73 Vt. 216 | Vt. | 1901
Eight questions reserved upon trial have been argued by the defendant’s counsel.
I. The defendant claims that the structure where the accident happened was not a bridge. The court ruled that it was a “broken down bridge” and to this ruling the defendant
II. The testimony of Tarbell, Wilson, Green, the Slacks, and the Hubbards was admissible. The witnesses passed over the broken bridge and their testimony tended to show its condition. It was descriptive of the place of the accident. The case of Walker v. Westfield, 39 Vt. 246, is full authority upon this point.
III. An additional objection was made to the testimony of Ebenezer Slack upon the ground that in answer to the question “What condition was it (the bridge) in?” he stated it was broken in, “unsafe;” and it is claimed that stating it was unsafe was in effect giving his opinion as to the sufficiency of the bridge. We do not find upon the record any reference to this question, but if it was reserved there was no error. The question was proper, but the answer was not responsive. Error cannot be predicated upon an improper answer to a proper question. Morse v. Richmond, 42 Vt. 539; Houston v. Russell, 52 Vt. 110; Frary v. Gusha, 59 Vt. 257; Lawrence v. Graves, 60 Vt. 657; Hawks v. Chester, 70 Vt. 273.
IV. Bertha Manning was called as a witness by the defendant and testified in chief that soon after the accident the plaintiff told her that in going down the hill towards the bridge, the harness broke, and the horse ran down the hill — ■
V. The defendant claims that the defect causing the accident was the want of a railing and not the insufficiency stated in the notice. This question was not made below, neither does it appear that there was no railing. The exception cannot be sustained.
VI. The plaintiff gave notice to the defendant .that she was thrown from her wagon, and that, using the words of the notice “the back of my head was injured by striking thereon,
VII. The court were requested to charge that if the road where the injury happened was a highway, only by adoption or recognition, the town was liable for an injury upon the culvert or approaches only in that part of the road which the town had recogniezed and adopted and not outside of it. This as an abstract proposition may be correct and might have been applicable had the injury happened where the defendant claimed it did — several rods south of the broken bridge. No question seems to have been made about the liability of the town in that respect if the accident took place at the culvert, where the plaintiff claimed it did. The plaintiff’s testimony tended to show that the horse did not go^ out of the traveled track of the road at the culvert; and the defendant’s testimony did not tend to contradict this — provided the accident haippened at the bridge, and upon this branch of the case the charge was satis
VIII. The defendant introduced testimony to show statements by the plaintiff made out of court inconsistent with her testimony given in court and the court charged with reference to such statements. The defendant now insists that the court should have gone further and explained what certain expressions meant, but points out no error in the charge as given — • but as the exception was to the charge as given — any shortage in the charge will not be considered. Had any valid one been pointed out no doubt it would have been rectified at once.
The judgment is affirmed.