Lead Opinion
Opinion by Judge Fernandez; Dissent by Judge W. Fletcher.
OPINION
Luke M. Hunton appeals the district court’s dismissal of part of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts that because he is raising a Brady
BACKGROUND
After Hunton was convicted in the State of Washington of bank robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for life, he appealed and raised a claim that his due process right to discovery had been violated. See Brady,
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief de novo. See Lopez v. Schriro,
While Hunton agrees, as he must, that he did procedurally default on his Brady claim, he asserts that he may still pursue it because he was deprived of counsel at his post-conviction relief proceeding. However, that pursuit is blocked by a barrier that the Supreme Court clearly recognized over twenty years ago. See Coleman,
There is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings. Coleman contends that it was his attorney’s error that led to the late filing of his state habeas appeal. This error cannot be constitutionally ineffective; therefore Coleman must “bear the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). That would end our discussion, but there is a more recent development to consider.
In 2012, the Supreme Court gave further consideration to the general rule. See Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S. -,
The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited circumstances recognized here.... It does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.
In addition, the limited nature of the qualification to Coleman adopted here reflects the importance of the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel and Arizona’s decision to bar defendants from raising ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Our holding here addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case, where the State barred the defendant from raising the claims on direct appeal.
Id.; see also McKinney v. Ryan,
Therefore, the question before us is quite uncomplicated. The Supreme Court has told us that a person cannot raise a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel because he is not entitled to post-conviction relief counsel, but that is subject to an exception where trial counsel was ineffective and the claim could not be raised earlier. The Court made it plain that the exception extended no further.
Yet, it is not surprising to have enterprising lawyers seek to cross the barriers and limitations noted by the Court. Not surprising, but not sufficient to allow us to move those barriers. Thus, we need not and will not consider the detail of Hunton’s arguments, except to say that a formal deductive logician might be troubled by an argument whose structure is: “X” is an important right and “Y” does not apply to it; “Z” is an important right; therefore, “Y” does not apply to “Z.” But, even if “[t]he life of the law has not been logic,”
CONCLUSION
We remain bound by Coleman, which requires that we reject Hunton’s attempt to have us remove the obstacle it presents. If Coleman’s revetment is to be torn down, it is not for us to do it. Rather, we must “follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the] Court the. prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Brady v. Maryland,
. Since then the Court has added that when, in practice, state courts will not hear claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, the situation is the same as that when state courts expressly deny permission to raise those claims on direct appeal. If there is a distinction, it "is a distinction without a difference." See Trevino v. Thaler, - U.S. -, -,
. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
In Martinez v. Ryan, — U.S. -,
Hunton was convicted in 2002 of second degree robbery in Washington state court and was sentenced to life in prison without parole under that state’s three strikes law. With some assistance from counsel, Hun-ton appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals. Hunton argued on appeal that the prosecution had violated Brady v. Maryland by delaying the production of some evidence and failing to disclose other evidence. The Court of Appeals refused to decide Hunton’s Brady claim on direct appeal. It wrote:
Mr. Hunton claims that the prosecutor did not timely provide exculpatory evidence including information and materials regarding another individual suspected of the robberies, as well as other exculpatory information. Mr. Hunton may have a point. However, the factual basis for his claim cannot be examined on the record before this court. See State v. Crane,116 Wash.2d 315 , 335,*1128 804 P.2d 10 (1991) (review is limited to the appellate record).
The Washington Supreme Court denied review.
Acting pro se, Hunton filed a personal restraint petition (“PRP”) in Washington court. Washington provides counsel only in limited circumstances for prisoners filing PRPs, none of which applied in Hun-ton’s case. Hunton did not raise his Brady claim in his PRP. The Washington Court of Appeals denied Hunton’s PRP, and the Washington Supreme Court denied review.
Still acting pro se, Hunton then filed a petition for federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he raised the Brady claim he had unsuccessfully raised in his direct appeal and had failed to raise in his PRP. The district court held that Hunton had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim. We granted a certificate of appealability ordering Hunton to address the following questions: (1) whether he had procedurally defaulted his Brady claim; (2) whether he had exhausted his Brady claim and, if not, whether he should be afforded an opportunity to exhaust in state court; and (3) whether he was entitled to relief on his Brady claim. We ordered appointment of counsel.
After briefing by counsel, we remanded to the district court to determine whether Hunton’s federal habeas proceeding should be stayed and held in abeyance in order to allow him to exhaust his Brady claim. The district court denied stay and abeyance on the ground that Hunton’s Brady claim had already been procedurally defaulted in state court and there would therefore be no point to a stay and abeyance order. Unbeknownst to the district court, seven days before the entry of its order the Supreme Court had decided Martinez. Hunton moved in the district court for reconsideration based on Martinez. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, but granted a certificate of appealability.
Hunton raises a single question in this appeal: does the equitable rule of Martinez apply to a case in which the underlying defaulted claim is a Brady claim? For the reasons that follow, I conclude that it does.
The Court held in Martinez that “[inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez,
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.
Id. at 1320.
A year later, in Trevino v. Thaler, — U.S. -,
The Court in Trevino summarized the four-part test Martinez had established to determine whether a federal habeas court may excuse a state court procedural default. “Cause” to excuse the default may be found
where (1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being “no counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-eounsel claim”; and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral review proceeding.” Martinez, [132 S.Ct. at 1318-19, 1320-21 ].
Id. at 1918. (The fourth requirement was relaxed in Trevino, as just described.)
The Court has provided several reasons justifying its new equitable rule excusing procedural default. First, “if counsel’s errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding do not establish cause to excuse the procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will review the prisoner’s claims.” Martinez,
Second, the Court recognized the importance of having effective legal assistance in bringing an IAC claim. Id. at 1317. The Court wrote:
Claims of ineffective assistance at trial often require investigative work and an understanding of trial strategy. When the issue cannot be raised on direct review, moreover, a prisoner asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim in an initial-review collateral proceeding cannot rely on a court opinion or the prior work of an attorney addressing that claim....
The same would be true if the State did not appoint an attorney to assist the prisoner in the initial-review collateral proceeding. The prisoner, unlearned in the law, may not comply with the State’s procedural rules or may misapprehend the substantive details of federal constitutional law. While confined to prison, the prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the trial record.
Id. at 1317 (internal citations omitted).
Finally, the Court emphasized the significance of the underlying right to effective trial counsel. That right “is a bedrock principle in our justice system.” Id. at 1317. Effective counsel is essential to a fair trial, and is a “foundation for our adversary system.” Id. Effective defense counsel tests the prosecution’s case, thereby ensuring “that the proceedings serve the function of adjudicating guilt or innocence.” Id.
Each of these reasons applies with equal force to a defaulted Brady claim. First, as in Martinez and Trevino, where the prisoner was prevented from raising a trial-counsel IAC claim on direct appeal, Hun-ton was prevented from bringing his Bra
Second, just as for a trial-counsel IAC claim, it is important for a Brady claim that a prisoner have effective assistance in developing evidence to support his claim. For both trial-counsel IAC and Brady claims, much — sometimes all — of the important evidence is outside the trial record. A prisoner acting pro se, or with only the assistance of ineffective collateral review counsel, cannot perform the necessary investigative work to collect and present the evidence in an initial-review collateral proceeding. See Martinez,
Third, trial-counsel IAC claims and Brady claims vindicate bedrock principles of our judicial system. Effective assistance of trial counsel and production of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution are both essential to a fair trial. Both are critical to a criminal trial’s essential “function of adjudicating guilt or innocence.” Martinez,
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: “The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the courts.” A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice, even though, as in the present case, his action is not the result of guile, to use the words of the Court of Appeals.
The holding in this case does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of proceedings, including appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral proceedings, and petitions for discretionary review in a State’s appellate courts. It does not extend to attorney errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial, even though that initial-review collateral proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.
In addition, the limited nature of the qualification to Coleman [v. Thompson,501 U.S. 722 ,111 S.Ct. 2546 ,115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991),] adopted here reflects the importance of the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel and Arizona’s decision to bar defendants from raising ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Our holding here addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this case, where the State barred the defendant from raising the claims on direct appeal.
Martinez,
According to the majority, this language precludes applying the Martinez rule here. I disagree. Nothing in what the Court wrote differentiates a trial-counsel IAC claim from the Brady claim at issue here. The Court’s first paragraph lists proceedings in which ineffective assistance of counsel does not come within the scope of Martinez. Hunton’s Brady claim was procedurally defaulted by counsel in his initial collateral review proceeding, not in any of the proceedings listed by the Court. The second paragraph emphasizes “the importance of the right to the effective assistance of trial counsel,” as well as “Arizona’s decision to bar defendants from raising ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal.” Id. The Court has repeatedly made clear the importance of a Brady claim. Its language leaves no doubt that a Brady claim is just as important as a trial-counsel IAC claim. Further, Hunton was barred from raising his Brady claim on direct appeal, just as Martinez and Trevino were barred from raising their trial-counsel IAC claims on direct appeal.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in Martinez, anticipated cases like the one now before us. He wrote that “[t]here is not a dime’s worth of difference in principle” between trial-counsel IAC claims and Brady claims that have been procedurally defaulted by initial collateral review counsel. Martinez,
I conclude that the equitable rule established in Martinez applies in a case where a petitioner, acting pro se during his initial collateral review proceedings in state court, failed to raise and thereby procedurally defaulted his Brady claim. I would reverse the decision of the district court and remand to allow that court to determine whether Hunton can satisfy the four-part test under Martinez that would allow an excuse of his procedural default.