Lead Opinion
Opinion
The self-represented defendant, Roderick A. Lynn, appeals from the postdissolution judgment of contempt, claiming that the court, Dolan, J., improperly (1) found him in contempt
The record reveals the following facts that are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff, who married the defendant in 1991, commenced an action to dissolve the
Judge Prestley also found that “the plaintiff currently lives in the family home, collects the rent of $900 per month on the other apartment, pays out-of-pocket an additional $200 and pays the mortgage of $1100 per month. The plaintiff has received the rental income from that property since September, 2003. She has taken the home mortgage deduction, which may have resulting negative tax consequences to both parties.”
In dissolving the parties’ marriage, Judge Prestley issued the following orders, among others. “The marital home at 28-30 Washington Street in Plainville . . . shall be listed for sale by a realtor agreed upon by the parties. If they cannot agree, Attorney [Jennifer E.] Davis
The defendant subsequently filed numerous motions regarding the sale of the marital home. On December 16, 2008, the defendant filed a postjudgment motion for order regarding the sale of marital residence.
On October 13, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motiоn for contempt.
“[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: What Your Honor told [the defendant] at that hearing . . . that if he paid his father the full amount ... he is going to
“The Court: That he was going to have problems.
“[The Plaintiffs Counsel]: . . . incur your wrath. ... He paid his father the full amount, and I have the document. . . . May I pass that up to the clerk?
“The Court: Sir, [to the defendant] get in here with a lawyer, because you run the risk of—you run the serious risk of going to jаil. Get a lawyer.
“[The Defendant]: I don’t have the funds to get a lawyer.
“The Court: Then I’m going to appoint a lawyer, because I’m going to put you in jail today, and then your father will give you back the money tomorrow, and then we’ll all live happily ever after. It’s going to be the same story that we did the last time, and you want to do this the easy way, or the hard way.
“[The Defendant]: The funds were not distributed to me, Your Honor. I have no ability to pay this.”
The court appointed attorney Robert Sussdorff to represent the defendant. In appointing Sussdorff, the court stated that the defendant “runs an absolute risk of going to jail today. Under the terms of the divorce judgment, he was to ... be responsible to pay his father $48,000, approximately. He, of course, did not pay it. He gave the $48,000 to his father and claims that he has no control over the situation. We’re going to have a hearing, and if I find that he’s in contempt, I am going to put him in jail today unless he comes up with a bank check for $20,000. You know what? I’m going to give you [the plaintiffs counsel] $2500 for counsel fees, too.”
Thereafter the plaintiffs counsel made specific representations of fact to the court as to the amount of money the defendant owed to the plaintiff. The court found that the amount owed to the plaintiff plus attorney’s fees totaled $21,671. The court told the defendant that he would go to jail that day unless he produced the funds. Sussdorff interjected that he had not yet had an opportunity to meet with the defendant. The defendant spoke up, stating: “I have five motions here that are relevant, which he didn’t even meet with me yet.” The court again stated that it would not hear the motions. The defendant also informed the court that the plaintiff had received rental income from the marital home. The court stated: “Sir, I’m not interested in any of this. All I want to know is . . . why you paid your
When the proceeding reconvened at 2 p.m., counsel represented to the court that the defendant had not paid the mortgage owed to the defendant’s father. The court asked if the defendant should be put on the stand or whether there was an agreement. Sussdorff stated: “Your Honor, I would like to see the contempt [motion]. I haven’t seen the contempt motion.” The court informed Sussdorff that all the court was interested in was whether the defendant had paid his father and that he was not hearing any of the defendant’s motions. Sussdorff informed the court that the defendant literally never received any of the funds from the sale of the house and that he could not have paid his father with those funds. The court asked Sussdorff if he wanted to offer the defendant’s testimony. The defendant then stated that he had not had time to prepare and that he was being denied due proсess of law. The court found that the defendant had “all the time in the world to prepare. We’re doing this right now.” It also came to fight that Sussdorff had not been given the complete court file, which consisted of five volumes, to review. At Sussdorffs request, the court ordered the plaintiffs counsel to show Sussdorff the contempt motion. The matter was passed briefly by the court.
When the matter came before the court again, the plaintiffs counsel sought to have the defendant stipulate to certain facts. The court interrupted, stating that the defendant would not stipulate to anything. The following colloquy then transpired:
“The Court: What do you mean, he didn’t? All right. Never mind. Go ahead. You’re in an impossible position, counsel. . . .
“[Sussdorff]: [The defendant] did not have that $48,000 in his hand, and if he had it ... it went to pay off that mortgage. It did not go through his hands . . . according to the settlement statement.
“The Court: All right. I’m going to hold him in deliberate contempt, and I’m going to order him incarcerated. I’ll give you your choice, sir. I’ll give you until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning, or I’ll lock you up now. It’s your pleasure. If you don’t show up here at 10 o’clock tomorrow, I’m going to hold you in jail longer. Do you want to go right now, or would yоu rather wait and clean up whatever affairs you have to clean up and be here tomorrow morning at 10 o’clock?
“[The Defendant]: Tomorrow morning at ten is fine.
“The Court: That’s fine. Okay, and the purge amount is $21,671.19, and if you are not here tomorrow, sir, the number is going up to $50,000. And it’s going to be a cash bond.”
The defendant produced the sum ordered on December 23, 2009, and was not incarcerated. The defendant appealed from the court’s judgment of contempt.
“[C]ivil contempt is conduct directed against the rights of the opposing party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge,
On appeal, the defendant claims, among other things, that the court misconstrued the judgment and denied him due process of law. We agree.
“[T]he construction of a judgment is a question of law for the court. ... As a general rule, judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinаtive factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as that which is expressed. ... In doing so, it assists a reviewing court to keep in mind the theory on which the case was tried and on which the trial court decided it.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Steiner v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.,
“A fundamental рrinciple in marital dissolution proceedings is that the trial court has broad discretion in determining the equitable allocation of the parties’ assets. . . . [B]ecause every family situation is unique, the trial court drafting a dissolution decree has wide discretion to make suitable orders to fit the circumstances. . .■ . Furthermore, the allocation of liabilities and debts is a part of the court’s broad authority in the assignment of property.” (Citаtions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McKenna v. Delente,
In her February 20, 2008 judgment, Judge Prestley found that the plaintiff resided in the marital home and collected the rental income and was paying the mortgage and took the mortgage deduction on her
“A judgment of contempt cannot be based on representations of counsel in a motion, but must be supported by evidence produced in court at a proper proceeding.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Kelly,
The judgment of dissolution ordered that the “defendant is 100 [percent] responsible for the mortgage debt owed to his father and brother. If the closing costs include and result in a pay off of the mortgage notes to the defendant’s father and brother, the defendant’s share of the proceeds shall be reduced by that amount.” (Emphasis added.) Thе judgment of dissolution therefore permitted the defendant’s father to be paid with proceeds of the sale of the marital home. The plaintiffs motion for contempt stated that “the mortgage held by the defendant’s father was paid in full in defiance of the aforesaid court orders.” Judge Dolan stated that the defendant paid the mortgage debt owed to his father from the proceeds of the sale. Under any construction of the dissolution judgment, it was not wrongful for the mortgage debt to the defendant’s father to be paid from the proceeds of the sale. Whether the defendant owes the plaintiff funds, however, is a different matter. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of contempt and remand the matter for a hearing; see Kelly v. Kelly, supra,
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for furthеr proceedings.
In this opinion DiPENTIMA, C. J., concurred.
Notes
On appeal, the defendant set forth multiple claims, many of which are interrelated. We have consolidated the defendant’s claims in order to address them in a coherent fashion.
Because we conclude that the court improperly found the defendant in contempt, we need not address the defendant’s claim concerning attorney’s fees.
After the dissolution action was commenced, the defendant encumbered the marital home with a third mortgage held by his brother Jeffrey Lynn. Although that mortgage was the subject of contempt proceedings in July, 2009, it is not relevant to this appeal.
Davis had been appointed guardian ad litem of the parties’ minor children.
The essence of the defendant’s motion was to seek the assistance of the court in facilitating the sale of the marital home. The defendant made аllegations against the plaintiff to the effect that she was impeding the sale of the marital home.
The essence of the defendant’s motion was that the plaintiff allegedly failed to pay the sewer taxes owed for the marital home, which allegedly caused a purported sale of the property to fail.
The essence of the defendant’s motion concerned factual claims that, if true, would have affеcted the amount due the parties from the proceeds of the sale of the marital home.
The plaintiffs motion for contempt stated in relevant part: “3. The Judgment of the Court (Prestley, J.) in subsequent order of the Court {Dolan, J.) required the Defendant to pay his father’s mortgage from his portion of the funds from said sale. After payment of the first mortgage, real estate taxes, municipal liens, real estate commission and HUD closing adjustments.
“4. Thе mortgage held by the Defendant’s father was paid in full in defiance of the . . . Court Orders by the Defendant.”
The defendant’s objection stated in part: “Item 4 of Plaintiffs motion states: ‘The mortgage held by the Defendant’s father was paid in full in defiance of the aforesaid Court Orders by the Defendant.’ This statement
Neither party requested that Judge Dolan articulate his factual findings. Although it is the appellant’s responsibility to provide an adequate record for review; see Practice Book §§ 60-5 and 61-10; on occasion, it may be in the interest of the appellee to ensure that the record is clear for appellate review.
The court issued the following relevant order. “1. Due to the Defendant’s risk of incarсeration, Attorney Robert Sussdorff is appointed as counsel for the Defendant. 2. The Defendant is found in contempt of the court order dated February 20,2008.3. The Defendant is to be present in court tomorrow, December 23, 2009 at 10:00 a.m., at which time he will be remanded to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction . . . with a purge amount of $21,671.19. If the Defendant fails to appear in court tomorrow, then the court will issue a capias for his arrest with a cash bond amount of $50,000.”
On appeal, the defendant claims that because “the February 20, 2008, Final Judgment did not address the issue of apotential shortfall in anticipated netproceeds (after closing costs had been paid), said Final Judgment became vague and irreconcilable.” We disagree. Judge Prestley found that “[t]he defendant is 100 [percent] responsible for the mortgage debt owed to his father ...” The language at issue identifies who is to pay the mortgage debt, not how it is to be paid.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion because I believe that the defendant, Roderick A. Lynn, has provided this court with an inadequate record to review.
Furthermore, even if I reviewed the limited record presented to us, I would conclude that any error was harmless. The transcript reveals that the only evidence that the defendant offered that might have supported his motions was his own testimony. Although the defendant ultimately did not testify under oath, he did offer several explanations to the court for why his father’s mortgage was paid in full out of the proceeds of the sale of the marital home, including that he believed that the plaintiff, Iris S. Lynn, had already received her portion of the proceeds and that he did not have control over the funds. Again, we dо not know the basis for the court’s ultimate conclusion, but in finding the defendant in contempt, the court implicitly did not credit the defendant’s explanations. There is nothing in the record to suggest that had the court agreed to consider the defendant’s motions, it would have modified the judgment.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
In footnote 10 of its opinion, the majority apparently acknowledges the shortcomings in the record, but for unstated reasons indicates that it was the appellee’s burden in the present case to provide an adequate record for our review.