46 Iowa 205 | Iowa | 1877
This proposition, so manifestly right in principle, is abundantly sustained by authority. See Jarman v. Davis, 4 Monroe, 115; Benedict v. Lynch, 1 Johnson, Ch. 370; Tyson v. Watts, 1 Md. Ch. 13; Bromly v. Jeffries, 2 Verm., 415; Law
The fact that Luse tendered to Deitz a deed in due form executed by himself and wife does not affect the case. The objection still exists that Deitz could not have enforced performance against Luse if Luse or his wife had been unwilling to convey. If a party who is not bound to specific performance may, by tendering performance, enforce a specific performance against the other party, he may, at his option, enforce the specific performance of any contract, though not bound to like performance himself. The judgment is
Affirmed.