176 N.W. 41 | S.D. | 1920
This action was instituted by certain electops ^ and taxpayers of school district No. 34, Alton township, Brookings county., to enjoin and restrain the school officers
At an annual township school election the question of the removal of said schoolhouse was submitted to a vote under the provisions of chapter 221, Laws of 1917, providing among other things as follows:
“The school board shall have power to direct the removal of a schoolhouse to a more convenient location, upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the electors of the entire district, or upon the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the electors of such district voting upon the proposition at any regular election, or special election called for that purpose, providing notice that the proposition for such removal of a schoolhouse is to be voted upon, shall have been given with the notice of such election.
“Provided, that in districts in which there shall be but one schoolhouse a two-thirds affirmative vote of the electors of the entire district shall be necessary to remove such schoolhouse from the center of the district to any other point in the district, except such removal shall be to the center of the district, in which case a majority vote shall be sufficient for such removal.”
It appears from the findings that there was but one schoolhouse in ,:said district; that by said election it was sought to remove said schoolhouse from a point without to the geographical center of the district; that due notice of such annual election was giyen according to law; that at such election all the qualified electors of said district were present, being 42 in number, and 42 ballots were cast, 20 in favor of such removal, 17 against, and 5 which did not indicate any choice for or against removal. It is the contention of appellants that an affirmative vote of a majority of all the electors of the entire district was necessary under the provisions of said chapter 221 to authorize' the said removal of said schoolhouse; that a majority of those voting upon the' question of removal was not sufficient; that that portion of the proviso in relation to removing a schoolhouse to the center of the district should be con
“The great fundamental rule in construing statutes is to ascend and give effect to the intention of the Legislature This intention, however, must be the intention as expressed in the statute, and where the meaning of the language is plain, it must be given effect by the courts, or they would be assuming legislative authority.” 36 'Cyc. 1106.
“When language is not only plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation may hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable to inteipret what has no need of interpreation. Such language best declares, without more, the intention of the Legislature, and is decisive of it. The Legislature must*419 be intended to mean what it has plainly expressed, and consequently there is no room for interpretation.” Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 5.
“Where a general intent and a particular intent are expressed in the same statute, the latter must prevail; thus, where a statute expresses first a general intent, and afterwards an inconsistent particular intent, the latter will be taken as an exception from the former and both will stand.” Sutherland on Statutory Construction, §§ 153, 159.
“A- proviso is something engrafted upon a preceding enactment, and is legitimately used for the purpose of taking exceptional cases out of a general class, or to guard against 'misinterpretation. The general intent will be controlled by the particular intent subsequently expressed.” Sutherland on Statutory Construction, §§ 216, 222, 231.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.