Lunsford v. ArmourLunsford v. Armour
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Duckworth
1. If the relationship may be considered as confidential, the rule stated in Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hospital v. Nisbet, 191 Ga. 821 (6) (14 S.E.2d 64), as to the presumption of undue influence can not be applied here, because there is no evidence showing the mental capacity of the grantee or a disparity in the mental capacity of the grantor and grantee.
2. There is no evidence showing undue influence, and no circumstances which would authorize a conclusion that either of the deeds in question was executed as the result of undue influence exerted by the grantee or some one in her behalf upon the grantor; nor would the evidence authorize a verdict finding that the deeds were without consideration. Since the evidence demanded the verdict in favor of the defendant, the alleged error in the charge will not be considered. White v. Southern
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
This is an action by two daughters and one grandchild of Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour, deceased, seeking cancellation of four deeds to realty, executed by the deceased to her daughter-in-law, Estelle Armour. The first trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, and on review this court reversed the judgment denying a new trial, because of error in the charge. 192 Ga. 598 (15 S.E.2d 886). In the report of that decision the material portions of the pleadings are fully set forth, and need not be repeated here. The cancellations were sought on the grounds that the deeds were without consideration, and were obtained by undue influence exerted by the grantee upon the grantor. The second trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiffs excepted to the overruling of their motion for a new trial, consisting of the general grounds and of one special ground assigning error on a portion of the charge defining undue influence which would authorize cancellation, and instructing the jury that the undue influence necessary to authorize cancellation must have been exerted at the time the deeds were executed. This instruction was given to the jury as a part of the main charge, and was repeated twice on the request of the jury for additional charge on the subject of undue influence.
The record contains a brief of the evidence comprising fifty pages. The substance of the plaintiffs’ evidence relating to undue influence is as follows: Estelle Armour was the daughter-in-law of Mrs. Lucinda M. Armour deceased. The only son of Estelle was a special favorite of his grandmother. Estelle was living with her son in a western State, and had been unemployed for some weeks when she returned to Georgia in 1932. At that time the deceased was living in the house of her son. Webb Armour. Shortly thereafter Estelle and the son moved into a house owned by the deceased, and the three lived together until Mrs. Lucinda‘s death in 1939. The first deed attacked was executed in 1934, when the grantor was eighty-seven years of age, and conveyed a portion of a
One witness for plaintiffs testified that she heard the deceased at one time say she did not think it right for one child to have all the property, but thought that all should share equally. Another testified that she heard the deceased tell Estelle that if she would operate the farms she could have all she made on them. All of the plaintiffs’ testimony was to the effect that the mind of deceased was good for a person of her age, but some of them said that her mind appeared to weaken as her body weakened with age. There was testimony that at different times, dates not given, witnesses
The defendant, by the testimony of a doctor who had attended the deceased a number of times, showed that the mind of the deceased was sound and strong for a person of her age. Numerous witnesses testified that they saw the deceased frequently, and that her mind was sound. The defendant testified, that she returned to Georgia at the request and upon the promise of the deceased that if she would do so and live with her she would give her the property; that the money consideration recited in the deeds was not paid, and that the consideration for each deed was love and affection; that when the deceased made her will she stated to the defendant that she was afraid some of them would attack it after she was gone; that within a few days she made the last deed here involved; and