Lukely Riley v. Louie L. Wainwright
810 F.2d 1006
11th Cir.
1987
Check Treatment

Lukely RILEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-5353

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 23, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1987.

Non-Argument Calendar.

4. Whether the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the combined effects of Jones‘s impairments?

Jones contends that the ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of his impairments. The Secretary contends that the ALJ considered the combined effect of Jones‘s impairment during an assessment of Jones‘s residual functional capacity.

It is now well settled that the ALJ must consider the combined effects of a claimant‘s impairments in determining whether he is disabled. In

, we stated that

where ... a claimant has alleged a multitude of impairments, a claim for social security benefits based on disability may lie even though none of the impairments, considered individually, is disabling. In such instances, it is the duty of the Administrative Law Judge to make specific and well articulated findings as to the effect of the combination of impairments and to decide whether the combined impairments caused the claimant to be disabled.

Here, the ALJ stated explicitly that the medical evidence did not establish the existence of an impairment or a combination of impairments which rendered Jones disabled under the Act. The Appeals Council reiterated the ALJ‘s determination regarding the combined effects of Jones‘s impairments. Of course, the Secretary could have set forth more specific findings regarding the effect of the combination of impairments on Jones‘s ability to work; however, given the ALJ‘s exhaustive consideration of the effect of these impairments on Jones‘s residual functional capacity, we conclude that the Secretary‘s findings were sufficient under the standards set forth above.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court‘s decision to uphold the Secretary‘s ruling.

AFFIRMED

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Susan A. Maher, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

Peter M. Siegel, Florida Justice Institute, Inc., Randall C. Berg, Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

relief as well as damages, this case is not clearly controlled by

.

Wainwright‘s petition for rehearing is DENIED.

Before GODBOLD, VANCE and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The defendant seeks to appeal from the denial of his motion for summary judgment. No appeal is available. 10 Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2715 (1983);

;
. Nor does this case fall within any of the narrow exceptions to the rule of nonappealability such as the collateral order doctrine. See
. The appeal is DISMISSED.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM:

held that “a district court‘s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” In the present case the district court‘s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment did not turn on an issue of law; the court denied defendants’ claim of qualified immunity because the case required substantial factual development before it could be determined with finality whether Riley had been subjected to constitutional deprivation and, if so, whether some or all of the defendants were entitled to the benefit of qualified immunity. The district court‘s order is therefore not a final appealable decision.

In addition, the Supreme Court in

specifically noted that it was expressing no opinion regarding the appealability of a denial of qualified immunity when the plaintiff‘s action involves claims for injunctive relief that will have to be adjudicated regardless of the resolution of any damage claims.
105 S.Ct. at 2812 n. 5. Because Riley requested injunctive