delivered the opinion of the court.
This appeal brings under review a decree setting aside and canceling, under § .15 of the act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 596, 601, c. 3592, as fraudulently and illegally procured, a certificate of citizenship theretofore issued to George A. Luria by the court of common pleas of the city and county of New York. 184 Fed. Rep. 643.
The petition was not carefully prepared, and yet it doubtless was designed to charge that the certificate was fraudulently and illegally procured in that Luria did not at the time intend to become a permanent citizen, of the United States but only to obtain the indicia of such citizenship in order that he might enjoy its advantages and protection and yet take up and maintain a permanent residence in a foreign country. There was a prayer that the certificate be set aside and canceled because “procured illegally.” The sufficienсy of the petition was not challenged, and the case was heard and determined as if the issue just described were adequately tendered. In the opinion rendered by the District Court it was said, after observing that the petition was subject to criticism: “That point, however, was not raised, and I suppose the defendant does not mean to raise it.” This view.of his attitude passed unquestioned then,- and it is too late to question it now.
The case-was heard upon an agreed statement and some accompanying papers, from all of which it indubitably appeared that Luria was born in Wilna, Russia, in 1865 or 1868 and came to New York in 1888; that he entered a medical college of that city the next year and was graduated therefrom in 1893; that he applied for and procured
In his answer, Luria interposed the defense that his presence in the Transvaal was solely for the purpose of promoting his health, the implicatiоn being that when he went there his health was impaired in such a way that a residence in that country was necessary or advisable
Section 15 of the act of 1906, under which this suit was conducted, is as follows (34 Stat. 601):
“Sec. 15. That it shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing- good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing the suit, for the purpose of setting aside and canceling the certificate of citizenship
on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured.
In any such proceedings the party holding the certificate of citizenship alleged to have been fraudulently or illegally procured shall- have
“If any alien who shall have secured a certificate of citizenship under the provisions of this Act shаll, within five years after the issuance of such certificate, return to the country of his nativity, or go to any other foreign country, and take permanent residence therein, it shall be considered prima facie evidence of a lack of intention on the part of such alien to become a permanent citizen of the United States at the time of filing his application for citizenship, and, in the absence , of countervаiling evidence, it shall be sufficient in the propet proceeding to authorize the cancellation of his certificate of citizenship as fraudulent, and the diplomatic and consular officers of the United States in foreign countries shall from time to time, through the Department of State, furnish the Department of Justice with the names of those within their respective jurisdictions-who have such certificates of citizenship and who have taken permanent residence in the country of their nativity, or in any other foreign country, and such statements, duly certified, shall be admissible in evidence in all courts in proceedings to cancel certificates of citizenship.
“Whenever any certificate of citizenship shall be set aside or canceled, as herein provided, the court in which such judgment or decree is rendered shall make an order canceling such сertificate of citizenship and shall send a certified copy of such order to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization; and in case such certificate was not originally issued by the court making such order it shall direct the clerk' of the court to transmit a. copy of such order and judgment to the court out of which such cer
“The provisions of this section shall apply not only to certificates of citizenship issued under the provisions of this act, but to all certificates of citizenship which may have been issued heretofore by any court exercising jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings under prior laws.”
One of the questions arising under this section is, whether the second paragraph, dealing with the evidential effect of taking up a permanent residence in a foreign country within five years after securing a certificate of citizenship, is confined to certificates issued under the act of 1906, or apрlies also to those issued under prior laws, as was Luria’s. If that paragraph were alone examined, the answer undoubtedly would be that only certificates under the act of 1906 are included. But the last paragraph also must be considered. It expressly declares that "the provisions of this section” shall apply, not only to certificates issued under the'act of 1906, but also to all certificates theretofore issued under prior laws. The words "the provisions of this section” naturally mean every part of it, one paragraph as much as another,- and that meaning cannot well be rejected without leaving it uncertain as to what those words embrace. Counsel refer to the Congressional Record, which shows that the second paragraph was inserted by way of amendment while the section was being considered in the House of Representatives. But as the section was in its present form when it was finally adopted by that body, as also when it was adopted by the Senate and approved by the President, it would seem that the last paragraph, in view of its-plain and unam
'' But it is said that it was not essential to naturalization under prior laws, Rev. Stat., §§ 2165-2170, that the applicant should intend thereafter to reside in the United States; that, if he otherwise met the statutory requirements, it was no objection that he intended presently to take up a permanent residence in a foreign country; that the act of 1906, differing from prior laws, requires the applicant to declare “that it is his intention to reside permanently within the United States”; and therefore that Congress,, when enacting the second paragraph of § 15, must have intended that it should apply to certificates issued under that act and not to those issued under prior laws. It is true that § 4 of the act of 1906 exacts from the applicant a declaration of his intention to reside in the United States, and it is also true that the prior laws did not expressly call for such a declaration. But we think it is not true that under the prior laws it was immaterial whether the applicаnt intended to réside in this country or presently to take up a permanent residence in a foreign country. On the contrary, by necessary implication, as we' think, the prior laws conferred the right to naturalization upon such aliens only as contemplated the continuance of a residence already established in the United States.
Citizenship is membership in a political society and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a -duty -of protection on the part, of the society. These . are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. .Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects, save that of eligibility to the Presidency.
Minor
v.
Happersett,
By the clearest implication those laws show that it was not intended that naturalization could be secured thereunder by an alien whose purpose was to escape the duties of his native allegiance without taking upon himself these of citizenship here, or by one whose purpose was to reside permanently in a foreign country and, to use his natural
Perceiving nothing in the prior laws which shows that Congress could not have intended that the last paragraph of § 15 of the act of 1906 should be taken according to the natural meaning and impоrt of its words,' we think, as before indicated, that it must be regarded as extending the preceding paragraphs of that section to all certificates of naturalization, whether secured theretofore under prior laws or thereafter under that act.
Several contentions questioning the constitutional validity of § 15 are advanced, but all, save the one next to be mentioned, are sufficiently answered by observing that the section makеs no discrimination between the rights of naturalized and native citizens, and does not in anywise affect or disturb rights acquired through lawful naturalization, but only provides for the orderly cancellation, after full notice and hearing, of certificates of naturalization which have been procured fraudulently or illegally. It does not make any act fraudulent or illegal that was honest and legal when done, imposes no penalties, and at most рrovides for the annulment, by appropriate judicial proceedings, of merely colorable letters of citizenship, to which their possessors never were lawfully entitled.
Johannessen
v.
United States,
“Legislation providing that proof of one fact shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main fact in issue, is but to enact a rule of evidence, and quite within the general power of government.. Statutes, national and state, dealing with such methods of proof in both civil and criminal cases abound, and the decisions upholding them are numerous. . . .
“That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary
“If a legislative provision not unreasonable in itself prescribing a rule of evidence, in either criminal or civil cases, does not shut' out from the party affected a reasonable opportunity to submit to the jury in his defense all of the facts bearing upon the issue, there is no ground for holding that due process of law has been denied him.”
Of like import are
Fong Yue Ting
v.
United States,
Nor is it a valid objection to such legislation that it is made applicable to existing causes of action, as is the case here, the true rüle in that regard being well stated in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed. 524, in these words:
;“It must also be evident that
a right to have one’s controversies determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right.
These rules pertain to thе remedies which the State provides for its citizens; and generally in legal contemplation they neither enter into and constitute a part of any contract, nor can be regarded as being of the essence of any right which a party may seek to enforce, like other rules affecting .the remedy, they must therefore at all times be subject to'modification and control by the legislature; and the changes which are enacted may lawfully be made applicable to existing causes of action, even in those States in which retrospective laws are forbidden. For the law as changed would only prescribe rules for presenting the evidence in legal controversies in the future; and it could not therefore be called retrospective
This court applied that rule in
Webb
v.
Den,
That the tаking up of a permanent residence in a foreign country shortly following naturalization has a bearing upon the purpose with which the latter was sought and affords some reason for presuming that there, was an absence of intention at the time to reside permanently in the TJnited’States is not debatable. No doubt, the reason for the presumption lessens as the period of tiine between the two events is lengthened. But it is difficult to say at whаt point the reason so far disappears as to afford no reasonable basis for the presumption. .Congress has'in1 dieated its opinion that the intervening period may be as much as five years without rendering the presumption baseless. That period seems long, and yet we are not prepared to pronounce it certainly excessive or unreasonable. But we are of opinion that as the intervening time apрroaches five years the presumption necessarily must, weaken to such a degree as to require but slight countervailing evidence to overcome it. On the other hand, when the intervening time is so short as it is shown to have been in the present case, the presumption cannot be regarded as yielding to anything short of a substantial and convincing explanation. So construed, we think the provision is not in excess of the power of Congress.
Lastly it is urged that the District Court erred in not according to the defendant a trial by jury. The claim is predicated upon the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which declares that “in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” This, however, was not a suit at. common law. -The right asserted and the remedy sought were essentially equitable,
Finding no error in the record, the decree is
Affirmed.