The only substantial question in this case is whether the circumstances relied upon by the State were sufficient to authorize the jury to find them legally corroborative of the testimony of the accomplice as to the pаrticipation of the defendant in the killing of C. A. Pittman. To authorize a conviction based on the testimony of an аccomplice, the corroborating circumstances should independently connect the defendant with the offense, and should raise an inference of guilt independently of the testimony of the accomplice. Childers v. State, 52 Ga. 106; McCalla v. State, 66 Ga. 346; Knight v. State, 143 Ga. 678, 680 (
Bearing these principles in mind, we will now consider the circumstancеs which were before the jury, independently of the testimony of the accomplice. In brief, the accоmplice testified that he met the defendant on the night when the homicide occurred, and 'they went to the homе of the deceased and called him to come to the store which he conducted across the road from his home; that in accordance with a prearranged plan, while the deceased was finding the account of the accomplice, the accomplice struck the deceased with an ax, аnd as he fell on the counter the defendant stabbed him with a knife; that the accomplice and the defendаnt took all the' money found in the store, carried out the body of the deceased, and threw it into a river neаr by. They then rowed across the river and went to the home of the defendant, where they spent the night. On the way homе a pistol taken from the deceased was thrown in a well. The money was hidden at the home of the defendаnt. The accomplice was arrested, and upon his trial assumed full responsibility for the crime. At his trial he was convicted and sentenced to hang, and while awaiting execution he called in the officers and gave the information which implicated the defendant in the crime. The evidence for the State corroborated the testimony of the accomplice as to the time, place, and circumstances of the crime; but, as we have observed, this alone would be insufficient. In addition, however, the State offered evidence, independent of that of the accomplice (and which the plaintiff in error contends was insufficient) to show the сorpus delicti; and there were circumstances from which the jury could infer that the murder had been accompanied by its frequent companion, robbery. When the witness Bob Oxford went to the home of the defendant to arrest him for complicity in the crime, he asked the defendant concerning the money which had been stolen. The defendant denied any knowledge concerning the money; then gradually weakened in his statement, saying‘he did not want tо get any one in trouble; but finally agreed to take the witness to where the money was hidden, and it was found — some hidden undеr his chicken coop and some under his house. Witnesses testified that as officers they brought the accomрlice and the defendant together,
It would seem that the above facts, though some were contradicted, were sufficient to corroborate the testimony of thfe accomplice. See Bell v. State, 73 Ga. 572; Rawlins v. State, 124 Ga. 31, 49 (
The first special ground of the motion for a new trial assigns error upon a refusal of the judge to charge the jury, as requested by the defendant, as to the amount of corroboration rеquired to authorize a conviction on the testimony of an accomplice. An examination of the сharge as given shows that the trial judge fully and fairly charged the jury upon the law applicable to this subject.
The sеcond special ground of the motion alleges that a new trial should be granted because of allegеd newly discovered evidence. The affidavit attached to this ground is not supported as required by the Civil Code (1910), § 6086, and hence cannot be considered. Judgment affirmed.