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Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education
649 P.2d 1005
Colo.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 al., LUJAN, et Theodore

Plaintiffs-Appellees, BOARD OF

COLORADO STATE

EDUCATION, al., et

Defendants-Appellants,

Adams-Arapahoe-Aurora District al., Intervenors-Appellants.

28-J, et

No. 79SA276. ,

Supreme Court Colorado

En Banc.

May 1982.

Rehearing Aug. Denied

1008 *5 Jr., Boulder, Sandstead,

Morris W. for American Un- amicus curiae Civil Liberties ion. Cockrell, Quinn

Henry, Creighton, Ben- & Denver, jamin Craig, L. for amici curiae Douglas County Dist. Re. School School County, Dist. No. in Adams and School County. 11 in El Paso Dist. No. HODGES, Chief Justice.

The trial court declared Colorado’s elementary system financing public secondary education unconstitutional. This system encompassed finance with provisions of the Public Fi section 22-50-101 et nance Act Stubbs, Davis, Richard & L. Graham seq., Cum.Supp., and 1981 and is C.R.S.1973 Denver, Freese, Jr., Joseph Bellipanni, J. relat statutory provisions affected C., E. Long, Washington, D. John David C. fund, to the reserve sections McDermott, Cal., City, plaintiffs- Studio 22-40-102(4) 22-45-103(l)(c), C.R.S. appellees. Cum.Supp., provi 1973 and 1981 and those Galindo, Denver, plaintiff-ap- Israel pertaining redemption to the bond sions Legal pellee Colorado Rural Services. fund, 22-42-104(l)(a) and 22-45- sections n Gen., MacFarlane, F. Atty. Richard J. D. 103(l)(b), Cum.Supp.1 and 1981 C.R.S.1973 Gen., Mary J. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Appellants are the Colorado Board of State Gen., Stephen Kaplan, H. Mullarkey, Sol. its Intervenors- Education and members. Hickman, Gen., Deanna E. Atty. Asst. First *6 within Appellants are 26 school districts Gen., Denver, for defendants- Atty. Asst. challenge the trial Colorado who court’s appellants. appellees declaration. The are school chil Earnest, Caplan, A. Al- Caplan & Gerald residing dren in 16 of the 181 school dis Boulder, Halpern, for intervenors- exander state, who, tricts located within the appellants. below, ruling plaintiffs sought a the Dufford, Lennahan, Philip Rebecca C. G. system school finance was unconstitutional. Denver, Brown, Douglas for the General G. The trial court determined that the school Assembly of Colo. State system, approximate- finance which derives Jacobs, C., & P. John C. McClure ly forty-seven percent operating of its in- Alamosa, McClure, Bosa, J. for ami- Gordon levies, property come from local tax violates Centennial, Alamosa, Brighton, ci curiae provisions equal protection of the Unit- Huerfano, Norte, Elizabeth, Monte Vis- Del Constitutions, ed States and the Colorado ta, Conejos, Valley, North Sierra Mountain violates the and also Colorado constitutional Grande, Conejos and Trinidad School South “thorough uniform” mandate that a Districts. 99, 1980, 558-560; appeal obligation Laws at ch. it is our to decide this ch. 22-50-105 1. While stands, 97, 551-553; presently as it Hall v. 22-50-103 at Colo.Sess.Laws based on the law 1979, 200, 797; 199, Beals, 45, 200, at ch. 22- 24 L.Ed.2d 214 ch. 22-50-116 396 U.S. 90 S.Ct. 794; 795-796; 198, statutory (1969), intervening 50-104 at ch. 22-50-102 at amendments 188, 779; change corporeal ch. 22-50-101.5 at in the Colo.Sess.Laws no sub have worked 1978, 69, system ch. 22-50-105 at 369-374. Accord- since the stance of the school finance ingly, provi- judgment our discussion will focus on the in 1979. See Colo. trial court entered 252, 1075; system sions of the school finance in effect at Sess.Laws ch. 22-50-102 1056-1057; special unless mention is warranted. CoIo.Sess. ch. 22-50-104 at Colorado, system public provided. schools be (1966). Colo. Research Publ. No. 117 IX, Art. 2.2 Const. Sec. We reverse provided This Act each school district with court’s judgment. trial equalization “support level” or set money amount of for each district in each court, Contrary to trial we hold that year. However, calendar this Act was soon Colorado’s school finance does not criticized for eliminating spending not Article violate Section of the Colorado disparities among the Ap- school districts. Constitution, deny equal protec- nor does it parently in response criticism, to this plaintiffs-appellees, tion of the law to Assembly General enacted the Public School hold, similarly those situated. We also con- Act of Finance sections et 22-50-101 court, trary to the trial that Colorado’s seq., PSFA], C.R.S.1973 capital outlay financing method of is [hereinafter consti- challenged was in the trial court and is the tutional and rule that this method of subject appeal. of this To financing, whereby understand the each local school district nature and substance of the governed taxing on issues is limitation its before us, it is necessary to examine authority, rationally some of the legiti- related to a features of Colorado’s purpose. mate state school sys- finance tem. Background I. Historical II. The System School Finance

By Enabling section 7 of the Colorado Act, the Congress currently set There are United States 181 school districts township providing aside certain in each Colorado a kindergarten through lands of Col- support “for grade 535,085 orado common twelfth education for stu- L., pt. PSFA, schools.” 18 at U.S.Stat. dents. Under the school (1875). local, primarily state, financed federal example, revenues. As an statehood, public schools in Since Colora- generated local taxes forty-seven percent locally have been do financed levied funds, general the state fund property taxes contributions. provided forty-three percent, federal reve- initially state’s contribution was limit- percent, nues accounted six for and miscel- generated through ed to the revenue the remaining laneous sources contributed interest, rentals, and leases on the state- percent. four di- owned lands. first support rect state of local school districts statutory provisions Under levying challenged enacted. was was It and found purposes, taxes each school Annear, to be constitutional Wilmore v. certify county district shall to the commis- P.2d 1433 Colo. Since sioners the amount revenue needed for 1935, a combination local tax operating system. county its school *7 levies and direct state contributions has place levy against commissioners then sup- the principal been source of financial valuation of taxable within the port public system. Colorado’s district’s boundaries to raise desired 22-40-102(1) (2), revenue. Sections and 1952, following of the study (1978 Supp. committee, C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum. system by a finance Governor’s Supp.). may Each all expend school district Assembly passed the first General Pub- such revenue collected its Leg- lic Act. within bounda- School Finance See Colorado ries, Council, Report strictly provided islative to the Colorado it is used for educa- Assembly: purposes. General State Aid Schools tional ages twenty-one years,' 2. Article section of the tween the may of six Colorado Constitu- and gratuitously. tion states: be educated One or more public schools shall be maintained in each public “Establishment maintenance of state, school district within the at least three shall, assembly general schools. The soon year; any months each school district fail- practicable, provide as and maintenance of a for the establishment ing to have such school shall not be entitled thorough and uniform any portion to receive of the school fund for throughout of free schools year.” state, state, wherein all be- residents section, raising capacity. creates four The school finance Under this a dis- provide funding generating capacity for the trict with low revenue components main will general bridge efforts of a school dis- receive aid to the difference generated by components prop- These authorized between revenues local trict. aid, base, equalization guar- erty statutorily guaran- tax levies and the revenue state 1977, capital outlay example, financ- teed amount. yield plan, anteed For Assembly passed ing. General S.B. 138 amend- ing equalization program the state in order Base A. Authorized Revenue per pupil guaranteed would be $35.00 (ARB) revenue base is a authorized general for each mill levied for the fund of specified dollar amount established annual- a school district. ch. Colo.Sess.Laws district, ly for each and is the maximum 264, 22-50-105. may spend gen- annual amount a district operating expenses per pupil. eral whether a determining A formula used ARB for each amount was first established aid can be equalization is entitled to district part district in was based on by applying it to the South Cone- illustrated spending the amount each district was then District, receiving con- jos a district per pupil. spending figure This was used equalization aid: siderable state by Assembly as an estimate General (AV)3.$4,772,260.00 V what the educational costs were for each Assessed aluation (ARB) 1,181.08 Authorized Revenue Base . . $ However, district. the ARB has been ad- (AE) Attendance Entitlement .... 782 students justed upwards, especially spend- in the low districts, accurately reflect the more Then it is necessary apply figures these educational needs of the districts. Under to the formula to determine the local share 1980, ch. S.B. Colo.Sess.Laws 22-50- per per mill4 pupil: 105 at the minimum ARB in 1982 will $2,000 per pupil, or the 1981 ARB level $160, plus greater. whichever amount State Guarantee.$35.00 Compare, ch. S.B. Colo.Sess.Laws 6.10 Local Share.$ 69, 22-50-106 at 371-372. State Equalization Aid.$28.90/mill/pupil may A school district increase its by ARB To determine the mill levy: First, ways. one of two by requesting an ARB increase from the Dis- State School Budget Second, trict Review Board. if this 33.75, With the mill levy being the state whole, request part is refused in or in equalization aid student X is $28.90

holding an election so that the electorate = Thus, 33.75 the total $975.38. State aid may decide on the increase. 22- Sections Conejos to the South School District in 1978 50-107 and C.R.S.1973. When an ARB = 782(AE) $762,844.00. X was $975.38 granted procedure, increase is either under Accordingly, provided State responsible the district funding Conejos South School District with the dif- Thereafter, year. increase for the first it is ference between the guaranteed state determining included in the formula amount and the revenue raised a 1 mill equalization aid. levy. contrast, In stark a 1 mill levy in B. Equalization State Aid *8 Rangely District, School a district with statutory The equalization program, higher sec- values, taxable property raised 22-50-105, tion C.R.S.1973 and 1981 per pupil during Cum. period. $326.27 this same provides Supp., support financial Rangely for dis- The School District was therefore lacking high tricts a tax clearly base or revenue ineligible equalization for State aid. monetary frequently 3. Assessed valuation is the sum of the total 4. A mill is a unit used in assigned property value to all taxable real with- taxation which has the value of one-tenth of a taxing in the district. cent. any year. Yield Plan four mills in given C. Guaranteed 22- Section 40-102(4), Expenditures C.R.S.1973. ability Regardless of a school district’s to this fund are to long-range limited future taxes to meet or the raise local exceed programs with such purposes acquisition as of equalization $35/mill/pupil, State’s aid of and the buildings land construction of guaranteed yield provides the each district thereon or the construction of additions to grant per pupil per a mill. Sec- with flat existing structures. Section 22-45- 22-50-105(2)(d), (1978 Supp. tion C.R.S.1973 103(l)(c)(I), C.R.S.1973. a in Cum.Supp.). and 1981 If district levied The trial present court found that mills, the guarantee excess the minimum of capital operates reserve fund high- so that per pupil mill in per was $11.35 $13.35 wealth districts can raise more revenue will $14.41 $15.53 statutory from the maximum of four mills 1982. If the district levied at less than 20 than a low-wealth district can. The facts mills, guarantee the set minimum $11.35 support finding. In example, for through 1979 remains in effect the Frisco School District was able to raise effect, gives the act a the district benefit per pupil the levy, $386.52 under four mill either the the share as calculated State’s Conejos while the South School District was equalization formula or the minimum guar- only able generate per pupil. $23.60 antee, greater. whichever is As an exam- ple, applied the finance formula (2) Redemption Bond Fund. This fund is Englewood for School District result- major building projects used for and is sub- following guaranteed yield: ed in the ject approval by It oper- electorate. a statutorily imposed ates under debt ceil- Valuation.$105,870,300.00 Assessed ing equal 20% of district’s assessed 1,720.85 .$ Base Authorized Revenue 4,201.80 property Attendance Entitlement. valuation. Section 22-42- 104(l)(a), C.R.S.1973. $105,870,300 x 0.001 = $25.20/mill/pupil trial high- court thus found that 4,201.80 wealth generate districts were able to far aid, Accordingly, equalization under State greater statutory revenue within the debt Englewood re- School District would ceiling than were the low-wealth districts. $25.20). $9.80/mill/pupil ($35.00 ceive minus at Evidence trial revealed that in However, guaran- because of the minimum top school districts in the 10% of assessed yield, teed the minimum this district actual- property average an valuation had bond Thus, ly $11.35/mill/pupil. was received mills, redemption generating rate of 4.74 Englewood District had yield average per pupil, while $184.50 budget $36.35/mill/pupil financial school districts in the lowest 10%levied at a $1.35/mill/pupil guaranteed $35.00 over the mills, 12.56 yielding pupil. rate of $98.44 yield. redemption that, operated bond fund so Financing5 Outlay Capital D. example, Conejos the South $954,- School District had debt ceiling There two primary methods 452 while the Granby School District’s debt may capital school districts con- finance $8,173,380. ceiling was fund, projects: capital struction reserve 22-45-103(l)(c), section C.R.S.1973 and 1981 III. Statement of Positions Supp., redemption fund, bond sec- summary, overall scheme fund- 22-45-103(l)(b), tion C.R.S.1973. Both part Colorado’s schools rests in entirely funds are financed out of local upon values within each dis- property tax revenues. trict. Because of the in as- differences

(1) Capital districts, Reserve Fund. The levy sessed valuations of may spent reserve not exceed per pupil vary fund amounts raised and Groshek, Kramer, generally 5. See Colorado Munici- Bondholders M. W. Schoolchildren— *9 pal Revolution, Lawyer Bonds—A The Effect of the Serrano Rule on School Bond 4 Colorado Financing, 1055, (1975). Hodgman Lawyer, (1972). See also D. 4 Urban among Appellants “suspect” the several districts. establishes a wealth-based classi- fication, system rationally requiring system that this is both thus contend to be purpose subject judicial legitimate scrutiny. related to a to strict State Conse- fostering quently, local control within the trial essential to court ruled that both of Appellees, on the other these equal protection each schooldistrict. effects violated the hand, system guarantee Constitution, argue that the school finance under the Colorado equal protection they supported by violates the clause in- since were not a “com- interest,” terfering right pelling with their fundamental judi- state the strict under by creating “suspect issue, scrutiny addressing education and a classi- cial test. They argue fication” based on wealth. that we will look to the effect of the school form, system subject system the school finance becomes finance as well as to its be- judicial scrutiny, requires legislation may impermissible to strict cause create system finance be shown to through application classifications its necessary compelling govern- See, be to serve a though language. e.g., not its Yick Appellees then mental interest. submit Hopkins, Wo v. U.S. S.Ct. holding that the trial court was correct in (1886). L.Ed. system the school finance failed to Appellants contend that education is not satisfy judicial scrutiny the strict test. right” a “fundamental in Colorado and that us,

With those facts before we must first wealth-based classifications do not create a determine whether Colorado’s school fi- “suspect” They class. argue the school fi- system impinges nance aon fundamental system nance need satisfy higher not operates disadvantage to the of a “compelling interest,” standard of a state suspect equal protection class under only but rather need rationally related to guarantees found in the United States legitimate purpose. Appellants state then so, Colorado Constitutions. If the school submit that the latter clearly standard is system subject judicial finance to strict met as the Assembly responded General scrutiny, which was the view of the trial rationally in enacting system this finance not, court. If we need to then examine purpose allowing for the local control system whether the finance rational- over the educational and financial needs of ly legitimate purpose furthers some each school district in Colorado. thereby satisfying equal the dictates of the The Fourteenth Amendment protection guarantee. Lastly, we must de- the United States Constitution declares that termine whether the system school finance deny person no state shall equal protec complies with the state’s constitutional tion of the law. Although the Colorado provide “thorough mandate to and uni- Constitution does not contain an identical form” of free schools. provision, it is well-established that a like Equal Analysis IV. Protection guarantee exists within the constitution’s presented The first issue clause, II, in this case is process due Colo.Const.Art. Sec. whether or not Colorado’s school finance and that its application substantive system violates the guaran- constitutional equal protection same insofar as analy equal protection provid- tees of Charnes, laws sis is Heninger concerned. See v. Colo., ed in the United States and the Colorado (1980); People 613 P.2d 884 Lay v. ton, Colo., Constitutions. (1980); People 612 P.2d 83 v. Max, (1921).6 70 Colo. 198 P.2d 150 The trial court declared that the Col orado school finance jurisdictions, interferes with As in other we have education, right” “fundamental recognize and come equal protection that the Const, Similarly, government while Bolling Sharpe, the federal is not amend. V. See subject Equal Clause, to the (1954), Federal Protection U.S. 74 S.Ct. 98 L.Ed. 884 Supreme supplemented Education, Court has held that federal ac- Brown v. Board of aegis equal protection by tions fall under 349 U.S. 75 S.Ct. 99 L.Ed. 1083 virtue of the Federal Due Process Clause. U.S.

1015 Green, People 25, v. guarantee insures that all individuals 183 Colo. 514 P.2d 769 (1973) (where fairly in their of the constitutionality treated exercise funda- rights,7 suspect rape analyzed II, and that classifica- statute is mental under Article impermissible Constitution). tions8 based on criteria be Section 29 of the Colorado 436, Childs, Mohammed, v. also People 380, eliminated. 199 Colo. See Caban v. 441 U.S. Nowak, (1980). 1760, J. R. (1979); 610 P.2d 101 See also 99 60 297 Craig S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Boren, Young, 190, 451, & J. v. Rotunda Handbook on Consti- 429 97 U.S. S.Ct. 50 (1978) Nowak, (1976). Law J. tutional L.Ed.2d 397 this Since case does not [hereinafter a7.,]. equal protection classification, et Under a analysis, gender-based involve no legislative enactments are accorded their further discussion of this standard of re- however, presumption validity; necessary.9 usual of view is disappears presumption this when the stat- The second standard of review utory impacts classification on fundamen- right occurs where a fundamental is affect right suspect tal or a In class. such situa- ed or a suspect classification is created. tions, employ scrutinizing we will a more Here, the has the burden of establish when determining review the constitution- necessarily the act is related to a Colorado, ality legislation. we of compelling governmental Hening interest. recognize three standards of review within Charnes, supra. er v. also See San Antonio equal protection analysis. Independent Rodriguez, School District v. 1, 1278, 16, first standard is invoked where 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d denied, 959, statutory gen reh’g 1919, classification based on 411 93 U.S. S.Ct. 36 situation, this (1973) der. must show L.Ed.2d 418 Rodriguez]; State [hereinafter important gov Co., that the classification serves United v. States Carolene 304 Products 144, objectives 778, it is ernmental and that substan 58 S.Ct. 82 U.S. 1234 L.Ed.2d tially objec (1938). of related to achievement those the party asserting While this chal W., Colo., lenge tives. R. McG. v. J. 615 P.2d 666 must first demonstrate that funda 29; II, (1980). involved, Cf. suspect Colo.Const. Art. Sec. mental interest or class is rights essentially only 7.Fundamental are those whether education is rights recognized having which have been as fundamental. liberty in value essential to individual our soci- ety. example, Carey Population For see v. “suspect” 8. A classification is if considered it 2010, Intern., 678, U.S. 97 52 Services 431 S.Ct. racial, singles religious, out or other discrete (1977) (right privacy: or L.Ed.2d 675 to bear and insular minorities such those based on Redhail, children); beget Zablocki v. 434 U.S. lineage alienage. City County v. Pollock 673, 374, (1974) (right 54 L.Ed.2d 618 98 S.Ct. Denver, 380, (1977). 194 Colo. 572 P.2d 828 113, Wade, marriage); v. 93 Roe 410 U.S. Richardson, 365, See Graham v. 403 U.S. 91 705, (1973) (right of a 35 L.Ed.2d 147 S.Ct. 1848, (1971) (alienage); S.Ct. 29 L.Ed.2d 534 abortion); uniquely private Eisenstadt nature — Florida, McLaughlin 184, v. 379 U.S. 85 S.Ct. Baird, 438, 1029, v. 405 U.S. 92 31 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. 283, (1964) (race); Oyama 13 222 L.Ed.2d v. (1972) (right privacy contraception); 349 — California, 633, 269, 332 U.S. 92 68 S.Ct. L.Ed. Carter, 134, 849, 92 31 Bullock v. 405 U.S. S.Ct. (1948) Rorex, (ancestry). 249 Cf. Skafte v. 191 vote); (1972) (right Shapiro 92 v. L.Ed.2d 399, (1976), appeal P.2d Colo. 553 830 dis 618, 1322, Thompson, 22 394 U.S. 89 S.Ct. question, missed 961, want federal 430 U.S. (1969) (right travel); 600 of interstate L.Ed.2d 1638, (1977) 97 S.Ct. 52 L.Ed.2d 352 Rhodes, 23, 5, 21 Williams v. 393 U.S. 89 S.Ct. (aliens). (1968) (rights guaranteed 24 L.Ed.2d Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex First recognize Supreme We the United States 1110, Williamson, 535, 316 U.S. 62 S.Ct. 86 rel. adopted has Court this intermediate standard (1942) (right procreate); v. Pierce L.Ed. variety review for a of other classifications. Sisters, Society of 268 U.S. 45 S.Ct. Gordon, See Trimble v. 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. (1925) (right parents 69 L.Ed. 1070 to direct (1977) Foley (illegitimacy); L.Ed.2d children). upbringing of their While there Connelie, 435 U.S. 98 S.Ct. rights or as to what other interests confusion (1979) (alienage) L.Ed.2d 287 See also J. No . fundamental, see v. Con deemed Griswold wak, 524-526; Note, supra, Developments at necticut, 85 S.Ct. U.S. Protection, Equal 82 Harv.L.Rev. Law — (1965), we need not resolve L.Ed.2d 510 question us since the issue before addresses *11 outset, 277, At the P.2d we note that 176 490 Rod People Sprengel, v. Colo. successful, riguez then has the state holds that education is not (1971), once afforded 65 act is neces- showing that the of protection the burden explicit implicit or under governmental compelling sarily related to Id. 411 at United States Constitution. U.S. showing interest, and, applicable, of when 35, analysis 93 at 1297. From our of S.Ct. fash- specifically is the classification accompanying holding and the discus to further its narrowly and tailored ioned sion, Rodriguez we conclude that states that supra; objective. Rodriguez, legitimate See right is not a fundamental under education 330, Blumstein, 405 92 S.Ct. Dunn v. U.S. Constitution, and there the United States 995, (1972). L.Ed.2d 274 31 fore, subject judicial strict scrutin is not ap of review The third standard y.10 right, suspect plies where no fundamental classification, gender classification is in or Supreme The United States instance, in only we will volved. such interpreter is the final of the United Court rationally is quire whether the state action Constitution, Aaron, Cooper v. 358 States purpose. Fritz legitimate to a state related 1, 1401, (1958); 78 3 L.Ed.2d 5 U.S. S.Ct. Colorado, 196 Regents University v. Rodriguez this federal issue. resolves 335, (1978). 586 P.2d 23 Colo. Accordingly, since the facts in this case are step equal protection analysis The next essentially Rodriguez, identical to those assign of review proper is to standard pronouncements clearly negate any its determining right to a free whether the sys claim that school finance Colorado right is a fundamental public education right tem interferes with a fundamental suspect class. whether wealth is a equal protection provi education under the Right A. Education as a Fundamental sion of the United Constitution. The States n remaining inquiry issue within this is equal protection analysis, the trial In its right whether education is a fundamental is a fundamen- court found that education under the Colorado right tal under the Colorado Constitution. Constitution.11 analyzing finding in relation to the For decisions that its state 10. After education constitution education, equal protection guarantee of the United States does create fundamental Constitution, Supreme Rodriguez see Alma School Dist. No. 30 of Court Crawford al., County, Dupree, v. et al. et No. 77-406 concluded: Ark., 26, (Ch.Ct. Cty., 1981); of Pulaski October clear, for the reasons stated “It should be Education, County Somerset Board of et al. v. prior and in accord with the decisions above Hornbeck, (Cir.Ct., et No. A-58438 Balti al.. Court, this is a case in which of this not more, Md., 19, May 1981); Washakie Sch. Co. challenged subjected state action must Herschler, (Wyo.1980); No. Dist. One v. 606 P.2d 310 judicial scrutiny searching to the reserved for denied, 824, 86, rt. 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. suspect ce lav/s that create impinge upon classifications or (1980); Pauley Kelly, 66 L.Ed.2d 28 v. 255 constitutionally protected (W.Va.1979); S.E.2d 859 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 40, rights.” 411 U.S. at 93 S.Ct. at 1300. State, 476, King County 1 of v. 90 Wash.2d 585 Smith, are, course, (1978); 550, P.2d 71 Buse v. 74 Wisc.2d 11. State courts free to consider Meskill, challenge (1976); under 247 N.W.2d 141 v. 172 the merits of a constitutional Horton 615, they (1976); provisions, their own constitutional Conn. 376 A.2d 359 Serrano v. (Serrano II), 728, independently Cal.Rptr. free to do so of United States Priest 18 135 Cal.3d 345, denied, opinions, (1976), Supreme even when the State 557 P.2d 929 cert. 432 Court U.S. 907, 2951, similarly (1977); iden- 97 and Federal Constitutions are S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d 1079 California, Hollins, 88, tically phrased. Cooper See v. Shofstall v. 110 Ariz. 515 P.2d 590 58, 788, (1967). (1973); (Serrano I), 17 L.Ed.2d 730 Serrano v. Priest 5 Cal.3d U.S. S.Ct. 1241, Brennan, generally Cal.Rptr. State Constitutions and 487 P.2d 41 A.L. See Cahill, (1971); Rights, v. the Protection of Individual 90 Harv.L. R.3d Robinson 62 N.J. nom., (1977). Although public Rev. 489 education is 303 A.2d cert. denied sub Dick Robinson, ey specifically required by forty-nine state consti- v. 414 U.S. 94 S.Ct. tutions, Comment, Restric- L.Ed.2d 219 State Constitutional finding decisions on School Finance Reform: Buse For that education is not a tions Smith, Thomas, (1977), right, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 1528 N. fundamental see McDaniel v. (1981); differing have reached results 248 Ga. 285 S.E.2d 156 Board of court decisions City fundamentality. Education of the School Dist. of Cincinnati on the issue Rodriguez, Supreme Conversely, the United States Colorado Constitu powers is tion is not one of limited held that whether education funda- where the Court authority state’s under the restricted to the four- mental Federal Constitution corners ex People document. rel. by comparisons not rela- determined Fleming, Rhodes v. 10 Colo. P. 298 significance tive of education as societal (1887). The Colorado Constitution does not but: opposed housing to subsistence or restrict to addressing only itself areas those “Rather, assessing answer lies in *12 Rather, deemed fundamental. it contains there right whether is a to education provisions equally which are both suited for by or explicitly implicitly guaranteed enactment, statutory e.g., Mining and Irri Constitution.” gation, XVI, Colo.Const. Art. Nuclear and IX, Article 2 the Colora Section Detonations, XXVI; Colo.Const. Art. as explicitly requires do Constitution the Gen well as those deemed fundamental to our Assembly thorough to eral establish “a and concept liberty, e.g., of ordered Freedom of system of free public uniform schools Elections, II, Thus, Colo.Const. Art. Sec. 5. throughout Accordingly, the state.” if this Constitution, under the Colorado fundamen test,” adopt “Rodriguez court were to rights tal are not necessarily by determined opportunity argu would then educational they whether are guaranteed explicitly or ably be fundamental interest in Colorado implicitly within the document. However, to strict scrutiny. entitled we face, On its Article of the Section 2 “Rodriguez reject the test.” While test merely Colorado Constitution ac- mandates may applicable determining in funda tion Assembly the General does not —it rights mental under the Cons United States establish as a right, education fundamental titution,12 it has applicability no deter require and it not does that the General rights mining fundamental under Colo Assembly establish a public central school This is rado Constitution. so because finance restricting each dis- inherently basic and different natures expenditures trict to equal per student. briefly the two constitutions as will be dis recognize We unequivocally that the following paragraphs. cussed in plays education vital role our The United States Constitution is society. free It can be major in an factor delegated restricted authority one of and individual’s chances for economic social and powers. provided As in the Tenth Amend success well as a unique on a influence ment, powers granted all not to the United development good child’s aas citizen and on Constitution, by nor denied to States his participation political future and com it, are reserved States States to munity Rodriguez, supra; life. See Wis People. or v. Yoder, See United States 205, 1526, consin v. 406 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 451, 100, Darby, 312 U.S. 61 85 L.Ed. (1972); S.Ct. 32 15 L.Ed.2d Brown v. Board of 609, (1941). Education, A.L.R. also 483, 686, 132 1430 U.S. 347 See U.S. 74 S.Ct. 98 873, IX. (1954); Const. Art. L.Ed. People 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 Walter, 368, pointed Cahill, 58 v. Ohio St.2d 390 N.E.2d 813 out in Court Robinson v. 62 N.J. denied, 1015, (1979), 473, 491, 273, (1973): cert. 444 100 U.S. S.Ct. 303 A.2d 282 665, (1980); Levy, L.Ed.2d 644 38 62 Matter proposition Rodriguez, “... discussed in 653, 13, 556, 382 N.E.2d N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d 345 right explicitly that a is ‘fundamental’ if it is appeal question, dismissed for want of Fed’l constitution, implicitly guaranteed or in the 805, (1976); 97 429 U.S. S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 66 vulnerable, immediately right to for the ac- State, (1976); v. 276 554 139 Olsen Or. P.2d quire guaranteed and hold in the Thompson Engleking, v. 96 Green, 537 P.2d Idaho Constitutions, surely Federal State and (1975); Milliken 635 v. Mich. right likely that is not a candidate for such (1973). 212 N.W.2d preferred treatment.” Accord, City Board Education of the parenthetically “Rodriguez note 12. We that the District, Walter, v. Etc. St.2d Ohio may guide not even be an test” determining accurate (1979), denied, N.E.2d 813 cert. 444 U.S. rights fundamental under the Unit- (1980). 100 S.C. 62 L.Ed.2d 644 Jersey ed As the New States Constitution. Y.D.M., point challenge 1356 focal here. We note 593 P.2d Colo. Note, Development appellees allege prove that See also that did not Protection, Law-Equal 82 Harv.L.Rev. being oppor- an they are denied educational Schoettle, Equal (1969); F. Protection Appellees argue that we tunity. instead Education, 71 Colum.L. Clause in Public accept, controversy, a raging should amidst However, (1971).13 we do not Rev. there is a direct correlation between argument that because accept appellees’ financing quality educational plays a vital role in public education such refuse, however, opportunity. We disparate impact resulting society, any our policy venture into the realm of un- social finance application of the school guise der the there is a fundamental statutes, unjustifiable gov- amounts to an right upon education calls us to with the individual’s ernmental interference equal opportunity find that re- argu- speak and to vote. Such quires equal expenditures for each school effectively rejected Rodriguez, ment was accept appellees’ child. Even if we were to agree we with the supra, and United States *13 contention, would, nonetheless, we refuse to that: Supreme Court’s statement adopt priori argument their a whereby a presumed possess to ei- “We have never complete uniformity lack of in school fund- ability authority guar- to ther the or the ing between all of the school districts of citizenry the the most effective antee to necessarily Colorado leads to a violation of speech or the most informed electoral equal protection the laws this state. (Emphasis original.) choice.” Lastly, a the review of record and case representative While our form law shows that courts are ill-suited to deter- society may government and democratic equal is, mine what opportunity educational greater degree public benefit to a from a especially disagreement since fundamental district system school in which each school concerning exists the extent to which there spends the exact dollar amount student is a demonstrable correlation between edu- eye providing with an toward identical edu expenditures quality cational and the all, these are considerations and cation for education. Rodriguez, supra, See at nt. 86 legisla lie the goals properly which within 43, 1302; 411 U.S. at 93 at S.Ct. Serrano v. weigh tive Judicial intrusion to domain. Priest, (Serrano I), 584, 5 Cal.3d 96 Cal. goals such considerations and achieve such 601, Rptr. 487 P.2d 41 1187 A.L.R.3d especially must be This is so in avoided. Cahill, (1971); supra. Robinson v. controversy, per we this case where the it, essentially what ceive is directed toward A recognition heartfelt and en public policy adopt which can is the best importance dorsement of the of an educa quality schooling equal ed to attain public tion does not elevate a education to a opportunity for all children who fundamental warranting interest strict Cox, public attend our schools. See M. scrutiny. The constitutional mandate Separation A Judicial Power: State requires Assembly General to Perspective, Powers 227 Okla.L.Rev. thorough establish “a system and uniform (1981). schools,” public of free is not a mandate for equality method Colorado has chosen for absolute in educational services or funding public expenditures. Rather, school education is the real it mandates segregation 13. Jurisdictions which find education to be a sessment of the effect of racial on sup- during years fundamental port often cite to Brown as children their formative in school. See, Thus, proposition. e.g., for that Horton v. the Brown decision must be read in its Meskill, context, proper namely, scrutiny 172 Conn. 376 A.2d that the strict Nonetheless, applied while the Brown court test was in Brown not because educa- “perhaps” interest, did state that important ments, is education most is a tion fundamental but because clas- govern- function of state and local clearly suspect. sification race is Accord Education, supra, Mandel, Brown v. Board of at F.Supp. Parker v. (D.Md.1977); Cahill, 347 U.S. at at that statement S.Ct. supra. Robinson v. with was made connection the court’s as- Thus, each Assembly provide Rodriguez, to to it was concluded in General where opportunity to receive a free age essentially child facts were identical education, here, for a guidelines presented to establish facts that wealth-based dis- thorough and uniform do not suspect tinctions alone create a class protection under equal provisions schools. Constitution, United States and that strict Suspect Wealth as a B. Classification scrutiny applied review is only where wealth recognized is entwined with a fun- totality of The trial court found that the 20-22, right.14 damental Id. 411 U.S. at in this the evidence case establishes S.Ct. at 1290-1291. requir- suspect wealth-based classification judicial equal pro- scrutiny under strict that Rodriguez We find ad clearly analysis. on to find tection court went appellees’ dresses and discards wealth based violated the finance equal protection claim under the United protection equal clause of the United both Simply, Rodriguez States Constitution. and the Colorado Constitutions States court stated: suspect clas- failing demonstrate that the “... a sufficient answer ar- appellees’ necessarily compel- is sification related that, gument at least where wealth ling governmental interest. involved, Equal Protection Clause Concerning require pre- the United Constitu- does not absolute equality States tion, trial court facts in cisely equal advantages.” found that the distinguishable were those in this case Id. 411 at at U.S. S.Ct. 1291. Other *14 Rodriguez Rodriguez, and thus held that states which have confronted this same is- controlling. disagree. We was not sue, held, here, as have we do that Rodri- guez establishes that wealth alone in Rodriguez, the United States cases is suspect finance not a classifi- prior Court deci Supreme conceded that Equal cation under Protection Clause review applied scrutiny have strict sions the United Was States Constitution. See classifications; however, wealth-based Herschler, hakie Co. Dist. No. v. Sch. One emphasized that the facts those court 319; supra, 606 P.2d at Serrano v. Priest two which distance cases had characteristics 950-951; (Serrano II), supra, 557 P.2d at Rodriguez. from the situation in them Cahill, 379; supra, Robinson v. 303 A.2d at First, plaintiffs cases were those Green, supra, Milliken v. 212 714. N.W.2d at completely pay unable to for some desired impecunity; suspect due to their of whether benefit issue wealth is a second, consequence, as a they sustained class under the Colorado one Constitution is deprivation meaningful oppor of a of first We impression. absolute note at the outset right. to exercise a that tunity allegedly fundamental the relative wealth criterion County, (1956) Hospital Maricopa (indigent’s right transcript Memorial v. 415 to free trial 250, 1076, (1974) upon appeal). 94 S.Ct. 39 306 U.S. L.Ed.2d criminal right penalized (indigent’s to interstate travel proposition scrutiny that strict is accorded by requirement); residence Boddie durational indigents only right when a is in- fundamental Connecticut, 371, 780, v. 401 U.S. 91 S.Ct. 28 supported by reviewing volved is also those (1971) (indigent’s right 113 to divorce L.Ed.2d right decisions where a fundamental not was required filing fees); Harper supersedes v. Vir example, Supreme involved. For has Court 663, Elections, ginia Bd. of 383 U.S. 86 S.Ct. held that the state indi- once has satisfied the 1079, (1966) right (indigent’s 16 L.Ed.2d 169 gent’s rights, longer fundamental it is no obli- require satisfying poll tax exists without vote gated all other to level economic distinctions. 708, ment); Bennett, Smith v. U.S. 81 S.Ct. 365 Moffit, 600, 2437, 417 U.S. 41 Ross v. 94 S.Ct. 895, (1961) (indigent’s 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1974) (indigent L.Ed.2d 341 not entitled to corpus attack of conviction habeas criminal discretionary appeal). also counsel See infringed by Douglas filing requirement); v. fee Kras, 434, v. United States 409 U.S. 93 S.Ct. California, 814, 353, 372 U.S. 83 9 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. (1973) (filing 626 L.Ed.2d fee in bank- (1963) (indigent’s right on crimi to counsel ruptcy proceeding need not be indi- waived for Illinois, appeal); Griffin v. 351 U.S. nal gents). 585, 100 L.Ed. 55 A.L.R.2d 1055 S.Ct. short, po- a protection guarantee. equal finance differs in the school used where, suspect class. See body due litical cannot be fundamentally from situations indigents City are total- v. inability pay, County Commissioners to their Board in in- participation Denver, 372 P.2d excluded either from 150 Colo. ly County of exercising rights. their or from (1962), appeal stitutions for want of dismissed Tenth Jud. Dist. v. Dist. Ct. of Franklin See question, federal 372 U.S. S.Ct. Pueblo, County 194 Colo. In and For (1963). 9 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).15 not the That is 571 P.2d Second, insular there is no distinct and case, therefore, we in this situation required for poor persons16 “class” of whether review to the issue of our limit analysis. this anal- equal protection Under suspect creates a classification wealth alone being group ysis, we define a “class” as provi equal protection under Colorado’s or character- marked common attributes sions. Here, however, alleged class of istics. noted, in previously As assert possibly while linked “poor persons,” unconstitutionally im legislation that levels, respective their income have no com- class, suspect appellees herein pinges on a mon attribute relative to Colorado’s school establishing they that the burden of have financing system. The evidence does not People Sprengel, class. v. constitute such a con- poor persons show that in Colorado are Hoffman, 171 Colo. supra; Dunbar districts, low-property wealth centrated We hold this case 468 P.2d they uniformly consistently re- or that or prove that appellees have failed to education, quality or that ceive a lower recognized, distinct class. they constitute a uniformly they districts in which reside “suspect consistently expend money less on educa- Appellees argue that a class” composed either as a “class” tion. present here districts, or as “class”

low-wealth example, For evidence at trial shows people. We disa- composed of low-income greatest Denver has the concentration of in this case does not gree. The evidence families. school children from low-income that the school finance demonstrate Yet, Denver, by comparison, relatively ais peculiar disadvantage of operates to the *15 Thus, high property it is wealth district. identifiable, class. any recognized suggest poor persons, incorrect to that as a class, First, suspect discriminatory the criteria for a receive treatment Secondly, Department a by met a school district PSFA. Colorado class cannot be supreme study the shows that there is no the merits. As of Education regardless of Kramer, Shelly low-property 334 correlation between wealth emphasized in v. court 1161, 836, In- 92 L.Ed. 3 A.L. districts and low-income residents.17 68 S.Ct. U.S. deed, study suggests it is (1948), equal protection clause the that more the R.2d rights, by very and its accurate to state that a correlation exists personal embodies property We a wealth and to individuals. find between district’s terms is limited apply pupil population. example, study in Colorado’s For that restriction to same defining “poor” persons possibly find wealth to be a sus- 16. We are as those would 15.We “poverty pect if the to attend below the Bureau of Census level.” classification secondary supra, elementary Rodriguez, schools was made de- or See at 411 U.S. at pupil pendent upon or his the net worth of S.Ct. at 1291. Assembly parents, if the mandated or General expendi- government limit its current that local Analysis A 17. See also Note: Statistical of the property valuations. on its taxable tures based However, Winning School Finance Decisions: On Battles (1972); most, not the case here. At such is Wars, Losing 81 Yale L.J. 1303 expenditures influenced are local supra Rodriguez, at U.S. 27 N. 93 S.Ct. base, along with other considera- size of the tax (Serra- at 1293 N. 64. But see Serrano v. Priest tions, judgment e.g., offi- of local collective I), supra. no respect, handled sim- this education is cials. In ilarly services, like fire and essential to other police protection. Arapahoe Rodriguez, that reports School the court reiterated the Cheyenne County had an as- District suspectness: traditional features of namely, $3,785,- taxable valuation of sessed (1) subjected that either class is a to 270, while Conejos South School District’s history purposeful unequal treatment Yet, $4,675,100. was due to dis- valuation disabilities, with its (2) attendant it is pupil Arapahoe’s as- paraties population, relegated to position political such a pow- $52,940.84, per pupil valuation was sessed erlessness as to extraordinary command Conejos’ per pupil valuation while South protection majoritarian political from the $5,897.69. Department of was Colorado Ed- process. It evident this case that ucation, Impact the Public School appellees satisfy do not either of these indi- Analysis Act —Fifth Finance Year suspectness. cia of (1978). Budget Act —1978 Year Appellees present no evidence to show Appellees prove to have failed that they subjected have history to a been they compose identifiably a class which is purposeful unequal Indeed, treatment. a and insular. Massachusetts Bd. distinct See review of Colorado’s school finance system Murgia, v. of Retirement U.S. 96 presents a contrary position. Colorado has There is S.Ct. L.Ed.2d historically sought equality between the satisfactory evidence showing no statisti districts, making a concerted effort poor persons cal correlation between within any impact avoid disparate upon the low-spending school districts. poor. As this noted in early court case find that such We a correlation essential McCartey Dist. No. School 75 Colo. judicial are apply scrutiny if we strict 305, 309, (1924): 225 P. “suspect an invidious discrimination of a “It is perfectly from an clear examination class.” of this [providing entire act minimum Additionally, though appellees even do salaries for its pur- chief Teachers] constitute recognized equal not class for pose is to raise the education standard protection purposes, we find that even if [financially] weaker districts of the did, they wealth alone would not create a place state and burden incident there- suspect classification in Colorado. upon [financially] stronger districts suspect Traditionally, classifica and, in necessity, the case upon have been to those groups tions restricted state itself.” readily are identifiable common development historical of public edu- explanation or lineal racial trait. One cation in been Colorado has centered on the is that lineage congenital, race philosophy of local control. See Colo.Const. unalterable characteristics. See 82 Harv.L. 15; Art. Sec. Dist. No. 16 v. supra Rev. at 1126-1127. Another view *16 1, High 292, Union No. 60 School Colo. 152 points against out that discrimination indi (1915); Barr, 87, P. 1149 v. Merrill 73 Colo. within suspect viduals classes has been ha (1923); People 213 P. 576 ex rel. Vollmar v. bitual, turn, pre which in warrants 276, 255 Stanley, (1927). 81 Colo. P. 610 See ferred treatment. Strauder v. See West Carey also v. Board of Education of Arapa Virginia, 303, (1880). 100 25 L.Ed. U.S. 664 Here, District, hoe however, (10th 598 F.2d 535 Cir. alleged “class” of low- 1979). Taxation of local has not persons incredibly income an constitutes only primary funding been the means of amorphous which group, group changes a education, local context, insuring but also of time that the over and which is citizenry local pattern provid to direct business of unable show the historical of ing public “suspect” discrimination that traditional education their school clearly expressed can. district.18 classes This was emphasis partly programs policies. This control is over local 18. on local greater discussing on the state based concern that control A list of authorities this concern is funding greater power will lead state over to 1022 Wilson, 96, 1153, (1970).

Belier v. 59 147 P. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 491 We Colo. 355 25 reaf- (1915), where this court held that under firm principle today. our adherence to that Article Section 15 of the Colorado Con- we Accordingly, appellees find that fail to stitution, County the Otero Commissioners satisfy requisite constituting elements levy a upon property could not tax located “class”; they identifiable that do not within District No. 9 for their School the meet suspect- of traditional features support No. of their School District 11. To ness; and that wealth alone will not create otherwise, do would sever the link connect- suspect classification in Colorado. ing citizenry the local to their school dis- ,C. Basis of Rational Standard Review trict. - Having suspect concluded that no class or short, appellees we find that have involved, fundamental is remain- they subjected failed to show have been ing step equal protection analysis is to purposeful unequal history of treatment. determine whether the Colorado Accord, Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. system rationally school finance furthers a Murgia, supra. supra; Rodriguez, legitimate purpose. state See Maher v. We also find no to show evidence that Roe, 464, 2376, 432 97 53 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d appellees been relegated position have to a (1977).20 484 powerlessness.19 political Appellees as- this, In instances such statuto political sert powerlessness ap- that their ry classification is pre entitled to the usual parent by passage of the PSFA which sumption validity with the individual operates against them. This a circular bringing having the attack burden argument adopt; which we refuse to to do showing rationally that it fails to further otherwise, would “politically extend the any legitimate state purpose. Harding v. powerless” designation any group alleg- Commission, Industrial supra. Additional legislation that certain disfavors them. ly, test, under the rational basis we are Lastly, we find wealth obligated any to uphold classification based a suspect alone is not classification in Colo on facts which can reasonably be conceived rado. The Colorado Constitution does not as supporting the Rodriguez, action. See wealth, disparities in forbid nor does it for supra; Village Boraas, of Belle Terre v. 416 persons residing bid district one 1, U.S. 94 (1974); S.Ct. 39 797 L.Ed.2d taxing higher themselves at a rate than Henninger Charnes, supra; v. Fritz v. Re persons in another As a primary district. gents Colorado, University supra. this, we steadfastly result of have refused impose identify first task is scrutiny strict review to actions legitimate purpose implementing policy. legisla economic or social purportedly Here, tion Employment, See v. Division furthers. Johnson the Gen eral (1976); Assembly Colo. P.2d 334 has not Harding expressly v. declared Commission, what objective Industrial 183 Colo. of the school finance is; however, P.2d 95 See also appellants United States v. and interve- Kras, Belcher, supra; nor-appellants Richardson v. advance argument (1971); objective U.S. S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 231 is that of local control.21 That Williams, is, Dandridge U.S. control locally elected school board Rodriguez, supra, Education, Levittown, found in at 411 U.S. at 53 nt. Cf. Board of Etc. v. Nyquist, at 1307 S.Ct. nt. 109. *17 83 A.D.2d 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (1981), (App.Div., 1981) filed October political powerlessness group (where 19.The of a was applied the New York Court the inter- Hansen, F.Supp. evident in Hobson v. equal protec- mediate level of review in their (D.D.C.1967) Hobson, aff’d sub nom. Smuck v. analysis). tion U.S.App.D.C. (D.C.Cir. 132 1969), 408 F.2d minority group where a racial was effec Appellant’s 61; Intervenor-Appel- brief at tively equal participation excluded from in the lant’s brief at 139. political process. Herndon, See also Nixon v. (1927). U.S. S.Ct. 71 L.Ed. 759 in the district. by Although recognize voters Such control we that due disparaties wealth, by influencing present is exercised determina- finance system can lead to the money low-wealth district tion of how much should be raised having less fiscal control than schools, wealthier money for the local and how that districts, result, itself, this by does not spent. should be strike down the sys entire school finance agree interpretation We with this for al- tem. See McGowan Maryland, 366 U.S. objective though the of local control not (1961); 81 S.Ct. 6 L.Ed.2d 393 explicit system within the school finance n Indeed, Rodriguez, supra. legislative itself, apparent upon reviewing we find it may scheme simply not be condemned be- history system of Colorado’s educational cause it does not goals effectuate the state’s along provisions with selected constitutional Williams, with perfection. Dandridge v. su- See, e.g., interpretative case law. Colo. pra. IX, (schools Const. Art. Sec. 15 to be con- Although all educational financ trolled and directed local school district generis cases are sui in the sense that directors); (the Colo.Const. Art. Sec. the alleged deprivation is relative rather Assembly General and state board of educa- absolute, here, than we find no discrimina prohibited prescribing tion are text- tion, otherwise, invidious or system schools); People books for the ex rel. Voll- applies subsidy uniform formula on a inher- Stanley, supra, (parents mar v. have basis, statewide while concurrently pro ent civil to exercise control over the moting community control by means of children). education of their local taxation. Thus, objective since local control is the Accordingly, we find the PSFA to system, the re- Colorado’s school finance rationally be constitutional as related to a objective maining question is whether such legitimate state purpose. rationally system. furthered We statutorily also hold that the imposed 4-mill levy prescribed restriction for the Every presumed statute is con fund, capital 22-40-102(4), reserve section beyond proven stitutional unless a reasona (1980 Supp.) C.R.S.1973 and the 20% limit constitutionally ble doubt to be invalid. on the valuation for assessment of the taxa- Lyon, Turner v. 189 Colo. 539 P.2d 1241 fund, redemption ble for the bond utilizing proper We find that local 22-42-104(l)(a), (1980 section C.R.S.1973 ty partly taxation to finance Colorado’s Supp.), rationally legiti- are also related to rationally effectuating schools is related to purpose, mate state and are therefore de- local control over schools. The use of clared constitutional. local taxes a school affords district free reserve fund restriction and money dom to devote more toward educat redemption the bond fund limitation are not ing its children than is otherwise available accompanied by any legislatively declared state-guaranteed in the minimum amount. purpose. However, analysis citizenry greater It also enables local school finance demonstrates participation influence and in the decision these restrictions or limitations are an im- making process as to how these local tax portant part of the state’s of financ- spent. might dollars are communities Some ing public they services and that are ration- schools, place heavy emphasis while on oth ally goals related to the sought to be may greater police protec ers desire or fire achieved. tion, improved public transpor streets or Finally, provides tation. local control each upon public Limitations indebted experimen district with the opportunity for spending constitutionally ness and au tation, innovation, healthy competi and a XI, imposed thorized and in Article Sections Here, tion for educational excellence. Rodri See 5 and 6 of Colorado’s Constitution. guez, supra. statutory restrictions or limitations as

1024 Colo, 177, prop- Id. 136 are tied to the taxable at 315 P.2d at 208. We to both funds district, erty again and that view valuation each school embrace here. limit to the district’s serve as an outer The restrictions and limitations found in also section 31-15- taxing authority. See the reserve fund re- and the bond 302(l)(d), (indebtedness incurred C.R.S.1973 demption rationally fund are related to the municipality shall not by governing body of legitimate purpose controlling state value percent three of the actual exceed public may agree debt. While we not with property); sec- municipality’s taxable determinations, legislative these our role (1981 32-l-1101(l)(a), tion C.R.S.1973 Cum. validity legisla- here is to review the of this (restricts levy imposed in Supp.) the tax action, tive not to policy. determine social than, (I) eight Special Districts to not more Accordingly, provisions we find these two districts, (II) two protection mills for fire constitutionally being rationally valid as re- districts, (III) hospital four mills for legitimate lated to purpose. districts). park mills for and recreation IX, V. Article 2 Section legislative controlling prerogative The Colorado Constitution any agency’s taxing the outer limits of au- appellees contend that the fi- thority legitimate wholly involves a IX, nance violates Article 2 Section purpose. purpose rational state of such of Colorado’s Constitution. In relevant essentially prevent limitations is part, this constitutional section states: present pledging public of future funds. general “The assembly provide shall .. . Interrogatories by In re See Colo. State the establishment and maintenance of a Senate, 298, (1977); P.2d 193 Colo. 566 350 thorough public and uniform of free 2, 101, In re Resolution No. 94 Colo. Senate ” throughout schools the state. . . .

31 325 P.2d Appellees’ argument essentially City Haxby, of Trinidad v. 136 Colo. “thorough and uniform” requires clause 168, (1957), 315 P.2d 204 this court ad- provide equal op- state to educational constitutionally dressed the issue of im- portunity schoolchildren, to its and that the limitations, posed and stated: present system violates this mandate “If the were framers of Constitution creating varying opportunities unnecessarily prescribing restrictive in due to revenue differences between the dis- limitation, many constitutional tricts. designed protect believe was credit political of the state and its We subdivisions have never upon been called to inter- improvident incurring pret for the any Article 2 in Section context debt, remedy people prove lies with the who which would helpful to this case al- power repeal though provision have the the limitation at in many discussed Also, polls.” cases.22 we are any unable to find 183, People M., 403, Knight, v. Y. D. (1944); 197 593 P.2d 147 Cline v. Colo. P.2d 823 111 (1979); 8, 680, Marshall v. School Dist. RE 3 # (1943); 1356 Colo. 137 P.2d 146 A.L.R. 1281 County, Annear, Morgan 451, 106, v. Wilmore 191 Colo. 553 P.2d 784 100 Colo. 65 P.2d 1433 Children, (1937); Fangman (1976); Moyers, 308, Denver Ass’n for Retarded v. 90 8 Colo. 1, City (1930); People Inc. v. School Dist. No. Duncan v. ex rel. P.2d 762 Denver, Moser, County 310, 149, (1931); 188 Colo. Hotchkiss 535 P.2d 200 89 Colo. P. 299 1060 County High Dist., (1975); 11 El Pacheco v. School Dist. No. v. Montrose 85 Colo. County, 270, 67, (1928); People Paso P.2d ex rel. Vollmar v. 183 Colo. 516 629 273 P. 652 Feast, Stanley, supra; (1973); Printing and Fish Game Commission v. Hallett v. Post & Pub Co., 303, lishing (1965); 573, 658, Board of 157 Colo. 402 P.2d 169 68 Colo. 192 P. 12 A.L.R. Spurlin, (1920); Chicago, Education of State of Colorado v. B & R. Co. v. School 141 919 Q. 508, County, (1960); Simonson v. Dist. No. 1 in Yuma Colo. 349 P.2d 63 Colo. (1917); School Dist. No. School District No. 16 v. Union Colo. 258 P.2d P. 260 Gaunt, High (1953); Hazlet v. School No. 126 Colo. 60 Colo. 152 P. 1149 People, (1952); (1915); School Dist. No. 26 Schwartz v. 250 P.2d 188 46 Colo. Hards, County Schools, Kindergarten (1909); Gunnison v. In re Colo. P. 92 Masse, (1944); Zavilla P.2d 651 112 Colo.

1025 glean general background guidance (insuring availability re- C.R.S.1973 historical public and, of the garding program); the intention of framers. school section seq., 22-50-101 et (establishing C.R.S.1973 a Nonetheless, previously has this court system finance). uniform of school “thorough that the term and uni- found complete require equality form” does not clearly province While it is free providing the sense of textbooks to all duty and judiciary of the to determine what students. v. School District RE Marshall is, Nixon, the law United v. 418 States U.S. Morgan County, # 3 191 Colo. 553 P.2d 94 (1974), S.Ct. 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1976). also 784 We have found that the fashioning system of a constitutional pupil residing in a word “uniform” means financing elementary and secondary high district without a school is entitled to public education only in Colorado is not high attend a in another district at school proper function of General Assembly, expense. the former district’s Duncan v. but expressly this function is mandated People Moser, 89 ex rel. Colo. 299 P. the Colorado Constitution. Colo.Const. Art. (1931); 1060 v. County Hotchkiss Montrose IX, Thus, Sec. 2. whether a better financ Dist., High Colo. 273 P. 652 ing system could be devised is not material (1914). However, interpret never we have decision, to this sole as our function is to provision require ed this constitutional rule constitutionality on the of our state’s equal expenditures within districts. system. This decision should not be read to Article indicate We find that Section that we find Colorado’s school fi system of the Colorado is satisfied if nance Constitution to be without fault or not thorough opportu requiring legislative improvements. and uniform educational further through today only nities are available state action in Our decision declares it is each school each constitutionally permissible. district. While school dis given necessary trict must be the control judgment of the district court is re- level, implement this at the local mandate versed. pre this provision constitutional does not providing vent local school district from ERICKSON, J., specially concurs. opportunities beyond additional educational LOHR, JJ., short, dissent. DUBOFSKY requirement this standard. system “thorough and uniform of free QUINN, J., participate. does not require that schools” does not educa pupil every expenditures per tional ERICKSON, Justice, specially concur- district be identical. ring: present majority opinion implies,

We that Colorado’s As the hold Colo- does financing system system not violate the rado school finance is not without “thorough mandate.23 We fault and should be revised the General and uniform” Assembly disparity particularly note that this im to correct in the mandate following opportunities which are plemented by the statutes. availa- Sec (one in the tion et class ble different counties and school dis- seq., 22-30-101 C.R.S.1973 created); 22- tricts in Colorado. The fact that a bare of school districts is section (creating majority justices reviewing a uni seq., 32-101 et case C.R.S.1973 present has governance form for those dis concluded tricts); equal et meets the seq., pro- section 22-60-101 minimum standards C.R.S. tection under the (creating a uniform teacher certifica United States Colora- program); seq., interpreted 22-33-101 et do Constitutions not be tion section should “thorough (1893); People v. identical to Colorado’s uniform” Colo. sioners, P. 422 Commis requirement, Kelley, Pauley P. 892 12 Colo. see S.E.2d (W.Va.1979). thorough presentation 23. For a of the educa- tion which are similar or clauses other states *20 statutory and as approval plan. appel- an of the control would follow from financing plan It simply issue of whether the school lees’ contentions. has never squares require- with more definitive been within the constitutional preroga- IX, ments 2 of the Colora- nullify of Article section tive of Court to this statewide do is even difficult. Constitution more financing public measures for services merely because burdens or benefits findings and of the trial conclusions unevenly upon thereof fall depending judge, which Justice reviewed in Lohr has relative of political wealth subdivi- opinion, dissenting arguably support his his sions in which citizens live.” U.S. at present conclusion that Colorado’s school fi- 54, 1307-08, at S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d at 55. nancing system pass does not constitutional Dubofsky’s empha- enacting muster. Justice such as dissent laws the school finance system, sizes her of the legislature view infirmities must free to rem- statutory edy parts problem, restrictions and limitations on recognize of or to school expenditures, degrees district and problem of a and to formulate solu- again points out the manner which she tions it in the areas to determines be more present plan legislative believes the is in readily need or more corrected than oth- the plain wording conflict with of Article ers. Thompson 793, v. Engelking, Idaho IX, of section 2 Constitution. Colorado 537 P.2d 635 dissenting opinions fairly Both and accu- have, instances, We in several recognized rately detail valid reasons for General that the legislature granted plenary pow- Assembly to formulate amendments to the er in public See, the field of education. financing plan school to its correct deficien- e.g., v. Marshall School RE District # concurring cies. In majority opin- with the 191 Colo. (1976); P.2d 784 Denver ion, opin- I do more express my no than to Children, Ass’n Retarded Inc. School Dis issue, ion that granted the statutes in when trict No. 188 Colo. 535 P.2d 200 a presumption constitutionality, barely (1975); Pacheco v. School District No. meet constitutional standards. 183 Colo. (1973). Indeed, P.2d 629 agree IX, I with the majority’s conclusion Art. 2 of sec. the Colorado Constitution right charges education should not be Assembly the General with the duty classified as fundamental which provide system a state public for State, compels purposes financing. for the Therefore, not, I would financing, wipe out local entities under the equal rational basis test for pro tection, and finance on basis of revenues raised substitute our judgment for that type system. some the legislature state-wide As in this area difficult without Justice giving Powell stated San Antonio Inde it opportunity to correct the defi pendent Rodriguez, District v. presently 411 ciencies system. inherent (1973):1 U.S. S.Ct. 36 L.Ed.2d 16 financing Colorado’s public edu cation, whole, as a is not the result expenditures of a local taxation for local “[I]f haphazard approach by the General Assem were an pro- unconstitutional method of bly, but developed through has been viding dec might for education then it be an ades of experience in Colorado and else equally impermissible of providing means where. Supreme As the United necessary States customarily other services fi- Court in Rodriguez: declared largely taxes, nanced property local including police protection, local and fire “The plan Texas is not the result of hur- public ried, and hospitals, health legislation. ill-conceived It certainly utility facilities of various kinds. We product is not the of purposeful discrimi- perceive justification such no a severe against any nation group or class. On denigration of local taxation the contrary, it is rooted in decades of Rodriguez opinion announcing a 5—4 opinion. was reflects evidenced in type the same of division which our Court has elsewhere, experience Texas and tees to the children of this state a right to major part product responsi- is the be educated in such a manner that all serv- by qualified people. giving ble studies ices and facilities are throughout identical presumption validity to the substance view, In my State. such a centralized entitled, to which the Texas it is system of required by education is not ei- important every that at remember ther the Colorado or United States Consti- stage development of its it has constitut- tutions. ‘rough aed accommodation’ of interests simply, Stated Art. sec. is a man- practical in an effort to arrive at *21 through date to the legislature State workable solutions. One also must re- complete establish a system and uniform system challenged member that the here public education for Colorado elementary peculiar any is not to Texas or to other secondary and provides: school students. It characteristics, State. In its essential plan financing public Texas for education general shall, “The assembly as soon as many reflects what for half educators a practicable, provide for the establishment century thought enlightened have was an and thorough maintenance of a and uni- approach problem to a which for there is form system of public free schools perfect no are unwilling solution. We throughout state, wherein all resi- assume for level ourselves a of wisdom state, dents of the between the ages of superior legislators, scholars, to that of six twenty-one years, and may be educat- States, and educational in 50 authorities ed gratuitously. public One or more especially where the pro- alternatives schools shall be maintained in each school posed only recently are conceived and no- state, district within the at least three yet where at tested.” U.S. year; months in each any school district (Cita- S.Ct. at 36 L.Ed.2d at 55-56. failing to have such school shall not be omitted.) tions entitled any portion to receive quality The difference in between two school year.” fund for that simplistically schools cannot be determined face, On its section mandates action by examining only per- the differences in legislature. It does not establish educa- See, pupil expenditures. e.g., Thompson v. tion as a right. basic fundamental Nor Engelking, supra; Northshore School Dis- does it dictate a system central state Kinnear, trict No. 417 v. 84 Wash.2d expenditures identical per student. Partial (1974). 530 P.2d 178 The decision of the funding of public our schools with local trial upon court this case rests the con- property taxes deprive does not itself Colo- money clusion that is the basic and overrid- rado’s system educational of those constitu- ing criterion adequate education. It is qualities tional which the constitutional supplied provide basic that funds must be draftsmen thorough described as and uni- teachers, staff, support physical facili- form. As the Washington Supreme Court ties, texts, supplies, transportation, and the succinctly has stated: myriad today’s public of other necessities in However, system. general educational I “A system, is, cannot and uniform adopt premise which, that unless an system identical within reasonable constitu- expended per amount of funds is pupil tional limits of equality, ample makes state, throughout students those dis- provision children, for the education of all receiving tricts less than the district with upon cannot be based equality exact greatest expenditure per student are funding per child because it takes more automatically equal op- denied educational money in some districts pro- child to portunities. See also Thompson v. Engel vide about the same level of educational king, supra. Cf. Priest, Serrano v. 5 Cal.3d opportunity Thus, than it does in others. 487 P.2d Cal.Rptr. the record shows that all states of the Moreover, Union, Hawaii, I IX, except do not believe that recognize Art. that tax- guaran- sec. of Colorado Constitution able property per pupil values vary

among expenditures provide Art. 2 that the the districts because state a “thor- § per pupil vary, Uniformity too. of size ough and uniform of free among dis- and values school schools.”

tricts is not . .. general n and uniform ¡ n # essential, system.” n we n think, [*] to a penses of school districts not included in day-to-day operating Capital expenditures costs large-scale encompass ex- general expenditures system, “A we such one-time and uniform construction think, is, time, schools, present improve- at new one alterations and every structures, free existing child has ments to and the access certain minimum and reason- purchase of classroom furniture ably in- standardized buses. School districts finance ex- opportunities to structional facilities and penditures two principally ways. One is grade least the 12th at admin- through levy, special tax the funds from —a degree uniformity istered with that placed which are in a capital reserve fund which enables child to transfer 22-45-103(l)(c), authorized under section same one district to another within the 40-102(4), C.R.S.1973. Under section 22— *22 grade loss without substantial of credit C.R.S.1973, special levy may this not exceed by standing with access each and student any year. mills in four The other method grade acquire of whatever to those skills capital outlays financing through of reasonably training and that under- bonded indebtedness. 22- Under section to and a stood be fundamental basic to 42-104(l)(a), C.R.S.1973,the bonded indebt- (Emphasis original.) sound in education.” edness of may each school district not ex- Kinnear, Northshore District v. of property ceed 20% the value of taxable in 530 P.2d at 202. 22-42-102(1), that district. Under section C.R.S.1973, agree analysis I with the set forth the a school bond must be approved Washington by majority be- a of a Supreme Merely Court. voters in school district. the special cause various school districts in Bonds are redeemed another not, vary levy, proceeds State in size tax base does the placed which are in a view, my finding our necessitate a that redemption bond fund. The redemp- bond public entire education is not capital tion and reserve funds are funded thorough provisions the and uniform under solely through pro- local levies. The state Constitution. funding the Colorado vides no to local school districts for capital outlays. reasons,

For the above I would not over- present system turn the used in to Colorado The district court majority found the finance education on constitutional recognizes high-wealth that districts can grounds, urge Gen- strongly but would the raise more levying revenue from the statu- Assembly eral to review the school financ- tory maximum of four mills than low- eye ing system correcting with an to the Similarly, wealth districts can. higher tax- plan which have so weaknesses been high-wealth able value enables dis- the dissenting opinions. well-described in money tricts raise more for im- I do Since not believe that defects provements exceeding without the 20% in- funding system legislative cause ceiling. debtedness majority The finds that plan unconstitutional, I to be concur with capital outlay financing scheme, includ- majority opinion of the Court. levy the four-mill limitation ceiling, debt equal 20% does not violate DUBOFSKY, Justice, dissenting: protection components because the of the separately to' out rationally I write set in some scheme are legiti- related to the my that the state purpose detail conclusion limita- mate state of “controlling pub- funding on district capital tions lic debt.” majority The also finds equal expenditures protection violate IX, scheme does not violate Colo.Const. Art. . requirement and the I disagree. laws Colo.Const. the levy § Because and debt Illinois, poorer appeal); dis- direct Griffin v. effectively prevent U.S. limitations capi- raising adequate (1956) (indi- funds 100 L.Ed. 891 from S.Ct. tricts majority and because expenditures gent transcript defendant entitled to on tal purpose fur- legitimate no enunciates appeal). Rodriguez contrasted this line of limitations, they I think vio- by the thered challenges with cases wealth-based clas- guarantees. In addi- equal protection late brought by poor sifications individuals on tion, the state’s failure to I conclude that designated merely whom a fine or fee im- mitigating provide any mechanism poses a heavier burden. The Court in Rod- districts’ abilities disparities vast riguez that, chal- concluded because the capital expenditures, combined to finance lenge to the Texas school finance limitations, funding violates the with the allege deprivation did not an “absolute” 2 of the Colo- requirement of Article § districts, poorer scru- education enhanced provide the state rado Constitution tiny was not mandated. system of education. thorough and uniform Supreme Rodriguez Court left aspects all majority determines that open question imposed whether a state financing at issue in this case need of school on ability limitation a school district’s relationship rational to a only bear some levy expenditures for educational which in According to the legitimate state interest. prevented raising fact district ade- justified is not in em- majority, this Court quate funds would constitute a wealth- scrutiny level of enhanced ploying some subject based classification to enhanced evaluating any part of the state school fi- scrutiny equal protection. under For exam- scheme, aspects nancing none of its because ple, Rodriguez the Court in indicated that a right or clas- abridge a fundamental either statutory provision establishing Texas *23 suspect the of a sify individuals on basis levy maximum of assessed $1.50 $100 determining In that the school criterion. might for school valuation maintenance impose an unconstitu- financing laws do not present question, a constitutional but that the basis of wealth tional classification on levy plaintiff since the school district’s was the admitted variations between despite allowed, the maximum barely one-third of expend- school district high- and low-wealth to required the Court was not decide majority relies on the per pupil, itures 50, 107, n. 93 at issue. 411 U.S. at S.Ct. in Anto Supreme analysis Court’s San U. S. 1305, n. 107. District v. Rodri Independent nio majority of Colorado school districts 1278, 1, 36 L.Ed.2d guez, 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. limit, already levying at the four-mill (1973) (Rodriguez). Rodriguez, 16 increasing yearly, with the number acknowledged prior that in Supreme Court here establishes that low-wealth dis- record scrutiny in applied it strict decisions had difficulty funding capital have ex- tricts classifications, but reviewing wealth-based 1977, example, in Frisco penditures. For where, “[bjecause of only in those cases district, levy with a reserve school of the affected impecunity, their members mills, per pupil, raised while $386.52 four pay completely unable to group were district, Conejos school with the same South benefit, consequence, and as a some desired levy, only per pupil. raised four-mill $23.60 deprivation of a they an absolute sustained 1978, districts in 136 of the 181 school enjoy that bene meaningful opportunity to statutory maximum of Colorado levied 20, at 93 at 1289. See fit.” 411 U.S. S.Ct. plaintiff sixteen school four mills. Of the 395, 668, Short, 28 401 91 S.Ct. Tate v. U.S. districts, the maximum of thirteen levied Illinois, (1971); Williams v. 399 130 L.Ed.2d Similarly, ceiling the debt re- four mills. 2108, L.Ed.2d 586 90 26 U.S. S.Ct. widely disparate in abilities of school sults (1970) (incarceration of defendants unable money through issuance of unconstitutional); districts to raise Doug pay to fine ruled example, Conejos school For California, bonds. South 83 S.Ct. las v. U.S. ceiling with students had a debt district (1963) (indigent defendants 9 L.Ed.2d $935,020 $954,452 for 1978. counsel on for 1977 and court-appointed have to levy with students reserve fund was 1.79 mills. In Granby school district it 3.52; 1978, 3.67; $8,173,380 ceiling for 1977 and was it had debt was $8,833,818 Thus, Granby’s levying debt 3.70. The number of districts for 1978. taxes that four-mill ceiling nine times at the maximum increases each approximately was capital expenses increase at Conejos. year of South as a rate than faster assessed valuation. trial, At an educational finance economist district, which levy testified that a lower-wealth I conclude that the and bond limita- statutes, generate only together would be a fraction of tions in Colorado’s able to with capital financing provide any from the four-mill the failure to mechanism for levy compared high-wealth correcting resulting disparities as with a dis- among trict, districts, unlikely provide to for its would be school effect constitute an abso- long-term capital outlay The debt lute deprivation opportunity needs. of educational ceiling presents problems. poorer For ex- identical to students school districts which ample, Douglas County justify has employment school district would of an en- up requiring issued level of scrutiny, bonds for construction hanced at least cannot financing 20% limit and issue additional that limitations bear a sub- bonds, by majority even if authorized relationship important govern- stantial vote, objectives. Boren, until Craig assessed valuation increases. mental See limitation, Given the the district’s 1980 20% U.S. S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d 397 million, (1976); property, Rodriguez, assessed valuation of at 411 U.S. $120 S.Ct. (Marshall, J., would dissenting). have to increase to billion at 1329 I $1.1 believe majority order to allow $220 bond-financed funds has failed even to demon- rationally million estimated be the cost for con- strate that the limitations further interest, any struction of schools to accommodate the in- legitimate required population flux of within its It scrutiny. boundaries. under lower-level The majority unlikely certainly assessed valuation of has justify failed to the limita- Douglas County will nec- demanding reach tions under more constitution- essary provide time new levels in al standard.1 construction, and since the district majority recognizes that neither limi- already assessing levy the maximum of four accompanied by any tation was legislatively

mills, it has no means of funding additional purpose declared and asserts that these lim- *24 capital expenditures. part itations “are an important of the Capital financing represented by system limits financing public state’s of services levy the the . four-mill limitation and 20% and . . are rationally goals related to the ceiling debt inhibit low-wealth dis- to sought school be the achieved.” To extent that providing adequate replace- limit, tricts provisions directly from both indirectly, aging meeting levies, ments facilities or annual tax the majority changes emphasis. analogizes in educational More- these levy to the limitations re- over, rising ability alone threaten 32-l-1101(l)(a), costs the strictions in section C.R.S. provide of adequate capi- (1981 these districts to Supp.) protection, on hospi- fire outlays. capital tal, tal the average park and recreation districts. The My capital analysis independent the limita- conclusion that finance His of this state.” riguez Rod- deprivation ability tions work an absolute of educa- and is founded Court’s on this to opportunity poorer equal interpret protection rights tional on students in under the Col- to differently districts leads me conclude that even under orado Constitution from the U. S. analysis Supreme Court’s Rodri- Supreme analysis the U. S. guez, Court’s under the U. S. Con- not accord the which would education analysis, 1 concur in stitution. Justice Lohr’s capital right, status of a these fundamental independent which would constitute an basis scru- limitations would tiny. entitled to enhanced invalidating capital provisions. the finance Lohr, dissent, Justice his agree well-reasoned aspects I also with his that all conclusion subject aspects financing would all of school to of Colorado’s school finance scheme would fail scrutiny of on the enhanced level based satisfy heightened scrutiny. level explicitly “favored accorded status education majority voters. Yet “controlling by a of the district’s concludes majority then provision preclude limitation would taxing au- the debt any agency’s limits of outer the the issuance of bonds in excess of 20% of purpose preventing to the thority” is tied property, taxable re- the value of the district’s public of future present pledging “the majority ap- even if a of the electorate not relate to This rationale does serves.” This limitation, proved the bond issue. cannot be which involves levy the four-mill revenues, goal majority with the which the squared not the present the collection of ones, financing majority asserts is furthered the state’s and the of future pledging affording “a school district the levy justification for provides no other money freedom to devote more toward edu- limitation. cating its children than is otherwise availa- seeking supply a rationale for [by] guaranteed the state minimum ble limitation, majori- indebtedness bonded amount,” enabling citizenry “the local limi- concerning debt ty merely cites cases greater participation influence and municipalities. See the state and tations on making process” regarding educa- decision Senate, Interrogatories by Colo. State In re Maj. op. at 1023. expenditures. tional (1977); City of 566 P.2d 193 Colo. majority opinion articulated no 315 P.2d Since Haxby, 136 Colo. Trinidad explain legitimate levy basis for the limitation and of the cases cited None limitation, ceiling, capital debt I conclude that nor does the school district debt satisfy even the reasoning expense limitations fail to majority explain how the employed by justify lenient rational relation test generalized to these cases can be course, majority. were a more strin- Of this limitation. scrutiny pro- these gent employed, level of guarantee equal protection If the as well. visions would fail that test anything, it must mean that the law means majority’s arbitrary disagree I also with the conclu- protected from citizens are to be provisions important capital outlay inter- sion that do which affect classifications Article 2 of the Colorado majority supplies no basis for not violate § ests. The to amelio- limitations The state’s failure asserting levy that the and debt Constitution. disparity ability in the of different wholly arbitrary. The limits on the rate are not capital districts to raise funds for ability tax and incur debt are districts’ the effect of district, outlays, exacerbating on while of a but based not on the needs through levy and debt disparities in the these amount of assessed valuation districts, limitations, re- Thus, violates the constitutional wealthy whose district. “provide the state for the adequate satisfy quirement spending is more than of a thor- needs, rais- establishment and maintenance precluded are not from capital districts, of free funds, ough and uniform poorer while additional ” ... throughout schools the state. may only the barest of funds to have items, precluded spend on capital outlay disparities The wide *25 raising money. additional funding are manifest from the trial court’s In school districts in Moreover, levy findings. those the limitations subvert per pupil top con- 10% of assessed valuation purported state’s interest in local levy 3.51 imposed capital a reserve fund of majority found as the under- trol which the mills, average yielded which an of legitimate $254.79 end achieved lying state By pupil per pupil per or mill. operat- per current provisions $72.59 school finance contrast, in the 10% in as- districts bottom ing expenditures. Clearly, the state-im- per pupil levied at a rate of sessed valuation prevents limit localities posed four-mill average an of $28.68 3.50 mills and raised determination of from an unrestricted per pupil per mill. Simi- per pupil, or necessary $8.01 to further de- level of taxation higher bond larly, low-wealth districts have goals. respect With sired educational high-wealth than dis- indebtedness, 22-42-102(1) redemption tax rates section bonded tricts, per pu- produce far less revenue approved but any school bond be requires that system. addition, top financing in the I pil. the school districts concur per pupil imposed assessed Lohr’s 10% of valuation with Justice conclusion that the Col- average levy redemption public financing bond of 3.33 orado school scheme as a yield average per mills for an of whole violates the Constitution. $206.81 Colorado pupil pupil, per per n.l, or mill. School p. $62.11 at supra See in the districts bottom 10% levied at an LOHR, Justice,

average yield dissenting: rate of 8.04 mills for of per pupil per pupil mill. $61.62 $7.66 majority flaw finds no constitutional states, dispari- with statutorily-created system Other faced similar Colorado’s ties, equalize capaci- elementary have intervened financing public secondary ty capital expendi- education, of districts to finance judgment and reverses the of the one of only tures. Colorado is states My trial court. analysis the relevant capital funding provide which no to local statutes leads me to the conclusion that Expert testimony school districts. at trial they protection fail equal to accord agreement general indicated that there is schoolchildren, contrary laws to all Colorado financing among experts school that states II, to Colo.Const. Art. and do not § be in assessing should involved districts’ establish “thorough and uniform” needs, capital funding needs and these ef- Colorado, throughout schools fectuating a distribution of the burden for IX, mandated Colo.Const. Art. 2.§ financing capital outlays across dis- Therefore, I dissent. respectfully York, example, trict For lines. in New expenditures provides capital 49% I. average propor- for districts of wealth and system, Colorado’s finance as rele- aid, up tionately more to a limit of 90% of here, vant comprised Public School particular the cost of a to low- facility, (PSFA), Finance ofAct section 22-50- districts. wealth 101 et and 1981 seq., Cum.Supp., C.R.S.1973 Again, no rational basis exists for the provisions relating capital and those to the state's failure to intervene. cannot It fund, 22-40-102(4) reserve sections 22- justified enhancing on the basis of local 45-103(l)(c), C.R.S.1973 and 1981 Cum. control, levy since ceilings and debt fund, Supp., and to the redemption bond autonomy limit local this area of school 22-42-104(l)(a) sections 22-45- finance. The financing scheme and 103(l)(b), Cum.Supp. C.R.S.1973 and 1981 remedy existing the state’s failure ineq- An analysis of those statutes and of their majority’s uities violate even the formula- that, operation persuades effect in me col- the requirement tion of of Art. § lectively, they requirement violate the finds constitution satisfied “if equal protection of laws under Colo. thorough and opportu- uniform educational II, Const. Art. inquiry 25. An § into through nities are available state action in appropriate equal protection to be standard each school Maj. (em- district.” op. at 1025 applied, by summary followed of the stat- added). phasis only Not has the state failed utory framework for Colorado’s school fi- obligation to meet its to insure this level of nancing system practical opera- and of the opportunity, through but and levy debt tion of that will demonstrate the limitations, it has made its attainment im- reasons conclusion. possible in some districts. A. my Because of the capital conclusion that *26 financing provisions violate the constitu- The Supreme United States has Court equal guarantee protection tional of and the held that education not a is fundamental thorough guarantee right and uniform of Article for purpose equal the protection of Constitution, 2 of the Colorado I under § the Fourteenth Amendment to the ruling would affirm the trial court’s strik- Constitution of the United States. An- San portion this down of the Colorado school tonio Independent School District v. Rodri-

1033 1278, 1, opinion five-jus- 411 93 36 L.Ed.2d Justice Powell’s for the guez, U.S. S.Ct. majority Rodriguez tice focuses on the 16, denied, 1919, 93 reh. U.S. S.Ct. 959. importance adoption principled of of a (1973)(Rodriguez). In 36 L.Ed.2d 418 Rod- constitutionally-based test for determina- went on to hold that riguez the Court importance rights equal tion of the for plan financing public for Texas’ education protection purposes. opinion states: equal protection satisfies standards because province It is not the Court to rationally legitimate pur- it furthers create substantive rights constitutional pose or interest. guaranteeing protec- name of equal majority recognizes, Rodriguez As the Thus, tion of the key laws. to dis- degree importance does not establish the covering whether education is “funda- equal to be attached to education in an mental” comparisons is not to be found in protection analysis under the Colorado Con- significance of the relative societal of ed- responsibility stitution. The ultimate opposed ucation as to subsistence or hous- ing. Nor is it by weighing to be found that rests with this determination Court. whether important education is as as the See, Court, e.g., People v. District 165 Colo. right Rather, to travel. answer lies 253, (1968). exercising In that 439 P.2d 741 assessing right whether there is a to however, majority responsibility, holds explicitly implicitly guaran- education right impinging that laws on the to educa- teed the Constitution. [Citations scrutiny un- require tion no more attentive omitted.]2 II, Rodriguez 25 than der Colo.Const.Art. § 33-34, 1297, 411 U.S. at at S.Ct. them Fourteenth Amendment accorded L.Ed.2d at Noting 43. that education is not protection purposes. reaching In that equal among rights explicitly protected by the majority rejects the test for conclusion Constitution, finding United States no fundamentality that led the constitutional saying implicitly guaranteed, basis for it is Supreme Court to conclude United States Court was led to conclusion that right that education is a fundamental not under the federal constitution the right to purposes, but does for federal constitutional Thus, is education not fundamental. scruti- applied to for this not tell us what test is ny plan was Texas limited to deter- As a result we can- purpose Colorado.1 mining it rationally whether furthers a le- not determine how it arrived at its conclu- gitimate state interest. A review of the relationship legiti- sion that a rational to a Colorado Constitution reflects the more fa- purpose justify is sufficient to mate state explicitly vored status accorded to educa- rights disparate treatment tion this state and leads to conclusion different classes of schoolchildrenin Colora- legislation according equal rights that not disagree majority’s analysis I with the do. to education to all classes must be tested heightened standard of review.3 and with its conclusion. 100, 1331, says “(Fun- opinion majority its U.S. at 93 S.Ct. at 36 L.Ed.2d at 82. n.7 of rights essentially rights those damental Others have criticized the test as too broad. recognized having See, Cahill, a value e.g., which have been Robinson v. 62 N.J. society.” liberty individual in our essential to Dickey A.2d cert. denied sub nom. v. Rob explicit majority not make whether does inson, 414 U.S. 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d state a constitu- this test is meant to Colorado (1973). any event it makes no tional standard. use analysis leading in the to its conclu- of this test notes, so, majority correctly 3.The that the right to education is sion that the non-funda- grant power Colorado Constitution “is not a mental. legislature, legislature to the but that plenary power pur- invested with poses for all the Marshall, dissent, point makes the 2. Justice government, of civil and that the consti- this formulation of the test is too narrow upon power.” tution but limitation Supreme explain the United States Court’s People Fleming, ex rel. Rhodes v. 10 Colo. holdings right procreate, right that the Accord, (1887). e.g., People elections, appeal 16 P. in state and the vote M., enjoy protection in the Interest of Y. D. 197 Colo. from a criminal conviction against discriminatory state treatment. P.2d 1356 While the United States *27 1034 5, 9, Only years

The of were ago §§ framers our constitution three this acutely explicitly the of court importance acknowledged impor- aware of educa- the society, by tion in a as evidenced tance which the democratic Colorado Constitution as- IX, signs in origi- the inclusion Article 2 our to in an opinion upholding of education a § section, compulsory nal state constitution. That school attendance statute. Peo- unchanged provides ple Y.D.M., day, remains to this the Interest of 197 Colo. part: (1979). pertinent P.2d 1356 shall, general assembly as soon as Notwithstanding the constitu- Colorado practicable, provide for the establishment provisions establishing tional the impor- thorough and maintenance of a and uni- education, tance majority assigns of the public form of free schools right to education no enhanced status for state, throughout all wherein resi- equal protection Thus, purposes. it holds state, ages dents of the between of right may that the to subject- education twenty-one may years, six and be educat- legislative ed to differential treatment on a gratuitously. ed showing only of a relationship rational to a legitimate purpose. state I disagree. balance Article of IX is devoted to While we must exercise caution in charac- aspects various of the of a establishment terizing rights “fundamental,” and so Colorado, public including triggering by examination scrutiny, strict a (§ 1), creation of a state board of education test most satisfy, my difficult to view the public of the administration fund majority give to fails the effect due to the 3, 5), (§§ compulsory school attendance language of the by Colorado Constitution 11), (§ (§ 15), of creation school districts not according right degree impor- of any power general and denial of to greater tance ordinary than an interest for assembly and the state board education equal protection purposes.4 (§ sense, prescribe 16). In a textbooks recognition importance of the Equal protection analysis not rigid so implicit school was birth as a Colorado’s as to only categories establish two union, of the state federal for in § rights fundamental, that are —those Enabling authorizing Act the formation of those that are bring not —and to to bear government in Colorado United only two scrutiny, tests —strict and mini- granted Congress sections States two in mum scrutiny determine constitu- —to every township support state “for the tionality of laws impinging unequally on 3, 1875, of common Act schools.” of March rights exercise of by those different classes pt. (1875). ch. Stat. A dealing suspect of citizens. with classifi- cations, framework for administration these Supreme the United States Court properties resulting and funds from their has legislative concluded that classification sale is established Art. on the gender, Colo.Const. basis of while not mandating govern- right Constitution is the source of federal 4. Some state courts have found the powers, majority apparently mental purpose which the education to be fundamental for characterizing rights protections considering basis concludes is the explicitly to be accorded this implicitly recognized right in that docu- under their own constitutions. See Serra fundamental, Priest, 584, Cal.Rptr. 601, ment as the Colorado Constitu- no v. 5 Cal.3d (1971); Pauley Kelly, tion extends to matters not deemed fundamen- P.2d 1241 v. 255 S.E.2d reason, rejects majority (W.Va.1979); County tal. For that Washakie School “Rodriguez fundamentality. Herschler, test” of It does District No. One 606 P.2d 310 follow, however, impor- degree (Wyo.1980), not that the Springs cert. denied sub nom. Hot assigned right by tance to a County Colorado constitu- No. District One v. Washakie provisions fundamentality One, tional is irrelevant to School District No. 449 U.S. 101 S.Ct. equal protection purposes simply cases, because 66 L.Ed.2d 28 Additional holding mention of the the constitution is not some right education to be a fundamental Indeed, it conclusive that is fundamental. it under a state constitution and others imagine holding contrary, would be difficult to a more reliable to be are collected at n. 11 of importance right’s digni- majority opinion. indicator aof than the ty assigned it the State Constitution. *28 specifical- More pupils within the district.” requires test more exact- scrutiny, a strict it legiti- ly, found: relationship to a ing than “rational Thus, in interest.” Ca governmental expenditures per pupil is

mate The level of Mohammed, 441 U.S. S.Ct. directly ability related to the of a school ban (1979), that Court held L.Ed.2d 297 a of educa- provide district to measure can sur overall gender-based quality classification tional in its curricula and that only if it protection challenge quality op- of educational equal program. an vive objectives to important governmental portunity provided by school districts serves significantly improved by an in- substantially pupils related to achievement and Boren, Be- per pupil expenditures.. . objectives. Craig v. crease those See (1976), disparities educational cause of 50 L.Ed.2d 397 97 S.Ct. [the] [in U.S. among dis- denied, expenditures the 181 school reh. 429 U.S. 97 S.Ct. Colorado], tricts students in low- (1977). review Intermediate L.Ed.2d wealth, low-spending districts receive an employed by the have also been standards opportunity significantly be- con Supreme in other United States Court high- to low that offered students texts. See Justice Marshall’s dissent wealth, high-spending districts. 70, 93 Rodriguez, 1315, 36 atU.S. S.Ct. at 64;5 Tribe, generally, see L. disparities opportunity L.Ed.2d at in educational 16-31 disparities Constitutional Law resulting corresponding § American We, too, (1978). gender-based have tested per pupil expenditures generally are standard by the intermediate fiscally partisan distinctions related to such factors Mohammed, size; supra. employed (1) (2) quality, in Caban v. as: class teacher J.W., Colo., 615 P.2d 666 especially ability R. McG. v. the teacher’s verbal to im substantiality and recognition operative principles of the of a communicate with which the Colorado Constitu portance study course of and their interrelation- education, any right (3) (4) dis ships; offerings; sup- tion invests the curricular services, legislative treatment of parate portive such as counselors and aides; protection suffi equal (5) tested for teaching should be teachers’ materials demanding textbooks, a standard. ciency by no less li- equipment, including and test, fi braries, facilities, the Colorado school Applying laboratory this cen- media facilities; exami ters, (6) cannot withstand critical nance laws health the condi- (Emphasis nation. tion facilities. add- ed.)

B. Although majority these fails to note findings appears deny the truth of that one measure of The trial court found content, legitimate ap- program is their it abandons its quality of an educational be, pellate doing may function in so. It money per pupil spent “the amount of asserts, offerings majority that a “fundamental on’ educational school district Rodriguez, ostensibly applying Rodriguez a test of mere Justice Marshall In his dissent in rigor rationality, convincingly an argues States Su- introduces unaccustomed that the United sup- approach preme even more test and serves as an exhibit to has been into that Court’s reading “spectrum principled port of what Marshall’s stan- flexible: “A Justice applied reading reveals that it has has done dards” Court’s decisions. Court spectrum reviewing discrimina- of standards in Oregon adopted approach similar to has Equal allegedly violative of the Protection tion suggested by Justice Marshall in evaluat- clearly comprehends spectrum This Clause. ing impairment rights of educational under the degree with which the in the of care variations equal protection clause of its constitution. Ol- classifications, particular will scrutinize Court depending, State, (1976); 276 Or. 554 P.2d 139 see sen v. believe, I on the constitutional Cahill, supra, generally, 62 N.J. at Robinson v. adversely importance the interest societal 491-92, (expressing disapprov- 303 A.2d at 282 recognized invidiousness of affected and approach the delicate al of a mechanical upon particular classifica- which the the basis necessary balancing interests in this con- 98-99, 93 at 411 U.S. at S.Ct. tion is drawn.” text). dissent Justice White’s 36 L.Ed.2d at 81. amount; up disagreement concerning the extent made 47% of that state tax exists 43%; provided to which is a correlation revenues federal contribu- there demonstrable *29 6%; other the tions accounted for and the 4% expenditures between and educational However, this came from miscellaneous sources. quality of education.” by any disagreement case was resolved such point starting understanding A useful for findings. evi- above-quoted the factual The financing the school is the authoriz- findings, we are supports dence these and (ARB), ed base the limit upper revenue of by E.g., bound them. Petersen Ground per expenditures pupil general operat- Commission, Water 579 P.2d 195 Colo. ing expenses.7 inception This had its in the PSFA, 22-50-106, in section C.R.S.1973 and Supp. year budget For the 1973 each C. assigned was an district ARB founded on majority The the school finance describes the property 1973 revenues from local tax- neglects laws detail to outline in some but es, equalization support the state un- findings trial court factual detail- prior legislation, der and the 1973 attend- financing operates how ance entitlement. These ARBs varied practice. sup- When this information among widely school districts essential- and plied, equal failure of the laws to accord ly spending reflected historical levels. protection to Colorado be- schoolchildren operational expenses ARBs limit Since apparent. comes I first shall summarize schoolchild, disparities for each in ARBs are by structure established statutes at the heart of the differentials educa- findings. and then turn to the court’s trial opportunity plaintiff tional of which the complain. schoolchildren In order to finance Colorado’s system, legislature Colorado has Complex statutory adjustments have re- adopted statutory a scheme which utilizes years sulted increases in ARBs over property funds from both local taxes and but not the disparities, have erased as will state taxes. Each school must raise district legislation enacted, be seen. Unless new portion a substantial of needed monies for will ARBs increase at a rate annually of 7% general purposes property from local taxes. subsequent years. 1983 and 22- Section supplemented by 50-106(2)(f), These revenues are then a (1981 Supp.). C.R.S.1973 Since vary A of now, state contribution. maximum amount ARBs among school districts per pupil pre- revenue sources is flat percentage both increases will cause further (J.e., scribed. This maximum limit is called the divergence of ARBs in the future. 7% by higher revenue Not yields authorized base. limited of a greater number a abso- this maximum are and state number.) federal contri- lute increase than 7% a lower butions, aids,” “categorical known as may A school pre- district its increase special purposes,6 certain and monies raised ARB First, scribed in one of ways. two property from local taxes for ex- may requested increase based on need be However, statutory penditures. separate the state budget school district review criteria capital expendi- limit the amount of 22-50-107, board. Section C.R.S.1973 and tures. Supp. alternative, In the or in the year will budget denial, serve illustrate event of review spe- board manner in which educational costs cial school district may election be called to $950,338,000 year shared. In that approval was the requested obtain increase. spent public primary secondary 22-50-108, on edu- Section C.R.S.1973 property cation Colorado. Local For Supp. year taxes any first increase law, “categorical programs” pupils Under Colorado 7. number is determined children, handicapped method, prescribed counting include the education of the result aid, vocational small attendance which is the “attendance entitlement.” See aid, transportation 22-50-104, (1981 Supp.). center 22- aid. Section section C.R.S.1973 50-101.5, (1981 Supp.). C.R.S.1973 methods, authorized either of these two district prescribed per amount per mill funding for the increase pro- must be pupil regard without to need. In 1977 this through property vided taxes within the per was per mill pupil. $10.85 This amount district, any without supplemental state aid. applies equalization toward the state aid 22-50-107(2)(b), 22-50-108(4), Sections C.R. obligation, but is payable in full even if a seen, As will first-year S.1973. fi- school district does any not need all or part substantially nancial hurdle inhibits school of it to achieve the guaranteed level districts with low assessed valua- per per pupil. mill For example, in 1977 in availing tions from proce- themselves of the a school district where a one mill levy would dure to increase their ARBs. (i.e., produce pupil $32.00 more than the *30 guaranteed level) state $31.92 the state The first source of school district monies pay would still per per mill pupil $10.85 in against “from levies the valuation for aid to the district. This oper- contribution assessment of all property taxable located ates within the ARB limit and effects a within the boundaries of school dis- [each] reduction in the levy mill to 22-40-102(1), imposed trict.” Section C.R.S.1973 high (1981 assessed Supp.). generate valuation districts to accomplish In order to their ARBs. levy, every year the board of education of

each school certify district must to the In addition to the plan for financing county board of commissioners of the coun- school operational district expenses, the Col- ty in which the school district is located the orado statutes impose limitations on the necessary judgment amount in its to be ability of school spend districts to capi- for general defray raised for funds to operating improvements. tal Capital expenditures during costs for education the next fiscal are not limited the ARB but are con- year. separately. They sidered are funded entire-

The assessed property valuations of ly through property taxation on within each the assessed valuations property per pu- respective district, supplementation without pil vary greatly among school districts. Capital state aid. expenditures are fi- recognition difficulty presents of the to nanced through capital funds, reserve sec- property-poor school in trying districts 22-45-103(l)(c), tion C.R.S.1973 and 1981 necessary schools, raise public funds for Supp., funds, and bond redemption section provided state has two forms of aid: state 22-45-103(l)(b), levy C.R.S.1973. The aid, equalization guarantee. and a minimum capital reserve funds is limited to four mills per year. 22-40-102(4). Section The bond equalization State aid is a method to redemption funds are financed from local equalize among power districts the of a one 22-42-118, tax revenues. Sections levy per pupil up mill tax to raise revenue 22-45-103(l)(b), C.R.S.1973. Bonded in- guaranteed level. In 1977 the state debtedness is limited to 20% latest guarantee per per was pupil. mill $31.92 valuation for assessment of the taxable 22-50-105(l)(a)(IV), Section C.R.S.1973 property in the district. 22-42- Section (1981 Thus, Supp.). levy if a one mill on 104(l)(a), (1981 Supp.). C.R.S.1973 As the assessed valuation a school district would found, trial court these severely limitations produce not per pupil in $31.92 ability curtail the of property-poor districts provided equalization aid necessary to money to raise for necessary im- school supplement the amount which the one mill provements. levy produce up would to the guaran- $31.92

teed amount. The equalization total aid to complexities interrelationships dependent a school district was on the mill financing components are such that levy necessary generate for that district to only when the effects of the are assigned its pupil. ARB for each great studied can disparities per pupil contribution, spending

A minimum state public the mini- school education in Col- guarantee, mum completes the state aid be brought orado into focus. The trial picture. Every year pays the state each findings court made of fact which expose relief, guarantee (e.g., disparities these in harsh and I now mum per $31.92 pupil per pupil mill minus findings. per per $10.85 turn to those

mill, pupil a difference per $21.07 mill). D. findings

The trial court made extensive Property-poor school districts are inhibit- respect of fact manner in increasing through with to the which ed from their ARBs budget state school district review Colorado school finance board approval by authorization or voter operated. findings need has Those are attached to finance the total authorized increase in part appendix. They as an substantial year the first without the assistance of large disparities among detail the found, state aid. As the trial court ability districts in the to finance education Although money amount of raised correspondingly large because of the varia- locally is to extent product some per pupil. tions in assessed valuation willingness of local residents tax points large trial court also out varia- themselves, practical as a matter school produced by tions in ARBs have been districts with small simply tax base they the statutory formulas and shows that raise mill cannot their rates the level rooted, part, at least in substantial *31 necessary to match the authorized reve- spending historical levels each district. by nue bases wealthy attainable the more Historical in turn in- spending district was districts with less onerous tax efforts on widely varying fluenced the assessed part the of wealthy these districts.... per pupil valuations the In within districts. practical consequence The requiring of sum, the trial court that: found low-wealth to pay district for an increase statutory The fi- scheme of solely its authorized revenue base out permitted nance has with rela- districts tax year local revenue in the first tively high per pupil assessed valuations such increase is that the low-wealth dis- generate high relatively authorized curtailed, is trict if not outrightly pre- expenditure revenue bases and levels. vented, pursuing from a higher quality hand, On the other districts with relative- program educational for its students and ly per pupil low assessed valuations have making significant choices in its relatively low authorized revenue bases curriculum total pro- and educational per pupil and low expenditure levels. gram. It ranking also found that the relative Likewise, property-poor districts are se- changed school districts not ARBs has verely limited in ability their to construct significantly since 1973. capital improvements by reason of four explored The district court then ef- levy capital mill limitation on fund reserve equalization fect of state aid minimum accumulations and the 20%of assessed valu- guarantee money aon school district’s fiscal ation limitation on bonded indebtedness. ability. equalization It found that state District, for example, Frisco School aid, prescribed per with its pupil maximum mills, with tax levy of 4 per raised $386.52 levels, per mill simply incapable pupil fund, “is for its reserve while Conejos District, equalizing raising potential the revenue of South for the same levy, only mill [i.e., per pupil. low-wealth low raised $23.60 assessed valuation appendix gives examples other pupil] with and sta- high-wealth districts districts.” vividly illustrating tistics the differences in Moreover, it found that guar- the minimum the abilities of school districts to construct antee money disparity increases the capital improvements dispari- as a result of ability fiscal of school districts to raise reve- ties in the assessed valuation of purposes nue for educational is because it within districts. regard awarded to districts without to need. Thus, the true measure of the state’s equali- Finally, the trial court reviewed zation efforts the difference between and 1978 amendments to the Public School equalization aid limit and the mini- Finance Act of 1973 and that found disparities program revenue will not within authorized base the school dis- trict, mitigated by (2) control, i.e., substantially be erased or local fiscal control legislation. over the amount of money new that will be spent purposes for educational within the

E. school district. Local administrative con- indisputably trol is important govern- matter fact The trial court found as a objective mental much so that it finds expenditures per pupil that level of “[t]he —so recognition in Colo.Const. Art. directly ability §§15 related to the of a school and 16.9 The assertion that local fiscal provide a measure district to of educational important governmental objec control is an quality pro- in its curricula and overall given credence, tive also must par some gram.” It went dis- on find “[t]he ticularly in view relationship of its to local among parities expenditures in educational administrative control. the 181 school districts in Colorado are to a product great extent random equal protection defect the PSFA fortuity historical of local taxable wealth.” capital expenditure associated limita- This establishes the fact that Colorado’s apparent, however, tion statutes is -when treat school finance laws do not schoolchil- those statutes are tested to determine through- dren in various school districts they whether are substantially related to equally the state in the exercise of their out objectives. achievement of local control heightened to education. Under the The trial court found as a fact scrutiny appro- standard which I consider operation the ARBs in low assessed valua- priate, this treatment can sur- differential tion school districts are so low as to make equal protection challenge only if it vive an empty concept. local control an It stated: important governmental objectives serves many districts, low-wealth including substantially and is related to the achieve- *32 the sixteen districts plaintiff school- objectives. ment of those Whether it does children, any there is a lack of meaning- inquiry. so is the next degree control, ful of local fiscal with a governmental The interest which the ma- concomitant lack of local administrative jority justify unequal practical finds sufficient to control. The consequence of re- opportunities quiring educational accorded Colorado a district lacking in local taxable is local control.8 Local con- pay schoolchildren wealth to for an increase in its autho- to at the solely trol refers control school district rized revenue base out of local tax observed, the trial year level. As court local revenue in the first of such increase (1) components: hindered, control has two local ad- is that the low-wealth district is control, i.e., forestalled, ministrative control over the if not in its choice of curricu- appellants urge among The that 8. also educational differentials school districts and the vary among majority needs districts. satisfaction of variant educational needs. justify financing plan does not school on Both the Public School Act Finance of 1973 reasonably this basis. Nor could it do so in statutory pertaining and the related structure findings following view of the of the trial court: capital redemption to the funding reserve and bond vary The educational needs of schoolchildren any fail to define or formulate overt degree among school districts be- to some program substantially related to the satisfac- social, geographical, ecological, cause of and to and tion of the variant needs of school children However, prior factors. economic since the enactment of the Public School nance Act of throughout the state. Fi- 1973, neither the As- General IX, provides perti- Art. § Colo.Const. sembly Department of Edu- nor the Colorado part, nent local boards of “[The education] ingre- has undertaken to formulate the cation dients of a public shall have of instruction in the control thorough education and uniform respective By nega- of their schools districts.” state, throughout the either for all students implication, tive § Colo.Const. Art. 16 also independent of local needs. as related to or aspect treats one of local administrative con- any analysis Nor has there been undertaken of what are the variant educational school children quently, gross general assembly trol: “Neither the nor the needs of power state board of education shall have to throughout the state. Conse- prescribe public textbooks to be used in the uncertainty respect exists with schools.” relationship between educational cost to the pursuit qualitative improvidently incurring public and in of a le- lum its debt is a program. gitimate City state purpose. educational See of Trini- Haxby, dad v. Colo. 315 P.2d 204 capital to Local control as it relates ex- hold, however, I would if that even penditures operative is within a narrow these limitations on revenue collection and A is limited to a range. local school district debt may properly be isolated year to per mill assessment contribute four financing remainder of the capital to its reserve fund cannot ex- scheme, they supported by govern- not limit of ceed bonded indebtedness 20% of objectives important mental so their valuation in the assessed dis- attainment permitted can be to override may trict. While these limitations reflect education, which has an enjoyed governmental policies limiting sound bur- important place among the rights of Colora- they landowner-taxpayers, dens on create do citizens since statehood. People See inequality moneys per great student Y.D.M.,supra. the Interest of I Although may capital spent which construction. might far, go quite not Dubofsky so Justice example, the that in For trial court found persuasively argues in her dissent in this 1977: case that levy “the and bond limitations in districts at the decile second levied at statutes, together Colorado’s with the fail- average capital rate an reserve of 3.01for provide ure to any mechanism for correct- average yield per pupil, an of $117.76 disparities the resulting among school per per pupil which mill. The $39.12 districts, in effect constitute an absolute districts at the ninth decile levied at an deprivation of opportunity average capital reserve tax rate of 3.67 poorer districts, students in ...” average yield per pupil, $40.16 (Emphasis added.) Certainly they create per pupil mill. $10.95 egregious capital inequality fi- facilities General Assembly nothing has done nancing capacity among the school districts. capital the inequality address facilities I would hold that the governmen- asserted funding capabilities that is created objective tal of debt limitation is not suffi- ceilings on capital fund reserve assessments ciently important sustain the challenged and bonded indebtedness. In the against heightened statutes level of area merely facilities “local control” is equal protection scrutiny that I consider euphemism masking inequalities gross applicable generally here. quota- See the abilities of school districts to meet their tion from Justice Marshall’sdissent in Rod- *33 needs.10 n.5, riguez at supra. majority The the holds that bonded in- Concluding that public Colorado’s ceiling debtedness limitation school and the on as- financing statutes are not capital substantially sessments for the reserve re- fund fur- lated to the achievement legitimate purpose ther additional of the asserted local controlling objectives, control public of the debt. and that of Although control public governmental a reserve assessment debt is not fund limita- inter- est weight tion relates to of sufficient justify current assessments and not the seri- debt, impairment ous ceiling bonded rights indebtedness is of the educational of substantially related to containment of the Colorado cap- schoolchildreneffected public dispute I protec- debt. do not that ital reserve fund assessment and bonded limitations, tion credit of a school district from indebtedness I would hold that majority’s tion, innovation, healthy The competition statements about the benefi- a for results op- cent made of local control could have been educational excellence.” The freedom and only by ignoring casting portunity or aside the trial so extolled are denied to school dis- states, findings majority court’s The fact. tricts with low assessed valuations reason e.g., “The use of affords a necessary local taxes school enjoy- the lack of funds for their money ment, district the freedom to more clearly devote to- as the trial court so found. The educating ward majority’s its children than is otherwise only deprivation allusion this tois state-guaranteed available in the minimum unimportant dismiss it as an perfection. deviation from And, provides amount.” “local control each experimenta- opportunity with district statutes, system public of free schools the together, deny considered General these must, even protection Assembly may, prescribe of the laws to Colorado equal implemented set curriculum to be in all schoolchildren. Against in the state. school districts II. background, agree with the I trial court “[wjhatever might possible be said of yet respect another in which There ‘uniform,’ ‘thorough’ constructions of it public school finance laws are Colorado’s seems evident that the education clause was constitutionally deficient. Under Colo. IX, intended for the benefit of Assembly schoolchildren Const. Art. General § duty underlying to establish a addresses notions the basic has a constitutional concept equal system meeting specified opportunity.” standards: educational Uniformity requires parity of educational shall, assembly as general as soon not, indicates, opportunity, as the majority provide practicable, for the establishment simply an assurance that some bare mini- thorough and uni- and maintenance of opportunity mum is available in each school free schools form district. state, resi- throughout wherein all state, ages dents of the between uniformity The assessment of of educa- twenty-one years, may educat- six and be opportunity setting tional in a where each gratuitously. ed district has a constitutional notes, majority we have never be-

As control instruction in its own schools is dif- upon called to determine what fore been ficult necessary, at best. It is not at all by “thorough and uniform” however, meant appropriate to determine the con- public schools.11 legislative stitutional limits on. and local powers present purposes. school district majority appears to hold enough impli- It is to note the constitutional standard is satisfied if the constitutional finding, quoted cations of the trial court’s unspecified that some mini- state insures earlier, here, bearing repetition but that: opportunities is availa- mum of districts, many including low wealth ble in each school district.12 Even overlook- found, that, plaintiff the sixteen districts of court school- ing the fact trial children, any meaning- there is a lack of Assembly the General has not addressed control, degree ful of local fiscal with a question of the nature of those educational concomitant lack of local comprise which would a con- administrative opportunities minimum, stitutionally practical consequence I believe control. The of re- sufficient given quiring lacking to the “thor- a district more content should local taxable ough pay and uniform” clause. wealth to for an increase in its autho- solely rized revenue base out of local tax “uniform,” recog- construing thé word year revenue in the first of such increase given Art. nition must be to Colo.Const. hindered, is that the low-wealth district is 16, placing 15 and control of instruction §§ forestalled, if not in its choice of curricu- forbidding the in local school boards and pursuit qualitative lum and in its of a Assembly and state board of educa- General *34 program. in prescribing from textbooks for use tion provisions dispel The trial court public the schools. These has found as a fact that the any establishing financing that in a “uniform” result of the state notion scheme constitutionality majority finance 12. The 11. The of school states: require- state constitutional schemes under IX, . .. Article Section 2 of the Colorado degrees similarity ments of various of to Colo. thorough Constitution is satisfied if and uni- IX, 2 been tested in § Const. Art. has numerous opportunities form educational are available Pauley differing with results. See state courts through state action in each school district. (W.Va.1979). Kelly, 225 S.E.2d 859 For a provision ... this constitutional does not provisions summary of the state constitutional prevent providing a local school district from them, interpretations see and the courts’ of beyond opportunities additional educational Developments generally, in the Law—The In- added.) (Emphasis this standard. Rights, terpretation State of Constitutional 1444-1463 Harv.L.Rev. pupil within their the is to furnish low assessed valuation school boundaries. funding inadequate districts with so that per pupil among assessed valuation Colora- they meaningful ability havé to exercise no ranged do high school districts from a of obligation their constitutional $326,269 $4,197 per pupil a low of per control instruction in their own' schools. pupil, a ratio of almost 78 Eliminat- uniformity, The constitutional mandate districts, extremely high low be, may requires whatever its full contours the range between the 90th per- and 10th than more this.13 centile of districts in per assessed valuation Accordingly, I that statu- would hold pupil in 1977 still remained aat ratio of 5.3 financing tory school scheme in Colorado average 1. The state of assessed valua- requirements violates the Const. Colo. per $29,165. tion pupil in 1977 was The IX, Art. 2.§ average per pupil assessed valuation 1977 in the in sixteen districts which the III. plaintiff $10,- only schoolchildren reside was concluding majority, as it does that average. about one-third of the state trial its court erred in constitutional As a result of in variations assessed valua- interpretations reversing judg- and so its per pupil, tions high school districts with ment, appropri- finds no need to address per pupil assessed valuations have a greater tjie adopted by ateness of the remedies trial ability fiscal to raise revenue for education- Similarly, I court. conclude that it is nei- purposes al from many local taxes than do necessary appropriate ther nor to address state, other including school districts in the them in this dissent. plaintiff sixteen districts which the IV. Conejos schoolchildren reside. In South levy School District a mill one on the as- join portion Dubofsky’s I Justice dissenting opinion in which she sessed property per concludes valuation of pupil that the limit 20% of assessed valuation on pupil raised $5.90 while the school district bonded indebtedness and the same mill levy one Rangely School Dis- reserve ceiling mill fund offend trict per pupil. raised $326.27 against Colo.Const. Art. 2.§ opinion, For reasons in this I stated B. Relationship Between Local Tax- affirm ruling would trial court able Wealth and a School District’s financing Colorado Authorized Revenue Base scheme violates Constitution of the When the Public School Finance Act of Colorado. enacted, 1973 was the historical variations existing APPENDIX TO then among JUSTICE LOHR’S DIS- school districts in local Excerpts findings ability fiscal accounted for substantial dis- SENT — Joseph fact made Honorable R. parities expenditures per pupil among Quinn in trial court. districts, regardless pupil size. The II. The Colorado Public Public School Finance School Finance Act assigned of 1973

System Operation each district an authorized revenue base determined on the basis of the district’s The Relationship A. Between Assessed per pupil 1973 revenues from state and local Valuation and a District’s Fis- sources. Ability cal authorized vary widely ranged Colorado school districts revenue bases *35 $3,101 per the amount of taxable high per wealth from a pupil to a low of possible partial right power per pupil equal 13. A formulation to obtain revenues give that would effect both state and local those obtainable in other local school districts.” responsibilities require might is “the that the This standard be refined to reflect differ- among school district in which the child lives have the ences in costs districts.

1043 highest authorized revenue bases in the state median all were above $1,004 of three to one. per pupil, a ratio 45 per pupil. Of the dis- assessed wealth ends, Eliminating at both the extremes revenue authorized tricts with the lowest revenue bases between range in authorized all but six were below bases in percentile the'90th and school districts at per pu- in assessed valuation state median at a ratio percentile still remained the 10th Only the 45 wealthiest districts pil. two of average two to one. The state of almost revenue in the state in 1977 had authorized $1,446. in which The sixteen districts was the other below the state median. On bases reside were below plaintiff schoolchildren hand, poorest the 45 districts in only five of average, among and themselves the state in 1977 had authorized revenue the state $1,138 was more averaged per pupil, which the state median. bases above than the state per pupil than lower $300 strength The measure of the of the rela- average. tionship between variables of authoriz- expenditures school district total ed revenue and bases assessed valuations $4,888 ranged high per pupil from a to a per pupil is indicated the correlation $1,212 per pupil, low of a ratio of about coefficient.1 The correlation coefficient be- Eliminating four to one. the terminal ex- tween per pupil authorized revenue bases tremes, range expenditures per total per pupil 1977 and assessed valuations pupil percentile for districts at the 90th 1977 was + .5548. The correlation coeffi- percentile the 10th was still over two to expenditures cient between total per pupil $2,020 average per pu- one. The state was per in 1977 and assessed pupil valuations pil. The in which sixteen districts exceptions, 1977 was + With few .4959. plaintiff reside were schoolchildren below positive relationship between local average, among the state themselves wealth and school spend- district authorized $1,597, averaged which was more than $400 ing permeates levels school districts of per pupil average. below the state varying pupil size. ranking school fi- The relative of school districts statutory scheme of permitted signifi- with relative- revenue has not nance has districts authorized bases gen- cantly changed since 1973. The correlation high per pupil to ly assessed valuations for 1973 and 1977 authorized relatively high authorized revenue coefficient erate + Districts which had levels. On the other revenue bases is .9. expenditure bases revenue bases in rela- hand, relatively low assessed low authorized with districts districts, relatively equally au- tive had low au- pupil have low to other per valuations pupil revenue bases in relative to and low thorized thorized revenue bases the sixteen Conejos other districts. In the case of expenditure levels. South schoolchildren, their plaintiff districts of spend itself 35 mills to District taxed School unchanged ranking low carries relatively Dis- $1,057 per pupil, while Summit School apparent from the spend mills to over into only itself 18 trict taxed following with table: $1,896 the 45 districts per pupil. Of 1973 1973 1974 1974 1977 1977 1978 1978 Plaintiff ARB Rank ARB Rank ARB Rank District ARB Rank 1163.04 148 1347.50 132 727.00 158 814.95 159 Alamosa 151 1111.54 163 1234.69 163 743.00 150 831.25 Center 1239.92 835.18 1117.14 745.00 Del Norte 1087.05 1216.83 726.00 812.29 Delta relationship imply correlation would no A zero meas- statistical coefficient 1. A correlation Generally the two variables. at all between degree two between of association ure ranging -1.0, speaking, positive from 0.0 may range correlations Correlations variables. moderate, low, (meaning 0.3 to 0.6 to 0.3 are considered negative that as perfect correlation part (This high. decreases), is not increases, footnote and 0.6 to 0.9 the other variable one findings.) (meaning the trial court’s 1.0, perfect positive correlation + increases, other). so does variable as one *36 1044 1978 1977 1977 1978 1973 1973 1974 1974 Plaintiff ' ARB ARB Rank Rank Rank ARB ARB Rank District

School 149 1285.57 151 157 1161.63 734.00 157 821.93 Otero East 150 152 129 1159.51 1284.86 128 883.96 790.00 Granada 171* 180 1168.00 179 750.00 1042.66 552.00 181 Ignacio 109 131 1399.37 114 941.81 1211.06 849.00 108 Johnstown 159 159 145 1124.78 1252.54 841.50 751.00 144 Manzanola 164 160 164 1100.93 1246.55 778.06 694.00 164 Vista Monte 168* 1042.71 179 1168.23 178 750.00 655.00 170 Cortez Montezuma 147 129 1351.11 131 839.14 1219.95 749.00 146 Montrose 115 154 1259.74 1381.60 827.29 738.00 153 Pueblo 146 1287.74 150 1165.69 694.00 165 821.93 Rocky Ford 174* 1057.44 1181.08 750.00 614.00 178 Conejos South 1184.44 137 1308.13 828.43 740.00 151 Trinidad * ranking, ARBs of which had identical several school districts the 1974 ARB In $750.00 of Education. in the Colorado from 166-181 sequence by Department ranked alphabetical many cases the revenue producing potential authorized revenue of a one wealthy bases of districts have increased However, levy. equalization aid, mill state more, amounts, in terms of actual dollar which is limited to per pupil-per mill than of prop- the authorized revenue bases levels of in $31.92 $35.00 in districts, erty-poor thereby resulting in a in in simply $42.25 $45.85 is greater disparity net dollar in 1977 and incapable of equalizing raising the revenue than in thereafter existed 1973. Further- potential of high- low-wealth districts with more, tax mill rates in several property- wealth districts. poor greater have districts increased at a Furthermore, statutory minimum districts, in property-rich spite rate than in guarantee per pupil many per actually that in mill in- fact cases the authoriz- ed revenue bases in overall dollar amounts creases disparity ability fiscal property-rich have increased districts at a school districts to raise revenue for educa- pace greater prop- than dollar increases purposes tional due to the fact erty-poor districts. money given is fully capable districts

A persuasively explanato- raising factor than guaranteed more level of ry disparities in school districts’ authoriz- equalization aid from their own local ed in 1977 revenue bases is the assessed taxable wealth. The minimum guarantee per pupil valuation in these districts 1973. per pupil per mill was $10.85 $11.35 The correlation coefficient between 1977 for and will $11.35 authorized revenue bases 1973 assessed through the true measure of per + pupil valuations This .7630. cor- the state’s efforts equalize school dis- relation coefficient indicates that local tax- tricts’ fiscal abilities was not the state able spending wealth and wealth-related equalization $31.92, level of but rather was disparities, as they prior existed to and in- per pupil per mill—the $21.07 result of sub- cluding continued to exert influ- tracting the minimum guarantee per pupil spending pub- ence on authorized levels per ($10.85) mill from the level of state lic education in the state of Colorado as late equalization per per ($31.92). aid pupil mill as 1977. Only incapable those school districts of rais- Equalization per

C. The Effect of or more pupil $21.07 State Aid mill Money and Minimum Guarantee on a “equalized” were fully with other districts Ability District’s Fiscal capable more, raising that amount or “equalization” the extent only up was equalization State aid does increase the level capacity fully by raising capable $21.07. district’s fiscal Districts *37 year solely the first out of local revenue sources. the extent To that school districts raising per pupil per of more mill $21.07 vary widely in their local taxable wealth guaran- nevertheless received the minimum per pupil, they to that same extent vary in and, money per pupil per tee of mill $10.85 ability their fiscal to fund increases in au- extent, disparity to that inter-district fiscal thorized revenue bases. example, For in proportion was exacerbated in inverse per pupil per 1977 the amount of revenue Likewise, actual need. in the true prop- mill obtained from tax levies on local measure equalization of the state’s effort erty among varied districts from per pupil per was mill —the result of $23.65 in Fountain School District to $4.20 $326.27 subtracting guarantee per pu- the minimum Rangely in high-wealth School District. A pil per ($11.35) inmill from the level Rangely, district such as with an assessed equalization of state pupil per aid mill $326,269 per pupil valuation of in 1977 and ($35.00). in 1978 $339,677 per pupil in is able to fund a vary widely Colorado school districts in per pupil increase its authorized $100 per pupil per amount of revenue mill revenue base with an levy additional mill rate, generated by the same mill even with mills, district, only 0.3 while a low-wealth assistance, posi- and this variation is Conejos such as with South an assessed tively related to district wealth or assessed $5,898 per pupil valuation 1977 and per pupil. valuation While state financial $6,012 required would be to in- property-poor assistance to school districts levy by approximately crease its mill to some extent disparities alleviates the mills to per pupil. raise same $100 which result from wide variations in as- Subsequent high-wealth to 1973 districts per pupil among sessed wealth the school larger have received increases in dollar districts, substantial differentials remain in amounts in revenue authorized bases from and, the revenue available in districts conse- Budget the State District Review School quently, in the level of expendi- educational Board than low-wealth districts. Addition- tures. financial simply State assistance is ally, high-wealth experienced districts have inadequate inequalities to offset inherent in equally greater obtaining success in elector- financing system widely based on varying approval ate of increases in authorized rev- local tax bases. Variations in local assessa- enue Although bases. the amount of mon- caused, ble wealth have and are ey locally prod- raised is to some extent the cause, continuing to disparities substantial willingness uct of the of local residents to expenditures per pupil among school dis- themselves, practical tax as a matter school tricts, including the sixteen school districts simply districts with a small tax base can- plaintiff which the schoolchildren reside. not raise their mill rates to the level neces- fact, the sixteen school districts of the sary to match the authorized revenue bases plaintiff spend schoolchildren substantially wealthy attainable the more districts money per less pupil many than other part with less onerous tax efforts on the school districts in the state. Conejos wealthy these districts. South Relationship Between D. The School District, example, School for the first Expendi- Ability District to Increase year of an increase would have had to raise Taxable Wealth tures and Local its mill rate of 35 mills 142 additional state, in the includ- school districts Some mills in order to raise its 1977 authorized plaintiff $1,057 the sixteen school districts of $1,897 revenue base of to the level schoolchildren, signifi- ability lack the fiscal enjoyed by School District at a mill Summit revenue cantly to exceed their authorized only practical rate of 18 mills. The conse- if District quence requiring bases even the State School a low-wealth district to might authorize an Budget pay Review Board for an increase in its authorized reve- statutory system of solely increase. Under the nue base out of local tax revenue in finance, year an increase in au- the first of such increase is that curtailed, if out- must be funded in low-wealth district not thorized revenue base $935,020 $954,- ceiling for 1977 and debt Granby District while rightly prevented, higher pursuing from ceiling students had a debt quality with 838 program for its students $8,833,818 $8,173,380 making for 1977 and significant choices in its *38 program. curriculum and to nine. approximately total educational —a ratio of one significantly district also Local wealth high- Generally, low-wealth districts have impacts primary on the two methods of high- tax redemption er rates than bond funding capital outlay, capital the reserve reve- produce districts but far less wealth redemption funds and bond funds. Both 1977, pupil levy. mill In per nue for each entirely of local reve- financed out tax highest the the school districts at decile capital subject nues. The reserve fund is per pupil of levied terms assessed valuation statutory levy a maximum tax of 4 mills. average redemption rate of 3.33 at an bond High-wealth reve- districts can raise more average yield per pupil, or $206.81 for an of statutory nue maximum of 4 mills for contrast, per pupil per By mill. $62.11 districts, than low-wealth even can with lowest terms districts at the decile in 1977, capital same reserve tax rate. In per at an pupil valuation levied of assessed District, with a tax of 4 levy Frisco School yield per rate of average 8.04 for of $61.62 mills, per pupil capital for $386.52 raised its per per pupil, pupil or mill. Eliminat- $7.66 fund, Conejos reserve while South extremes, high low those dis- and District, for the 4 mill levy, same raised aver- tricts in the second decile levied at an 1977, only per pupil. ten top $23.60 age redemption tax rate of 3.53 for a bond districts, percent the school of terms of yield per pupil, per or $130.41 of $36.94 per pupil, assessed valuation at an levied pupil per mill. Those districts in the ninth capital 3.51, average reserve tax rate of average redemption at an decile levied bond yielded average per which an of $254.79 yield per tax of 8.44 for a of rate $91.96 pupil per pupil per or mill. By $72.59 con- per pupil per or mill. pupil, $10.90 trast, percent the bottom ten of dis- tricts, per in terms of assessed valuation pupil, average at capital levied an reserve F. The Effect Subsequent of Amend- tax rate of 3.50 average and raised an of ments to the Public School Finance pupil, per per per which is pupil $28.68 $8.01 (Senate Act 25) Bills 138 and on the Eliminating extremely high mill. and System of Educational Finance for extremely low in terms districts of assessed Colorado’s Schoolchildren per pupil,

valuation districts at Bill Senate Colo.Sess.Laws capital an Vol. average second decile levied at I, 1063-69, ch. 264 at was enacted in 1977 average yield reserve of 3.01 an of rate for and was directed to school pupil, funding is district per per pupil $117.76 $39.12 for 1978. It equalization increased state per at the aid mill. districts ninth decile per pupil per mill average capital $35.00 levied at reserve rate tax and increased the yield guarantee an average per 3.67 for minimum $40.16 to $11.35 per pupil, per pupil pupil which is mill per mill. $10.95 1978. The bill also granted high districts with concentrations redemption bond fund is utilized to of children from low-income pay families addi- off a districts bonded indebtedness for tional aid $125.00 for every long-term capital low-income needs. Bonded indebted- child in excess percent of fifteen ness approved by must be the electorate in total district entitlement, each attendance district and is limited statute to this extent twenty percent implicitly recognized of a district’s nega- valu- assessed tive statutory personal ation. effect of structure, Under high- poverty on educa- wealth capable However, districts are tional more low- achievement. than since the bill wealth assuming primarily districts of financing addressed funding greater level of indebtedness it a stopgap only and does not improvements. example, For significantly South Cone- affect the overall framework jos School District with students had a school finance. per pupil. all districts will $50 increase, receive same so that no reduc- Bill ch.

Senate Colo.Sess.Laws spending disparities tion absolute will 369-74, scope than at is much broader in year. occur in that equalization Beginning in 1983 and Bill 138. It raises state Senate thereafter, permits Bill per pupil per aid to mill Senate authoriz- $42.25 guarantee in 1980. The minimum ed revenue bases for all districts to increase $45.85 there- raised to in 1979 and percent. point $13.35 seven At this of imple- $12.35 after, mill at except for districts with rates mentation authorized revenue bases actual- less, twenty in which case the minimum ly will disparate become more for the obvi- per pupil per guarantee remains at $11.35 ous reason percent seven increase respect mill. With to authorized revenue larger will result in a dollar increase for a bases, permits, Bill 25 but does not *39 Senate high-spending district than for a lower- specified lev- require, each district to attain spending district. example, For a district in through els for 1979 1981: $1400 with an authorized revenue base of in $3000 permitted with a increase of at least $130 increase, 1983 would receive a while a $210 including those with authorized all districts district with an authorized revenue base of $1400; in excess in $1600 revenue bases only would receive $2000 increase. $140 1980, with an increase of at least for $140 Thus, beginning in it can reasonably including those with authorized all districts that, expected countervailing leg- be absent $1600; revenue in excess of and $1800 bases islation, spending disparities again will once in with an increase of at least for $150 increase thereby disparity vitiate the including with all districts those authorized wrought by reduction Bill in Senate In 1982 revenue bases in excess of $1800. preceding years. will to increase permitted all districts Furthermore, Senate Bill 25 does not re- by per their revenue base $160 authorized quire spend school districts to at the autho- pupil, and after 1982 an annual increase of authorized, rized revenue base percent the law levels established for the seven is unless by years through in changed the interim General 1983. School districts Assembly. spend are free to at a lower level and rev- in authorized

Assuming no increases consequently enjoy a lower mill rate than by the State permitted enue bases required would be permitted for the statu- by Board or Budget Review District tory level. If low-wealth districts choose to electorate, assuming and further the local spend at levels lower than those authorized spend districts choose that all low-wealth by Senate Bill any then reduction in Bill by Senate at the levels authorized spending current disparities by achieved fund- the bill to current application of neutralized, Bill 25 Senate will be at least a reduction in patterns will result in to the extent of the difference between the with disparities between districts spending spending by level authorized statute and bases of authorized revenue high and low spending the lower level selected Under pupil from 1979 to 1982. per $246 district. range of in- funding conditions the present current While Bill 25 will reduce Senate in 1979 in authorized revenue bases crease by a maximum of spending disparities $246 per Bill 25 from $130 varies under Senate 1983, one cannot pupil from 1979 tc per per high-spending districts pupil $266 revenue bases accurately predict authorized lowest-spending district for the pupil present statutory 1980. Under after results in a range of increase 1978. This scheme, aid funding equalization for state per pupil. disparity of $136 net reduction in after at least will remain constant permit an in- Bill 25 will Senate If legislation. further any the absence per pupil, a net to $200 crease from $140 aid does re- equalization funding for per pupil. disparity of $60 reduction constant, districts then low-wealth main revenue bases increases in authorized their mill rates required to raise will be range will from $150 Bill 25 under Senate permitted to receive substantially order $200, disparity net reduction further Additionally, Senate Bill does not change requirement school dis- that a If low- revenue base increases. authorized their mill pay any do raise rates trict must authorized revenue wealth districts not permit- necessary to reach to the level solely base increase out of local bases, then the max- authorized revenue ted year tax revenues in the first of such in- spend- in current possible imum reduction creases. The maximum reduction in cur- pupil will not ing disparities per of $246 spending disparities rent affected Senate Senate Bill 25. occur under Bill years per 25 for the 1979 to $196 1980— Assessment extent to Senate pupil may high-wealth, never occur if — spending disparities Bill 25 current reduces high-spending districts increase their autho- accurately gauged when the can be more rized at a rate revenue bases faster than years to the period of assessment limited low-wealth districts. Bill 25 Senate does years During these 1979 and 1980. prohibit not high-wealth districts from in- possible in current reduction maximum bases, creasing their authorized revenue spending disparities highest between the if wealthy districts their au- increase spending in the state and lowest districts bases, dispar- thorized the spending revenue ($136 pupil will in 1979 and $60 be $196 1980). This calculation assumes that no ities currently existing high- between bases are in authorized revenue increases wealth and low-wealth districts will be fur- *40 approved by Budg- District State School ther widened. electorate, by et Review Board or the local practical all low-wealth On a and further assumes that level a formidable incen- spend choose to at authorized districts tive wealthy exists for districts to seek in- permitted revenue levels Senate base creases in their authorized revenue bases However, while Bill 25 in 1979 and 1980. for years. the next few pro- increases might Bill well achieve reduc- Senate vided in Bill probably Senate 25 most will disparities spending in current tion of $196 fall below threadbare inflationary increases 1979-80, period during nevertheless gauged by current economic trends. For spending significant differences in actual example, in per 1980 the pupil $140 increase among to exist school districts. will continue in authorized revenue bases will amount to spite of the ameliorative effects of For in a seven percent increase district disparity, reducing 25 in local Senate Bill $2,000 spending per However, at pupil. remain taxable wealth will unaf- district spending $2,500 district at the per level of strongly will fected and continue to be cor- pupil, per pupil $140 increase will potential relative to school district fiscal only amount spending ability. percent increase, to a 5.6 thereby highest forcing at district school districts either to cut valuation of assessed programs in terms back decile or to seek an increase in its revenue average authorized an pupil had authorized revenue base from the State hand, school the other On base of $1950. Budget District Review Board or its in terms of decile at lowest districts local electorate. average per pupil had valuation assessed The dif- base of revenue $1153. authorized The long and short of the matter of levels of dis- these two ference between school district funding under Senate Bill 25 per pupil. $797 tricts was is that the spending patterns of school dis- bases be- authorized revenue difference tricts after 1980 are conjectural at best. deciles of highest and lowest tween patterns Those dependent legislative on a net per pupil, reduc- be $750 districts will action or inaction with respect to state Thus, considered per pupil. only $47 tion of equalization aid, the rate of increase in as- themselves, autho- in minimum increases sessed valuation, the chosen response of dis- Bill 25 bases under Senate rized revenue tricts to the post-1980 status of statutory spend- the wealth-related will not eliminate equalization aid, and the continuation or among exist presently ing disparities cessation of present inflationary trends. districts.

Case Details

Case Name: Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: May 24, 1982
Citation: 649 P.2d 1005
Docket Number: 79SA276
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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