155 Iowa 458 | Iowa | 1912
Plaintiff was in the employ of the •defendant railroad company as a section hand. The defendant Burke was yard foreman for the railroad company at Ft. Dodge. On the day that plaintiff was injured, the •section crew, of which he was a member, was 'ordered to .■go 'to Ft. Dodge to help Burke arid his men in the yard. When the plaintiff arrived there, he was directed , by Burke to help two other men carry ties and put 'them on a flat car upon which a bumper was being constructed. Burke •directed the two men working with the plaintiff to carry the front end of the ties, arid to use ia track wrench fori the purpose, and told, the plaintiff to carry the back end of the ties. After -a few ties had been thus loaded on the ■car, the men were directed to load <a tie that was wet on the under tide, and while they were attempting to do .so, and after the front end of the tie had been raised a little above the floor of the car, it slipped on the track wrench and slid back, striking the plaintiff and inflicting the injury complained of.
But on-the other hand, if it be shown that the plaintiff’s physical injury superinduced, or contributed to, the production of pneumonia, the defendant is liable therefor. If pneumonia results from an- injury, which renders the person susceptible thereto, the injury is a predisposing cause of the pneumonia. 1 Thompson on Negligence, section 154; Murphy v. Railroad Co., 31 Nev. 120 (101 Pac. 322, 21 Ann. Cas. 502); Railroad v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346, (49 Am. Rep. 168). There was evidence tending to show that the injury received by the plaintiff was, at least, a -predisposing cause of the pneumonia, if not the sole cause thereof. We are of the opinion therefore that the evidence under consideration was properly received. '
The second asked whether the plaintiff and his two co-laborers, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have placed the tie on the car without injury to the plaintiff. This question did not call for a specific ultimate fact. It in effect asked whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and the answers thereto must of necessity have inhered in the general verdict and have been based upon a series of facts. It was therefore rightly-refused. Whalen v. Railway Co., 75 Iowa, 563; Runkle v. Insurance Co., 99 Iowa, 414; O’Leary Bros. v. Insurance Co., 100 Iowa, 390.
The other interrogatory required the jury to say whether the slipping of the tie from the wrench was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. This question ■also called for a conclusion on facts, rather than for facts, and furthermore it did not call for -an ultimate fact, as the law requires. Its effect would have been to confuse the minds and the deliberations of the jury, without being 'determinative of the ease. Wilder v. Cereal Co., 130 Iowa, 263; Boddy v. Henry, 126 Iowa, 31; Phoenix v. Lamb, 29 Iowa, 352.