Defendants, Board of Regents for the University of Michigan and University Health Services of the University of Michigan, appeal as of right from a Court of Claims judgment in favor of plaintiff in this medical malpractice case. We affirm.
Plaintiffs action is based on the alleged failure of Dr. Mary Johnson, a doctor at University Health Services of the University of Michigan, to advise plaintiff that hypothalamus pituitary dysfunction, a condition from which plaintiff suffered that was manifested by amenorrhea, could cause endometrial cancer if untreated and to recommend treatment for the condition.
Plaintiff first sought treatment from Dr. Johnson in March 1982 because of chronic vaginal infections. At the first of two meetings, plaintiff informed the doctor of her medical history, including cervical cancer, an abortion and resultant surgery to correct scarring, removal of an intrauterine device, and amenorrhea. Dr. Johnson ordered a series of tests and placed plaintiff on Provera, a synthetic progesterone, to diagnose the cause of plaintiffs amenorrhea. Plaintiff was instructed to return in one month.
At her next appointment, plaintiff advised Dr. Johnson that she had minor spotty bleeding. Dr. Jоhnson, having determined that plaintiff had hy
Dr. Johnson testified that she instructed plaintiff about regular treatment with Provera and gave hеr a prescription for Provera. Dr. Johnson indicated that her custom and habit was to have follow-up appointments with patients who had been prescribed Provera. Dr. Johnson agreed that she did not tell plaintiff that she was at increased risk for cancer.
Plaintiff continued to experience amenorrhea through 1987, when she was diagnosed with endometrial cancer and underwent a total hysterectomy. In December 1987, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Washtenaw Circuit Court against Dr. Johnson, the Board of Regents, and University Health Services. The case was assigned to Judge Edward Dеake. Pursuant to Judge Deake’s September 2, 1988, order, the suit against the Board of Regents and University Health Services was transferred to the Court of Claims. Judge Thomas L. Brown was assigned to sit as the judge in the Court of Claims. The case was later joined with the case against Dr. Johnson in the Washtenaw Circuit Court pursuаnt to MCL 600.6421; MSA 27A.6421.
Defendants sought and were denied summary disposition based on governmental immunity. Judge Deake concluded that the amended version of MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4) applied in this case.
Before trial, the case was reassigned to Washtenaw Circuit Judge Donald E. Shelton, who presided over the circuit court cаse and sat in the capacity of Court of Claims judge in plaintiff’s suit against the Board of Regents and University Health Services.
i
The first issue in this case is when the cause of action arose for purposes of the application of governmental immunity. The governmental immunity act was amended in 1986 to include a public hospital exception to governmental immunity. MCL 691.1407(4); MSA 3.996(107)(4). The exception does not apply to causes of action that arose before July 1, 1986.
The issue regarding when a cause of action "arises” under § 3 of Act 175 presents a question of legislative intent. Courts must read the statutory language being construed in light of the general purpose sought to be accomplished.
Witherspoon v Guilford,
It is presumed that, when the Legislature enacts statutes, it is familiar with the rules of statutory construction and has knowledge of existing laws
The Supreme Court seems to view the word "arises” as being synonymous with "accrues.”
Hyde v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents,
It could be argued that a plaintiff should know or have reason to know of a cause of action before it arises. Also arguable is that the accrual date, hence when the cause arises, should be fixed by the statutе of limitations that specifically provides the means to arrive at the accrual date.
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions provides that the claim must be brought within two years of the accrual date or six months of discovery of the claim. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). Discovery is merely an alternative means for commencing the running of the
The accrual date óf a medical malpractice cause is the date of the act or omission upon which the claim is based, rеgardless of when the claim was discovered. MCL 600.5838a; MSA 27A.5838(1). For causes of action arising before October 1, 1986, the accrual date is the date of the last treatment. It is clear that under the statute of limitations, the accrual date is not synonymous with the date the claim arises.
Indeed, it is logical tо assume that the Legislature used the word "arise” to avoid any confusion with the special definition given accrual language in statutes of limitation. Thus, we conclude that, when the Legislature used the term "arise,” it intended the meaning commonly associated with the phrase "causes of action which arise.” Specifically, the date the claim arises is when the action can be alleged in a complaint. See Inglis, supra.
The question, therefore, is whether plaintiff could have alleged all the elements of the malpractice claim before July 1, 1986. Defendants’ contention that the claim could have been alleged in 1982 ignores the damages element. Although Dr. Johnson treated plaintiff in 1982, plaintiff was not diagnosed with cancer until June 16, 1987, after which she underwent a hysterectomy. A fair reading of plaintiff’s complaint reveals that the damages for which monetary relief were claimed resulted from the cancer and resultant surgery, and not from continuing amenorrhea as suggested by defendants. Accordingly, plaintiff’s cause of action arose after July 1, 1986, and the public hospital exception to governmental immunity applies.
n
Defendants claim that the Court of Claims was
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsеquent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
Collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues previously decided in a first action when the parties to the second action are the same; where the second action is a differеnt cause of action, the bar is conclusive regarding issues actually litigated in the first action and essential to the judgment.
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1564, AFL-CIO v Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority,
Applying the above requirements to the present case, there is no question that there was neither rеlitigation of Dr. Johnson’s negligence nor a subsequent action. The circuit court action against Dr. Johnson and the Court of Claims action against
We believe, however, that collateral estoppel is inapplicable for a separate and distinct reason. The Legislature is free to modify strict application of the doctrine in any given statutory scheme. Nummer, supra at 544. Plaintiff was forced by the Court of Claims Act to sрlit her cause of action between the Court of Claims and the circuit court. The Court of Claims Act confers on the Court of Claims exclusive jurisdiction over claims for money damages against state agencies. MCL 600.6419; MSA 27A.6419. The clear intent of the Legislature in creating the Court of Claims is that parties tо an action against the state will have their respective rights and liabilities determined by a judge and not a jury. MCL 600.6421; MSA 27A.6421. Consequently, neither plaintiff nor defendants had any right to a jury trial in the Court of Claims action against defendants.
The combining of the Court of Claims action with the circuit court action for trial pursuаnt to MCL 600.6421; MSA 27A.6421 did not permit the circuit court, or any jury empaneled by it, to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim against the state.
1
See
Williams v
Shin,
hi
Defendants also assert that a new trial is warranted as a result of the inconsistent vеrdicts rendered by the jury in the circuit court action and the judge in the Court of Claims action. The cases cited by defendants, however, stand only for the proposition that a
single jury
may not render verdicts or findings inconsistent with other verdicts or findings they have rendered. See, e.g.,
Clark v Seagrave Fire Apparatus, Inc,
iv
Last, defendants argue that the Court of Claims finding that Dr. Johnson was negligent is not supported by the evidence. In reviewing the Court of Claims decision, findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.
Kensington Corp v Dep’t of State Hwys,
The Court of Claims found that Dr. Johnson was negligent on the basis of testimony that (1) hypothalamic pituitary dysfunction could lead to endometrial сancer if untreated, and (2) Dr. Johnson failed to advise plaintiff of the ramifications of having hypothalamic pituitary dysfunction and failed to recommend treatment. The court also found that plaintiff had no reason to believe she was in any medical danger because of her amenorrhea. These findings were supported by testimony at trial. Both defendants’ and plaintiff’s experts testified that hypothalamic pituitary dysfunction can lead to cancer. Plaintiff testified that Dr.
Affirmed.
Notes
MCL 600.6421; MSA 27A.6421 provides that cases in the Court of Claims may be joined for trial with cases arising out of the same transaction that are pending in a trial court. When cases are joined for trial, the Court of Claims case "shall be tried and determined by the judge even though the trial court aсtion with which it may be
In
Stolaruk Corp v Dep’t of Transportation,