19 S.E.2d 550 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1942
The evidence authorized the finding that the claimant's injury resulted from an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that his earning capacity was impaired in the amount found by the director.
The employer contends that the finding of September 9, 1940, that the claimant had sustained an accidental injury, which arose out of and in the course of his employment, and awarding compensation, was contrary to law in that it appeared from the evidence adduced before the Industrial Board that the claimant's injury was caused by an accident which did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and was therefore not compensable. The claimant was an insurance salesman, employed at the time of his injury by the Associated Mutuals Incorporated. The accident occurred about 5 p. m. on Saturday January 14, 1940. The regular working hours of the claimant for the week ceased at noon on Saturday of each week. Evidence to support the finding of fact of Director Monroe that the claimant's injury was compensable in that it resulted from an accident which arose out of and in the course of claimant's employment was to the following effect: "Claimant's work required him to contact customers or prospects to sell and collect for insurance; and therefore he was required to work outside the office of the company. . . On January 14, 1939, at about 5:00 p. m. claimant left his home at 206 East Yale Street in College Park, Georgia, with the intention of going to the business section of the town to contact a prospect and deliver an insurance policy. Claimant had sold a policy of insurance to one W. P. Oxford, who operated a grocery store in College Park, and had made an appointment with Oxford's father to contact him at the store late on the afternoon of January 14. Claimant stopped at the store, which was about a block from his home, and delivered the policy of insurance to W. P. Oxford. Oxford told claimant that he did not have any money with which to pay the premium but that his father had gone to a barber shop on the west side of *163 town, and if claimant would go there his father would probably pay the premium. Claimant then left the store and drove his automobile across the John Wesley railway crossing, which was directly in front of the store, crossing over on the west side of the railway tracks and onto West Main Street. Claimant stopped at the barber shop and inquired about Oxford and found that he had already left the barber shop. Claimant then went into a ten-cent store and made a purchase of a Chinese checker board and some fig bars. He then got into his automobile for the purpose of returning to the store to contact Oxford, drove south along Main Street to John Wesley Avenue, and turned left to cross the John Wesley railway crossing for the purpose of going to the store which was just beyond the crossing, when an approaching train struck his automobile and injured the claimant for which injury he now claims compensation." The claimant, "who was a traveling insurance salesman, had no regular hours of work." He "reported at the office of the company early in the morning, and he then left the office and traveled around contacting customers, and had no particular hour for quitting work." He "did a great deal of his work at night." The "accident occurred on a Saturday afternoon, and the office of the company usually closed at 1:00 o'clock on Saturday; but the claimant was not required to report back at the office before closing after having reported early in the morning, and he sold insurance on Saturday afternoons just the same as on other afternoons."
The claimant contended that he left his home for the purpose of going to the business section of College Park to deliver a policy of insurance and collect the premium; that he delivered the policy but was unable to collect the premium at that time; that the person to whom he delivered the policy told him he might get some money from such person's father who had gone across the railroad to a barber shop, and claimant went to the barber shop but did not locate this man; that he then went to the ten-cent store and purchased the Chinese checkers and fig bars, and that he was returning to the store, where he had delivered the policy and which was on his direct route back home, for the purpose of contacting his customer and "with the intention of then going home," when he entered upon the railroad crossing and was struck by the train.
Before an injury is compensable under the workmen's compensation *164
act it must be caused "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." Code § 114-102. The courts have held that such an injury must arise both out of and in the course of the employment, and that neither alone is sufficient. NewAmsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell,
There was evidence to the effect that the claimant, at the time of his injury by being run into by the train, was traveling in his automobile and going to the store of his customer for the purpose of collecting an insurance premium, and that the claimant at the time was performing the duties of his employment. It can not be determined conclusively from the evidence that the claimant would not have been where he was at the time of the accident if he had not been going to collect the insurance premium. The rule is well stated in the following which is taken from Vitagraph Inc. v. Industrial Com.,
It appears from the evidence that the claimant at the time of the injury received from his employer a salary of $100 per month plus $15 as operating expenses of his automobile which he used in the discharge of his duties. This was a payment to the claimant of $115 for the services rendered by him to the employer, and should be counted as salary although $15 of it consisted in payment to him for the expense of the operation of his automobile. There is therefore no merit in the contention of the employer and the insurance carrier that the director was in error in fixing compensation on the basis of a salary of $115 per month instead of on the basis of $100 per month.
It appears from the evidence that as a result of the accident the claimant suffered extremely severe personal injuries which themselves would authorize an inference that his capacity to work was considerably impaired. There was medical testimony to the effect that, and the director so found, the claimant's capacity to work had been impaired 33 1/3 per cent. The nature of his injuries and this reduction in his capacity to work, when taken in connection with evidence that the claimant was unable afterwards to work regularly at any job, although he worked some, and that he frequently had to go home and rest during the day was sufficient to authorize the director to conclude, in the absence of any definite evidence as to the claimant's actual earnings after his injury, that his earning capacity was impaired 33 1/3 per cent. as found by the director.
The sum of $1250 which the claimant received from the railroad *166
company as a third-party tort-feasor causing his injuries, was not a legal liability resulting from an adjudication in a lawsuit, but was received in a settlement by him with the railroad company. Under Walker v. Employers LiabilityAssurance Cor.,
The evidence authorized a finding that the claimant was entitled to the full amount of compensation awarded. The superior court did not err in affirming the awards of the director.
Judgment affirmed. Sutton and Felton, JJ., concur.