*1 CORP. FINANCE v. HOUSEHOLD LYNCH al. et et al. 23, 1972 March 7, 1971 Decided Argued December No. 70-5058. Doug- Stewart, J., opinion Court, delivered the in which las, BrennaN, joined. Marshall, JJ., White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, Burger, J., J., Blackmun, in which C. *2 joined, post, RehNQUist, p. JJ., Powell part and took no the consideration or decision of the case.
David M. Lesser argued the cause for appellants. Clendenen, With him on the briefs was William H. Jr. Richard G. Bell for argued appellees. the cause With him on appellees the brief for Corp. Household Finance Pulaski, Jr., et were al. Charles A. David Gold- and W. Killian, man. Robert K. General of Connect- Attorney icut, Raymond Hirtle, and J. Cannon and Robert L. Jr., Attorneys Assistant General, Barrett, filed brief for Deputy Sheriff. opinion delivered the
Mr. Justice Stewart Court.
In 1968, the appellant, Dorothy Mrs. a resi- Lynch, dent of Connecticut, New her Haven, directed em- ployer deposit $10 $69 of her in a weekly wage credit union savings appellee account. Household Corp. Lynch Finance $525 sued Mrs. for in a state court, alleging nonpayment of a promissory note. Before she was served with process, appellee cor- poration her garnished savings pro- account under the visions of summary Connecticut law that authorize pre-judicial garnishment at attorneys the behest of alleged creditors.1 appellant then in a brought this class action
federal district court against Connecticut sheriffs who on bank levy against accounts and creditors who in garnishment 1 The pursuant was levied to Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. description statutory 52-329. For a further gar of Connecticut’s scheme, nishment see opinion, Part II of this infra. Lynch alleged Mrs. garnishment
voke statute.2 and prior garnishment no notice of the that she had no the state opportunity to be heard. She claimed Equal statutes were under the Protection and invalid Due and Amendment, Process of the Fourteenth Clauses declaratory injunctive pursuant relief sought jurisdictional counterpart, U. S. C. its (3):4 A court of three judges 28 U. S. C. district §§ was convened to hear the claim under 28 U. S. C. and 2284. appellant, Toro, cheeking her The second named Norma had ac garnished by landlord, Eugene Composano.
count her former one Subsequently Composano garnishment. released the An issue of mootnesss—which was not resolved the District Court —is thus *3 presented. not, however, Lynch Appellant do reach We this issue. savings appellant had a account checking Toro a account. garnished, applicable type The considerations to one of account seem identical applicable opinion, those to the v?e shall therefore, other. In this only appellant Lynch. refer to the case of
An issue is also raised propriety as to the purported of the classes represented by appellants be appellees. the In view of our disposition case, of the we leave this by issue for consideration upon District Court remand. provides: The statute
“Every person who, any statute, under color of ordinance, regula- tion, custom, usage, any or Territory, subjects, State or or causes to subjected, any be citizen of the United person States or other within jurisdiction deprivation thereof to the any rights, privileges, or by immunities secured laws, Constitution and shall be liable party to the injured in an law, action equity, at suit in or other proper proceeding for redress.”
4 The statute states in part: relevant “The district original courts shall have jurisdiction any civil action by authorized law to be by commenced any person: “(3) To redress deprivation, under any color of law, State statute, ordinance, regulation, custom usage, any right, privilege or immunity secured the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing equal for rights of citizens or of persons all jurisdiction within the of the United . . States . .”
The District did not the merits Court reach evidentiary- cáse. It complaint dismissed the without an on grounds jurisdiction that it lacked hearing (3) § and that relief was barred the statute injunctions prohibiting against state court proceedings, 28 U. C. 2283. F. prob § 1111. We Supp. noted able jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 1253,5 U. S. C. jurisdictional presented. consider issues 401 U. S. appellees argue we have no to consider this appeal ease on three-judge Court, direct from the District 28 U. S. C. the court did because not reach appellant’s the merits of the injunction claim for an but subject dismissed lack of matter jurisdiction. But appeal whether a direct depends will lie on “whether the three-judge properly Moody Flowers, [court convened.” was] v. 387 U. S. 99. This challenges action constitutionality of a enjoin state statute and seeks to ques- its enforcement. The it tions raises It, are therefore, requirements substantial. meets the for convening a three-judge court. 28 S. C. U. Idlewild Liquor Bon Voyage Corp. Epstein, v. 370 U. S. 715. This case may, therefore, be distinguished Ledesma, from Perez v. 401 U. S. 82, upon appellees rely. which the case, power we had no to consider the merits of appeal an ques- because the ordinance in tion was neither a state statute nor of application. Perez, statewide supra, at (concurring opinion). When a state statute is chal- lenged injunctive sought, relief we granted have direct review pursuant to although three-judge courts dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Carr, Baker Abernathy *4 v. Carpenter, 241, 373 U. S. Hodge, Doud v. 350 485, U. S. Florida Lime Growers v. Jacobsen, 73, 362 U. S. or because relief thought by be barred 28 U. S. C. Johnson, Cameron v. § 390 U. S. The appellees also note permits that appeals 1253 § to this Court only from orders “granting or denying an interlocutory ... permanent injunction . They . . argue that since three-judge the court never considered injunction whether an granted should be an appeal should lie to the Appeals. Court of The three-judge court, however, judgment entered a “denying sought all relief by plain- tiffs.” We therefore jurisdiction have to consider the presented. claims 542 that neither hold, follow,
We for reasons the appel- (3) 1343 nor 2283 warranted dismissal § § the case to complaint. lant’s remand Accordingly, we remaining the District for consideration of the Court in issues this litigation.
I
District
appellant’s complaint,
the
dismissing
(3) applies
“personal”
Court held that
1343
if
only
rights,
opposed
allegedly
“property” rights,
are
impaired. The
on
decision of the
court relied
Court
Appeals
Eastman,
in
Circuit
Eisen v.
Second
421 F. 2d
which
on
560, 563,
rested,
turn,
Mr. Jus-
tice
opinion
generation ago
Stone’s well-known
Hague
CIO,
v.
g.,
307
also,
U. S.
531. See
e.
Director,
Weddle
Long,
v.
436
2d
Bussie v.
383
342;
F.
F. 2d 766;
Higgins,
Howard v.
This Court adopted has never between distinction personal liberties proprietary rights as a guide (3) jurisdiction.6 Today contours of 1343 we ex pressly reject that distinction.
6 appellees cite three cases decided this Court before Hague CIO, they v. that, say, support 307 U. S. the limitation (3) jurisdiction deprivation personal to claims of liberties. Greenhow, Greenhow, 317; Carter v. v. S. U. S. Pleasants U. Mfg. rely Co., v. appellees Holt Indiana 68. The also U. S. affirmances, opinion, on three- two recent without of decisions judge (3) dismissing ground district on courts suits Hamm, rights allegedly infringed proprietary. Hornbeak v. were Abernathy aff’g (MD 1968); 393 U. Supp. 283 F. Ala. Carpenter, 1962). aff’g Supp. (WD 208 F. Mo. challenges
All of these cases involved constitutional to the collec- Congress judicial tion of state taxes. has treated interference with subject by unique the enforcement of governed state tax laws aas considerations accordingly: and has restricted federal enjoin, "The district suspend courts shall not or restrain the as- sessment, levy any or collection of tax under State law where a
A Neither the words (3) of § nor legislative history provision of that distinguishes personal between property In rights. fact, the Congress that enacted predecessor of §§ 1983 (3) and 1343 clearly seems to have intended to provide federal judicial forum for the redress wrongful deprivations of property by persons acting color of under state law.
This Court has the origin traced 1983 and its § jurisdictional counterpart to the Civil Rights Act of Stat. 27. Co., Adickes v. Kress 398 U. S. 144, 162-163; Monroe Pape, 365 U. S. 171, 183- 185.7 That Act guaranteed “broad and sweeping pro- ... plain, speedy remedy may and efficient be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U. S. C. 1341. § repeatedly We have barred anticipatory adjudication federal validity of state tax City laws. Dows v. Chicago, 108; 11 Wall. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 521; Dredge U. Great Lakes & Dock S., Co. v. Huffman, see Ledesma, also Perez v. 401 U. at 126-127, n. 17 (opinion J.). The decisions cited BrenNan,
by appellees may, therefore, be seen as consistent with congres sional restriction of federal special in this cases, class of and with longstanding judicial policy. Section of the 1866 Act was the model for 1 of the Civil § Rights Act of Stat. 13. n. See Sections 1983 infra. (3) and 1343 are direct descendants of 1 of the Act of 1871. 1874, Congress consolidated the various federal large statutes at separate titles in the Revised codify Statutes in order to existing process, law. In the provision substantive of 1 of the 1871 Act separated became jurisdictional from its counterpart. Rev. Stat. Although original provision substantive pro had rights, privileges, tected immunities Constitution, secured provision in the Revised enlarged provide Statutes protec rights, tion for privileges, or immunities secured federal law well. Originally, suits under 1 of the 1871 Act could be brought either circuit or district court. After juris- codification in *6 Little v. Sullivan rights. civil to basic tection” enjoy- Acquisition, 237. 229, S. Park, U. 396 Hunting those among were property of alienation and ment, 432.8 409, S. Co., 392 U. Mayer v. Jones rights. all per for vindicated Amendment Fourteenth The Monroe, 1866. ofAct the rights established sons the “It cannot at 509-510. supra, Hague, at supra, be to intended rights civil the among that be doubted by the Four action state discriminatory from protected enjoy, acquire, to rights the are Amendment teenth enjoy in the Equality of property. dispose own and framers by the regarded was rights of property ment the to pre-condition an essential Amendment of that which liberties and rights civil other basic of realization Shelley guarantee.” intended was Amendment the v. Buchanan also, 10. See 1, Kraemer, 334 U. S. of Adoption Flack, H. The 74-79; 60, 245 S. Warley, U. (1908); 90-97 81, 75-78, Amendment Fourteenth the Fourteenth Antislavery of Origins The tenBroek, J. (1951). Amendment scope with in identical was the district courts grant dictional (12). Circuit 563 Rev. Stat. provision, § substantive expanded rights, of deprivations claimed limited to jurisdiction was court by any Constitution secured immunities privileges, or (16). 629 Stat. equal rights.” Rev. § “providing Congress Act of jurisdic original courts’ the circuit abolished Congress when now into what sections jurisdictional the two merged and tion the revised retained was “equal rights” limitation (3), the 1343 § De Stat. 36 Act of Mar. grant. jurisdictional jurisdictional and the substantive wording of spite the different violations, constitutional alleges claim 1983 provisions, when construed are both sections (3) provides 1343 157, 161. Jeannette, City 319 S.U. Douglas v. identically. of 8 2, 39th Doc. No. Shurz, Exec. Report C. of generally See Sess., 3034r- Cong., 1st Globe, Cong. 39th (1865); 1st Cong., Sess. Origins of Antislavery tenBroek, The (1866); J. App. Orig The Munro, & (1951); Frank Amendment the Fourteenth L. Laws,” Col. of “Equal Understanding Protection of inal (1950). 131, 144-145
Rev.
concept
rights
broad
of civil
embodied
Act
and in the Fourteenth
is un-
Amendment
mistakably
history
evident
in the
1 of
legislative
the Civil
Rights
Act of
the direct
Stat.
(3).
only
lineal
and 1343
§§
ancestor
Not
was
1§ of the 1871 Act derived from 2 of the 1866 Act,9
but
passed
the 1871 Act
express purpose
for the
“enforcing]
Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”
17 Stat. 13.
the rights
Congress
And
sought
in the
protect
1871 were described by
Act
the chairman of the House Select Committee
*7
drafted
legislation
as “the enjoyment of life and
liberty,
right
with the
to acquire
possess property
and
every
of
kind, and to pursue and obtain
and
happiness
safety.” Cong.
42d
Globe,
Cong.,
App.
1st
69
Sess.,
(1871)
(Rep. Shellabarger,
from
quoting
Corfield
Coryell,
9 Rights Act, Section of the 1866 currently Civil 14 Stat. 27, slightly codified in different 242, form as 18 U. S. C. read in pertinent part: “[A]ny person who, any law, statute, color of ordinance, regulation, custom, subject, or shall subjected, any or cause to be any inhabitant of State ... deprivation any to the right of secured protected by or act, punishment, this or to different pains, penalties or on person account having any of such at time been in a con- held slavery dition of involuntary servitude .. . be shall deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 2 provided Section penalties any criminal for violation of 1 of the 1866 Act. Screws v. United States, 98-100. The latter section rights enumerated the protected, the Act alia, inter including, right “to make and contracts, enforce inherit, to sue ... purchase, lease, sell, hold, convey and personal real and property....” Representative Shellabarger, chairman of the House Select Com- mittee which drafted the Rights Civil Act of stated that “The model of the 1871 [§ will be found Act] in second section of act April 9, of 1866, known as rights the 'civil act.’ That section provides a criminal proceeding identically in the same case as this provides one a civil remedy Globe, Cong. 42d Cong., Sess., 1st App. (1871). protection
That property personal rights as well as intended is also confirmed Grant’s mes- President and sage Congress urging passage legislation,10 many the remarks of members of Congress during legislative debates.11
B
In 1875, Congress granted
juris-
the federal courts
diction of “all suits of a civil nature at common law
or in
..
.
under the
equity
arising
Constitution or laws
of the United States.”
470.
(3),
Stat.
Unlike
general
this
federal-question
the forerunner
provision,
of 28 U. S. C. 1331, required
that a minimum amount
controversy
be alleged
proved.12
Mr. Justice
opinion
Stone’s
in Hague, supra, as well as the federal
court
g.,
decisions that followed
e.
it,
Eastman,
Eisen v.
421 F. 2d
reflect the
view that
apparent
there is an
President,
message
in a
dated March
stated:
“A
condition
affairs now
exists
some States of the Union
rendering
property
life and
insecure
I urgently
....
recommend
legislation
such
as in
judgment
Congress
effectually
shall
secure
life, liberty,
property,
and the enforcement
parts
in all
law
of the United
Cong. Globe,
States.”
Cong.,
Sess.,
42d
1st
*8
11See,
g., Cong. Globe,
e.
Cong.,
Sess.,
42d
1st
(Rep.
332-334
Hoar);
(Rep.
369-370
Monroe);
(Rep. Lowe);
375-376
(Rep.
429
Beatty);
(Rep.
448
Butler);
(Rep.
459-461
Coburn);
475-476
(Rep. Dawes);
(Sen.
501
Frelinghuysen);
(Sen. Edmunds);
568
(Sen.
577
Carpenter);
(Sen. Pool);
607
(Sen. Sumner) ;
650-651
(Sen.
653
Osborn);
(Sen.
666
Spencer).
Rep.
See also
1,
Cong.,
No.
42d
(1871).
1st Sess.
Several
months before
passage
of
Rights
the Civil
1871,
Act of
a Senate
Committee
formed
investigate
was
to
conditions in the Southern
States.
purpose
One
of
investigation
was to “ascertain . . .
persons
whether
property
and
are secure.
. . .”
at II.
Id.,
12
jurisdictional
The
amount was increased
$2,000
$500
from
to
by the Act
3,
of Mar.
1887, 24
552;
$3,000 by
Stat.
to
the Act of
Mar.
1091;
36 Stat.
$10,000
and
by
to
July
Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 415.
conflict
(3)
e.,
§§
between
and
i.
1331,13
that a broad
reading of
1343 (3)
§
to
all rights
by
include
secured
the Constitution would render
§
and its amount-
in-controversy requirement,
superfluous.
opin-
These
ions sought
to
jurisdictional
harmonize the two
provi-
sions
construing
(3)
§ 1343
as conferring federal
jurisdiction
suits
brought
only
under § 1983
when
right
(cid:127)the
asserted is personal,
proprietary.
not
The initial failure of this
reasoning
the sup-
posed conflict between
(3)
§§ 1343
simply
does not exist.
(3)
Section 1343
applies
to
only
alleged
infringements of rights under “color of
..
. State law,”
whereas
contains no
requirement.
such
Thus,
for example, in suits
federal
against
for alleged
officials
deprivations of constitutional
rights,
necessary
it is
to
satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement
for fed-
jurisdiction.
eral
See Oestereich v. Selective Service
Board, 393
U. S.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents,
But the more point fundamental to be made is that any such contraction jurisdiction §of 1343 (3) is not Hague plaintiffs brought in a suit federal district court enjoin enforcement city prohibiting ordinances the distribution of printed holding matter and the public meetings per without a They mit. alleged that the ordinances violated the union members’ right speech assembly. of free Both the District Court and the Appeals jurisdiction Court found under (3). and 1343 §§1331 This Court reversed as to plain since the tiffs had failed to requisite establish the amount controversy. Although no opinion commanded majority, jurisdiction under (3) upheld. Roberts, Mr. Justice writing opin the lead ion, expressed the view that the reference in “any right, privilege immunity secured the Constitution” should be inter preted only alleged cover violations of Privileges and Im munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pape, Monroe v. 365 U. 170-171, S. 167, rejected we such a reading narrow of similar *9 language in 1983.
548
supported by history The legislative the of 1875 Act the hear suits giving power federal courts to arising Ill, 2, was, under Art. of Constitution the authority like the Act of an of national expansion over War, matters before the Civil been left that, had to the States. F. & J. Landis, Frankfurter The Business of Supreme Court 65 (1928); Koota, Zwickler 389 U. S. 241, Levin, Chadbourn & 245-248; Original Juris- diction of Federal 90 Questions, U. Pa. L. Rev. (1942). The Act, “clearly . part . rather therefore, of, . than an exception to, trend of legislation which preceded it.” supra, Chadbourn Levin, & at Zwickler, supra. There very little discussion of the measure before its enactment, to the contrast extensive congressional pas- debate attended the of sage the Act of 1871.14 And is, there as result, a no indication whatsoever that Congress, in a rather hastily passed measure, to scope intended narrow provision passed years part four earlier major as rights civil legislation.15 study history of the by “[A] the bill as revealed Congres yields
sional Record no reason its time; enactment at that may even be said strong to raise a presumption that it was ‘sneak’ legislation. originally It was introduced in the Repre House of sentatives in the form of a bill to amend the removal statute.” Levin, Chadbourn & Original Jurisdiction of Questions, Federal U. Pa. L. (1942). Rev. 642-643 Nonetheless, passage Act, despite debate, the lack of regarded has been as the “culmination of a movement strengthen ... the Federal Govern against ment the states.” F. Landis, Frankfurter & J. The Business Supreme Court 65 (1928). n. 34 Maury, See also Late War, Civil Its Effect on Jurisdiction, and on Civil Remedies Gen erally, Reg. Am. L. 129 (1875). noted, As Congress in enlarged also scope of 1983’s predecessor protect rights secured federal law rights well as secured the Constitution. 7, supra. See n. Moreover, when Congress increased the amount-in-controversy requirement $3,000 Stat. there was no indication *10 repeals by The rule . . . that implication “cardinal are City Bank, favored," Posadas National not v. 296 U. S. Mayer Co., 497, 503; Jones 392 U. at thus S., 437, coun pare a refusal to 1343 (3) jurisdiction— sels down § and the substantive scope by of § means the 1983— personal distinction between liberties and property rights, any or in way. statutory other descendants 1 of the § Civil Rights Act be given must the meaning sweep and their and their origins language dictate.16
Moreover, the although of the purpose amount-in- controversy requirement is to congestion reduce in the federal Rep. S. 1830, No. 85th courts, 2d Sess. Cong., (1958), has Congress substantially impor- lessened its tance respect with § 1331 many passing statutes confer federal-question jurisdiction without an amount-in-controversy requirement.17 So it was that (3) under what- is now 1343 fact, was to be In reduced. § legislation explicitly preserved exemption brought of action (3)’s predecessor under amount-imcontroversy from the § requirement. 16 In Price, United States v. 797, interpreted U. S. we phrase “rights, privileges, or immunities secured ... Constitution or States,” laws of the United contained 18 U. S. C. 242, to "all embrace § Constitution and laws of the United States.” The language similar (3) 1983 and 1343 originally §§ modeled on predecessor, 242’s Rights of the Civil § Act of 1866. § 9, supra. n. Price, See supra, we said that liberty not are at “[w]e ingenious analytical seek instruments” giving to avoid a con gressional scope enactment the language that its origins require. Id., at 801. 17A series of particular grant statutes jurisdiction, regard without to the controversy, amount in in virtually all areas that otherwise would general fall under the federal-question special statute. Such admiralty, statutes cover: maritime, prize cases, 28 U. S. C. 1333; bankruptcy matters and proceedings, 28 U. 1334; C. re view of orders Interstate Commerce 28 U. S. C. Commission, arising cases any under Congress Act of regulating commerce, from amount jurisdictional increased Congress
when it July Stat. ofAct $10,000, $3,000 was to reduce concern primary its made clear that arising to cases regard with judiciary’s workload federal §C. diversity jurisdiction, federal under 1331.18 not “personal rejecting compelling
A reason final, *11 im- is the virtual (3) 1343 upon § limitation liberties” cases, 28 trademark 1337; copyright, and patent, 28 U. S. C. § 1339; matters, internal revenue 1338; U. S. postal 28 C. U. C. § S. § disputes, 28 1340; election actions, C. duties 28 U. S. and custom § party, 28 is a 1344; in the United States C. cases which U. S. § 1361; 1345, 1346, 1347, 1348, 1349, certain and C. U. S. §§ 1350; by aliens, on bonds executed 28 U. S. C. actions tort actions § law, 1352; involving Indian allot- 28 cases under federal U. S. C. § ments, 1353; injuries law, 28 U. 28 C. under federal S. C. U. S. § 18 $10,000 applies limitation to cases “While this bill minimum diversity involving questions, greater Federal its effect will be on many question cases since of the so-called Federal cases will be ex empt provisions.” Rep. Sess., from 2d 6 its No. 85th Cong., (1958). report echoing finding The Senate of the Judicial raising Conference’s Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue that jurisdictional-amount mainly significant upon would “have effect diversity Id., cases.” at 22. amount-in-controversy
Recent studies have demonstrated that the requirement “relatively impact still has little on the volume of federal question litigation.” Institute, Study American Law of the Division Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 489-492 (1969). also, Warren, See Institute, Address to the American Law 213; 25 F. R. D. Wright, C. (2d Law of Federal Courts 107 ed. 1970). Information from the Administrative Oifice of the United States Courts majority that a private federal-question shows cases $10,000. involve less than Institute, American supra, Law at 491. Although litigation involving rights federal civil increasing, such only actions constituted of the suits instituted in district courts 4.6% during the year. 1970 fiscal Administrative Office of the United Courts, States 1970 Report, 11-31.
possibility it.19 The federal applying courts have been particularly bedeviled in “mixed” cases which personal both and property are rights implicated, the line between them has difficult to been draw with any consistency principled objectivity.20 The case above, adopted As noted we have property never rights- personal jurisdiction. liberties test (3) for 1343 In Eisen v. East man, 421 F. 2d Appeals Court of for the Second Circuit application said that many of the test would bar welfare claims. Id., have, at 566 n. 10. however, continually (3) We found 1343 See, g., Department such e. cases. Hu California Java, man Resources v. 121; Wyman, U. S. Rosado v. 397 U. S. 397; King Smith, v. 309; Goldberg Kelly, 392 U. S. 254; v. Dandridge Williams, v. 471; U. S. California, Damico v. U. S. 416. See Yeager, also Rinaldi v. 305; Lennox, ante, U. S. Swarb v. p. Lindsey Normet, ante, p. 56. cases, arguably, These only deprivations involved of property, (3) but we found
jurisdiction nonetheless.
20Difficulty
application
has been one source of the commenta
tors’ dissatisfaction
“personal
with the
liberties” limitation.
gen
See
*12
erally Note, 24 Vand. L.
(1971);
Hague
Rev. 990
Laufer,
v. C. O.:
I.
Mr. Justice Stone’s Test of Federal
Reappraisal,
Jurisdiction —A
19 Buff. L. Rev. 547 (1970); Note, 1970
819;
Duke
Note,
L. J.
N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1208 (1968); Note, 66 Harv. L.
(1953).
Rev. 1285
The federal courts
produced
have
inconsistent
regarding
results
(3)
of welfare
Compare
claims.
Roberts v.
Harder, 440
F. 2d
with Alvarado v. Schmidt,
Supp.
317 F.
1027. See
supra.
also n.
Yet,
always explaining why
without
such
“personal”
interests are
rather than “proprietary,” courts have
consistently found
rights jurisdiction
civil
alleging
over suits
dis
crimination in the issuance of
See,
business
g.,
licenses.
e.
Barnes
Merritt,
v.
376 F. 2d
Michigan
Glicker
Liquor
v.
Comm’n,
Control
II Under 28 U. may S. C. federal court not “grant injunction an stay proceedings a State court except expressly authorized Act of Congress, where in aid of necessary jurisdiction, its or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” The District Court relied upon this statute as an alternative ground for dis-
21The District Court found that access to funds held in a sayings indistinguishable account simple ownership from *13 money. garnishment Thus infringe per of that account did not rights. Lynch, however, sonal Mrs. alleged that because of the garnishment pay she was unable to her rent on time and encoun difficulty maintaining family minimally adequate tered her on a allegations true, Lynch’s diet. If personal liberty these are Mrs. profoundly garnishment savings. could be affected of her appellant of the The con- appellant’s complaint. missal tends that is to this case because inapplicable § prejudgment garnishment under Conn. Gen. Stat. We 52-329 not in state court. proceeding Rev. is a agree.23 ju- without Connecticut, garnishment instituted Ibid.; Stephenson,
dicial order. 1 E. Connecticut Civil 1970).24 (2d garnish- Procedure 151 ed. levy usually not deputy effected a sheriff —does ment — in confer on courts and may, fact, state provides: 22 The statute any in which
“When the effects of the defendant in civil action money may judgment payment a be rendered or decree for the they agent are in trustee so that concealed the hands of his or any attached, be when a debt is due from cannot found or any debt, distributive person defendant, legacy or to such or when may estate of such defendant from the share is or become due to may any debtor, plaintiff insert person deceased or insolvent leave a true and attested in a direction to the officer to his writ least twelve accompanying complaint, at copy thereof and of the court of common days superior court or the in the case of the court, the session before days in the case of the circuit pleas, or six trustee or agent, returnable, with such to which it is of the court executor, may be, defendant, or, the case with debtor of the place of estate, the usual or at trustee of such administrator or copy leaving such the time garnishee; and from abode of such any garnishee, such the hands of of the defendant all the effects defendant, any any garnishee to the any such debt due from may due become share, due or that debt, legacy or distributive insolvency, executor, or trustee administrator him from such of such in the hands execution, be secured shall exempt from not may recover.” plaintiff judgment as pay such garnishee to ante, Hartke, p. 15. Roudebush Cf. upon the suit beginning of at occurs Garnishment lawyer, acting as a Commissioner plaintiff’s direction “The 51-85, 52-89. Stat. Rev. Conn. Gen. Superior §§ Court. of summons attorney merely in his writ includes his plaintiff or garnishment or serve attachment to make an the sheriff direction to (2d Procedure 151 Civil Connecticut Stephenson, process.” E. 1970). ed. *14 prior
occur to commencement of an alleged creditor’s Young suit. v. Margiotta, 136 Conn. 433, A. 2d 924, 926. Despite the state court’s control over the plaintiff’s docketed case, garnishment is “distinct from and independent of that action.” Potter v. Appleby, 136 Conn. 641, 643, 73 2d 819, 820. garnished A. prop- erty is secured, not authority of the court, but merely in the hands of the garnishee. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-329. Prejudgment garnishment is thus levied and maintained the participation without of the state courts.
In this case, the appellant sought enjoin garnish- ment proceedings, not the finance company’s suit on the promissory note. The District Court noted that “garnishment may be separated from the underlying personam action,” but held that awas bar be- cause the interference with existing creditors’ suits caused by such an injunction “probably would be substantial.” 318 P. Supp., at 1115. According to the appellees, would interference occur garnishment because is neces- sary to any make eventual judgment in the pending state suit Hill effective. v. Martin, 296 S. 393, U.
This argument
persuasive
not
in the context of the
Connecticut prejudgment
garnishment
scheme. Gar
nishment might
serve
subsequent
make a
judgment
Hill,
effective. Cf.
supra;
Record Pub
Manufacturers
lishing Co.
Lauer,
268 F.
2d
cert.
denied,
U.
Furnish v. Board Medical Examiners
California, 257 F.
2d
cert denied,
25The fact plaintiffs’ that attorneys are, formally, officers of the court does not convert the garnishment Connecticut process into a state proceeding court purposes, attorneys since the state officials who pursuant acting were themselves not to a court order or authority. under a court's Hill, supra, said “proceeding” we a federal court enjoin is forbidden to steps “includes all *15 taken or which may be taken in the state court or by its from the institution to the close of the final officers process.” Id., at 403 (emphasis In supplied). case, this the garnishment occurred before appellee corpora- tion had served appellant process. with
More important,
the state court and its officers are
insulated from control over
garnishment.
Connecti-
appears
cut
to be one of the few
authorizing
States
an
attorney for an alleged creditor
to
or attach
garnish
property
any
without
participation
a
or clerk
judge
by
of the court. Stephenson, supra,
person
at 230. A
whose
account has been
only
seized
get
can
minimal relief at
best.26 The state
have held
they
courts
that
cannot
enjoin a garnishment on the ground that
it was levied
unconstitutionally. Michael’s
Jewelers v. Handy, 6
Conn. Cir.
A. 2d 904;
Barone,
266
Harris v.
Conn.
158 A.
2d
assumption
855. One
underly-
ing 2283
is that state courts will vindicate constitutional
fairly
claims as
and efficiently as federal courts. But
assumption
this
cannot obtain when the
doors
complete
have
24, supra;
discretion
issue a writ. See n.
Sharkie
Smith,
wicz v.
Conn.
2d
Nussenbaum,
A.
Sachs
92 Conn.
We conclude, therefore, the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s suit for an in- junction under § 1983. Accordingly, judgment be- fore us is reversed, and the case remanded for further *16 proceedings consistent opinion. with this
It is so ordered. Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Powell took part no in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice White, with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun join, dissenting,
I agree with the Court jurisdiction that federal U. S. C. 1343 is not adjudication limited to the personal rights and if disposition of this case turned solely on that issue I would without join reservation in the majority opinion. But I cannot agree either with approach majority that takes to the anti- 27See Pfister, Dombrowski v. U. S. 484 n. Cameron v. Johnson, S., 3; Younger 390 U. at 613 n. Harris, v. The circuits have question. divided Cf., g., on the Cooper e. v. Hutchinson, 184 F. 2d City and Baines v. Danville, 337 F. 2d 579. injunction statute, 28 U. S. C. its conclusion that the statute does not bar this I do not mean suit. to suggest appellants’ due process on the attack Connecticut garnishment It statute is not substantial. obviously is. Sniadach Family Finance Corp., 395 337 (1969). U. S. my appellants Nevertheless, view, should be required press their constitutional attack in the state courts.
In Connecticut, garnishment or attachment one is method of a beginning lawsuit. Conn. Gen. Rev. Stat. 52-329; E. Connecticut Proce- Stephenson, Civil dure 156-157, 232-237 (2d 1970). ed. course, Of the requisite personal upon service a defendant is necessary in personam to obtain Conn. jurisdiction, Gen. Stat. Rev. § 52-54, as well as to an secure effective garnishment, Stephenson, supra, at 244, but as a matter of right certain kinds of actions civil plaintiff a may simultaneously garnish a defendant’s bank account and upon serve summons the defendant, together complaint with a stating the nature of the un- action. derlying Conn. Gen. Rev. § Stat. A state 52-329. court obtains action and of questions concerning garnishment when return process is made to that court. Stephenson, supra, at 67. Garnish- “ancillary ment main action for damages cannot exist without such Id., action.” at 143. Its purpose, majority notes, tois secure property *17 will thus be made available aof satisfaction judgment. Ibid. A writ of garnishment be may issued aby judge of the court of jurisdiction, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. (Supp. § 52-89 1969), garnishment but because in Connecticut, unlike most other States, is a matter of right and requires prior no judicial determination, may writ also by be issued a court clerk or licensed attorney. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 51-85. In either
case, accomplished simply by matter completing a form. Lynch
Appellant brought enjoin federal action to this than seven garnishment more months after the writ complaint had been executed, served, the summons process and the case in docketed Connecticut returned, At injunc- court. the earliest moment that a federal proceeding tion could have issued the state court way. Despite majority purports this, well to sever the from the action that under- garnishment lies it. Court that Connecticut garnish- reasons in it is proceeding ment is not a state court because by parties pursuant not to private acting carried out Ante, a court order. at 554-555. majority
If means that is a sever- garnishment independent for that matter, able of the main suit and I suppose per reason outside of then would it enjoin any missible for a federal court garnishment to attachment, inception or whether obtained at the of a while it is in lawsuit, progress, judgment after purpose for the approach execution. This to the anti-injunction articulated Simon statute, v. South Co., ern R. U. S. 124-125 I (1915), was, Martin, in Hill laid to rest thought, the Court (1935), construed “proceedings where any comprehensively court of State” and as embracing may
“all
taken
steps
or which
be taken in the state
by
court or
its officers from the
to the
institution
process.
close of the final
It applies
appellate
well as to original proceedings;
independent
and is
judicata.
applies
the doctrine of res
It
alike
action
the court and
its
officers;
ministerial
applies not
to an execution issued on a
only
judg-
but
ment,
supplemental
any proceeding
or an-
*18
ciliary taken with a view to making the suit or
judgment
(Footnotes
effective.”
omitted.)
today
Court
on
embarks
quite a different course
and rejects not
Hill
only
v. Martin but also a sub
stantial body of federal court of appeals law to
effect
that § 2283 bars federal court interference
execu
with
tions on state court
judgments. E. g., Manufacturers
Record Publishing
Lauer,
v.Co.
F.
2d 187 (CA5), cert.
denied, 361 U.
(1959); Furnish v. Board Medi
cal Examiners
California,
The Court also suggests inapplicable here because no Connecticut court authorized garnishment. Its view apparently is that a federal in junction would therefore not interfere with state court processes. Until now, however, it has been reasonably clear 2283 cannot be avoided by the simple expe dient of enjoining parties instead of judges. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Co., Electric 4, 9 (1940). Moreover, the Court’s rationale proves too much. Contrary to the views expressed in Hill v. Martin, supra, state court ministerial officers could be enjoined at any time and for any purpose in the course of a litigation and without regard to § 2283. In addi parties tion, to state litigation court could be enjoined from performing any one or all of the tasks essential to the orderly progress of litigation so long as the acts in question are not carried out pursuant to court order. Depositions of parties and witnesses, interrogatories parties, and subpoenas for witnesses are commonly pur- persists Some confusion whether a federal may, court consistently 2283, enjoin with operation of a state court judgment procured by fraud. Wright, See C. Law of Federal (2d Courts 179-181 ed. 1970). question That presented is not here. *19 other and these Are judge. to a resort
sued without subject now order court performed functions not offended option of court at to attack in federal litigant? state court by mak- create confusion fear, Iwill,
Today’s decision are rules that on 2283 turn §of applicability ing between for conflict potential apply. The to difficult for price and will increase federal courts state and courts alike. by and paid litigants be judicial errors will is that me, matter, it sense of the seems The common of a parcel part here is and at issue the garnishment way. Garnishment now under proceeding state court from the separate may be characterized Connecticut proceeding and but it is nonetheless action, underlying At accompanies. it from the suit legitimacy derives its process return of brought, the time federal action was this court had completed been and the state had since long action, jurisdiction of a cause acquired straightforward constitutional- questions legitimacy of the and including ity garnishment. quite apart
It me from to that, also seems to day’s v. holding departs from such cases as Stefanelli Minard, Ledesma, 117 and Perez v. 401 (1951), U. S. atomizing U. which counsel state (1971), against by litigation enjoining, example, the introduction of obtained from illegally evidence, gen as well as the more Younger Harris, eral admonitions of v. U. S. Mackell, Samuels v. (1971); (1971); Boyle 401 U. 66S. v. Landry, Ledesma, Perez (1971); U. S. supra, improvident against exercise of a federal court’s equitable powers to frustrate or interfere with the operations of state courts adjudicating federal questions that are involved in state court litigation and which can be adjudicated there. As the Court Stefanelli, said in if such interventions were to be “[e]very permitted, question procedural proc- due far-flung ess law—with and undefined range— its invite a movement flanking against system would courts resort to the federal forum, State with review if need be to this Court, determine the issue.” 342 if S., resort, U. at 123. Such permitted, provide “would ready opportunities, which conscientious might counsel be bound to employ, subvert the orderly, effective prosecution of local crime in Id., local courts.” at 123-
Appellee Younger Barrett invokes companion cases as a ground for affirming the judgment of the District Court. Of course, those injunc- cases involved federal *20 against tions state criminal proceedings, but relevant considerations, my view, are equally applicable where state civil litigation is in progress, as is here the case.2
I would affirm judgment of the court below. 2 I thus would affirm whether or not 42 U. S. C. an exception to the bar of question 2283. That is at issue Foster, Mitchum v. 70-27, judice. No. now sub