Tory Worum LUND, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HENNEPIN COUNTY; Pаtrick D. McGowan, Sheriff; Michele Smolley, Chief Deputy; Thomas Merkel, Inspector; Richard Estensen, Former Inspector, officially and individually, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 05-1791.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: September 16, 2005.
Filed: November 4, 2005.
Kay Nord Hunt, Seth M. Colton, Theresa Ann Bofferding, argued, Lommen & Nelson, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Toni Ann Bunker Beitz, argued, Hennepin County Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before MURPHY, BRIGHT, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Tory Worum Lund brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hennepin County, Sheriff Patrick D. McGowan, and several other officers in his department, alleging that the delay in Lund's release from the Adult Detention Center (ADC) due to its outprocessing procedures violated his due process rights and state law. The district court1 granted summary judgment to the defendants and Lund appeals, arguing that he has produced sufficient evidence to warrant a jury trial. We affirm.
Lund was arrested in Richfield early in the morning on September 26, 2001 and was boоked into the ADC on probable cause for second degree driving while intoxicated, a gross misdemeanor under Minnesota law. At a court hearing on September 28 the presiding judge continued the case to permit Lund to obtain counsel, ordered that no bail was required, and told Lund that he would be going home. Lund was taken back to the ADC and later released. He claims he was not released until 1:10 a.m. on September 29, twelve hours after the judge had ruled that no bail was needed. Appellees maintain that he was released several hours earlier, at approximately 9:30 p.m. on September 28, but for purposes of our review we accept Lund's version of the disputed facts. Turner v. Honeywell Fed. Mfg. & Techs., LLC,
Official county policy states that release from the ADC should proceed "as expeditiously as possiblе" consistent with the need to maintain security, but there are standard procedures and paperwork required before an individual is released. These include a computer search for any new warrants or detainers that may have been issued after the individual wаs originally booked, preparation and service of "release citations" informing inmates of their next court appearance, location and return of money and personal effects to inmates, verification of identity, and review of all relеase paperwork for error. At the same time the ADC staff is responsible for processing incoming inmates and detainees on their way to and from court or other locations. The staff must also answer telephone inquiries, count the inmate population thrеe times daily, and deal with uncooperative arrestees. ADC records for September 28 indicate that the number of inmates booked and the number released on that day were average to slightly above average.
Lund brought this action against the county, Sheriff MсGowan, and other members of his department, alleging that the period of detention following his hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, giving rise to liability under § 1983; violated his rights under Article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution; and amounted to false imprisonment under state lаw. He subsequently agreed to the voluntary dismissal of all defendants except for the county and Sheriff McGowan in his official capacity (collectively the County). The County moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted the motion, holding as a matter of law that Lund had not аlleged facts sufficient to meet the deliberate indifference standard for municipal liability under § 1983. The district court also dismissed Lund's state constitutional claim since no private right of action had been recognized under the cited provision, and it concluded that thе statute of limitations had run on his false imprisonment claim. Lund appeals only the dismissal of his § 1983 claim.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lee v. State of Minn., Dept. of Commerce,
Section 1983 imposes civil liability on any person who, "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State," deprives an individual of "any rights, privileges, or immunities" secured by the United States Constitution. To survive summary judgment, a claim under § 1983 must raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and 2) the alleged wrongful conduct deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right. Cooksey v. Boyer,
Lund argues that deliberate indifference is the applicable standard governing not only the issue of municipal liability, but also the issue of whether his detention violated due process. He contends in addition that the issue of deliberate indifference is a question of fact, Davis v. Hall,
Lund's argument essentially collapses the tests for liability under § 1983 for due process violations and for municipal liability, and the County maintains in contrast that thе question of whether a due process violation occurred is distinct from whether there was deliberate indifference. It argues that the due process question requires an objective assessment of whether a defendant's conduct "shocks the conscienсe." Hayes v. Faulkner County,
It is well settled under our precedents that establishing a violation of due process as a basis for municipal liability under § 1983 requires plaintiff to show more than mere negligence or unreasonableness; a plaintiff must point to conduct by the municipality, or by employеes acting with its knowledge, that shocks the conscience given the totality of the circumstances. Hayes
In the course of this year we have already deсided three other § 1983 cases attacking the outprocessing procedures at the ADC, all brought by the same law firm. Russell v. Hennepin County,
The plaintiff in Luckes, the first of these decisions, had been arrested because of unpaid traffic tickets. After being told that he would be released "shortly after booking," he was detained for a period of twenty four hours in a crowded holding cell with more violent offenders who threatened and intimidated him. He initially grounded his constitutional argument on the Fourth Amendment, claiming that his detention had been an unreasonable seizure. The panеl concluded that this argument had no merit because the plaintiff had been arrested under a valid warrant and with probable cause.
In Golberg, the plaintiff's release from the ADC after posting bail was delayed for ten hours because of problems with a new computerized jail management system. The panel rejected the plaintiff's assertion that her detention was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment because she was being held pursuant to a valid warrant, and focused instead on whether the county had been deliberatеly indifferent to her due process rights.
Finally in Russell, the plaintiff's conditional releasе was delayed for six days because of an administrative error. As in Golberg, the panel did not reach the constitutional issue, instead finding that the facts were insufficient to show that the moving force behind plaintiff's detention was a county policy whose inadequacy was "both obviоus and likely to result in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights" or that there was a widespread informal custom having substantially the same effect.
As our cases teach, in order for Lund to prove his due process rights were violated and that the County should be held respоnsible, he must show both that his detention shocks the conscience and that it was caused by a county policy or custom evidencing a level of culpability akin to criminal recklessness. His reliance on County of Sacramento, Berry, and Lewis to avoid these evidentiary burdens in favor of something like a Fоurth Amendment reasonableness test is misplaced. Nowhere in County of Sacramento does the Court even hint that such a standard would apply to pretrial custody situations following a valid arrest. Decisions like Berry,
Lund's claim is that the County's outprocessing procedures delayed his release for twelve hours with the knowledge of the County and its officials. He has not alleged that the County refused or failed to investigate claims that he should be released or subjectеd him to any other mistreatment at the hands of the ADC staff or his fellow inmates. Nor has he shown any pattern of official tolerance by the County concerning delays in release, and the County has described in detail the reasons for its procedures, a number of which arе mandated by state law. There is no evidence that the treatment Lund received was sufficiently conscience shocking so as to give rise to a due process violation or that it resulted from the sort of intentionally harmful or reckless conduct needed for a showing of deliberate indifference.
Because Lund has not alleged facts sufficient to show that his due process rights were violated or that the County was deliberately indifferent to such a violation, the district court did not err by granting summary judgment. The judgment is accordingly affirmed.
Notes:
Notes
The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota