Mr. Justice Mercur

delivered the opinion of the court May 2d 1881.

It is "well settled, if a member of a mutual insurance company is in default in the payment of an assessment on his policy, after due notice according to the by-laws and rules of the company, the protecting power of the policy is suspended until the assessment is paid. No recovery can be had for a loss sustained during the continuance of such default: Hummel Appeal, 28 P. F. Smith 320; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Buckley, 2 Norris 293; Washington Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Rosenberger, 3 Id. 373; Crawford County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cochran, 7 Id. 230.

The main contention here is, whether the alleged assessment was actually made on the 19th of October 1871. It is known as assessment No. 29. The minute-book of the company duly proved, show's that a meeting of all the directors was held on that day, and the following preamble and resolution were adopted: “ Whereas the losses by fire in Pennsylvania have been very heavy within the last few months, and recently an extraordinary fire has occurred in the city of Chicago, involving a large amount of loss to the company, therefore Resolved, that an assessment of twelve and a half per cent, be made on all premium notes held by the company, and in force on the tenth day of October 1871.” The secretary of the company .testified that, in pursuance of that resolution, an assessment was made on all the premium notes, as directed by the board of directors. Among the others, an assessment.was made on the premium note of the defendant in error. H. A. Smith testified that he, as agent of the company, sent a notice of this assessment, No. 29, to the defendant in error about the first of December 1871. The learned judge thought there could be no assessment that did not set forth the name of the maker of the note, and the amount assessed upon it, and therefore charged there was no evidence that such assessment was made on the premium note of the defendant in error, nor did the notice of an agent, that such an assessment had been made, supply the defect.

In holding that an assessment could not be valid unless the resolution levying it set forth the name of the defendant in error, and the sum assessed on his note, there was error. We believe a reference to the maker of each note by name is unusual and wholly unnecessary. The resolution covered all notes in force at the date *419specified. It imposed a specific percentage on each. That is certain which may be made certain. It was very easy to ascertain the sum imposed on each note. The work was merely clerical, and could be readily performed by any person who understood the multiplication table. The precise sum he was required to pay was ascertained and stated in the notice sent to him. lie was therein required to pay the specific sum within thirty days, and also reminded of the by-law which declared the policy to be null and void unless so paid. It is true a notice of an assessment, when, in fact, none had been made, would not supply the defect. But that is not this case. The notice showed him the precise sum the percentage produced, and relieved him from making the calculation. Levying a specific percentage-on a note of a certain and fixed amount, is wholly unlike fixing a rate of taxation on land on which the valuation is not yet ascertained. Until the valuation of the land is determined, no computation can show the sum to be paid.

There is some force in the argument of the counsel for the defendant in error, that the record does not show clearly what portion of the deposition was received in evidence. There is, however, an assignment to meet each view of the case. If the part to which we have referred was rejected, it was error. If it was admitted, then it was error to charge there was no evidence of an assessment.

Much useless contention appears to have arisen on the trial, when the witnesses on the part of the plaintiff in error referred to the amount of the premium note. The amount of it was distinctly stated on the foot of the policy which tho defendant had already given in evidence. We think the evidence was amply sufficient to submit to the jury to find whether the assessment had been made. In so far as the objections covered by the assignments are in conflict with this opinion they are sustained.

Judgment reversed, and a venire facias de novo awarded.