| Mass. | Nov 26, 1996
At issue is whether in a city election, G. L. c. 43B, § 17 (1994 ed.),
The facts of the case are undisputed. In 1985, the citizens of Worcester adopted a home rule charter, modifying their form of local government and establishing an electoral process for their local government officials.
All twelve candidates who survive the preliminary election are considered to be running for both mayor and councillor at-large, although they may withdraw from the mayoral race and run “solely for the office of councillor at large.” Art. 2, § 2-2(b)(2) of the city charter of Worcester. The office of mayor is then awarded to the “candidate elected to the office of councillor at large [who] receiv[es] the highest number of votes for the office of mayor.” Art. 2, § 2-2(b)(l). The office
The plaintiff was listed as one of the twelve candidates who survived the preliminary election for councillor at-large. In a timely manner, she sent a letter to the board which stated, “This letter is to inform you that I plan to run for the position of City Councillor-at-Large only, and not the position of Mayor in the upcoming November election.”
Only three of the remaining twelve candidates maintained their eligibility for the office of mayor. At the election, two of these three candidates did not receive enough votes to be elected as a councillor at-large. The other candidate who did gain election to the city council also received the highest number of votes for mayor and was declared mayor.
As directed by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, see G. L. c. 43B, § 17 (1994 ed.), blank spaces were left on the ballot during the final election. The plaintiff received thirty-seven write-in votes for the office of mayor, despite her withdrawal from that race. No other candidate elected to the city council received more write-in votes for mayor. Based on those write-in votes and her election as a councillor at-large, Lukes claims that she is entitled to the office of vice-chair.
The thrust of the plaintiff’s main argument is that State law requires that write-in ballots be counted. See G. L. c. 54, § 42 (1994 ed.).
“Our goal in interpreting two or more statutes relating to the same subject matter is to construe them so as to constitute an harmonious whole, consistent with the legislative purpose.” Independence Park, Inc. v. Board of Health of Barnstable, 403 Mass. 477" court="Mass." date_filed="1988-12-07" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/independence-park-inc-v-board-of-health-6450115?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6450115">403 Mass. 477, 480 (1988). Atkinson v. Ipswich, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 663" court="Mass. App. Ct." date_filed="1993-06-25" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/atkinson-v-town-of-ipswich-6459045?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6459045">34 Mass. App. Ct. 663 (1993) (granting deference to city charter over statute).
The board states that it only put write-in blanks on the ballot because, in its view, the Secretary of the Commonwealth required such blanks. The board’s opinion was that blanks for write-in votes should not have been on their final ballot because it would be inconsistent with its charter. We agree with the board that State law requiring blank spaces on all ballots for write-in votes can be overridden by a home rule charter. The Legislature specifically has allowed cities and towns the right to change this aspect of the local election process by a home rule charter.
Worcester’s charter does provide voters with an opportunity to select candidates not named on the ballot. That opportunity occurs in the preliminary election. Art. 7, § 7-4(e). The purpose of this preliminary election is to streamline the number of candidates, a legitimate State goal. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134" court="SCOTUS" date_filed="1972-02-24" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bullock-v-carter-108470?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="108470">405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972). Worcester’s preliminary election, with the opportunity for write-in votes, eliminates the practicality and necessity of putting blank spaces on the final local ballot. We conclude that,
The plaintiff next argues that, although she withdrew her candidacy for the office of mayor, she never withdrew from becoming vice-chair through the electoral process. There is no merit to this argument. A reading of § 2-2(b) of the charter reveals that one must run for the office of mayor to be eligible for the position of vice-chair. In relevant part, the section maintains that all candidates for councillor at-large are eligible for the office of mayor, but at their own discretion, a “candidate duly nominated and seeking election solely for the office of councillor at large may withdraw his/her name from nomination to the office of mayor.” Art. 2, § 2-2(b)(2). The wording of the charter states that, by withdrawing one’s name from the ballot for mayor, the candidate is seeking election only to the councillor position. The plaintiff therefore made herself ineligible for the office of vice-chair through the electoral process.
The matter is remanded, to the single justice session where an order vacating the stay and judgment consistent with this opinion are to enter.
So ordered.
The text of G. L. c. 43B, § 17 (1994 ed.), provides: “The provisions of chapters fifty to fifty-seven, inclusive, applicable to city or town elections shall apply to the proceedings governed by this chapter so far as apt, but the provisions of sections fifty-five to fifty-eight, inclusive, of chapter fifty-four shall not be deemed to apply, and the provisions of this chapter shall prevail where they are in conflict with any applicable provisions of said chapters fifty to fifty-seven, inclusive.”
The statute requiring cities and towns to include blank spaces on their
Approximately 24,000 votes were cast in the election.
See art. 2 of the Amendments to the Constitution of Massachusetts, as amended by art. 89.
The relevant portion of G. L. c. 54, § 42, provides: “Under the designation of the office, the names of candidates for each municipal elective office shall, except as city charters otherwise provide, be arranged alphabetically according to their surnames, except that names of candidates for re-election to any such office of which they are the elected incumbents . . . shall be placed first on the ballot in alphabetical order according to their surnames, next and in like order the names of candidates of political parties as defined in chapter fifty, and the names of all other candidates shall follow in like order. . . . Blank spaces shall be left at the end of the list of candidates for each different office equal to the number to be elected thereto, in which the voter may insert the name and address of any person not printed on the ballot for whom he desires to vote for such office . . .” (emphasis added).
In Atkinson v. Ipswich, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 663 (1993), the provisions of G. L. c. 48, § 42 (1994 ed.), only applied if accepted by the community. The town charter was adopted five years after the town adopted the provisions of the law. The court concluded that the charter’s provisions superseded those of the statute. Similarly, Worcester’s charter supplants the statutory requirement of a blank space on the ballot because the language of the relevant statute only applies if a city’s charter does not create a different process.
The board faced with the same situation in 1989 declared the vice-chair position vacant. The city council then selected the vice-chair from among its members. The plaintiff, a member of the city council at that time, acquiesced to the appointment of a vice-chair by the city council despite the fact that some of the candidates had received write-in votes. Neither the electorate of Worcester nor the plaintiff has made any effort to change the charter after 1989. This precedent, however, did not preclude the plaintiff from making this challenge.