Lyles v. StateLyles v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Candler, Wyatt
H. T. O‘Neal, Jr., Charles F. Adams, Special Assistant Attorneys-General, Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Rubye G. Jackson, Deputy Assistant Attorney-General, contra.
On June 10, 1959, a grand jury in Bibb County by a special presentment charged and accused Mrs. Anjette Donovan Lyles with the offense of murder. The presentment alleges that the accused “with malice aforethought, did, in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-Eight in the county aforesaid, make assaults upon Marcia Elaine Lyles by administering and causing to be administered to the said Marcia Elaine Lyles deadly poisons, to wit: Arsenic and arsenic trioxide, and other poisons of like deadly character the names of which are to the grand jury unknown, but all of the same being substances likely to produce death in the manner so used; the said Anjette
1.
The presentment in this case was good in substance. It alleged all the essential elements of the crime of murder so plainly that the nature of the offense could be easily understood by
2. On the trial several witnesses for the State were permitted to testify to facts showing or tending to show that the accused had previously poisoned and killed three other persons for monetary motives. Such testimony was objected to when offered on the ground that it was irrelevant, immaterial, and put the defendant‘s character in evidence when she had not elected to do so. Special grounds 1 to 55 inclusive of the motion for new trial allege that the court erred, over the objection made thereto, in allowing such evidence. Counsel for the plaintiff in error has argued these several grounds together, and correctly so, inasmuch as they present for decision one composite question which was raised many different times during the trial. This is certainly not a new question, but one which this court has had for consideration many times. By several full-bench decisions, and by some where there were one or more dissents, this court has affirmed convictions where testimony of the character here complained of was admitted over a similar objection timely made. Among the unanimous decisions just referred to, is Williams v. State, 152 Ga. 498, 521 (110 S. E. 286), where the defendant was indicted in Jasper County for the murder of one Lindsey Peterson, and where evidence, showing or tending to show that he had for the same asserted motive, namely, the destruction of evidence against himself and sons for the offense of peonage, previously murdered seven other persons, was admitted over timely objections thereto, it was held: “The general rule is, that, on a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent from that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible; but to this rule there are several exceptions. Among them is the admissibility of evidence showing or tending to show the commission of crimes other than that for which the accused is on trial, for the purpose of showing motive, plan, or scheme.” Some of the other full-bench decisions referred to are: Hill v. State, 148 Ga. 521 (1) (97 S. E. 442); Coart v. State, 156 Ga. 536 (119 S. E. 723); Waters v. State, 158 Ga. 510 (123 S. E. 806); Green v. State, 172 Ga. 635 (158 S. E. 285); Wilson v. State, 173 Ga. 275 (2) (160 S. E. 319); Honea v. State, 181 Ga. 40 (181 S. E. 416); Cooper v. State, 182 Ga. 42 (3) (184 S. E. 716, 104 A. L. R. 1309); Sisk v. State, 182 Ga. 448 (1) (185 S. E. 777); Goodman v. State, 184 Ga. 315 (191 S. E. 117); Black v. State, 187 Ga. 136 (199 S. E. 810); Hunter v. State, 188 Ga. 215 (3 S. E. 2d 729); Mimbs v. State, 189 Ga. 189 (5 S. E. 2d 770); and Emmett v. State, 195 Ga. 517 (25 S. E. 2d 9). None of these decisions has been overruled or modified, and until they are they have the force and effect of a statute and are binding authority which this court is required to and should follow. As authority for this, see West v. Trotzier, 185 Ga. 794, 796 (196 S. E. 902); Hagan v. Candler, 189 Ga. 250, 258 (5 S. E. 2d 739, 126 A. L. R. 108); and Crown Laundry v. Burch, 205 Ga. 211 (53 S. E. 2d 116). Some of the more recent decisions referred to, where there were one or more dissents, are Gossett v. State, 203 Ga. 692 (2) (48 S. E. 2d 71); Dorsey v. State, 204 Ga. 345 (49 S. E. 2d 886); Biegun v. State, 206 Ga. 618, 620 (58 S. E. 2d 149); and Mosley v. State, 211 Ga. 611 (87 S. E. 2d 314). On its facts, the Gossett case is remarkably similar to the instant case. Like the defendant in this case, Mrs. Gossett was indicted for killing one person with arsenic, money being her motive for the homicide as the State contended, and over her objections the court admitted evidence which showed or tended to show that she had previously killed her father and mother with arsenic for a monetary motive. It was there held by the majority that the evidence objected to was relevant for the purpose of showing plan, scheme, and motive with respect to the crime for which she was then being tried; and some of the full-bench decisions mentioned above were cited in the opinion which Mr. Justice Bell prepared for the court as authority for the ruling there made. The full-bench decision in Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261 (71 S. E. 2d 615), is not in conflict with the decision rendered in any one of the several cases cited above. It simply holds, as they do, that, on the trial of one charged with the commission of a crime, proof of a distinct, independent, and separate offense is not admissible, even though it be a crime of the same sort, unless there is some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other. In the instant case, the presentment accused the defendant
3. The brief for the plaintiff in error argues special grounds 56 to 59 inclusive together. These special grounds complain of the introduction and allowance of several canceled checks, some of which are dated after the death of Marcia Elaine Lyles; a letter to the Veterans Administration, dated June 21, 1955, purporting to be written and signed by Joe Neal Gabbert, and inquiring about the status of his insurance; an instrument purporting to be signed by Mrs. Ben F. Lyles, Sr., dated September 2, 1957, addressed “To Whom It May Concern“, and directing that her body be delivered for burial to Anjette Donovan Lyles (the defendant); and a photostatic copy of the last will and testament of Mrs. Ben Lyles, Sr. That they were irrelevant, immaterial, did not illustrate the issue on trial, and were being offered by the State solely for the purpose of putting her character in evidence when she had not elected to do so, was the objection timely made by the accused to their admission. None of these grounds of the motion requires a reversal of the judgment refusing a new trial. They were facts which it was proper for the jury to consider in connection with the State‘s contention that the accused murdered Ben F. Lyles, Jr., Joe Neal Gabbert, and Mrs. Ben F. Lyles, Sr., as well as the person named in the presentment; and that her motive for each homicide was the same, namely, money. Respecting all of the documents so tendered, except the canceled checks, the State introduced evidence which would have authorized the jury to find that they were not only forgeries but forged by the accused.
4. Special ground 60 alleges that a new trial should be granted movant because the jury which tried her was not sworn as required by law. The recital of fact in this ground of the motion for new trial was not approved as being true by the trial judge; but, to the contrary, was disapproved by him and his certificate expressly recites that the jury was sworn before the trial started. Hence, this ground of the motion cannot be considered. Clifton v. State, 187 Ga. 502 (2) (2 S. E. 2d 102).
5. The evidence, though circumstantial in nature, authorized
6. Since the judgments complained of are not erroneous for any reason assigned, they are therefore affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, P. J., who dissents from the rulings in the second and third divisions of the opinion and from the judgment of affirmance.