1 Cai. Cas. 581 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1804
We agree with the counsel for the defendant, that the first count is to be considered, when taken together, as stating no other publication than the sending a letter sealed up from the one party to the other. A letter is always to be understood as sealed, unless otherwise expressed, and the law is too-well settled to be now shaken, 'that sending a letter is no publication on
Judgment arrested nisi.
Hicks's case, in Hob, 215. Poph. 139. S. C. Hob. 62. 12 Co. Ed
S. P. by Lord Kenyon, in Phillips v. Jansen, 2 Esp. Rep. 625. The contrary is, however, inadvertently stated by Williams, Serjeant, in note (2), to Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 132. But the cases cited do not bear out the position. In the first (Baldwin v. Elphinston, 2 Bl. Rep. 1037,) the court decided that “printing" was prima facie evidence of publishing; and “ causing to be printed " confirmed the fact of publication, because it called “in a third pen-son." The second was the case of a letter written to a third person, Weatherston v. Hawkins, I D. & E. 110, but not applicable to the principle for which adduced. While making this observation, I feel, from conscious inferiority, ashamed at writing, what may seem a criticism, on so truly learned an annotator. See also to the same effect Waistell v. Holman, 2 Hall, 172.
This is the reason why a libel is a crime. Its falsity is not the offence,