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(5). “The grounds for objecting to [the] request must be stated,” and a party may not object “solely on the ground that the request presents a genuine issue for trial.” Id. A party may, for example, object that a request for admission exceeds the scope of discovery stated in Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1); that responding to a request would require disclosure of attorney-client privileged or work product protected material, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3); or that a request is defective in form and therefore unanswerable, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(2) (“Each matter must be separately stated.”); Wright et al., supra, § 2262 (“The [responding party] should not be required to go through a document and assume the responsibility of determining what facts it is being requested to admit. Each request ... should be phrased simply and directly so that it can be admitted or denied without explanation.”) The purpose of Rule 36 admissions is “‘to narrow the array of issues before the court, and thus expedite both the discovery process and the resolution of the litigation.’ ” EEOC v. Balt. Cnty., No. L-07-2500,
1. Request for Admission # 1
Plaintiffs Admission Request # 1 states: “The calls made to 301-620-22[50] were
2. Request for Admission # 4
Plaintiffs Request for Admission # 4 states: “You were attempting to collect a debt as defined above on the dates the calls alleged in paragraph 23 of the complaint were made.” PL’s Mot. 8. Defendant’s response states: “Despite reasonable inquiry!,] [Defendant] is unable to admit or deny.” Id. In its response to Plaintiffs motion, Defendant amends its response to Plaintiffs Request for Admission # 4, stating that Defendant now denies the request, as it “has no information with which to confirm or refute that the subject account holders purchased any product or services ‘primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,’ as [would be] required to characterize the subject accounts as ‘debts’ under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.” Def.’s Resp. 9. It is Plaintiffs burden, Defendant argues, “to prove that [Defendant] was attempting to collect a ‘debt’ as that term is defined under” the statute. Id.
I note, preliminarily, that Defendant’s original response to Plaintiffs Request for Admission # 4 is insufficient. Unaccompanied by reasons, a general statement that a party can neither admit nor deny a matter is an insufficient response to a request for admission. Wright et al., supra, § 2261; see Hall,
Defendant, having answered a Rule 36 request for admission, has a duty to supplement its responses. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1) (“A party who has ... responded to a[ ] ... request for admission ... must supplement or correct its ... response.”); House v. Giant of Md. LLC,
In his reply, Plaintiff requests attorney’s fees because Defendant only completely answered Request for Admission # 4 after a motion to compel was filed. Pl.’s Reply 9. Under Rule 37, if requested discovery is provided after a motion to compel is filed, unless an exception applies, the court must “require the party ... whose conduct necessitated the motion ... to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A). The rule provides for three exceptions where an award of fees is not mandatory, despite the submission of discovery responses after filing a motion to compel. See id. Those exceptions are where: “(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action; (ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Id. Defendant only provided a complete response to Plaintiffs Request for Admission # 4 after Plaintiff filed a motion to compel; Defendant’s original response was not sufficient. See supra. None of the exceptions to Rule 37(a)(5)(A) apply. First, Plaintiff made a number of efforts to obtain the discovery without court аction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i); see, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. ¶¶ 3-6; Pl.’s Apr. 30, 2012 Ltr. 1; Pl.’s May 14, 2012 Ltr. 1-2. Second, Defendant’s initial response was not substantially justified. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii). A party satisfies the “substantially justified” standard “if there is a ‘genuine dispute’ as to proper resolution or if ‘a reasonable person could think [that the failure to produce discovery is] correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.’ ” Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Grp., Inc.,
3. Request for Admission # 5
Plaintiffs Admission Request # 5 states: “You are a debt collector as defined above.” Pl.’s Mot. 9. Defendant’s response
Defendant’s original response to Plaintiffs Request for Admission # 5 is insufficient, as it was not accompanied by a specific explanation as to why Defendant was unable to admit or deny. Wright et al., supra, § 2261; see Hall,
4. Requests for Admission # 7, # 8, and # 10
Plaintiffs Request for Admission # 7 states: “The name of the individual called was not clearly stated at the beginning of the calls alleged in paragraph 23 of the complaint.” PL’s Mot. 9. Plaintiffs Request for Admission #8 states: “The name of the business, individua^,] or other entity responsible for initiating the calls was not clearly stated for the calls alleged in paragraph 23 of the complaint.” Id. Plaintiffs Request for Admission # 10 states: “The calls alleged in paragraph 23 of the complaint did not provide meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.” Id. at 10. Defendant originally denied all three requests. See id. at 9-11. Plaintiff argues that responses to the requests should be compelled because “[i]t is not really in any dispute that for at least several of [Defendant’s] calls to [Plaintiff] or to his number ..., [Defendant] left no message during the calls.” Id. at 9-10. As a result, Plaintiff states, “the individual caller, and name of the business, could not possibly have been identified, as the denial necessarily states.” Id. In its response, Defendant indicates that Plaintiffs motion highlighted “a nuance that undersigned counsel did not previously understand,” namely the significance of the calls where no message was left. See Def.’s Resp. 10-11. In light of its new understanding, Defendant clarified and supplemented its response to Requests for Admission #7, #8, and # 10 by stating that it “admits that the name of thе business, individual caller[,] or other entity responsible for initiating the subject calls was obviously not identified in those instances in which a call was disconnected or did not connect to a live
Defendant’s original answer to Plaintiffs requests was the result of a failure to appreciate a “nuance” of the requests, and not a product of evasiveness. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4); Wright et al., supra, § 2259. Defendant’s answer was amended in light of the understanding of Plaintiffs requests that it gained from Plaintiffs motion papers.
5. Request for Admission # 9
Plaintiffs Admission Request # 9 states: “The purpose of the calls alleged in paragraph 23 of the complaint included the acquisition of location information.” Pl.’s Mot. 9. Defendant’s response states: “Denied as written. The purpose of the calls alleged in paragraph 23 of the complaint was the collection of debts.” Id. In his motion, Plaintiff argues that its admission request asks Defendant “to admit that the purpose of the calls ‘included’ the acquisition of location information.” Id. Therefore, “even if there was another, sеcond, purpose of the calls,” i.e., the collection of debts, the request should have been admitted “wholly or at least in part, if the purpose included acquiring location information.” Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added). In its response, Defendant clarifies its answer to the request, “admit[ting] that the purpose of the calls alleged in ¶ 23 of the complaint was the collection of money owed to creditors by persons other than Plaintiff ..., and that, included in this purpose was the acquisition of information to locate the subject account-holders.” Def.’s Resp. 10. Plaintiff replies that Defendant “had no basis for [originally] denying Request # 9,” and requests reasonable fees and expenses for Defendant “only admitting Request #9 after a Motion to Compel was filed.” Pl.’s Reply 10.
Where a party does not admit a matter stated in a request for admission, it “must specifically deny [the matter] or state in detail why [it] cannot truthfully admit or deny it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 36(a)(4). Denials “must fairly respond to the substance” of the request, and answers to requests for admission
6. Fee Award in Relation to Requests for Admission
Plaintiff is awarded expenses and fees pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(A) as to Requests for Admission # 4, # 5, and # 9. In light of this award, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a Certification of Fees and Costs associated with preparing these three discrete aspects of the motion to compel within fourteen (14) days. Plaintiffs certification is to address only those discovery requests for which fees have been awarded — namely, Requests for Admission #4, #5, and # 9. Expenses and fees will not be awarded as to any other discovery requests litigated in the motion to compel.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. My ruling as to each discovery request is outlined in detail below.
1. As to Interrogatory # 1, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to provide the relevant telephone numbers to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
2. As to Interrogatory # 6, Plaintiffs Motion to Cоmpel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to provide the*369 relevant telephone numbers to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
3. As to Interrogatory # 9, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to provide the requested information to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
4. As to Interrogatory # 12, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to produce the responsive documents to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
5. As to Interrogatory # 15, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. The parties are directed to confer to clarify the nature of Plaintiffs request within seven (7) days, so that the interrogatory may be answered by Defendant within fourteen (14) days.
6. As to Interrogatory # 16, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to fully and completely respond to Interrogatory # 16 within fourteen (14) days.
7. As to Interrogatory # 17, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to fully and completely respond to Interrogatory # 17 within fourteen (14) days.
8. As to Document Production Request # 11, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. If the responsive documents are within Defendant’s actual possession or custody, Defendant must produce them, subject to the parties’ stipulated confidentiality order, if Defendant contends that they contain confidential information. If the documents are in the physical custody of a non-party telephone carrier, Plaintiff may obtain the documents by issuing a Rule 45 subpoena to the carrier.
9. As to Document Production Request # 12, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED. Plaintiff may obtain the documents from the telephone service • provider by subpoena.
10. As to Document Production Request # 15, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is DENIED AS MOOT in light of the parties’ June 8, 2012 Stipulation As to ATDS, ECF No. 33.
11. As to Document Production Request # 18, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED, subject to the terms of the parties’ Stipulated Confidentiality Order, ECF No. 37.
12. As to Document Production Request # 19, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED, subject to the terms of the parties’ Stipulated Confidentiality Order, ECF No. 37.
13. As to Request for Admission # 1, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED AS MOOT in light of the parties’ June 8, 2012 Stipulation As to ATDS, ECF No. 33.
14. As to Request for Admission #4, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED. However, Plaintiff is awarded expenses and fees incurred in making the motion to compel as to Request for Admission #4, and is directed to submit a Certification of Fees and Costs.
15. As to Request for Admission #5, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED. However, Plaintiff is awarded expenses and fees incurred in making the motion to compel as to Request for Admission #5, and is directed to submit a Certification of Fees and Costs.
16. As to Request for Admission #7, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is DENIED.
17. As to Request for Admission #8, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED.
18. As to Request for Admission # 9, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is DENIED. However, Plaintiff is awarded expenses and fees incurred in making the motion to compel as to Request for Admission # 9, and is directed to submit a Certification of Fees and Costs.
*370 19. As to Request for Admission # 10, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED.
20. If modifications to the discovery schedule are merited as a result of this Order, the parties are directed to submit a jointly proposed modified Scheduling Order to Judge Quarles.
A separate Order shall issue.
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is, this 27th day of June, 2012, ORDERED that:
1. As to Interrogatory # 1, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to provide the relevant telephone numbers to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
2. As to Interrogatory #6, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to provide the relevant telephone numbers to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
3. As to Interrogatory # 9, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to provide the requested information to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
4. As to Interrogatory # 12, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to produce the responsive documents to Plaintiff within fourteen (14) days.
5. As to Interrogatory # 15, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. The parties are directed to confer to clarify the nature of Plaintiffs request within seven (7) days, so that the interrogatory may be answered by Defendant within fourteen (14) days.
6. As to Interrogatory # 16, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to fully and completely respond to Interrogatory # 16 within fourteen (14) days.
7. As to Interrogatory # 17, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED. Defendant is directed to fully and completely respond to Interrоgatory # 17 within fourteen (14) days.
8. As to Document Production Request # 11, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. If the responsive documents are within Defendant’s actual possession or custody, Defendant must produce them, subject to the parties’ stipulated confidentiality order, if Defendant contends that they contain confidential information. If the documents are in the physical custody of a non-party telephone carrier, Plaintiff may obtain the documents by issuing a Rule 45 subpoena to the carrier.
9. As to Document Production Request # 12, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED. Plaintiff may obtain the documents from the telephone service provider by subpoena.
10. As to Document Production Request # 15, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED AS MOOT in light of the parties’ June 8, 2012 Stipulation As to ATDS, ECF No. 33.
11. As to Document Production Request # 18, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED, subject to the terms of the parties’ Stipulated Confidentiality Order, ECF No. 37.
12. As to Document Production Request # 19, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is GRANTED, subject to the terms of the parties’ Stipulated Confidentiality Order, ECF No. 37.
13. As to Request for Admission # 1, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED AS MOOT in light of the parties’ June 8, 2012 Stipulation As to ATDS, ECF No. 33.
14. As to Request for Admission #4, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED. However, Plaintiff is awarded expenses and fees incurred in making the motion to compel as to Request for Admission #4, and is directed to submit a Certification of Fees and Costs.
*371 15. As to Request for Admission #5, Plаintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED. However, Plaintiff is awarded expenses and fees incurred in making the motion to compel as to Request for Admission #5, and is directed to submit a Certification of Fees and Costs.
16. As to Request for Admission #7, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED.
17. As to Request for Admission # 8, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED.
18. As to Request for Admission # 9, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED. However, Plaintiff is awarded expenses and fees incurred in making the motion to compel as to Request for Admission # 9, and is directed to submit a Certification of Fees and Costs.
19. As to Request for Admission # 10, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is DENIED.
20. If modifications to the discovery schedule are merited as a result of this Order, the parties are directed to submit a jointly proposed modified Scheduling Order to Judge Quarles.
Notes
. Judge Quarles referred this case to me to handle all discovery and related scheduling matter on April 17, 2012, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rules 301 and 302. ECF No. 25.
. On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel wrote to the Court that counsel had been productively conferring in an effort to resolve without Court intervention the discovery disputes raised in Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. See Pl.'s Apr. 30, 2012 Ltr. 1, ECF No. 26. Accordingly, counsel requested that "the Court wait until [hearing further from counsel] to spend time on this particular Motion.” Id. On May 14, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel wrote to the Court, listing those items in Plaintiff's Motion to Compel on which the parties had been able to reach agreement аnd those for which Court resolution remained necessary. See Pl.’s May 14, 2012 Ltr. 1-2, ECF No. 27 (requesting that the Court resolve the parties' disputes regarding Document Production Request #18 and Interrogatory #15 and noting resolution of all other disputes). However, on May 28, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel again wrote to the Court, stating that, since his May 14, 2012 letter, he has “not received any of the discovery promised to [him] by [Defendant] and its counsel.” PL's May 28, 2012 Ltr. 1, ECF No. 29. Accordingly, counsel stated, he "consider[s] as unresolved the items that had been identified in [his] May 14 letter as having been resolved.” Id. Thus, all of the disputes raised in Plaintiff's Motion to Compel remain ripe for review.
. Where the requesting party may determine the answer to an interrogatory by “examining, auditing, compiling, abstracting, or summarizing a party's business records,” including digital records, the responding party may answer "specifying the records that must be reviewed, in sufficient detail to enable the interrogating party to locate and identify them as readily as the responding party could,” and "giving the interrogating party a reasonable opportunity to examine and audit the records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts, or summaries." Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(d). Such an answer is appropriate only where "the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer will be substantially the same for either party.” Id.; see also United Oil Co., Inc. v. Parts Assocs., Inc.,
. If a party objects on attorney-client privilege or work product grounds, the objection must be particularized, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5)(A), and it must be accompanied by the information required by this Court’s Discovery Guidelines, see D. Md. Loc. R., App’x A, Guidelines 7 & lO.d. Failure to do so may result in waiver. Victor Stanley, Inc.,
. I note that Standard Interrogatory No. 1 is a standard interrogatory to a plaintiff. See D. Md. Loc. R., App’x D, at 135. In this case, Plaintiff submitted this interrogatory to Defendant. Plaintiff also submitted Standard Interrogatory No. 6 to Defendant. Standard Interrogatory No. 6 is a standard interrogatory to a defendant. See id. at 136. The two interrogatories are largely repetitive, and Plaintiff would have obtained the same information by submitting only No. 6. Plaintiff should not have propounded both interrogatories; doing so would impose unnecessary burden and expense on Defendant, and would violate Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g)(l)(B)(ii).
. Plaintiff’s reply also states that Defendant "should be ordered to identify what knowledge these two former employees have,” mistаkenly asserting that Defendant "only [made] the generic statement that these former employees 'may have knowledge regarding the facts at issue in the complaint,’ which does not really state anything about what they know or may know.” Pl.’s Reply 3. While Defendant’s original answer stated only that the two former employees "may have knowledge regarding the facts at issue in the complaint,” Pl.’s Mot. 2, Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s motion provides sufficient additional detail: According to Defendant, “Ni-kole Stampone is a former Monarch collector who may have knowledge regarding collection of the subject accounts,” and "Moses Dukuly is a former Monarch collector who may have knowledge regarding collection of the subject accounts.” Def.’s Resp. 2; see also Pl.’s Mot. 2.
. I note, additionally, that Plaintiff requested in his reply that Defendant "he required to swear to” the assertion made in its response that it does not receive an itemized telephone bill. See Pl.'s Reply 6. Plaintiff cites no authority for this demand, nor is Plaintiff's demand necessary. By virtue of signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating on a pleading, written motion, or other party, an attorney "certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances ... the factual contentions have evidentiаry support or, if specifically so identi-fled, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g) (stating the effect of an attorney placing his or her signature on a discovery request, response, or objection). Violations of Rule 11(b) may subject "any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation” to sanctions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c). There is no factual basis of record for believing that Defendant has in any way violated this rule. Accordingly, Plaintiff's demand for a sworn statement from Defendant is meritless.
. In his reply, Plaintiff notes that Defendant now denies Request for Admission # 4 and states that he "may seek additional fees at a later point when it is proven that [Defendant] was attempting to collect a debt” as defined by the federal statute. PL's Reply 9. Under Rule 37(c), if a party fails to admit a request made under Rule 36, "and if the requesting party later proves ... the matter true, the requesting party may move that the party who failed to admit pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in making that proof.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(2). The Court must award fees unless: (A) "the request was held objectionable under Rule 36(a)”; (B) "the admission sought was of no substantial importance”; (C) "the party failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on the matter”; or (D) “there was other good reason for the failure to admit.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(c)(2)(A)-(D). Because I find that Defendant’s supplemental response to Request for
. The Court cannot help but observe that, had counsel truly conferred in good faith in an attempt to resolve these disputes without Court involvement, this dispute should have been resolved before the motion was filed, based on Defendant's new understanding of the "nuance” of the requests. That it was not is symptomatic of the failure of counsel to approach their discovery obligations as required by the federal rules and this Court's local rules and guidelines.
. Plaintiff’s papers request fees only for those discovery requests that were answered fully by Defendant after Plaintiff's motion was filed. See Pl.’s May 14, 2012 Ltr. 2. Under Rule 37, where a "motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, the court may ..., after giving an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion." Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(C). Beyond the expenses and fees associated with litigating those discovery requests that Defendant plainly could have answered fully prior to Plaintiff’s filing of the present motion, I do not find that an additional award of expenses or fees against Defendant is appropriate.