Luster SLONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-AppelleeLuster SLONE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee
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- Krupansky
Plaintiff-appellant Luster Slone (Slone) appealed from an order of the district court which dismissed his petition for a writ of mandamus filed pursuant to
Slone was born on August 24, 1937, and received seven years of formal education. He last worked on August 15,1972, when a back injury and mental illness allegedly caused him to leave his job as a “steel fabricator.” At that time, Slone applied for and was granted disability benefits under the State of Ohio Welfare Plan. When the Ohio benefits plan was incorporated into the federal benefits program pursuant to the enactment of Title XVI of the Social Security Act (the Act), Slone’s claim was transferred into the federal program and Slone began receiving Title XVI benefits.
While he was receiving Title XVI benefits, Slone filed two claims for benefits under Title II of the Act. 1 Slone filed his first claim in December, 1972, in which he asserted that he had been disabled since August, 1972. The Secretary denied the claim in March, 1976, reasoning that Slone was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Act prior to the expiration of his insured status. Slone did not appeal from this denial, but instead filed a second claim for Title II benefits in April, 1981. Slone’s second claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, and Slone made a timely request for review under an Administrative Law Judge (AU).
While conducting de novo review of Slone’s second claim, the AU compared the disability test employed by the State of Ohio Welfare Plan, with the disability test utilized under Title II of the Act. The AU determined that the criteria employed under the Ohio test were more “severe” than those employed under the Act. Because Slone had been found to be disabled under the Ohio test, the AU reasoned that the March, 1976 denial was erroneous and hence that he had jurisdiction to reopen Slone’s first claim for Title II benefits. The AU then reviewed the claim and, in a decision dated June 8, 1982, granted Title II benefits retroactively to August, 1972.
In a letter dated February 6, 1984, the Appeals Council notified Slone that it intended to reopen his case pursuant to
On September 14, 1984, Slone initiated this separate action in district court seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary to reinstate benefits. In his petition, Slone charged that the Secretary had a non-discretionary duty to refrain from reopening the AU’s decision. Slone alternatively alleged that his case should be remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration under the revised listings governing mental illness, that were promulgated pursuant to the enactment of the Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984. The Secretary answered the complaint by filing a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In the order in which it granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that Slone’s petition for mandamus was essentially one seeking the payment of Social Security Benefits. The district court then analyzed the merits of Slone’s alternative request for remand for reconsideration under the new listings, and dismissed the mandamus action for lack of jurisdiction. Slone filed a timely appeal from the order dismissing his petition for mandamus.
The Sixth Circuit has expressly declined to decide if
Mandamus jurisdiction in federal courts is governed by
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
“The existence of jurisdiction under
Slone’s first argument on appeal is that the district court erred when it characterized his mandamus petition as one that essentially sought the payment of benefits, and is without merit. Slone expressly stated that his petition for a writ of mandamus was to mandate the Secretary to reinstate benefit payments. Further, the petition was exclusively based upon his assertion that the Secretary lacked discretion to reopen his case. Assuming that this assertion was correct, the singular and necessary reason for issuing the writ would be to order the Secretary to reinstate the payment of benefits to Slone. Thus, despite the manner in which the instant cause of action was framed, Slone’s cause of action was barred as untimely since it was cognizable under
Slone’s second argument, that further exhaustion of remedies provided by
[Section 405(g) ] clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of agency action, a ‘final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing.’
# ¡je # # * #
Moreover, an interpretation that would allow a claimant judicial review simply by filing — and being denied — a petition to reopen his claim would frustrate the congressional purpose, plainly evidenced in [§ 405(g) ], to impose a 60-day limitations upon judicial review of the Secretary’s final decision on the initial claim for benefits.
Id. at 986 (citations omitted).
Judicial review of an alleged abuse of discretion in
reopening
a prior determination in which benefits were granted does not implicate the concerns articulated by the Supreme Court in
Sanders.
Unlike the decision to reject a claimant’s request to reopen his case, the Secretary’s decision to reopen Slone’s case resulted in a hearing and a final decision on the merits. Hence, the Secretary’s decision produced the particular type of agency action that is subject to judicial review under
Therefore, it is apparent that further exhaustion would not have been futile and that Slone failed to colorably demonstrate that the district court had jurisdiction to entertain his petition for a writ of mandamus.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing Slone’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is AFFIRMED. 3
Notes
. There are several benefits programs under the Act, including the Disability Insurance Benefits Program of Title II (
.
“[w]ithin four years of the date of the notice of the initial determination if we find good cause, as defined in § 404.989, to reopen the case....”
“[t]he evidence that was considered in making the determination or decision clearly shows on its face that an error was made.”
. Absent proper jurisdiction, it would not be appropriate to assess the merits of Slone’s claim that he is entitled to remand for reconsideration under the newly revised listings governing mental illness. See Bisson, 787 F.2d at 185-186 (court not reaching the merits of the claimant‘s case because the court lacked jurisdiction). Accordingly, this court does not reach that issue.