293 F. 893 | 9th Cir. | 1923
(after stating the facts as above). Appellant questions the authority of the town: (a) To levy a tax in excess of 2 per cent, annually upon the assessed valuation within the corporate limits of the city in order to provide for the payment of the bonds and interest; (b) to sell electric energy and power to be used and consumed outside of the corporate limits of the town; and (c) to bind itself to pay the bonds before the expiration of the period prescribed in the acts of Congress authorizing their issue.
It is clear to us that the special act of Congress gave to the town authority to incur the somewhat unusual expense and to issue bonds as a means of paying for the improvement authorized. The provisions of the Alaska statutes, heretofore referred to, limiting the power of the town to 2 per cent, of the assessed valuation upon all property, and denying authority to issue bonds to incur a debt in an amount in any year greater than the current revenue for the year, relate to the use of revenues for ordinary municipal purposes. With the small population of the town and the present assessed valuation of the property, the improvements could not be had, except through special congressional enactment. Presumably Congress acted upon knowledge of conditions and advisedly passed the legislation authorizing the town to issue the bonds here being considered.
There is no constitutional limit upon the taxing power of a municipality in Alaska, and Congress, having conferred upon the town council the authority to hold an election and issue bonds for purposes expressed, what may be termed extraordinary purposes, the authority to levy a tax to meet such authorized obligations may be implied. In
The reasoning is that the intention is legally to be inferred from the authority to issue the bonds, provided, always, there is nothing by way of limitation in the act creating the power or by way of inhibition in the general law or the organic act. The decisions go to full extent in sustaining the view that when the power to create a municipal debt exists there is .a corresponding power to provide for the payment of the debt. The power to make the provision for the payment, though implied, is conclusively implied and “cannot be overcome except by express words excluding it.” County Court v. United States, 105 U.S. 733, 26 L.Ed. 1220; City of Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U.S. 109, 2 S.Ct. 361, 27 L.Ed. 669. Whether there is authority in the town to sell electric current to be used outside of the corporate limits is not a question arising upon the existing rights of the parties. It is irrelevant to the material question just decided, and we express no opinion upon the matter.
In the ordinance passed by the town there is a provision (section 7) creating a sinking fund for the payment of the bonds as they mature and the interest thereon; also a provision that the town shall annually levy a tax upon all the real and personal property within the town subject to taxation in an amount sufficient to pay the interest and installments of principal due for the ensuing year, and such amounts as may be required for the payment of interest and installments shall be kept and remain in the sinking fund to be used and applied to the payment of such interest and installments. Another provision (section 2) is that the bonds shall mature at the rate of $5,000 each year from 1928 to 1942, and $40,000 July 1, 1943. The acts of Congress provide that the interest on the bonds shall be paid semiannually, and that the bonds must be redeemed in 20
The judgment is affirmed.