432 Mass. 438 | Mass. | 2000
Lead Opinion
Pursuant to G. L. c. 215, § 13,
“1. whether a testator, survived by a minor child to whom he owed . . . support pursuant to a court order, may disinherit that child pursuant to the [omitted child statute,] G. L. c. 191, § 20;
“2. whether the child’s claim for support is in the nature of a preferred creditor’s claim;
“3. whether a posthumous support obligation includes assets of an inter vivos trust; and
“4. whether an order to secure postmajority educational support may be made in the circumstances of posthumous support.”
We discuss the background facts and applicable law before answering the questions.
1. Background. The father died on November 20, 1994, at the age of fifty-five. He was divorced at the time of his death. He was survived by two children, an adult daughter from his only
On June 3, 1994, the father executed a will that disinherited his minor child, leaving to her the amount of one dollar. He further directed that she “shall not be considered as an heir-at-law of mine” nor “a child of mine or issue of mine for any purpose under this will.”
On the death of the father, the mother filed a claim for Social Security benefits on her child’s behalf based on the father’s participation in the Social Security system. It was determined that the child, as a qualified minor, was entitled to receive at that time $849 a month in Social Security benefits.
A guardian ad litem, appointed to represent the child’s interests in the father’s estate, filed a complaint for modification of the child support order entered in 1992, and a notice of claim against the estate seeking further support payments for the child.
The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts and made a joint request for rulings. The judge ruled preliminarily that (1) the father could not disinherit his minor child to defeat his sup
2. Questions one and two. For ease of discussion we address in tandem the first two questions.
Testamentary freedom is not absolute, and certain preexisting obligations have priority over all testamentary dispositions. See, e.g., Harrison v. Stevens, 305 Mass. 532, 535 (1940) (testamentary dispositions subject to the “claims of creditors and to administration expenses”); G. L. c. 191, § 15, 16 (spousal elective share takes priority over testamentary dispositions). See also H.J. Alperin & L.D. Shubow, Summary of Basic Law § 22.113, at 565 (3d ed. 1996). A legally enforceable obligation to pay child support, like other financial obligations of the testator, takes precedence over testamentary dispositions and must be satisfied prior to any distribution of assets under the will.
In order to answer questions one and two, therefore, we must resolve whether the order to the father to support his minor child survived his death. Specifically we must decide whether a child support order, made pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 9, during the father’s life, creates an obligation on his estate to continue support until his child reaches majority, or whether any obligations for her future support were extinguished by his death.
The duty of a parent to support a minor child is statutory. See, e.g., G. L. c. 208, § 28; G. L. c. 209, § 37; G. L. c. 209C, § 9. The question, therefore, is one of statutory interpretation. We conclude that the death of the father does not extinguish his duty to support his minor child. We do so for several reasons.
Second, in this Commonwealth there have been recent and profound legislative changes that have increased significantly the obligation of parents to support their children.
Third, the Legislature has imposed an explicit duty on parents who divorce and those who give birth to children out of wedlock to support their minor child until they attain their majority. General Laws c. 209C, § 1, imposes child support responsibility on a parent from the child’s birth to the age of eighteen, and beyond that period if certain statutory and readily discernible circumstances exist.
Our ruling is also consistent with the declared public policy of this Commonwealth “that dependent children shall be maintained, as completely as possible, from the resources of their parents.” G. L. c. 119A, § 1. See G. L. c. 209C, § 20. It would be inconsistent with that and other mandates of the Legislature to conclude that a father’s court-ordered support obligation abated on his death, depriving his young daughter, of the resources necessary for her maintenance. In an intact family, minor children have security against the loss of support when one parent dies, even in the case of testamentary disinheritance, because of the spousal elective share. G. L. c. 191, §§ 15, 16. See also G. L. c. 190, § 1 (spouse’s right to share of property not disposed of by will); G. L. c. 193, § 1 (surviving spouse listed first in schedule of persons entitled to appointment to administer intestate’s estate); G. L. c. 229, § 1 (right of surviving spouse to bring wrongful death action). Children' of divorced parents and children bom out of wedlock do not have the same protection. For this reason, we are unpersuaded by the defendants’ argument that our holding would unfairly discriminate against children from intact families.
Fourth, a conclusion that child support obligations survive
Finally, there is nothing in G. L. c. 191, § 20, that prohibits such a construction. That statute “forbids nothing and compels nothing; it merely provides a framework within which private testamentary decisions may be freely made.” Hanson v. Markham, 371 Mass. 262, 265 (1976). Our conclusion interpreting the legislative mandate that child support obligations do not abate at death will not create any uncertainty for estate planning purposes. See Hornung v. Estate of Lagerquist, 155 Mont. 412, 419 (1970) (“the enforcement of an obligation for future support presents no greater problems than any other unliquidated claim against an estate”). Unlike alimony, an order to provide for the support of a minor child terminates at a specific age. Accordingly, the total amount of child support that a parent is obliged to pay may be readily determined — in contrast to an order to provide alimony that in many circumstances terminates only when a spouse remarries (a date uncertain in the future) or on the recipient’s death (similarly uncertain).
The protection of minor children, most especially those who
3. Question three. We consider whether the father’s support obligation can be satisfied from the assets of his inter vivos trust. We conclude that all the assets of the inter vivos trust established by the father, under which he was the sole beneficiary entitled to funds at his request, and which he solely retained the power to modify, alter or revoke, must be included in the estate and, as such, must be made available to satisfy his child support obligations. Such a ruling is consistent with our law in closely related areas.
We have held that, for the purpose of determining a surviving spouse’s elective share, G. L. c. 191, § 15, assets in an inter vi-vos trust over which the decedent had a general power of appointment, exercisable by deed or by will, constitute the estate of the deceased spouse. See Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 867 (1984).
4. Question four. We are asked to determine whether an order to secure postminority educational support may be made posthumously. We note, preliminarily, that on a related issue the judge concluded that the Social Security benefits received by the child after her father’s death were not a “substitute” for his child support obligations, but a credit to him. The judge did not report that question to us. However, that issue is inextricably connected to our consideration of the posthumous order to pay some amount for the child’s college education: both issues require us to consider whether the death of a parent warrants reconsideration and possible modification of the original child-support order.
The judge found that the child would be entitled to receive monthly Social Security benefits until her eighteenth birthday, and possibly to the age of nineteen if she has not completed her high school education as of that date. She further found that the child’s mother would be more than sixty years of age at the time the child is ready to enter college and that other than the support the child receives now, “there are no other sources of funds for her present and future needs.” The judge concluded that she had the authority “to set aside a lump sum in trust as security for [the child’s] future educational support if the assets are sufficient,” and that the amount for educational support “may be made contingent upon the child’s eligibility for that award under G. L. c. 209C, § 9.” She noted that “[i]n this way, the estate administration will not be unduly prolonged.” As to the Social Security benefits, she concluded that the benefits “act as a ‘credit’ to the obligor in determining the appropriate amount of support in a modification hearing, and not as a substitute for
The judge’s authority to enter or to modify a support order is statutory. G. L. c. 209C, § 20. General Laws c. 209C, § 20, provides in relevant part that a “court with original jurisdiction . . . has continuing jurisdiction, upon a complaint filed by a person or agency entitled to file original actions, to modify judgments of support, custody or visitation”
The original 1992 support order did not contain any provision for his child’s later educational support. The terms of that order, however, made it subject to further modification, and, as the judge in this case found, in the eleven-year period prior to the paternity action, the father had held several positions of employment commensurate with his educational background and expertise. But at the time of the hearing he characterized his occupational status as “[unemployed.” He was fifty-two years of age at the time, and there is no suggestion that he would not have attained gainful employment subsequent to the paternity adjudication.
A support order may be modified if the judge finds a “substantial change in the circumstances of the parties or the child has occurred and finds modification to be in the child’s best interests.” G. L. c. 209C, § 20. See G. L. c. 208, § 28. While nothing mandates that the death of the parent-obligor automatically results in a “substantial change in circumstances” warranting modification, this case plainly meets that standard. The child now receives Social Security benefits as a result of the father’s death that were not earlier available. Moreover, in contrast to the period before the father’s death, any resources that may be necessary to maintain his young daughter are available only for the limited period during the administration of the estate; beyond that the support order can no longer be changed by “further order of the Court.”
With respect to the effect of the now-available Social Security benefits, we previously have held, along with the majority of States, that a noncustodial parent who receives Social Security disability income benefits is entitled to modification of his child support obligation. See Rosenberg v. Merida, 428 Mass. 182, 185-186 (1998). See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R. 5th 447, 469-
The question whether a judge may posthumously “set aside a lump sum in trust as security for future educational support” for the child is a more difficult one. The Legislature has explicitly provided that in some circumstances parents have an obligation to provide educational support for children who have attained the age of eighteen: “The court may make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and education for any child who has attained age eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-one, who is domiciled in the home of a parent and is principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance” (emphasis added). G. L. c. 209C, § 9. As a general rule, support orders regarding the future payment of “post-high school educational costs are premature and should not be made.” Passemato v. Passemato, 427 Mass. 52, 54 (1998). We have, however, upheld an order creating an educational trust for a minor child who is neither about to attend nor already enrolled in higher education; those cases must be “based on the particular facts” of the case. Id. See Bush v. Bush, 402 Mass. 406, 410 (1988) (child support orders should reflect “current needs” of child).
The judge here appropriately recognized that an order for postminority support for a young child would generally be premature, but relied on our decision in Passemato v. Passe-mato, supra, to conclude that the “circumstances of posthumous support” was a valid exception to the general rule because
The Legislature has increased significantly the obligations of parents to support their children, imposing an obligation to provide support for their children’s educational needs after the age of eighteen. Because the statute places limitations on educational support awards and does not limit general support awards for children under the age of eighteen in the same way, we conclude that the establishment of an educational tmst fund while the child is ten years old and where there can be no showing that she presently meets the statutory requirements of G. L. c. 209C, § 9, is not authorized in this case.
5. Answers to reported questions. We conclude that the judge’s questions, as reported, must be answered as follows: (1) a testator survived by a minor child may disinherit that child, pursuant to G. L. c. 191, § 20, subject to the prior satisfaction of all of his child support obligations, present and future; (2) a minor child’s claim for support is in the nature of a preferred creditor’s claim and must be satisfied prior to any testamentary dispositions; (3) assets in an inter vivos trust containing the terms of the trust at issue here (see note 7, supra) can be reached to satisfy support obligations; and (4) a judge in the Probate and Family Court does not have the authority to enter an order after the death of the obligor to secure postminority educational support for a child who does not presently qualify for such support pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 9.
So ordered.
General Laws c. 215, § 13, states: “A judge of the probate court by whom a case or matter is heard for final determination may reserve and report the evidence and all questions of law therein for consideration of the appeals court, and thereupon like proceedings shall be had as upon appeal. And if, upon making an interlocutory judgment, decree or order, he is of opinion that it so affects the merits of the controversy that the matter ought, before further proceedings, to be determined by the appeals court, he may report the question for that purpose, and stay all further proceedings except such as are necessary to preserve the rights of the parties.”
In determining the appropriate amount of child support, the judge considered that the father had a bachelor of science degree from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and a master’s degree from Northeastern University. During the eleven years prior to the paternity action, he had been employed as an instructor of electrical technology at Wentworth Institute, as a reliability engineer and computer analyst at Raytheon Service Company, and as a substitute teacher in various public school systems and area community colleges. At the time of the paternity adjudication the father characterized his occupational status as “[ujnemployed”; his financial statement listed a weekly income of $275.76.
The will noted that the father did not provide equally for his adult daughter and his minor child. That “inequality,” he said in the will, “is my wish and not the result of any inadvertence or mistake.”
According to the terms of the trust, as amended in 1994, during his lifetime, the father, as settlor, was named the sole beneficiary and was entitled to receive any or all of the income or principal at his request, or, without such a request, all or part of the income or principal at the trustees’ discretion. Pursuant to the terms of the trust, the father specifically reserved for himself the right at any time to modify, alter, amend, or revoke the trust itself.
The amount the child receives was subsequently adjusted and, as of January 1, 1999, was $927.
The financial statement of the mother filed in the 1992 paternity action indicated that the mother was employed as a social worker with a modest income, $644 per week. She owned no real property and had assets of de minimis value.
By temporary order the mother was substituted as the plaintiff in the complaint for modification.
The record does not indicate why a second guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the child.
Our holding is consistent with that of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Taylor v. George, 34 Cal. 2d 552, 556 (1949) (obligation of father to support minor child which is fixed by decree or agreement does not cease on father’s death, but survives as charge against his estate); West v. West, 241 Mich. 679, 684 (1928) (“So solicitous is the law for the welfare of the child that the decree for such support survives the death of the father and may be amended to give the provision for the child’s maintenance the effect of a lien upon the estate with priority over rights of the widow and heirs’’); Homung v. Estate of Lagerquist, 155 Mont. 412, 418-419 (1970) (father’s obligation to make child support payments required by divorce decree survive death and are enforceable against his estate where divorce decree required him to pay fixed monthly amount during child’s minority without exemption or qualification); Scott v. Wagoner, 184 W. Va. 312, 316 (1990) (future child support obligations enforceable as lien against estate if compelling equitable considerations present). See also Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 402-403 (1948) (child support order in effect “until further order of the court” is sufficient to allow the order to be enforced against deceased parent), and cases cited; Edelman v. Edelman, 65 Wyo. 271, 291-292 (1948) (child support payments ordered to continue “until further order of the court” survive death of obligor).
We use the male pronoun because the obligor parent in this case is a man.
General Laws c. 191, § 20, provides: “If a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, whether bom before or after the testator’s death, or for the issue of a deceased child, whether bom before or after the testator’s death, they shall take the same share of his estate which they would have taken if he had died intestate, unless they have been provided for by the testator in his lifetime or unless it appears that the omission was intentional and not occasioned by accident or mistake; provided, however, that no such child or issue shall take any share in any real property in the testator’s estate unless a claim is filed in the registry of probate by or in behalf of such child or any of such issue within one year after the date of the approval of the bond of the executor.”
In contrast, the Legislature has limited the testamentary freedom of a husband to disinherit his wife (and vice versa), and has provided statutory protection for the wife in such cases. See, e.g., G. L. c. 191, §§ 15, 16. The lack of equivalent legislative protection for minor children, particularly those of divorced parents and those born out of wedlock who do not benefit indirectly from spousal elective share legislation, such as the children of intact families, has been criticized. See, e.g., Note, Disinheritance of Dependent Children: Why Isn’t America Fulfilling its Moral Obligation?, 14 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 125, 131 (1999). See also M.L. Fellows, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 319, 366 (1978). But the plain language of the omitted child statute, G. L. c. 191, § 20, makes no distinction between adult and minor children, or between minor children of intact families and those of divorced parents or bom out of wedlock, and there is no statutory limitation on the testamentary freedom of the father in this regard.
While not directly relevant to this case, we note that the Legislature has gone further and declared it “to be against the public policy of the commonwealth for a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce an agreement between parents if enforcement of the agreement prevents an adjustment or modification of a child support obligation when such adjustment or modification is required to ensure that the allocation of parental resources continues to be fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the child.” G. L. c. 119A, § 1, as amended through St. 1998, c. 463, § 101 (approved with emergency preamble, Jan. 14, 1999).
See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Act, G. L. c. 119A, inserted by St. 1986, c. 310, § 10B; and G. L. c. 211B, § 15, inserted by St. 1986, c. 310, § 16A, repealed by St. 1992, c. 379, § 85. See also G. L. c. 208, § 28, as amended by St. 1975, c. 661, § 1 (authorizing support orders for children up to age twenty-one); as amended through St. 1976, c. 279, § 1 (expanding orders beyond support to include education); as amended through St. 1983, c. 233, § 76 (requiring health care coverage be extended to child if obligor has health insurance on group plan); as amended through St. 1991, c. 173, § 1 (authorizing support orders for children up to age twenty-three); as amended through St. 1993, c. 460, § 61 (requiring modification on complaint if there is an “inconsistency” between the existing order and child support guidelines or to provide health care coverage. Modification of child support may enter notwithstanding an agreement of the parents that has independent legal significance). See generally G. L. c. 208, § 36, as appearing in St. 1986, c. 310, § 12 (allowing court to require security for payment of alimony or support); G. L. c. 119A, § 1, inserted by G. L. c. 208, § 34, as amended through St. 1986, c. 310, § 10B (creating child support enforcement commis
Federal law mandates the establishment of child support guidelines, 42 U.S.C. § 667, as well as comprehensive enforcement procedures, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See also Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, appearing in 42 U.S.C. §§ 655, 658, 664, 666, 1305 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See also Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (making it a crime for failing to pay past support for child who resides in another State).
We have noted that the primary purpose of the paternity statute is to collect and to enforce child support from a child’s biological father. See Cordon v. Sawin, 420 Mass. 735, 738 (1995).
General Laws c. 209C, § 1, provides in relevant part: “Every person is responsible for the support of his child bom out of wedlock from its birth up to the age of eighteen, or, where such child is domiciled in the home of a parent and principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance, to age twenty-one.”
Our decisions concerning alimony are not an “analogous area” of law that provide guidance to legislative policies concerning child support, as the dissent claims. Post at 455. The legislatively imposed duty of a parent to support a minor child is materially different from any agreement or order to provide alimony to a former spouse. The Supreme Court of Kansas has explained the difference cogently: “[T]he fundamental difference between the marital and parental duty of parents is that after a divorce the relation of husband and wife is at an end, and all marital obligations not preserved by the decree are at an end, while the relation of parent and child continues unchanged, and a father’s obligation to support his offspring continues to exist unless cut off by the decree.” Allison v. Allison, 188 Kan. 593, 597 (1961). Accord Knowles v. Thompson, 166 Vt. 414, 417 (1997) (“Child support presents an altogether different situation from spousal maintenance”).
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has explained that there are mechanisms readily available to facilitate prompt
In Sullivan v. Burkin, 390 Mass. 864, 867 (1984), we said that the estate of the decedent included the value of assets held in an inter vivos trust that the deceased spouse alone retained the power during his or her life to direct in “any inter vivos trust created or amended after the date of this opinion [January 23, 1984].” In this case, the father’s inter vivos trust was established on February 3, 1977. It was subsequently amended, however, and restated entirely in 1994. Although not controlling, the Sullivan rule is pertinent to our consideration of the inter vivos trust at issue here.
The defendants suggest that, if we determine that the assets of the inter vivos trust can be reached to satisfy the father’s support obligations, our rule should be prospective only. In Sullivan v. Burkin, supra, we decided to apply our rule prospectively because our holding there was “a retroactive invalidation of an established principle.” Id. at 871. There is no such “established principle” in this case, and no merit to the defendants’ suggestion.
General Laws c. 209C, § 20, provides, in part: “A court with original jurisdiction pursuant to section three has continuing jurisdiction, upon a complaint filed by a person or agency entitled to file original actions, to modify judgments of support, custody or visitation; provided however, that no modification concerning custody or visitation shall be granted unless the court finds that a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties or the child has occurred and finds modification to be in the child’s best interests. Except as restricted by section twenty-three, the court may also modify a judgment to protect a party or child. In furtherance of the public policy that dependent children be maintained as completely as possible from the resources of their parents and on a complaint filed after a judgment of support, orders of maintenance and for support of minor children shall be modified if there is an inconsistency between the amount of the existing order and the amount that would result from application of the child support guidelines promulgated by the chief justice for administration and management or if there is a need to provide for the health care coverage of the child.”
This is the conclusion of the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions that have considered the issue. See, e.g., Kress v. Kress, 219 Cal. App. 2d 173, 174 (1963); In re Marriage of Meek, 669 P.2d 628, 629-630 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Matter of Estate of Champagne, 153 Ill. App. 3d 560, 564 (1987); Estate of Brummett v. Brummett, 472 N.E.2d 616, 619-620 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Bowling v. Robinson, 332 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); West v. West, 241 Mich. 679, 684 (1928); Garber v. Robitshek, 226 Minn. 398, 402 (1948); Hornung v. Estate of Lagerquist, 155 Mont. 412, 419 (1970); Smith v. Funk, 141 Okla. 188, 191 (1930).
The Legislature may wish to clarify whether support for a minor child’s future educational needs may be ordered on the death of an obligor-parent.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting, with whom Ireland, J., joins). The court today decides that a child support order issued pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 9, survives the death of the father unless a court order specifically provides that the obligation is terminated on death. I would conclude that such an order survives an obligated father’s death only if a judge has specifically provided for its survival and the Probate Court judge here has not so provided.
I agree with the court that “certain preexisting obligations have priority over all testamentary dispositions.” Ante at 442. In addition, I agree that a judge has the power to order child support that survives an obligated parent’s death and that such an order is a “legally enforceable obligation . . . [that] takes precedence over testamentary dispositions and must be satisfied prior to any distribution of assets under the will.” Ante at 442.1 disagree with the court, however, that G. L. c. 209C, § 9, expresses the Legislature’s intent that child support orders are presumed to survive an obligated father’s death unless otherwise provided by a court order or that we can glean that intent from the general legislative policy in favor of parents supporting their minor children or from other statutory provisions.
As child support is a creature of statute, see, e.g., G. L. c. 208, § 28; G. L. c. 209, § 37, G. L. c. 209C, § 9, and see also Gediman v. Cameron, 306 Mass. 138, 140 (1940), and cases cited, courts are not entitled to add to the statutory scheme. A policy that support orders shall automatically survive the death of obligors should be based on a clear expression of legislative intent. Had the Legislature intended that such support orders were automatically to survive a parent’s death, it would presumably have provided so expressly. In the absence of such an express statement of intent, I am not prepared to conclude that orders for child support survive the obligated parent’s death by implication.
In the analogous area of alimony, we have long held that orders do not survive the death of the obligated party unless ordered by the court. Barron v. Puzo, 415 Mass. 54, 56 (1993) (“As a general rale, an order for the payment of alimony ceases with the death of the party obligated to pay it unless the decree or judgment provides otherwise or arrearages are due and unpaid”), and cases cited. When amending statutes, we presume that the Legislature is aware of the prior state of the law as explicated by the decisions of this court. Opinion of the Justices, 408 Mass. 1215, 1222 (1990), and cases cited. In view of our alimony decisions, it is unlikely that the Legislature would have intended that support obligations continue beyond the obligor’s death without specifically so stating. A provision in the child support statute establishing the age requirements for the child to receive support does not indicate a legislative intent that support orders survive the death of the obligor. This provision is silent regarding circumstances other than age that may terminate the support obligation. If it is a desirable policy to continue support beyond the death of the obligor, it is not for this court
The court also relies for its decision on the public policy of this “commonwealth that dependent children shall be maintained, as completely as possible, from the resources of their parents,” ante at 444, quoting G. L. c. 119A, § 1, and various legislative enactments that have increased the obligations of parents to support their children. These general expressions of legislative policy and unrelated statutory changes have little to do with deciding the question before the court. The court is faced with a specific question of statutory interpretation, i.e., whether a child support order is presumed to survive an obligated parent’s death. In the absence of specific language so extending the support obligation, the court’s reliance on unrelated statutory provisions and general policy expressions to reach its conclusion is misplaced and is an attempt to justify what is essentially judicial legislation.
Therefore, the only question that remains is whether the Probate Court judge in this case issued a child support order that survived the father’s death. The support order entered against the father states: “Defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $ 100.00 beginning forthwith and each week thereafter
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The court also cites as authority the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 9A U.L.A. 102 (Master ed. 1998), which provides: “[Provisions for the support of a child are terminated by emancipation of the child but not by the death of a parent obligated to support the child.” The Legislature is likely aware of the existence of proposed uniform State laws and it has not chosen to adopt the provisions relied on by the court. If the existence of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act is at all instructive, it suggests that the Legislature has chosen not to follow the position advocated by the court.
It is noted that the possibility of the death of an obligated parent during the support period is addressed by probate judges when they require the obligor to purchase a life insurance policy to cover such eventuality. See Taverna v. Pizzi, 430 Mass. 882, 885 (2000).
