The instant appeal requires this court to determine whether the jurisdictionally required penalty prepayment provision set forth within R.C. 1513.02(F)(3) denies an insolvent mine operator due process of law or
“It is axiomatic that all legislative enactments enjoy a presumption of constitutionality. Benevolent Assn. v. Parma (1980),
Keeping these principles in mind, we now address the question before us. Ohio’s enforcement scheme for the reclamation of surface coal mining is divided into two parts, a “guilt determination” stage and a “penalty determination” stage.
Appellant argues, however, that, notwithstanding the alternative review opportunities available without prepayment, insolvent coal miners are unable to prepay the penalty amount into escrow and thus are being unconstitutionally deprived of their right to review by the Reclamation Board of Review. We disagree.
Although this court has not previously passed upon this issue, at least three federal circuit courts of appeals and six federal district courts have upheld the constitutionality of a nearly identical penalty prepayment provision contained within the federal Surface
“* * * While the fundamental requirement of procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ Armstrong v. Manzo,
Application of the Mathews standards to R.C. 1513.02(F)(3) indicates that the non-penalty prepayment review alternatives within R.C. Chapter 1513 are sufficient to provide mine operators, such as appellant herein, with a meaningful opportunity to be heard and, therefore, are constitutional.
First, appellant’s private interest, although arguable, is not overriding. The statute acts only to temporarily deprive appellant of the use of the money paid into escrow during the pending appeal. Graham, supra, at 1111; Blackhawk Mining Co., Inc., supra, at 757. Further, the money must be returned within thirty days with interest, pursuant to R.C. 1513.02(F)(3), if appellant is successful in reversing the assessment. This court is convinced, therefore, that any poten
Second, this court believes that under the present procedures, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is slight. As described above, R.C. Chapter 1513 prescribes several procedural safeguards, including hearings and review conferences, which may be utilized prior to any penalty prepayment being required. “[‘] * * * [A]n operator’s failure to take advantage of the relief available [does not] render * * * the statutory scheme unconstitutional. * * * [’]” Blackhawk Mining Co., Inc. at 757.
Finally, the government has a substantial interest in the prompt assessment and collection of penalties as part of its objective to insure compliance with R.C. Chapter 1513, Ohio’s coal mining reclamation provisions. The prepayment requirement avoids the problem of non-collection of fines and discourages delays in payment due to frivolous appeals. Graham, supra, at 1111; United States v. Crooksville Coal Co. (S.D. Ohio 1982),
Appellant argues, however, that it cannot afford to prepay its $229,150 penalty
The United States Supreme Court has found that monetary prerequisites to court access are permissible unless the right attempted to be vindicated is fundamental and the courts provide the only means through which vindication of such right may be obtained. Ortwein v. Schwab (1973),
Appellant seeks to vindicate a right which is merely pecuniary in nature. Such interest is economic in character and not fundamental. Ortwein, supra, at 660; Kras, supra, at 445. Moreover, even were appellant’s interest considered fundamental, appellant had access to, yet failed to utilize, available alternative administrative remedies not conditioned upon prepayment of the assessed penalty. Due process requires no more. Ortwein, supra; Kras, supra.
For a statute to pass constitutional muster under an equal protection analysis it need only have, absent a suspect class or fundamental right, a rational basis for its classification. Ortwein, supra; Kras, supra. The instant cause concerns a classification based upon wealth, operators who can and cannot prepay their assessed penalty. Classifications based upon wealth alone have, however, never been found to be suspect. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973),
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The “guilt determination” stage is conducted pursuant to R.C. 1513.02(D) and 1513.13. The “penalty determination” stage is set forth within R.C. 1513.02(F)(3).
Section 1268(c), Title 30, U.S. Code, provides in part:
“* * * [I]f the person wishes to contest either the amount of the penalty or the fact of the violation, forward the proposed amount to the Secretary for placement into an escrow account. * * * Failure to forward the money to the Secretary within thirty days shall result in a waiver of all legal rights to contest the violation or' the amount of the penalty.”
The federal courts which have passed upon this issue include Graham v. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation & Enforcement (C.A. 3, 1983),
While at first glance appellant’s penalty assessment appears clearly prohibitive, it is worth noting that of the $229,150 total assessment, only $400 represents the fine imposed by appellee. The remainder of the assessment, fully $228,750, is composed entirely of $750 a day noncompliance fines, the minimum amount permitted by statute. Accordingly, although the total assessment herein is unquestionably large, all but $400 of such assessment was totally self-created by appellant.