11 S.E.2d 699 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1940
1. Disability to an employee caused by a disease which results from unusual, sudden, and unexpected inhalation of gas or fumes, while performing the duties of his employment, where the disease causing the injury is not the natural result of the existence of conditions necessarily incident to the work being performed, is the result of an injury by accident and is compensable under the compensation act.
2. Negligence of an employee in continuing to work after knowingly inhaling the fumes under the conditions above indicated does not constitute a bar to compensation.
The hearing director denied compensation, holding that the claimant's "disability did not result from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, nor to a disease or condition which resulted naturally and unavoidably from an accidental injury; but that his disability was due to a congested and irritated condition of the lungs brought about, not by an accidental injury, but what was in the nature of an occupational disease due to long and continued exposure to gas and fumes," and that "there is no evidence establishing any definite injury at any *532
definite time, but to the contrary it appears that his condition gradually developed during the day from continued exposure to the fumes." He further found that in the present case the "claimant was forewarned of the fact that the fumes were causing nausea and weakness, and he should have foreseen and expected that the continuous exposure to the fumes would be injurious to his health," and that "after several hours of inhaling the fumes he began feeling the ill effects of the fumes, but he continued exposing himself to the fumes and because of this continuous exposure his condition gradually grew worse, and finally resulted in the disease from which he suffered for seven weeks." The board, on appeal, reviewed and affirmed the award of the director. The claimant appealed from that award to the superior court of Jasper County, where the award of the board was reversed. The order of the court, in part, is as follows: "It is the opinion of the court that the award or decree of Harry E. Monroe, on May 26, 1939, and the award of approval by the full board on June 19, 1939, should be reversed on the ground that said award is contrary to law, for the reason that it is without evidence to support it, in that the evidence in the case demands the single director and full board should have found that the disability of the claimant resulted from an injury or disease, or injury arising out of and in the course of employment in resulting naturally therefrom." From this judgment the employer and the insurance carrier excepted.
"`Injury' and `personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any form except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident." Code, § 114-102. In order to be compensable under the compensation act the disease must arise out of, or result from an accident or injury arising out of, and in the course of, the employment. If the facts show a causal connection between the injury and the development of the disease the victim of the disease is entitled to compensation. It has been held that where a disease results from a sudden or unexpected inhalation of gas or fumes it results from an accident or injury within the meaning of the compensation acts. Although the decisions on the subject are not uniform and can not *533
be entirely reconciled, generally diseases resulting from unusual and unexpected inhalation of gas fumes or dust result from accident within the meaning of the compensation act, but where the injury is the natural result of the existence of conditions necessarily incidental to the work being performed, as where the resulting diseases are occupational diseases, it is held that they do not result from accident. 71 C. J. 593, § 344. It has been held that where an automobile mechanic inhaled a large amount of exhaust gas from an automobile in the course of his employment, and thereafter contracted pneumonia from which he died, the cause of his injury was the inhalation of the gas although the pneumonia would have been the immediate cause of his death. See Columbine Laundry Co. v. Industrial Commission,
An occupational or industrial disease is not compensable under *534
the Georgia workmen's compensation act. See Covington
v. Berkeley Granite Cor.,
Under the facts of the case now before the court the disease of *535
the claimant's lungs resulted from an unexpected inhalation by him of the gas and fumes caused by the welding carried on by him and his fellow employee in the manhole beneath the street, on the occasion in which the claimant and the other employee were repairing the tank underneath the street, and did not result from a diseased condition arising gradually from the character of the work in which the claimant was engaged, and as the natural result of the existence of conditions necessarily incidental to his employment. Such disease resulted rather from unusual and sudden inhalation of gas and fumes on a single and special occasion wholly unexpected by him, as contradistinguished from inhaling such fumes over a considerable period of time as a natural and expected incident to the employment. Under the authorities first above referred to it is our opinion that the disability of the claimant resulting from the diseased condition of his lungs caused by inhaling the gas or fumes from the electric welding on the occasion when he and his fellow employee were working in the manhole beneath the street, was the result of an accidental injury and was therefore compensable under the workmen's compensation act. The undisputed evidence demanded a finding that the claimant's disability resulted from an injury by accident, and the award by the hearing commissioner and the board denying compensation was without evidence to support it. The fact that the claimant continued to work that day, after being aware of the fumes and after feeling ill effects therefrom, would not bar him from compensation. Negligence of the employee, no matter how gross, will not bar compensation where the injury is otherwise compensable. See AEtna Life Insurance Co. v.Carroll,
Judgment affirmed. Sutton and Felton, JJ., concur.