Lead Opinion
Shari Lyes contends that the City of Riviera Beach (“the City”), the City of Riviera Beach Community Redevelopment Agency (“the CRA”), and several officials of both entities (collectively, “appellees”) discriminated against her because of her gender. Granting summary judgment, the district court held that: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over Lyes’s Title VII claim; (2) Lyes had not pleaded a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983; and (3) suits under the civil rights conspiracy statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), could- not be premised upon gender-based discrimination. We reverse and remand.
I.
Florida law permits the governing body of a county or municipality, after appropriate findings of necessity, to create a community redevelopment agency. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 163.356(1) (1997).
In Riviera Beach, the CRA receives approximately two-thirds of its funds from the City. The City’s governing body (“the City Council”) also serves as the head of the CRA; each of the five members of the City Council is likewise a member of the CRA Board of Commissioners. Nevertheless, the CRA operates in some ways apart from the City. It maintains its own bank accounts and records. It also has separate staff and offices.
The CRA hired Lyes as a redevelopment planner in July 1989, and she served in that capacity until her termination in December 1993. At the time of Lyes’s hire, Don DeLaney was the CRA’s Executive Director. De-Laney left in February 1992, whereupon the City Manager, Tony Smith, became the interim Executive Director and drew a separate salary from CRA funds for his service. In July 1993, Lyes learned that Neil Crilly, a planner for the City, was being considered as the permanent Executive Director of the CRA. Lyes made inquiries as to why she was not offered the job. She claims that she was told by Smith and one of the CRA Commissioners that she was unqualified because of her sex. These people allegedly told her that discrimination is “the way of the world,” that she would have to “get used to it,” and that gender was a factor because the Executive Director would need to deal frequently with male developers. Lyes protested her treatment in writing to the CRA Board.
The CRA Board named Crilly as Executive Director in August 1993, making him Lyes’s direct supervisor. The day after Crilly was hired, Lyes filed an EEOC complaint against the CRA, alleging discrimination in hiring. Notice of the complaint was sent to Smith and was forwarded to the CRA on August 25. The next day, Crilly suspended Lyes for refusing to attend a meeting. Crilly claims that he had no knowledge of the EEOC complaint when he suspended Lyes. Lyes filed a second EEOC charge, this time against the City, alleging retaliation. Upon returning from suspension, Lyes received a written reprimand from Crilly.
Lyes filed internal grievances with respect to her suspension and reprimand. Consequently, Crilly requested that James Waldron, Director of Personnel for the City, conduct a review of his discipline towards Lyes. Waldron made a written report approving Crilly’s conduct. Within two months, Crilly gave Lyes a negative performance review, a week after which he fired her. Lyes filed a third charge with the EEOC, naming the City and alleging retaliation for the second complaint. She also requested an appeal hearing in connection with her firing. The CRA Board held a hearing at which Lyes and the CRA were represented by counsel and presented evidence. The CRA Board unanimously upheld Lyes’s termination.
II.
Lyes’s complaint alleged that the foregoing facts constituted gender discrimination actionable under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and Florida law. Appellees responded to the complaint with various motions to dismiss. After converting these motions into motions for summary judgment and allowing the parties to present evidence beyond the initial pleadings, the district court granted summary judgment. Specifically, it held that: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over Lyes’s Title VII complaint because the CRA was not an “employer” within the meaning of the statute; (2) appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Lyes’s section 1983 claim, in light of this court’s opinion in McKinney v. Pate,
A.
Title VII makes it illegal for an “employer” to “discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s ... sex....” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The statute defines “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person____” Id. § 2000e(b). The existence of a Title VII “employer” is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the statute. Virgo v. Riviera Beach Assocs., Ltd.,
We review the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal under summary judgment standards. In Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs.,
Lyes claims that the district court erred in concluding that she did not work for an “employer” within the meaning of Title VII because the CRA and the City together have more than fifteen employees and because the entities should be aggregated for counting purposes. Courts have held that aggregation is proper in three circumstances: when the plaintiff “show[s] that the respondent and the actual employer are so integrated in their operations as to be a ‘single’ employer; show[s] that the respondent exercises such control over employment conditions as to be a ‘joint’ employer; or show[s] that the putative employer was an ‘agent’ of the respondent, who is the true employer.”
We have held that the factors to consider in determining whether private entities operate as a single employer are those administratively promulgated for cases under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The “NLRB factors” include: “(1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.” McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home,
Appellees argue, however, that binding circuit precedent precludes use of the NLRB factors in government employment cases. In Dumas v. Town of Mt. Vernon, Ala.,
Although the new Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of our shared precedent is instructive, it does not bind us, United States v. Thomas,
Applying the NLRB factors to the present case, we conclude that Lyes presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact that the City and the CRA are a single Title VII “employer”; thus, the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal was in error. First, Lyes presented significant evidence that the CRA and the City have interrelated operations. Specifically, the record contains: (1) minutes of the CRA Board meeting considering Crilly’s appointment as Executive Director, at which one Commissioner describes the hire as “essentially a ‘promotion from within’”; (2) CRA bylaws stating that the CRA “Executive Director shall report to the City Manager” and “prepare Agency agendas with coordination of [the] City Manager”;
Second, and most importantly,
Third, it cannot be doubted that the CRA and the City share common management. The same five people serve on the City Council and the CRA Board, the policy-making bodies of both entities. Moreover, for a year and a half, Tony Smith served as both City Manager and CRA Executive Director. The district court, however, concluded that it was unclear that the City and the CRA are commonly managed, again citing the statutory provision that declares redevelopment agencies to be separate and independent. But legislative declarations do not change the facts; these entities are managed commonly.
Finally, Lyes has introduced ample evidence that the CRA is fiscally dependent on the City. The CRA lacks independent revenue-raising power; instead, the relevant taxing authorities (both city and county) pay a portion of their revenues to the CRA. Accordingly, the CRA receives two-thirds of its budget from City taxes. Lyes also points out that the City made an interest-free loan to the CRA, and we take notice of the Florida statutes permitting the City to provide further funds to the CRA. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 163.358(3) (governing body may authorize issuance of revenue bonds for redevelopment activities); id. § 163.356(3)(d) (governing body may appropriate to redevelopment agency sufficient funds for operating expenses).
The totality of the circumstances thus indicates that genuine questions of fact remain as to whether or not the CRA and the City have sufficiently overlapping operations so as to be considered a single employer. Consequently, we must reverse the district court’s summary judgment to the contrary.
B.
In the district court, Lyes sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in public employment. Although she invoked the Fourteenth Amendment, Lyes did not specifically style this claim as one to vindicate her rights under the Equal Protection Clause. This pleading oversight led the district court to analyze her constitutional argument in light of our due process precedent alone. In her appellate brief, however, Lyes labels her claim appropriately.
Lyes’s complaint contains numerous allegations consistent with an equal protection cause of action. Most strikingly, Lyes claims that she was told outright that she was not promoted because of her gender. Moreover, Count III of the complaint alleged: (1) “It has been the policy and custom of Defendants ... acting individually and in their official capacities, to discriminate against female employees”; (2) “Defendants ... have implemented this policy and custom of keeping females out of management positions by not selecting Plaintiff for the position of Executive Director”; (3) “Defendants’ action constituted sexual discrimination of Plaintiff, violation of her Civil Rights, her due process of law, and constituted a deprivation of her rights, privileges and immunities”; (4) “The sexually discriminatory acts of Defendants and their refusal to follow departmental standards and procedures for hiring ... were actions under the color, regulations, customs, and usages of the State of Florida”; (5) “The actions subjected Plaintiff ... to the deprivation of rights ..:, to wit: Plaintiffs right under § 1983 ... to be free from discrimination in employment and to be protected by
Our inquiry does not end, however, with a determination that the complaint provided adequate notice to the appellees of an equal protection claim. Because the district court granted summary judgment after allowing the parties further to refine their arguments, as opposed to dismissing Lyes’s complaint, we must ask, in light of the pleadings before the district court on summary judgment, whether Lyes sufficiently expressed her equal protection theory to the court. See Adams v. James,
Appellees, ignoring the equal protection implications of Lyes’s complaint, moved for summary judgment on the ground that Lyes did not state an actionable due process claim in light of McKinney v. Pate,
It appears that Lyes is arguing that she has a fundamental right not to be discriminated against on the basis of her gender, and that this right rose to the level of a property interest when she was terminated for discriminatory reasons. Lyes, however, fails in her attempt to avoid the consequences of McKinney. The Court is not persuaded by Lyesf’s] argument that she has a recognized fundamental right not to be terminated based on her gender. Lyes cannot take a gender based Title VII claim and transform it into a Constitutional claim by alleging discrimination. Applying Lyes’[s] reasoning to its logical conclusion would provide every discrimination plaintiff with an additional substantive due process claim.
Lyes v. City of Riviera Beach, No. 95-8285-CIV-RYSKAMP, slip op. at 24-25 (S.D.Fla.1996).
We therefore conclude that Lyes’s complaint and responsive pleadings, although far from a model of clarity, sufficiently notified appellees and the district court that she was challenging her termination on an equal protection theory. Accordingly, the district court on remand should analyze Lyes’s equal protection claim to determine if summary judgment is proper.
C.
Lyes also alleged that appellees conspired to deprive her of her equal protection rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) by denying her the Executive Director’s job and eventually terminating her. The district court denied relief because neither the Supreme Court
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ..., the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
The statute on its face does not exclude women from its coverage. Rather, the section’s use of the phrase “equal protection of the laws,” enacted only three years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified with identical language, see U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, suggests that the enacting Congress intended section 1985(3)’s coverage to track Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which now views women as a protected class. Craig v. Boren,
The legislative history of section 1985(3) also does not warrant a restrictive view of the classes protected by the provision. The members of the 42d Congress may not have had the protection of women foremost in their minds when enacting the provision that became section 1985(3), but neither did they endeavor to limit the statute’s scope. As Senator Edmunds, the floor manager for the bill, remarked, a conspiracy would be actionable if “it should appear that [the] conspiracy was formed against [a] man because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter....” Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871). More to the point, a member of the House observed that the bill was intended for all Americans: “It is not to protect Republicans only in their property, liberties, and lives, but Democrats as well, not the colored only, but the whites also; yes, even women and children....” Id. at App. 190 (statement of Rep. Buckley). Thus, although “it is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause,” United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott,
Similarly, the judicial gloss that the statute has acquired since its enactment leads us to conclude that women are a class protected by section 1985(3). The Supreme Court has stated that the provision’s “language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. Breckenridge,
III.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the order of the district court, save for those issues discussed in note 15, supra, which we AFFIRM. This ease is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. See id. § 163.355 (governing body must determine that: (1) slum or blighted areas or areas with shortage of affordable housing exist in jurisdiction; and (2) redevelopment efforts are “necessary in the interest of the public health, safety, morals, or welfare of the residents”); id. § 163.356(1) (governing body must also find that there is a specific need for a redevelopment agency).
. We note that the Supreme Court recently decided that an entity’s "employer” status should be determined by counting employees under the so-called "payroll method,” see Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., Inc., - U.S. -,
. The City argues that the district court could have dismissed the City from the suit because Lyes named only the CRA in her initial EEOC charge. Accordingly, the City asks us to affirm on that alternative ground. Although it is true that, "as a general rule, the failure to name a party in the EEOC complaint precludes a future civil action against that party,” the requirement is construed liberally, and “[w]here the purposes of the Act are fulfilled, a party unnamed in the EEOC charge may be subjected to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Virgo,
.It is clear that the "employer” issue is part of a Title VII plaintiff’s claim. See Garcia,
. See Virgo,
. Lyes referred to the "agency” approach in her pleadings in the district court and before this court. Specifically, she cited Owens v. Rush,
.In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
.The parties introduced different versions of the CRA bylaws. In appellees' submission — which bears the notation "Revised 11/17/93” — neither of the references to the City Manager's role vis-avis the Executive Director appears. Because these amendments seem to have been adopted after Lyes had filed her second EEOC charge and only a month before her termination, we consider the former bylaws as probative evidence of the workings of the entity which discharged Lyes. We also note that the timing is somewhat suspicious; the change occurred within three months of the City's first notice that it was a potential defendant.
. Courts often have noted that this factor should be weighed more heavily than others. See Lindemann & Grossman, supra, at 1310 (collecting cases).
. Appellees also rely on Crilly's employment contract, which provides that he serves at the pleasure of the CRA Board. This proof is only marginally helpful; it says simply that Crilly’s employment conditions are controlled by the CRA, but says nothing about the CRA staff in general or Lyes in particular.
. The district court’s disposal of this evidence was inappropriate on summary judgment. It stated, "[tjhat a City employee approved a CRA disciplinary action ... is not convincing evidence
. Indeed, the Florida Attorney General has recognized that this statute is not talismanic; in an unrelated context, he acknowledged the statute but opined: “the Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency is an agency of the City of Miami Beach and not a juristic entity which is legally separate and distinct from the city....” Op. Fla. Ally. Gen. 82-5 (Feb. 4, 1982) (internal quotations omitted).
. Appellant's Br. at 46.
. Plaintiffs Amended Verified Complaint at 15-17.
. Appellees further argued — and the district court agreed — that any procedural due process claim was meritless for two reasons: first, that Lyes did not have a protected property right in her job, as she was an at-will employee; and second, that appellees gave Lyes all the process she was due by providing her a hearing in which she could present her case. Lyes does not appeal the district court’s ruling on this issue and we therefore deem it abandoned. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster,
. We expressly reject the district court's apparent assumption that Title VII is an exclusive remedy for discrimination by state and municipal employers. We have assumed otherwise in our prior cases. See Cross v. State of Ala.,
. The Supreme Court has reserved the question of section 1985(3)'s application to gender-based conspiracies. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
. Lyes, slip op. at 31.
. We note that only one element — whether gender-based animus can trigger section 1985(3)'s protection — of Lyes's cause of action is involved in the present appeal. To succeed on remand Lyes must still prove:
(1) a conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance*1390 of the conspiracy, (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Childree v. UAP/GA CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1146 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied,-U.S.-,
. An additional burden on section 1985(3) plaintiffs is not present in the instant case. "A § 1985(3) private conspiracy ... requires an intent to deprive persons of a right guaranteed against private impairment.” Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
. See Libertad v. Welch,
Two Circuits have suggested that section 1985(3) is limited to race-based conspiracies, but did so in cases where a gender-based conspiracy was not at issue. See Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I dissent on each issue, except I concur in the result on the section 1983 claim and on the Due Process claim discussed in footnote 15.