LUTHERAN CAMPUS COUNCIL, a North Dakota religious corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, WARD COUNTY, North Dakota, and Edwin Sjaastad, State Tax Commissioner of North Dakota, Defendants and Appellants.
Civ. No. 8561.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Feb. 20, 1970.
174 N.W.2d 362
If the Defendant desired the presence of the third parties on the appeal, he should himself have served them with notice of appeal. The judgment of the Court below does not deal with the third parties at all, and therefore it was unnecessary for the Plaintiff, in appealing from that judgment, to serve any notice on them.
In re Salmon, (C.A.1889) 42 Ch.D. 351, 360.
In the case at bar this was the procedure that was followed. The plaintiff served upon the defendants the notice of appeal from the judgment dismissing the complaint in the main action, and the defendants served upon the third-party defendant the notice of appeal from the judgment dismissing the third-party complaints in the third-party action. The third-party defendant thereby had been given the right to appear in the appeal from the judgment in its favor and has the full right to appear in this court to determine the issues between it and the defendants. By analogy, the third-party defendant, having interposed defenses to the complaint of the plaintiff in the main action against the defendants, and the defendants, as third-party plaintiffs, having appealed from the judgment dismissing the third-party complaints in favor of the third-party defendant, has such an interest in the plaintiff‘s complaint in the main action that it should be entitled, if it so desires, to appear and argue on behalf of the defendants in the appeal from the judgment in the main action.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
TEIGEN, C. J., and PAULSON and ERICKSTAD, JJ., concur.
STRUTZ, J., deeming himself disqualified did not participate in this decision.
Richard B. Thomas, State‘s Attorney,
Waldron & Kenner, Minot, for plaintiff and respondent.
PAULSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Ward County, North Dakota, whereby, on appeal, the court reversed a decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Ward County denying an application for abatement and settlement of real estate taxes assessed for the years 1966 and 1967 against residential property owned by the Lutheran Campus Council in Minot, North Dakota, and trial de novo is demanded.
The Lutheran Campus Council, a North Dakota religious coporation, owns Lot Two (2), Block Four (4), Valli Hai Addition to the City of Minot, Ward County, North Dakota. This property was purchased in December, 1965, pursuant to a sales agreement, from Kenneth O. Nelson, and fee title acquired by warranty deed in April, 1968. The residence situated on the property has been used and occupied by the Reverend Richard L. Jurgensen since December of 1965.
The Reverend Mr. Jurgensen is an ordained minister of the American Lutheran Church and, since 1961, has ministered to the Lutheran students and faculty members of Minot State College on a full-time basis, on behalf of the Lutheran Campus Council. The premises in question have been and are being used by the Reverend Mr. Jurgensen for periodic religious group meetings, counseling of students and faculty members; as a study, an office, and a conference facility; and as a residence for himself and his family.
The real estate taxes for the years 1966 and 1967 have been levied and assessed against the property owned by the Lutheran Campus Council used and occupied by the Reverend Mr. Jurgensen for the purposes mentioned. The Council, on April 28, 1968, filed an application in duplicate for abatement and settlement of the real estate taxes with the board of county commissioners of Ward County. The reasons set forth in the application were that the property is owned by the Lutheran Campus Council, a North Dakota religious corporation, and that the property is used as a parsonage and for religious purposes and is exempt from general taxes, pursuant to the provisions of
The Honorable Roy A. Ilvedson, Judge of Ward County District Court, found that the property owned by the Lutheran Campus Council and as used by the Reverend Mr. Jurgensen as his residence was exempt from real estate taxes pursuant to
The facts in the present case are virtually undisputed and are in essence those related above.
The appellants state the issue as follows: whether the property owned by the Lutheran Campus Council, a religious corporation, and used and occupied by a minister engaged in counseling and guidance work with students and faculty members of an
The board of county commissioners of Ward County urge that an exemption only exists by virtue of either a constitutional or a statutory provision.
“* * * property used exclusively for * * * religious * * * or other public purposes shall be exempt from taxation. * * *”
The pertinent provisions of
“All property described in this section to the extent herein limited shall be exempt from taxation, that is to say:
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“7. All houses used exclusively for public worship, and lots or parts of lots upon which such buildings are erected, and any dwellings belonging to religious organizations intended and ordinarily used for the residence of the bishop, priest, rector, or other minister in charge of the services of the church, together with the lots upon which the same are situated;
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“9. All real property, not exceeding two acres in extent, owned by any religious corporation or organization, upon which there is a building used for the religious services of such organization, or upon which there is a dwelling with usual outbuildings, intended and ordinarily used for the residence of the bishop, priest, rector, or other minister in charge of such services, shall be deemed to be property used exclusively for religious services, and exempt from taxation, whether such real property consists of one tract or more. All taxes assessed or levied on any such property, while the same was so used for religious purposes, are void and of no effect, and must be canceled. * * *”
We find, in analyzing these provisions, that
As we approach the construction of our statute and its application to the facts of this case, we bear in mind the rules that the burden is on the claimant of a tax exemption to establish the exempt status of his property and that the laws under which such an exemption is claimed will receive a strict construction against the claimant. North Dakota Soc. for Crippled Child. & Ad. v. Murphy, 94 N.W.2d 343, 345 (N.D.1959). However, with regard to the rule of strict construction, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated, in Lincoln Woman‘s Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb. 357, 133 N.W.2d 455, 459 (1965):
“It is well settled that provisions exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed; that their operation should not be extended by construction; and that the power and right of the state to tax are presumed and the exemption must be clearly granted. This does not mean that there should not be a liberal construction of the language used in order to carry out the expressed intention of the fundamental lawmakers and the Legislature but, rather, that the property which is claimed to be exempt must come clearly within the provisions granting such exemption. [Citation omitted.]
“The theory that the rule requiring strict construction of a tax exemption statute demands that the narrowest possible meaning should be given to words descriptive of the objects of it would establish too severe a standard. A liberal and not a harsh or strained construction is to be given to the terms ‘educational,’ ‘religious,’ and ‘charitable’ in order that the true intent of the constitutional and statutory provisions may be realized. The judicial interpretation of such statute should always be reasonable.”
We believe that the Nebraska approach to the problem of determining the breadth of tax exemption statutes is the correct one and we apply it here. We so hold especially in light of
“The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be construed strictly has no application to this code. The code establishes the law of this state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions and all proceedings under it are to be construed liberally, with a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice.”
This section was not considered in the decision of North Dakota Soc. for Crippled Child. & Ad. v. Murphy, supra.
The board of county commissioners further contends that the constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to exempt property place emphasis on the use of the property, rather than on the ownership, and, accordingly, its use determines the exemption from taxation of church property used for religious purposes.
The Lutheran Campus Council asserts that the property falls squarely within the exemption provisions of
Our view is that the property in the instant case is exempt under either
It is exempt under
It is exempt under
A further review of the record reveals, without any refutation by the board of county commissioners, that the Council was and is a North Dakota religious corporation; that it owned the property; that such property was used and occupied by the Reverend Richard L. Jurgensen as his residence; that, as an ordained minister, he was ministering on a full-time basis to the needs of students and faculty members of Minot State College; that the parsonage included a study, an office, and a conference facility; that the Reverend Mr. Jurgensen was paid a salary by the Lutheran Campus Council; that the Lutheran Campus Council paid $1,400.00 a year rental for the use of facilities at the Augustana Lutheran Church at Minot, where regular religious services were held on Wednesday of each week; and that the property here involved is therefore not owned or used for financial gain or profit to either the Council or its minister. These findings support our earlier conclusion in this opin-
ERICKSTAD, J., concurs.
STRUTZ, J., concurs in the result.
TEIGEN, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the result. In my opinion, the property in question is exempt from taxation under
The original text of
In 1918,
The Lutheran Campus Council does not own the land or the building in which their church services are conducted, but such ownership is not necessary under
KNUDSON, J., concurs.