162 A.2d 770 | D.C. | 1960
This appeal seeks to reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to vacate a default judgment against her.
In March 1956 appellant was sued for damages arising from an automobile collision. The complaint alleged that appellant owned the striking automobile and that one Steven Garrett was operating it at that time. Appellant failed to answer the complaint and in March 1958, after ex parte proof as to damages, a default judgment was entered against her.
In November 1959 appellant moved to set aside and vacate the default judgment on the ground that it was void.
After a hearing on the motion the trial court ruled that the fifteen-yéar-old son was a “person of suitable age and discretion” to receive service of process and thereby bind his mother.
This appeal does not question the ruling of the trial court that service was legally effected, but asserts that the trial court was in error in not holding that the judgment was void for lack of proof of ownership of the automobile.
Appellant argues that the language of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act,
Whether or not the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act requires proof of ownership of an automobile before a default judgment can be entered need not be reached on this appeal.
Affirmed.
. Municipal Court Civil Rule 60(b) (4).
. Municipal Court Civil Rule 4(e) (1).
. Code 1951, 40-424, Supp. VIII.
. Though we do not decide this question, it should be pointed out that “A judgment entered after default is just as conclusive an adjudication between the parties of whatever is essential to support the judgment as one entered after answer and contest.” Marshall v. Marvins Credit, Inc., D.C.Mun.App., 122 A.2d 583, 584.