26 Ga. 537 | Ga. | 1858
By the Court.
delivering the opinon.
Wm. S. Rockwell was sworn in chief by the plaintiff.
It follows that the Court below did not err, in permitting the defendants to cross examine him, generally.
The order written by the witness, Rockwell, for A. Y. Hampton, to sign, was delivered to Hampton, and he was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court, therefore, in permitting the ivitness, to state the contents of the order, did not err.
The defendants alleged, that Wm. J. Steely, to induce Hampton to aid in the compromise of the caveat, agreed to admit his claim at $3,000, and thereupon, gave him three notes of $1,000 each ; one made by him, Steely, in his own right; one made by him, as guardian of Edward; and the other made by him, as guardian of John G. Coates. And the defendants proved these allegations.
Now, if the fact really was, that the estate was indebted to Hampton, to the amount of the notes, or, even to a less amount, the case was obviously better for the plaintiffs, than it would have been, if the fact had been, that the estate was not at all indebted to Hampton.
The testimony of Wm. S. Rockwell, giving "the result of calculations he had made, upon vouchers and returns, as to the indebtedness of the estate of John G. Coates to him, as executor of said estate,” went to show, that the estate was largely indebted to said Hampton, as such executor. The testimony, therefore, was not “against” the plaintiffs, but was beneficial to them; consequently, even if it was illegal testimony, its admission was not a ground for a new trial. The new trial Act of 1854, goes no further, than to require, a new trial to be granted, when the illegal evidence is “ against” the party excepting to its admission.
Therefore, the Court was right in excluding the answer of Andrew Y. Hampton, made in the cause as against him in favor of Steely and wife.
We think, therefore, that the Court was right in refusing to give these seven requests in charge.
Therefore, we think that the Court’s qualification of the ninth request, was a proper qualification.
*547 “ The Court was requested to charge the jury
“ 1st. In general, infants, as well as adults, are bound by the conduct of their solicitors acting, bona fide, in their behalf.”’
“2d. Infants are bound by a decree taken by consent, although no reference to a Master to enquire, whether it was for their benefit.”
“ The Court told the jury, that these were correct principles of law, but did not apply to this case, unless the jury should be satisfied, that the agreement was not tainted with fraud ; was manifestly for the benefit of the minors; and, also, that they must be satisfied, that the solicitor was employed by a properly constituted guardian.”
Surely it must be true, that an infant is not bound by the act of a solicitor, who is not his solicitor. And it must be equally true, that a decree obtained by the consent of infants, does not bind them, if the decree is tainted with fraud.
The questions on the next two requests,- have been disposed of, in the disposition made of previous requests.
The last request and the disposition made of it, are stated as follows:
“ The Court was requested to charge the jury, that a foreign guardian can sue and litigate in this State, for his wards, and has the consequent right and power, to compromise any suit which may be pending.”
“ The Court told the jury, that this was correct as a geneal principle, but did not apply to this ease, if the guardian, Steely, had removed from Alabama to this State, at the time —for his letters obtained in Alabama, abated upon his removal to Georgia.”
The “ time” here meant, was the time when Steely appeared in the Court of Ordinary, and entered the caveat, as guardian of the two minors.
It is only by statute, that a guardian appointed in another State, can sue at all in this. And the statute goes no further, than to authorize such guardian to sue, if both he and the
We think, that the qualification annexed to the request by the Court, was substantially correct.
Judgment affirmed.