Lutynski v. B. B. & J. Trucking, Inc.Lutynski v. B. B. & J. Trucking, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Dupont
The principal issue to be decided in this appeal is whether the trial court improperly refused to award the plaintiff prejudgment interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to
We are not aware of any appellate case in this jurisdiction that answers the question whether interest pursuant to
The facts are not in dispute. On January 8,1988, the plaintiff was traveling on Interstate 84 in Waterbury when a truck owned by the defendant, and operated by one of its employees, was traveling in the opposite direction. As the vehicles converged, the truck struck the median divider, became airborne, and crashed into the plaintiffs car. The plaintiff, in his complaint filed April 21,1989, alleged that he had been “thrown about the interior of the car striking his face and head against the windshield which shattered and he was trapped in his car as it was crushed around him. . . He further alleged that he suffered serious injuries as a result of this collision, including a cerebral concussion, a permanent facial scar and spasmodic muscular contractions along the left side of his face. On August 18,1989, the plaintiff filed an offer of judgment pursuant to
The plaintiff moved to amend his complaint on January 9,1991, to add the words “permanent brain dam
After the trial, both the plaintiff and the defendant made posttrial motions regarding the amount of the award. The plaintiff moved for an award of prejudgment interest on his recovery and for reasonable attorney’s fees under
The defendant moved to reduce the jury award by $10,676.62, arguing that under
The plaintiff now appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for interest and attorney’s fees, and the defendant cross appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion to reduce the amount of the award by the amount received from collateral sources.
I
The plaintiff’s appeal is premised on several grounds. Principally, the plaintiff argues that the award of prejudgment interest is mandatory under
In response, the defendant contends that since the offer of judgment did not offer to settle the claim on which the plaintiff ultimately recovered,
Our courts have consistently held that prejudgment interest is to be awarded by the trial court when a valid offer of judgment is filed by the plaintiff, the offer is rejected by the defendant, and the plaintiff ultimately recovers an amount greater than the offer of judgment after trial. See, e.g., Civiello v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corporation, supra; Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 192 Conn. 301, 472 A.2d 316 (1984); Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Winters, supra; Gillis v. Gillis, 21 Conn. App. 549, 575 A.2d 230, cert. denied, 215 Conn. 815, 576 A.2d 544 (1990); Edward Denike Tree Co. v. Butler, 21 Conn. App. 366, 573 A.2d 349 (1990); Crowther v. Gerber Garment Technology, Inc., 8 Conn. App. 254, 513 A.2d 144 (1986); Kusha v. Respondowski, 3 Conn. App. 570, 490 A.2d 1014 (1985). Moreover, an award of interest under
An offer of judgment is an offer to settle the entire case, including claims both known and unknown, and both certain and uncertain. Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 307. Obviously, if injuries worsen as time passes, damages will increase, and, if injuries mend, damages will decrease. These are the vagaries of offers of settlement. The fact that the plain
The purpose of
The purpose of the statute is not to penalize a plaintiff whose monetary claims increase because of worsening of a physical condition by forcing him or her to file another offer of judgment when the change occurs more than eighteen months after the filing of the complaint.4 If, on January 9, 1991, the date the plaintiff first amended his complaint to allege “permanent brain
Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., supra, 307, held that an offer of judgment under
The defendant also argues that because it did not have “notice” of the plaintiff’s brain damage allegation at the time of the offer of settlement, the imposition
II
In its cross appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly denied its motion to reduce the jury award by the amount of collateral source payments received by the plaintiff from his insurance providers.5 The defendant contends that in accord with
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion as to the medical benefits paid by CHCP on the basis that the plaintiff had previously paid more in premiums than he received in benefits as a result of the accident.
The trial court also denied the defendant’s motion as to the no-fault benefits. The trial court properly noted that under our decision in Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Barton, 1 Conn. App. 569, 574-75, 474 A.2d 104 (1984), Travelers has an equitable right to reimbursement from the plaintiff for the no-fault benefits it paid to the plaintiff, although its statutory right of subrogation under
We conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to recover prejudgment interest on the entire amount of his recovery, pursuant to
On the plaintiffs appeal, the judgment is reversed in part and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment as on file except as modified to include an award of interest in accordance with this opinion. On the cross appeal, the judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
“(b) After trial the court shall examine the record to determine whether the plaintiff made an ‘offer of judgment’ which the defendant failed to accept. If the court ascertains from the record that the plaintiff has recovered an amount equal to or greater than the sum certain stated in his ‘offer of judgment’, the court shall add to the amount so recovered twelve per cent annual interest on said amount, computed from the date such offer was filed in actions commenced before October 1, 1981. In those actions commenced on or after October 1,1981, the interest shall be computed from the date the complaint in the civil action was filed with the court if the ‘offer of judgment’ was filed not later than eighteen months from the filing of such complaint. If such offer was filed later than eighteen months from the date of filing of the complaint, the interest shall be computed from the date the ‘offer of judgment’ was filed. The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees in an amount not to exceed three hundred fifty dollars, and shall render judgment accordingly. This section shall not be interpreted to abrogate the contractual rights of any party concerning the recovery of attorney’s fees in accordance with the provisions of any written contract between the parties to the action.”
The plaintiff appealed from the denial of his motion for an award of interest and attorney’s fees, but did not brief his entitlement to attorney’s fees and we thus deem that portion of his appeal abandoned. See State v. Samaha, 180 Conn. 565, 565 n.1, 430 A.2d 1290 (1980).
See footnote 5, infra.
No Appellate Court case has yet decided whether “refiled” as used in
In its original motion, the defendant alleged that the total amount of collateral source payments made to the plaintiff exceeded the total amount recovered by the plaintiff for past economic damages, and thus requested a reduction of the jury award in an amount equal to the total recovered for past economic damages, or $10,676.62. On appeal, the defendant seeks a reduction of only $7644.90, representing the total collateral source payments actually received by the plaintiff, as stipulated by the parties.
“(b) Upon a finding of liability and an awarding of damages by the trier of fact and before the court enters judgment, the court shall receive evidence from the claimant and other appropriate persons concerning the total amount of collateral sources which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant as of the date the court enters judgment.
“(c) The court shall receive evidence from the claimant and any other appropriate person concerning any amount which has been paid, contributed, or forfeited, as of the date the court enters judgment, by, or on behalf of, the claimant or members of his immediate family to secure his right to any collateral source benefit which he has received as a result of such injury or death.”