15 Haw. 424 | Haw. | 1904
OPINION OP THE COURT BY
This is an action of assumpsit for $78.95, instituted in the District Court of South Hilo, Hawaii. Summons was issued on September 13, 1902, returnable on September 16, 1902, at 10 a. m. The defendant not being found, substituted service was made on the day of issuance, or attempted, by leaving a copy, etc., with his wife at his last and usual place of abode. On the morning of September 15, one of the members of the firm of Ridgway & Ridgway, attorneys, informed the District Magistrate, in court, that his firm would appear for the defendant upon the calling of the case. On the return day, at the appointed hour, counsel for the plaintiff, although informed by the Court and the clerk of the intended appearance of counsel for the defendant, moved for trial and such trial was thereupon
Tbe mere fact that tbe District Court bad denied one or more motions to re-open would not preclude it from granting still another motion to the same effect, provided only that it had tbe power under any circumstances to set aside its own judgment and to re-open tbe case. If it bad tbe power, it could exercise it even of its own motion, if satisfied that tbe ends of justice so-required.
Tbe District Court ruling appealed from is interlocutory and therefore not appealable if that court bad authority to make it. In our opinion, District Magistrates have, under our laws, power to set aside their'own unsatisfied judgments and to re-open cases before they have been removed by appeal or otherwise to another Court whenever, in their discretion, tbe ends of justice require that tbis be done. Whatever tbe rule may be elsewhere as to police or justices’ courts, our district courts have long exercised tbe power 'and tbe practice not only has been unquestioned but has been recognized by tbe Supreme Court. See The King v. Yok Lan, 7 Haw. 854, where tbe court, composed of five judges, said that “if tbe defendant”, who bad been sentenced upon a plea of guilty and whose motion to have tbe judgment set aside and tbe case reheard bad been denied by the police justice, “thought tbe police justice was wrong in refusing tbe application for a rehearing of tbe case, be should have appealed from that decision and not from tbe judgment in tbe case.” Tbe exercise of tbis power is sometimes necessary in order that mistakes may be corrected and in order that the determination of tbe controversy may be a just one. Irregularities in obtaining a judgment constitute good ground for setting it aside and permitting further bearing.
In Gouveia v. Nakamura, 13 Haw 450, 452, we held that a district magistrate erred in not granting a motion to vacate a
Whether the district court misconceived the intent and the effect of the remarks of the Circuit Judge in his decision of September 20, or whether for any other reason the ruling of the magistrate should be sustained, we need not say. These are questions which could be determined only if we were at liberty to consider the appeal on its merits.
Counsel for the plaintiffs have, in this Court, referred to the ruling of the district magistrate as though it were an order for a new trial. While the order as stated in the certificate of appeal prepared by counsel for the appellants would seem to have been to that effect, yet upon an examination of the whole record we think the intention of the Magistrate was simply to order a re-opening for the admission of further testimony. In none of their motions did the present appellees ask for a new trial.
In our opinion the ruling appealed from is interlocutory and not appealable. The exceptions are overruled.